And it also includes the powerful and shifting senses in which the voices of men have constructed and deployed images of Woman as a vehicle for political and national discourses, ones in which women themselves were not inevitably the priority. The interwoven exploration of these strands gives depth and complexity to the oft-observed conception of the state as family writ large and of the family as microcosm of the state. Competing conceptions of Woman appear both as focused on women's lives within this layered hierarchical order, and as a metaphorical means of personalizing and engendering discourse about the Chinese nation and its place in the world, whether as lament or as aspiration.

To achieve this, Hershatter departs from the gendered tensions and deepening fractures of the modern era to show how women actively participated in revolution from the Taiping era onwards, and how some of the key revolutionary issues were concurrently intensely gendered in the discourse of Woman – notably land rights and marriage reform. Women's issues and Woman issues were both drawn intensely into militarized conflicts that were often long-lasting and imperfectly resolved through to the middle of the 20th century, amid devastating costs. Liberation was followed with a continuation of the same gendered themes and concerted campaigns directly affecting women – marriage and family law reform, the training and provision of midwifery, and opposition to prostitution. Significant gendered changes for women and men in access to work, material and symbolic resources, services and mobility concurrently altered women's lives in China in comparably fundamental manner. Throughout these decades Woman persistently recurred in the campaigns, mobilizations and the relative stability of this era as a powerful marker of nation and of national values.

In *Women and China's Revolutions*, the concerns and fractures that made women and Woman central to China's revolutions are powerfully delineated, together with the courage, work, achievements and sacrifices women made for their liberating visions in China's revolutions. The volume concludes with an up-to-date account of the present era (to 2018) and its percolating mix of stability and dynamism. Readers are left, as we should be, with deeply informed and thought-inspiring questions.

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Down with Traitors: Justice and Nationalism in Wartime China
YUN XIA
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Hanjian is a powerful term in China. Yun Xia reminds us that while the motivations of collaborators during "China's war of resistance against Japan" were complicated, and though the lived experiences of real people defied the simple resistance–collaboration narrative promoted by post-war Chinese governments, the term *hanjian* has significantly influenced perceptions of the war. *Hanjian* is sometimes translated as "traitor" or "collaborator," but neither fully conveys the term's condemnation not just of the act of betrayal, but also the fundamental character flaws and immorality of the person who is *hanjian*. Utilizing legal regulations, court cases and press

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accounts, Yun Xia traces the development of the discourse of *hanjian* in the legal, political and popular realms, as well as the long-lasting consequences of efforts to punish these "internal others."

The connotations of *hanjian* in China's late imperial era were varied, sometimes referring to foreigners who threatened ethnic Han subjects and sometimes to cunning Han who threatened the tranquillity of the empire by causing trouble among non-Han groups. During the mid-Qing, however, court documents applied the term to those who illegally aided foreigners in military or commercial ways, thereby damaging the multi-ethnic empire. With the fall of the Qing, revolutionaries emphasized the ethnic part of the formula, as Han officials who aided the "foreign" rule of the Manchu Qing, were labelled *hanjian* as well. Despite Republican-era ideals of ethnic inclusiveness, nationalist writers conflated Chinese with Han, and now anyone who colluded with foreigners was potentially *hanjian*.

After total war began in 1937, the Nationalist government hastily created anti-*hanjian* regulations as a means of inspiring loyalty, with little concern for due process. During the war, enforcement was left in the hands of military courts, members of competing intelligence agencies, and even civilians. Punishing *hanjian* was an extremely popular way to strike back at "internal enemies" when it was otherwise difficult to attack the Japanese military or civilians. In encouraging extra-legal means to punish traitors, however, the Nationalist state ultimately made it impossible to establish "rule by law" after the war. Focusing on post-war trials, Yun Xia shows how the judiciary branch was beset with many problems including insufficient staff and the active interference of rival military and intelligence organizations that did not want to cede authority to civilian courts. The state, then, resorted to mass campaigns, whereby individuals were encouraged to inform against *hanjian*, who could then be brought to "justice" through public pressure. This encouragement further eroded the efficacy of the judiciary as many individuals took the opportunity to file inflammatory false accusations that were difficult to prosecute through legal processes.

