

LETTER

Party Behaviour and the Gender Voting Gap

Gonzalo Di Landro 

Department of Political Science, Rice University, Houston, TX, US

Email: gonzalo.di.landro@rice.edu

(Received 21 July 2023; revised 4 April 2024; accepted 13 September 2024)

Abstract

How does party support for gender equality in the labour market affect the gender voting gap? A well-established argument from the literature on gender and political behaviour states that working women tend to vote for left-wing parties more than men because they are stronger supporters of the welfare state. However, no study has assessed whether parties' welfare positions affect the gender voting gap. Leveraging three decades of public opinion data from sixteen Western democracies, I provide evidence in support of that claim: increases in women's labour force participation are associated with higher female/male voter ratios for the left, but only when those parties strongly support gender-egalitarian policies in the labour market. These findings confirm and add nuance to the previous understanding of the gap: by focusing on public opinion, previous research overlooked party behaviour. Therefore, my evidence elevates the importance of party strategy in explaining gender differences in voting.

Keywords: gender voting gap; labour force participation; welfare state; party behaviour; public opinion

Over the past four decades, mass political behaviour in Western democracies has undergone a major transformation marked by a shift from the traditional gender gap to the modern gender gap. Before the 1980s, women were stronger supporters of right-wing parties than men (Dogan 1967; Duverger 1955; Lipset 1960), but since then they have become increasingly more likely than their male counterparts to vote for left-wing parties (Abendschön and Steinmetz 2014; Giger 2009; Inglehart and Norris 2003).

Scholars have offered compelling explanations for this phenomenon. Cultural theories alluded to the process of modernization experienced by post-industrial societies, and the proliferation of post-materialist values of equality between the sexes – mainly, but not exclusively, among women citizens – (Emmenegger and Manow 2014; Inglehart and Norris 2003; Shorrocks 2018). Structural theories, on the other hand, focused on women's growing economic empowerment and its implications for gender relations, household organization, and the types of welfare policies that women and men tend to prefer (Carroll 1988; Iversen and Rosenbluth 2006; Manza and Brooks 1998).

Both cultural and structural theories of the gender voting gap highlight the prominent role of women's entry into the formal workforce in the second quarter of the twentieth century. Since 1960, most Western countries have experienced significant increases in women's labour force participation rates (Costa 2000) due to the growing aggregate demand for female workers, the expansion of part-time work, and the greater inclusion of women in the education system (Goldin 2006). Women's employment affects the gender voting gap through diverse pathways: it exposes women to novel forms of discrimination in the workplace, fostering an attitudinal shift towards more egalitarian gender-role values (Andersen and Cook 1985; Inglehart and Norris 2003;




Figure 1. The gender voting gap in Western Europe. Solid lines represent LOESS curves illustrating the ratio of the share of women voters for a specific left-wing party to the share of men who voted for the same party. The dotted lines indicate female labour force participation rates. Left-wing parties encompass the largest Ecological, Socialist, and Social Democratic parties in each election: (a) Pooled sample, (b) Country samples.

Source: Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, European Social Survey, European Election Study, Comparative Manifesto Project, and the International Labor Organization. Design weights applied.

Rindfuss, Brewster, and Kavee 1996; Togeby 1994); it puts women in contact with peers and mobilizing agents such as labour unions (Norris 2002); and it increases women's economic autonomy vis-à-vis men (Carroll 1988; Iversen and Rosenbluth 2006). As Iversen and Rosenbluth point out, working women tend to vote for left-wing parties more than men do because the policies those parties promote in the domain of welfare – namely, public investment in work-family services – socialize the burden of domestic work that falls on women's shoulders under patriarchal arrangements. This allows women to invest their time in developing marketable skills and increases their bargaining power at home relative to their partners.

Taken together, these arguments imply that a larger gender gap in the vote for left-wing parties should be observed as female labour force participation rises. Figure 1 leverages public opinion and International Labour Organization (ILO) data from sixteen Western European democracies between 1985 and 2019. It illustrates that, although the prediction of previous research is accurate in the aggregate (A) when analyzed on a country-to-country basis, there is significant variation in the shape and size of the gender voting gap (B), even among countries with similar rates of female labour force participation (FLFP) over time. Notably, we see differences not only between countries but also within countries across time.

