

# The impact of intra-EU migration on welfare chauvinism

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**Abstract:** We examine whether intra-EU migration affects welfare chauvinistic attitudes, i.e. the idea that immigrants' access to the welfare system should be restricted. According to the in-group/out-group theory, migration can unleash feelings of insecurity and thus trigger welfare chauvinism. According to intergroup contact theory, welfare chauvinism should decrease when immigration is higher, because contact reduces prejudice and softens anti-immigrant stances. We test these theories using data from the European Social Survey 2008/2009, supplemented with country-level data, and analyse these data using a multilevel ordered logit approach. We find a negative relation between intra-EU immigration and welfare chauvinism, supporting the intergroup contact theory: in countries with more intra-EU migration, welfare chauvinism tends to be lower. Furthermore, the higher the percentage of East European immigrants compared to other EU immigrants, the higher the level of welfare chauvinism.

**Key words:** Bismarckian and Beveridgean welfare system, Europe, intergroup contact theory, intra-EU immigration, welfare chauvinism

Under the “free movement” rules of the European Union, EU workers have the right to freely work in any EU member state, as well as the right to full and equal access to that country’s welfare state. This has led to a situation where European Community rules and regulations have partly dissolved national state borders in social policy, and where EU enlargements expand the potential numbers of social policy claimants (Kvist 2004). Even though social policy *de jure* is a national prerogative, *de facto* it is not since EU states no longer can choose whom to give social rights to: the domain of potential welfare beneficiaries is decided by the uncontrollable influx of intra-EU immigrants.

Our study examines whether the combination of unrestricted intra-EU migration and equal access to national welfare states for EU workers is associated with *welfare chauvinism* – the idea that native citizens are unwilling to grant social rights to foreigners (Andersen and Bjørklund 1990). Despite a growing literature on welfare chauvinism (e.g. Crepez and Damron 2008; Mewes and Mau 2012; Reeskens and Van Oorschot 2012; Van der Waal et al. 2013) it is still not obvious what can best explain cross-national heterogeneity in welfare chauvinistic attitudes. Moreover, the effect of actual levels of immigration on welfare chauvinism has scarcely been examined, especially in terms of intra-EU migration, which is surprising given the mounting controversies spurred by this particular immigration.

Our study fits within the growing literature that examines how immigration affects social preferences (e.g. Luttmer 2001; Alesina and Glaeser 2004; Eger 2009; Mau and Burkhardt 2009). We contribute to and expand on the literature by focussing primarily on intra-EU immigration rather than on general immigration, and by concentrating on welfare chauvinistic attitudes.<sup>1</sup>

Ensuring the right to social security when the right of freedom of movement is exercised has been a major concern for the EU. To achieve this, EU social security regulation protects EU citizens working and residing in any Member State from losing their social security rights (Regulations 883/2004 and 987/2009). EU labour immigrants are entitled to welfare benefits on equal terms with the natives.

Coupled with the free movement of workers in the EU, this right to equal benefits creates a tension: on the one hand we have the liberal ideal of free movement of people, and on the other hand we have the ideal of the national welfare state. In the words of Freeman (1986), the welfare state is “inward looking”, seeking to take care of its own, and its ability to do so is premised on the assumption that “outsiders” can be kept at distance. But this is no longer possible in a world erased of borders and with supranational regulations requiring the outsiders to be granted full access to the welfare state (Cappelen 2016). This tension stimulates outbursts of reactionary political activity, giving the political right material with

<sup>1</sup> A study by Cappelen and Peters (Forthcoming) also examines the effects of intra-EU immigration on social preferences. However, this study rather examines how immigration affects preferences for across-the-board retrenchment of the welfare state. Moreover, it argues that since EU states cannot discriminate against intra-EU immigrants in terms of welfare and social security, natives ultimately develop overall retrenchment preferences. The present article, on the other hand, uses contact theory to examine how different types of immigration (both intra-EU and non-western) relate to the sentiment that immigrants should not have access to the welfare state on the same terms as natives (welfare chauvinism).

which to appeal to voters and to challenge the left. According to Johns (2014), media sources have often portrayed the postenlargement migrants (often immigrants from Eastern Europe) in a negative light. They have thereby played a role in building ethnic tension, accusing them of lowering wages as well as being a burden on the welfare system. Mainstream politicians and government agencies have often reinforced these stereotypes (Johns 2014, 10).

