

of sympathy with the arguments of governmentality and especially the work of Tyler yet at times the complexity and detail (and some of the language) makes it difficult to follow the argument. While the book builds in reviews and reflections to help the reader grasp the argument as it unfolds it does at times become too complex and leaves you uncertain about the legitimacy of the claims. I would be cautious about using this book with my undergraduate students as many would find it beyond them. I also think that, in the complexity, it loses a core focus on who is impacted most by these developments (i.e. the poor, the working class). It is clear that if you are middle class and have the protection of wealth and capital (s) you are unlikely to be criminalised for your non-participation. While he makes reference to this at different points in the discussion I do think it should be made more explicit in the analysis. That said, Ross Fergusson does provide new insights by his breadth of coverage and by combining the work of Habermas and Tyler. He also opens up new theoretical ways of looking at governmentality that shed light on the process and practice in policy of criminalisation. While his argument is complex it does move our thinking forward and introduces us to new ways of conceptualising, theorising and analysing, within the social sciences, the criminalisation and marginalisation of youth.

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Mark Monaghan and Simon Prideaux (2016), *State Crime and Immorality: The Corrupting Influence of the Powerful*, Bristol: Policy Press, £26.99, pp. 256, pbk.

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As one would expect in any overview of 'State Crime and Immorality', this book covers a broad empirical terrain, and impressively so. Thus the reader is led through explorations of the international drugs trade, with a particular focus on the 'Iran/Contra' affair in the 1980s; Murdoch's routine-phone-hacking newspaper empire; the US-led Coalition's destruction of state and civil society in Iraq; what the authors refer to as 'The Troubles' in Great Britain and the island of Ireland; and, finally, a juxtaposition of Argentina's Dirty War with the British state's assault on organised labour through the miners' strike and in particular the symbolic events around Orgreave. Through these empirical foci, Monaghan and Prideaux reflect upon the nature and dimensions of state violence, terrorism, and collusion, not least with the help of an almost-always supine, and at times simply criminal, media, in a rigorous and indeed highly readable fashion.

There is, as is often the case, a price to be paid for this vast terrain of subject matter – a cost in terms of conceptual and theoretical depth, albeit the first three chapters of the book are dedicated to laying the groundwork in these respects. Having set out the significance of 'rethinking "the crime complex"' (6) via a focus on 'non-conventional criminality' (9) in their Introductory chapter, the authors go on, in Chapters 2 and 3, to elaborate upon a definition of the state and then to explore the relationships between the state, corporations and organised crime, respectively. These two chapters, each seeking to mark out the theoretical, conceptual and empirical terrain of what is to follow, succeed only partially, albeit for different reasons.

Chapter 2 develops two ideas which are central to the book. One is that of the 'Ideal State', and its impossibility, an impossibility exacerbated significantly by the emergence of neo-liberalism, the second key idea introduced in the chapter. As the ideal state seeks legitimacy

through its (albeit never-realised) ability to generate and maintain social cohesion, the more entrenched that neo-liberalism becomes, the more it manifestly undermines any potential for such cohesion. This, then, generates a discussion of the problem of state crime – a phenomenon effectively denied by the ability of states to legitimise their actions and inactions through their control over the definition of crime, a control challenged by successive scholars of varieties of state crime, as well as by the advocates of the ‘notion’ of social harm, which, according to the authors, is an attempt to impose “an even wider accountability” on governments (56). It presumably matters not at all to readers of this review that I find some of the details of these claims plausible, others less so. But what does seem to me to be slightly problematic here is that these claims are advanced rather assertively, at break-neck speed, with an eclecticism of reference points that requires but does not receive justification and elaboration. Why a Habermasian notion of state contradiction and legitimacy crises? Why a focus on neo-liberalism (through the somewhat dated terminology of ‘The New Right’) rather than capitalism *per se*? Why immorality and not a-morality or a particular form of neo-liberal morality? And, indeed, why social harm, whether such harm is to be understood in terms of a denial of rights (53) or needs (208) or both?

Chapter 3 then turns to definitional and terminological considerations of state, organised, corporate legality and illegality. These are well known debates within and around criminology, and there is merit in exploring them, but the authors do so in a reviewing sense with “no intention to settle . . . scores” (87). Fair enough, but that leaves me wondering why so much space was devoted to these questions since, and in any case, the authors have already decided to focus broadly across ‘State Crime and Immorality’ not least through reference to a highly elastic notion of ‘social harm’ (and I write as someone sympathetic to that notion, while very much aware that it requires considerable conceptual and theoretical development).