Variation in the gender voting gap is not new but prevalent in cultural and structural studies. Inglehart and Norris (2003, 11) acknowledged it, suggesting that 'industrialization brings broadly similar trajectories, even if situation-specific factors make it impossible to predict exactly what will happen in a given society'. Similarly, Giger (2009, 486) argued that the driving force for the emergence of the gender voting gap in Western Europe is increased levels of female labour participation, but observed that 'the pace of gender realignment differs across European countries'. Abendschön and Steinmetz (2014, 315) also confirmed the relevance of women's workforce participation for the gender voting gap but documented that '[i]ts size, however, varies across countries'.

How can we explain this variation? This article aims to answer this question by focusing on a piece of this puzzle that has been overlooked by previous research on the gender voting gap: the role played by political parties and, specifically, the extent to which they represent working women's interests. The argument is simple: women's growing presence in the labour force might

create a demand for representation in the form of welfare policies, but the final shape of the gender voting gap should depend on the extent to which parties advocate for such policies. Despite mounting comparative evidence that women are more supportive of the welfare state than men (Weeks 2022) and solid theoretical reasons to expect working women to vote for left-wing parties more than men (for example, Iversen and Rosenbluth 2006), no study has yet assessed whether the gender voting gap is larger for left-wing parties that are more supportive of gender-egalitarian policies in the labour market compared to those who are less supportive of these policies. Empirical evidence of this claim is a necessary piece of the gender voting gap puzzle that political science is still lacking.

This note provides such a test by drawing on three decades of public opinion, expert surveys, and macroeconomic data. Multilevel regressions further support the association between female labour force participation and the female-to-male voter ratios of left-wing parties; however, this correlation is positive only when left-wing parties strongly endorse gender labour equality. These findings have important implications for the way we think about the gender voting gap and elevate party behaviour as a key factor behind it.

Employment and the Gender Voting Gap

There is a rich literature in political science examining women's and men's turnout in elections (for example, Dassonneville and Kostelka 2021; Teele 2022; Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978), political engagement and activism (for example, Beauregard 2014; Coffé and Bolzendahl 2010; Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer 2012), political interest and ambition (for example, Bos et al. 2022; Clayton, O'Brien, and Piscopo 2024; Coffé 2013), and political attitudes (for example, Barnes and Cassese 2017; Bush and Clayton 2023; Inglehart and Norris 2003; Iversen and Rosenbluth 2006; Weeks 2022). The concept of the gender voting gap refers to differences in the vote choices of men and women (Coffé et al. 2023; Kittilson 2016; Weeks et al. 2022). It acquired special relevance in the 1980s when Western women gradually became more supportive of left-wing parties than men (Inglehart and Norris 2003).

Most research on the gap converges on the idea that female employment lies at its core. This is not a straightforward correlation and should be conceptualized as a process with multiple layers. Some authors argue that formal employment changed women's attitudes toward gender equality, which then shaped their political behaviour (Andersen and Cook 1985; Inglehart and Norris 2003; Rindfuss, Brewster, and Kavee 1996; Togeby 1994). Inglehart and Norris (2003) posit that economic development gradually shifted Western citizens' values toward post-materialist ideals of freedom, self-expression, and equality between the sexes, particularly among women and the youngest generations. Modernization brought new job opportunities for women and has been accompanied by a process of secularization, which had a stronger impact on women's values, policy positions, and vote choices than on men's (Emmenegger and Manow 2014; Shorrocks 2018). Women face strong inequalities in labour markets and workplaces, which, it is argued, increases their demand for gender equality (Togeby 1994). Early evidence from the United States showed that working women were more likely than housewives to believe in a women's equal role in running a business, industry, and government; they also tended to disagree more with the idea that women should be the first workers to be laid off (Andersen and Cook 1985) and that children of working women suffer more (Rindfuss, Brewster, and Kavee 1996).