Throughout this study, Yun Xia shows how the reality of wartime collaboration was indeed complicated. Whether one was a lawyer, the owner of a business, a writer, or even a resident of the Japanese colony of Taiwan, if one did not or could not flee into the interior with the Nationalist leaders, it was difficult, if not impossible, to survive without working with the Japanese authorities. Business leaders in Shanghai often engaged in complex strategies of trying to help the resistance (e.g. by conducting clandestine trade with Nationalist-held regions) while being forced to make concessions to Japanese authorities just to stay open. Authors, particularly women, often chose to write about "non-political" subjects such as family, love and intimacy. In circumventing due process, however, and encouraging broad, moralistic campaigns against *hanjian* instead, the state ensured that there would be no room for complicated or apolitical understandings of wartime experiences. As public opinion prosecuted political, economic and cultural *hanjian* during and after the war, complexities were reduced to a simplistic loyalty-versus-betrayal narrative that meant anyone who had worked with the Japanese was potentially guilty. This left Nationalist leaders themselves ultimately vulnerable, because party leaders had often worked with, indeed collaborated with, those now called *hanjian*. Having helped establish the narrative, the Nationalists fell victim to it as the Chinese Communist Party was able to present itself as more consistent in punishing traitors than the Nationalists, who seemed to be more obviously self-serving in using the post-war campaigns to serve partisan interests.

Yun Xia illustrates how anti-*hanjian* precedents had significant influence on politics and society in both Communist and Nationalist areas. Anti-*hanjian* laws remained

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in effect on Taiwan until the 1960s, though now they were applied to Communist sympathizers. The CCP meanwhile used anti-*hanjian* campaigns of the 1950s as a means to undermine wealthy classes and consolidate its power and legitimacy. Nationalist-era regulations also served as a legal model for similar laws against counterrevolutionaries. Even today, the distillation of complicated circumstances into simplified notions of loyalty versus betrayal continues to be seen in the popular use of the term *hanjian* in a China that again promotes moralistic nationalism while the "rule of law" remains hampered by competing interests.

Overall, Yun Xia has effectively described the importance of *hanjian* in the Chinese "national imagination," while also revealing some of the fundamental dilemmas and problems of states that rely on moralistic populist campaigns at the expense of due process.

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The Costs of Conversation: Obstacles to Peace Talks in Wartime
ORIANA SKYLAR MASTRO
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When and why do nation-states pursue diplomatic talks with the adversary during wartime? And what prompts them to shift from just fighting to "talking while fighting"? In this book, Oriana Skylar Mastro offers elegant and thoughtful answers to these questions. In doing so, she sheds new light on how states agree to negotiate peace, including critical decisions that shaped the unfolding of the Cold War around China's periphery. Her carefully researched case studies offer new insights into China's diplomacy in the Korean War, Chinese and Indian diplomacy in the Sino-Indian War, and North Vietnam's diplomacy in the Vietnam War. The research draws on archival research in China, India, the United States and the United Kingdom, as well as interviews in Vietnam and a range of other sources.

The book begins with a presentation of Mastro's theoretical approach. In essence, she sees leaders as preoccupied with how the adversary will respond to openness to diplomatic talks in the midst of war. More specifically, Mastro contends, leaders worry that the enemy will interpret openness to talks as a sign of weakness, and they also weigh how much capacity the enemy has to intensify its prosecution of the war in response to such an interpretation. As a result, states only agree to direct and unconditional talks when the "costs of conversation" are low. This is the case when leaders believe their states have shown sufficient resiliency to avoid conveying weakness and that the enemy has limited capacity to escalate the war. Overall, Mastro's theorizing is quite lucid, and it fills an important gap in the study of international security.

The theoretical framework also does much to illuminate the diplomatic decisions Mastro scrutinizes. In the Korean War, Mao refused talks initially, only to agree to direct talks in mid-1951 after the perceived costs of engaging with the US became low. In the Vietnam War, Hanoi also refused talks at the outset, only to agree to negotiations following the Tet Offensive in 1968. In the Sino-Indian War, China

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