The case studies which follow across five chapters are engaging, and, in their variety, well-chosen. They certainly add to the conclusions that both capitalism and neo-liberalism are “inherently criminal” (42), that existing law, whether national or international, is relatively impotent in the face of state crime and immorality, and that states and key actors within them (and within this book there is a great deal of agency rather than structure) are able systematically to evade accountability for the generation of harms in which they are so clearly implicated. In a review it is not simply possible to do their individual and collective richness any justice whatsoever – you should just get hold of the book and read them.

Then, as with the opening substantive chapters of the book, I found the conclusion a little frustrating. Its six pages do not do justice to the weight of empirical material which has preceded it. Therein, we learn in detail how a variety of states (and, I would argue, state forms) within differing forms of capitalism are violent, corrupt, mendacious – and not just in aberrant, isolated ways, but in the routine administration of political, economic and social life. These points are thoroughly and persuasively made, and the empirical material at the heart of these chapters is the over-riding strength of the book in my view. But beyond this, the authors tell us in their ‘Conclusion’ that: we only see the tip of the iceberg of state crime, albeit citizens of “Western democratic states” are privileged because “we have a relatively free press” (212); there are gaps in criminological knowledge of state crime; that power and influence ‘beget’ power and influence (215) – and thus fuel political violence and corruption; and a social harm “lens” is that most useful for accessing criminal and immoral state “behaviour” (216). Some of these claims are advanced to some extent through the preceding empirical case study chapters, but overall too much is assumed of and for the reader.

Further, I am not sure where any of this leaves us, as academics or activists who might seek to challenge state and corporate power, but I am not sure it adds up to the authors’ parting shot: namely, their “belief that a protracted public moral outrage will act as a catalyst for holding

rogue state actions and the corrupt acts of the powerful accountable” (216). Sadly, this belief is rather undermined by the wealth of evidence presented in this significant but ultimately flawed book.

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Eva Bertram (2015), *The Workfare State: Public Assistance Politics from the New Deal to the New Democrats*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, £65.00, pp. 336, hbk.

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In 1996, by transforming welfare into workfare, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) marked a watershed in American public assistance policy. The legislation eliminated Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and ended entitlement to cash assistance for single-parent families. Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) has been one of the most discussed pieces of legislation amongst political scientists, legal scholars, social historians and economists commenting on welfare reform. The increase in severe poverty as measured by the number of families living on \$2 a day – from 636,000 in 1996 to 1.5 million today, according to Edin and Shaefer (2015) – has been partially explained by the shift from welfare to workfare, when public assistance is conditioned by participation in low-paid, insecure and part-time jobs, and when there is much less cash available to the poor.

Eva Bertram revisits the road to workfare. She challenges the popular account according to which welfare reform was the result of a conservative Republican backlash starting with the Reagan revolution and the attacks on the ‘Cadillac queen’. She explains how AFDC, however meagre and inadequate, reflected a needs-based approach to social policy under the New Deal. This thin entitlement model became slightly less restrictive in the 1960s, thus forming the core of the liberal approach to welfare. This timid expansionary approach generated a powerful ideological backlash, especially in the South. Bertram makes two types of arguments to explain the gradual transformation from a needs-based entitlement to a work-based model of public assistance.

The first argument is based on the analysis of the politics of the Democratic Party. Bertram shows that liberals did not know to react to the workfare policy proposals endorsed by Conservative Southern Democrats. In particular, her main contention is that between 1971 and 1975 congressional leaders transformed the character and politics of public assistance in three main ways, first by introducing work requirements through the Work Incentives amendments, second by federalising Supplemental Security Income for low income populations deemed incapable of working – the elderly, those with physical or mental health conditions – and finally by introducing the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). The EITC, a tax credit that props up low wages, has been continuously expanded since 1975; it now represents a crucial part of the safety net for low income working families. Thus the expansion of EITC complements and compensates the restrictions on cash assistance for ‘undeserving’ welfare mothers.

The second argument is that Southern Democrats defeated welfare liberals because they wanted to protect a deeply segregated labour market and low-waged service economy. Traditionally employers in the South relied on agricultural seasonal workers or domestic help. Employers wanted to keep a reserve army of low-waged labour and lawmakers endorsed the idea that welfare benefits must be kept well below wages in the service economy to enable