Work also shapes the gender voting gap through its influence on women's resources, which are key for political participation (Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995; Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001; Norris 2002). For example, rising female labour force participation rates correlate with greater citizen political engagement, as evidenced by increased discussion, heightened political interest, persuasion, the contacting of politicians, and more frequent voting (Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer 2012).

Households constitute an arena of interest for the gender voting gap due to the constraints that an unequal gender distribution of household labour imposes on women's political behaviour. Women demobilize from politics during pregnancy in ways that men do not, and this gap in political engagement strengthens during the earliest stages of parenthood (Naurin, Stolle, and Markstedt 2023). Furthermore, breadwinning responsibilities negatively affect women's political ambition, especially for mothers (Bernhard, Shames, and Teele 2021). Women also carry most of the cognitive household labour, which prevents them from engaging with news about politics and political discussion (Weeks 2024). Those imbalances become more pronounced when women's life prospects are closely linked to their partners. That is because women's material and psychological autonomy lies at the heart of the gender voting gap (Carroll 1988; Iversen and Rosenbluth 2006).

In their canonical work, Iversen and Rosenbluth posit that gender differences in voting behaviour are shaped by household dynamics, which are greatly influenced by the distribution of material resources between partners. These authors demonstrated that there are few differences in the policy preferences of men and non-working women; however, differences arise as women join the workforce. Iversen and Rosenbluth argue that female employment breaks the male breadwinner logic of women's material dependence on men and increases women's bargaining power at home over household decisions and the distribution of household work. Working women are thus more likely to advocate for policies that increase their outside marriage options – such as public investment in childcare and improvements in maternity leave schemes – because they socialize the burden of domestic work that falls on their shoulders under patriarchal arrangements, allowing women to invest their time outside the household. Men, conversely, tend to be more concerned about the fiscal impact of those policies. The result is a gender gap in policy preferences that has been thoroughly documented by comparative research (Weeks 2022).¹ Since left-wing parties tend to support welfare expansion, Iversen and Rosenbluth argue that working women become more likely than men to vote for them.

Women's Substantive Representation and the Gender Voting Gap

While women's labour force participation and the gender voting gap are positively correlated in the aggregate, this association becomes less clear in cross-country comparisons (Fig. 1). Most of the change in women's workforce participation occurred before the mid-2000s, whereas a sharp uptick in the gender voting gap emerged in many countries from 2010 onwards. Furthermore, the gender voting gap fluctuates from one election to another, unlike the more stable trends in women's employment. This suggests that the relationship between these two factors is not linear and may be contingent upon aspects of each election.

Research on gender and politics has long underscored the pivotal role played by contexts in shaping gender differences in political behaviour. For example, inclusive institutions such as proportional representation electoral systems and mechanisms of direct democracy enhance women's political engagement and participation more than men's (Kim 2019; Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer 2010; Skorge 2021; Teele 2022). Moreover, higher levels of political efficacy, engagement, and participation are reported among women when female candidates are more visible in electoral campaigns and when there is an increased presence of women in parliament (Atkeson and Carrillo 2007; Campbell and Wolbrecht 2006; Wolbrecht and Campbell 2007).

When it comes to gender differences in vote choice, a key contextual factor refers to the behaviour of political parties, particularly, how much left-wing parties champion policies that promote gender equality in the labour market. Even in the presence of a gender gap in preferences

¹Between 1985 and 2012, women from OECD countries have been more supportive than men of an active role of government in reducing inequality, job creation, and spending on unemployment. Women are also more likely than men to reject traditional gender roles and to consider work-family issues as the most important when voting (Weeks 2022, 62–63).

towards welfare (Iversen and Rosenbluth 2006; Weeks 2022), it is still on parties to address those demands and supply those policies. Implicit in previous studies is the idea that all left-wing parties are strong supporters of welfare expansion. Although that is true in comparison to parties on the right and centre (Kittilson 2011), it overlooks the fact that left-wing parties differ in the extent to which they support such policies (Figures A1 and A2). Consequently, parties' substantive representation of women could serve as the missing link that connects the well-known shifts in public opinion highlighted by previous research to the large variation observed in the gender voting gap.² I build on this fact to formulate two hypotheses. The first is the classical conjecture linking women's workforce participation to the gender voting gap.

- H_1 (Classical hypothesis): As female labour force participation increases so does the female/male voter ratio for left-wing parties.

The second hypothesis adds the moderating effect of the parties' policy positions, the main intended contribution of this article. It aims to show that the association proposed in H_1 should be conditional on parties' advocacy for gender labour equality.

- H_2 (Party behaviour moderation): The association between female labour force participation and the female/male voter ratio will be stronger for left-wing parties that are more supportive of gender egalitarian policies in the labour market.

Empirical Approach

To test my argument, I rely on data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), the European Election Study (EES), and the European Social Survey (ESS), which ask respondents about their vote in the last national election.³ I use these data to build an original dataset at the party-election level covering the period 1990–2019. Following Weeks et al. (2022), I estimate the female-to-male party voter ratio (F/M), which I use as my measure of the gender voting gap. For a party i in an election year t , I computed:

$$F/M_{it} = \frac{(N \text{ women voting for party } i \text{ in election } t / N \text{ women voters in election } t)}{(N \text{ men voting for party } i \text{ in election } t / N \text{ men voters in election } t)}.$$

Values over 1 mean that women have a relatively higher presence in a party's electorate than men.⁴ I restrict my analyses to left-wing parties, which are those from the Comparative Manifesto Project's Ecological, Socialist, and Social Democratic families ($N = 248$ party elections).⁵ Since the distribution of the resulting ratio is right-skewed, I use its logarithm as an outcome variable.⁶

The main explanatory variable of this study is an indicator of parties' support for measures promoting the equal participation of women in the labour market, taken from the V-Party dataset (Hindle and Lindberg 2020). V-Party is a collaboration of more than 700 experts who assessed different features of most parties in the participating countries, starting in 1970. To produce this indicator, experts were asked to what extent each party in a specific election supported legal provisions for equal treatment, pay, parental leave, and financial support for childcare. V-Party

²See Appendix 1 for an illustration of this point.

³In line with Weeks et al. (2022), I use CSES as my preferred source due to the temporal proximity to elections, and I complement it with EES and ESS when CSES surveys are not available.

⁴Demographic weights were applied so that the distribution of gender in each sample resembles that of the population.

⁵I also restrict my analysis to the most voted parties from each of these families per election because estimations of the F/M of parties with very few voters could be sensible to survey sampling issues.

⁶See Appendix 1. The logarithm of a ratio also has the useful property of making the order of its terms interchangeable: $\log(F/M_{it}) = -\log(M/F_{it})$. Thus, its substantive interpretation does not depend on the order of F and M .

specialists used the answers to those questions to fit ordinal IRT models, generating a continuous latent variable that reflects a party's overall commitment to gender labour equality.⁷ When it comes to answering my research question, the V-Party indicator has important advantages over similar measures such as the Comparative Manifesto Project's 'welfare state expansion' (per504) indicator (Volkens et al. 2020) because it taps into the specific dimension of welfare that Iversen and Rosenbluth (2006), identified as relevant for the gender voting gap.⁸

The second explanatory variable of interest is a measure of women's workforce participation. I use the International Labor Organization's measure of female labour force participation rates (FLFP), which captures the proportion of the female population aged fifteen and older that is economically active (ILO 2023). I lag this indicator one year to measure its impact on election outcomes.⁹

Identification Strategy

I test my hypotheses using linear mixed-effects models with random intercepts for country years (that is, elections) and parties. In line with previous research, these models assume that the gap is a consequence of changes in country-level variables over time. I use random intercepts for parties to capture variations in the gap due to the unobserved characteristics of each party.

The strategy I follow to identify the effect of FLFP and parties' gender labour equality positions on the gender voting gap is controlling for a set of theoretically relevant covariates able to block plausible back-door paths between my explanatory variables and the outcome (Keele, Stevenson, and Elwert 2020).¹⁰ First, I control for the OECD's (2023) measure of the divorce rate, which is the number of divorces during a given year per 1,000 people. I lag this variable for one year. I also control for the percentage of the population that adheres to Christianity at the time of the election, extracted from the World Religion Dataset (WRD) (Maoz and Henderson 2019).¹¹ At the party level, I control for two confounders of the relation between party positions and the gender voting gap: the share of women in the parliament party and the presence of a female party leader, variables borrowed from Weeks et al. (2022), and lagged one election year.¹²

I estimate three models, which iteratively display my argument. When analyzing them, I pay special attention to both the estimated coefficients for the explanatory variables and the differences in the variance of the random components across models. Model 1 includes structural and cultural variables – on which most of the literature on the gap has focused – providing a direct test of H_1 . Model 2 adds party-level indicators. Model 3 interacts with the V-Party indicator of gender labour equality with FLFP to test H_2 .

Results

Table 1 presents the results. Consistent with previous research, Model 1 shows that FLFP rates are positively associated with the gender voting gap ($p < 0.01$), evidence that supports H_1 . We see that most of the variation in the outcome comes from the party and party-election levels ($\hat{\sigma}^2_{\text{party}} = 0.039$, and $\hat{\sigma}^2_{\text{residual}} = 0.06$).

⁷See Appendix 1 for more information on this variable.

⁸Moreover, these two indicators are weakly correlated, which means that they differ substantively (Appendix 1).

⁹The use of a one-year lag aims to reflect the state of women's involvement in the labour force at the time of the election.

¹⁰See Appendix 2 for a discussion about the modelling strategy followed, the control variables, and their confounding effects based on previous findings.

¹¹The WRD contains estimates of the share of a country's population of each religion for every half-decade period. I assigned each country in my dataset the value of the closest estimate prior to the election.

¹²I lag the percentage of seats held by women in the party's parliamentary delegation to account for the effect of women's descriptive representation in the current election. The gender of the party leader is lagged to give female leaders sufficient time to influence parties.

Table 1. Determinants of the gender voting gap

	Dependent variable:		
	$\log(F/M)$ party voter ratio		
	1	2	3
FLFP _{<i>t</i>-1}	0.013** (0.004)	0.005 (0.006)	-0.022* (0.010)
Gender labour equality position		0.085* (0.049)	-0.695** (0.245)
FLFP _{<i>t</i>-1} × Gender labour equality position			0.015** (0.005)
% Women in parliament party _{<i>t</i>-1}		0.001 (0.002)	0.0004 (0.002)
Female leader _{<i>t</i>-1}		0.034 (0.053)	0.032 (0.052)
Divorce rate _{<i>t</i>-1}	-0.043 (0.042)	-0.019 (0.047)	0.049 (0.050)
% Christians in population	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.003)
Constant	-0.253 (0.340)	-0.098 (0.382)	1.207* (0.547)
$\hat{\sigma}^2$ country-year	0	0	0
$\hat{\sigma}^2$ party	0.039	0.033	0.028
$\hat{\sigma}^2$ residual	0.06	0.05	0.048
<i>N</i> country-years	105	103	103
<i>N</i> parties	64	43	43
<i>N</i> observations	248	184	184
Log likelihood	-39.400	-11.580	-6.490
Akaike Inf. Crit.	92.800	43.161	34.980
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	117.394	75.310	70.344

†*p* < 0.1; **p* < 0.05; ***p* < 0.01; ****p* < 0.001.

Model 2 introduces the party-level indicators. Results already suggest that parties' positions on gender labour equality are meaningful for the gender voting gap: those two variables are positively correlated (*p* < 0.1), the coefficient for FLFP becomes indistinguishable from zero, and both the party and the residual-level variances decrease.

Model 3 confirms those intuitions. Consistent with H_2 , the interaction coefficient – the main focus of this article – is positive and statistically significant (*p* < 0.01). Also consistent with H_2 is the sign of the FLFP coefficient: when left-wing parties' positions on gender labour equality are at their minimum, increases in FLFP rates are not associated with more support from women voters relative to men.¹³

To better interpret the interaction coefficient of Model 3, Fig. 2 plots the marginal effect of FLFP across different levels of parties' support for gender labour equality. Women's participation in the labour market is positively associated with larger gender voting gaps for left-wing parties, but only when those parties are strong advocates of gender labour equality. For instance, around a quarter of the sample (FA3) – predominantly consisting of Ecological parties, but also including parties from the Socialist and Social Democratic families (FA1) – scores more than 2.7 on the gender labour equality indicator. In those cases, a ten-point increase in FLFP results in a 20 per cent increase in *F/M*. Conversely, when left-wing parties offer limited support for these policies, the association between women's workforce participation and the gender voting gap becomes negative, resulting in the electorates of these parties becoming more masculinized.

Robustness tests in Appendix 3 confirm that the results remain stable under different specifications, such as models adding country random effects, which assume that elections are nested in countries. Consistent results are found after controlling for other features of elections that could affect the *F/M* ratio of left-wing parties, such as the behaviour of other parties, economic hardship (Shorrocks and Grasso 2020), the share of the rural population (Teale 2024),

¹³The negative coefficient of gender labour equality indicates that, at minimum FLFP levels, an increase in a party's support for gender labour equality correlates with a higher proportion of male voters relative to women. Although the coefficient might appear large, it is noteworthy that seven out of ten deciles in the FLFP distribution exceed 46.3 (FA6). For most observations in the sample, the party's positions have a positive overall impact, leading to increased support from women compared to men.




Figure 2. The marginal effect of $FLFP_{t-1}$ across different levels of parties' support for gender labour equality. Estimated coefficients based on Model 3, with 95 per cent confidence intervals.

Source: CSES, ESS, EES, ILO, and V-Party.

parties' incumbency status, alternative lag structures for the main variables, and models removing outliers. Conditional logistic regressions of vote choice yield similar results, even accounting for voters' demographics, socio-economic status, religiosity, and gender values. Further analyses at the individual level uncover differences across occupational groups of voters, notably a positive impact of parties' gender labour equality positions on middle-class women's vote choices and a more nuanced effect on middle-class men's, which align with the expectations from resource theories of the gap.

Conclusion

The gender voting gap has received a great deal of attention from scholars, who have positioned women's participation in the labour force as one of its main drivers. The second half of the twentieth century saw a rise in female employment in Western democracies, which altered gender relations (Inglehart and Norris 2003; Iversen and Rosenbluth 2006); since then, left-wing parties in the region have tended to receive more electoral support from women than from men. However, a great deal of variation in the shape of the gap across and within countries remains unexplained.

This article brings political parties to the forefront of the study of the gender voting gap, showing that its shape responds to differences in left-wing parties' welfare positions. Findings only confirm the established association between women's employment and the gap when left-wing parties embrace policies of gender equality in the labour market. Party behaviour is therefore key to understanding gender differences in vote choice, which should be a focal point in future research on gender and political behaviour.

Future research could build upon these findings to explore how party competition influences the gender voting gap. The late-twentieth century witnessed the emergence of new left-wing contenders such as Ecological parties, impacting the strategies of Social Democratic parties (Kitschelt 1994). As this note shows, Social Democratic parties differ in their support for gender labour equality (FA2), which could respond to the different electoral incentives they face across countries. Research could also investigate how party behaviour impacts different groups of women and men voters; for instance, depending on their class. That would require developing fine-grained measures of party behaviour that tackle specific dimensions of welfare relevant for voters

according to their social strata (see Appendix 3). As gender differences in political attitudes grow more salient in public discourse, understanding the influence of political parties on the gender voting gap becomes essential.

Supplementary material. The supplementary material for this article can be found at <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123424000425>.

Data availability statement. Replication data for this article can be found in Harvard Dataverse at: <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/321H1X>.

Acknowledgements. I want to thank Diana Z. O'Brien, Randolph T. Stevenson, Leslie Schwindt-Bayer, and Jonathan Homola for their invaluable feedback. I would also like to thank the editor and the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions during the review process.

Financial support. None.

Competing interests. None.

References

- Abendschön S and Steinmetz S** (2014) The gender gap in voting revisited: Women's party preferences in a European context. *Social Politics* 21(2), 315–344.
- Andersen K and Cook EA** (1985) Women, work, and political attitudes. *American Journal of Political Science* 29(3), 606–625.
- Atkeson LR and Carrillo N** (2007) More is better: The influence of collective female descriptive representation on external efficacy. *Politics & Gender* 3(1), 79–101.
- Barnes TD and Cassese EC** (2017) American party women: A look at the gender gap within parties. *Political Research Quarterly* 70(1), 127–141.
- Beauregard K** (2014) Gender, political participation and electoral systems: A cross-national analysis. *European Journal of Political Research* 53(3), 617–634.
- Bernhard R, Shames S and Teele DL** (2021) To emerge? Breadwinning, motherhood, and women's decisions to run for office. *American Political Science Review* 115(2), 379–394.
- Bos AL, Greenlee JS, Holman MR, Oxley ZM and Lay JC** (2022) This one's for the boys: How gendered political socialization limits girls' political ambition and interest. *American Political Science Review* 116(2), 484–501.
- Brady HE, Verba S and Schlozman KL** (1995) Beyond SES: A resource model of political participation. *American Political Science Review* 89(2), 271–294.
- Burns N, Schlozman KL and Verba S** (2001) *The Private Roots of Public Action: Gender, Equality, and Political Participation*. Cambridge, MA and London, England: Harvard University Press.
- Bush SS and Clayton A** (2023) Facing change: Gender and climate change attitudes worldwide. *American Political Science Review* 117(2), 591–608.
- Campbell DE and Wolbrecht C** (2006) See Jane run: Women politicians as role models for adolescents. *The Journal of Politics* 68(2), 233–247.
- Carroll SJ** (1988) *The Politics of the Gender Gap: The Social Construction of Political Influence*. London: SAGE.
- Clayton A, O'Brien DZ and Piscopo JM** (2024) Founding narratives and men's political ambition: Experimental evidence from US civics lessons. *British Journal of Political Science* 54(1), 129–151.
- Coffé H** (2013) Women stay local, men go national and global? Gender differences in political interest. *Sex Roles* 69, 323–338.
- Coffé H and Bolzendahl C** (2010) Same game, different rules? Gender differences in political participation. *Sex Roles* 62, 318–333.
- Coffé H, Kittilson MC, Meguid BM and Weeks AC** (2023) Parties, issues and gender. In *The Routledge Handbook of Political Parties*. Routledge, pp. 312–322.
- Costa DL** (2000) From mill town to board room: The rise of women's paid labor. *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 14(4), 101–122.
- Dassonneville R and Kostelka F** (2021) The cultural sources of the gender gap in voter turnout. *British Journal of Political Science* 51(3), 1040–1061.
- Di Landro G** (2024) Replication Data for: Party Behavior and the Gender Voting Gap. Available from <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/321H1X>, Harvard Dataverse, V1.
- Dogan M** (1967) *Political Cleavage and Social Stratification in France and Italy*. Free Press.
- Duverger M** (1955) *The Political Role of Women*. UNESCO.
- Emmenegger P and Manow P** (2014) Religion and the gender vote gap: Women's changed political preferences from the 1970s to 2010. *Politics & Society* 42(2), 166–93.

- Giger N** (2009) Towards a modern gender gap in Europe?: A comparative analysis of voting behavior in 12 countries. *The Social Science Journal* **46**(3), 474–492.
- Goldin C** (2006) The quiet revolution that transformed women’s employment, education, and family. *American Economic Review* **96**(2), 1–21.
- Hindle G and Lindberg SI** (2020) *New Global Data on Political Parties: V-Party*. V-Dem Institute.
- ILO** (2023) International Labor Organization. Modelled Estimates and Projections database. ILOSTAT: Female Labor Force Participation Rates. Available from <http://www.ilo.org/data> (accessed February 2023).
- Inglehart R and Norris P** (2003) *Rising Tide: Gender Equality and Cultural Change Around the World*. Cambridge University Press.
- Iversen T and Rosenbluth F** (2006) The political economy of gender: Explaining cross-national variation in the gender division of labor and the gender voting gap. *American Journal of Political Science* **50**(1), 1–19.
- Keele L, Stevenson RT and Elwert F** (2020) The causal interpretation of estimated associations in regression models. *Political Science Research and Methods* **8**(1), 1–13.
- Kim JH** (2019) Direct democracy and women’s political engagement. *American Journal of Political Science* **63**(3), 594–610.
- Kitschelt H** (1994) *The Transformation of European Social Democracy*. Cambridge University Press.
- Kittilson MC** (2011) Women, parties and platforms in post-industrial democracies. *Party Politics* **17**(1), 66–92.
- Kittilson MC** (2016) Gender and political behavior. In *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*. Oxford University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.71>.
- Kittilson MC and Schwindt-Bayer L** (2010) Engaging citizens: The role of power-sharing institutions. *The Journal of Politics* **72**(4), 990–1002.
- Kittilson MC and Schwindt-Bayer LA** (2012) *The Gendered Effects of Electoral Institutions: Political Engagement and Participation*. Oxford University Press.
- Lipset SM** (1960) *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics*. New York: Doubleday.
- Manza J and Brooks C** (1998) The gender gap in US presidential elections: When? Why? Implications? *American Journal of Sociology* **103**(5), 1235–1266.
- Maos Z and Henderson EA** 2019. World Religion Project: Global Religion Dataset.
- Naurin E, Stolle D and Markstedt E** (2023) The effect of pregnancy on engagement with politics. Toward a model of the political consequences of the earliest stages of parenthood. *American Political Science Review* **117**(1), 311–317.
- Norris P** (2002) *Democratic Phoenix: Reinventing Political Activism*. Cambridge University Press.
- OECD** (2023) Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Family Database: Divorce rates. Available from <http://oecd.org/social/family/database.htm> (accessed February 2023).
- Rindfuss RR, Brewster KL and Kavee AL** (1996) Women, work, and children: Behavioral and attitudinal change in the United States. *Population and Development Review* **22**(3), 457–482.
- Shorrocks R** (2018) Cohort change in political gender gaps in Europe and Canada: The role of modernization. *Politics & Society* **46**(2), 135–175.
- Shorrocks R and Grasso MT** (2020) The attitudinal gender gap across generations: Support for redistribution and government spending in contexts of high and low welfare provision. *European Political Science Review* **12**(3), 289–306.
- Skorge ØS** (2021) Mobilizing the underrepresented: Electoral systems and gender inequality in political participation. *American Journal of Political Science* **67**(3).
- Teele DL** (2022) Gender and the influence of proportional representation: A comment on the peripheral voting thesis. *American Political Science Review* **117**(2), 1–8.
- Teele DL** (2024) The political geography of the gender gap. *The Journal of Politics* **86**(2), 428–442.
- Togebly L** (1994) Political implications of increasing numbers of women in the labor force. *Comparative Political Studies* **27**(2), 211–240.
- Verba S, Nie NH and Kim J-O** (1978) *Participation and Political Equality: A Seven-Nation Comparison*. Cambridge University Press.
- Volkens A, Burst T, Krause W, Lehmann P, Matthieß T, Merz N, Regel S, Weßels B and Zehnter L** (2020) The Manifesto Data Collection. Manifesto Project (MRG/CMP/MARPOR). Version 2020b. <https://doi.org/10.25522/manifesto.mpd.2020b>
- Weeks AC** (2022) *Making Gender Salient: From Gender Quota Laws to Policy*. Cambridge University Press.
- Weeks AC** (2024) ‘The political consequences of the mental load’. Technical report Working Paper.
- Weeks AC, Meguid BM, Kittilson MC and Coffé H** (2022) When do Männerparteien elect women? Radical right populist parties and strategic descriptive representation. *American Political Science Review* **117**(2), 1–18.
- Wolbrecht C and Campbell DE** (2007) Leading by example: Female members of parliament as political role models. *American Journal of Political Science* **51**(4), 921–939.