Still, it is not straightforward how intra-EU immigration affects welfare chauvinistic attitudes. According to *intergroup contact* theory (Allport 1954), a larger share of immigrants decreases perceived group threat and thereby leads to less immigrant derogation (Schlueter and Wagner 2008), which would soften exclusionary preferences. On the other hand, a large relative number of immigrants can be expected to cause a snowballing in-group/out-group emotion of the majority population (e.g. Scheepers et al. 2002), which again can increase intergroup tension and subsequently surge welfare chauvinism.

### Intra-EU immigration and welfare chauvinism

There is a growing literature on how *general* immigration and ethnic heterogeneity affect social preferences. It has been suggested that in the United States (US), ethnically heterogeneous societies display lower levels of support for redistributive welfare programs (e.g. Gilens 1995; Luttmer 2001; Alesina & Glaeser 2004). In Canada, however, the experience seems different, with no clear empirical evidence of a negative relationship between immigration/ethnic heterogeneity and redistribution preferences (Soroka et al. 2007; Johnston et al. 2010; Banting, et al. 2013). Canadians (compared to Americans) are more likely to believe that immigrants are good for the economy; and in Canada ethnic diversity does not generally seem to significantly erode social solidarity (Banting 2010). In Europe, evidence is more mixed and ambiguous than in the US and Canada. Some European studies find only a weak or no association between immigration and preferences for social spending (Crepaz and Damron 2008; Finseraas 2008; Mau and Burkhardt 2009; Senik et al. 2009; Stichnoth 2012), whereas others report negative effects (e.g. Ford 2006; Eger 2009; Larsen 2011). A recent study by Cappelen and Peters (Forthcoming) finds in particular intra-EU immigration to be negatively associated with preferences for welfare state spending; other types of immigration, i.e. general (or non-EU immigration), only weakly relates to such preferences.

People have questioned whether the results from the US case are really applicable to European countries, given the peculiar racial history of the US

(Freeman 2009). First, Western European countries have been (notably) diversified by immigration only in the second half of the 20th century, by which time they already had solid welfare institutions in place. Second, since the typical European welfare state is more generous and universal than the US welfare state, more people benefit from it, which assumingly gives it a broader base of legitimacy. Third, throughout much of Europe welfare state institutions enjoy much greater acceptability than can be explained by economic self-interest alone (Koning 2011).

These differences can help explain why the evidence for a negative association between immigration and preferences for wholesale retrenchment is much weaker in Europe than in the US. However, the implication is not necessarily that immigration does not affect social preferences in Europe. Unease about immigration might provoke so-called *welfare chauvinism* rather than preferences for wholesale retrenchment (Koning 2011). Welfare chauvinism is the notion that welfare benefits should be restricted to certain groups, usually to natives (Andersen and Bjørklund 1990; Freeman 2009). As such, a welfare chauvinist is not in favour of across-the-board retrenchment; rather, welfare chauvinism represents nativist resentment against welcoming immigrants into the welfare system (Crepaz and Damron 2008). This can occur in various degrees. People may want to exclude immigrants from the welfare system entirely, or they may rather want to restrict their access.

People in most European countries feel access should at least be restricted somewhat (e.g. Gorodzeisky and Semyonov 2009; Van Der Waal et al. 2010, 2013; Koning 2011; Mewes and Mau 2012). However, it is not yet fully clear which factors affect cross-national variation in welfare chauvinism, partly because of the scarcity of cross-national studies. In what follows, we outline two contradictory arguments related to this issue; the *in-group/out-group* theory and the *intergroup contact* theory.

### *The in-group/out-group theory*

It has been claimed that people have a natural tendency to develop group identities and to differentiate between “us” and “them” (Allport 1954). People are inclined to develop positive feelings towards people who share similar traits – e.g., ethnicity, religion, language (the in-group) – and negative feelings towards people who do not (the out-group) (e.g. Sniderman et al. 2004). Consequently, the native-born population – the “in-group” – can be less inclined to include the “out-group” in their social benefit schemes. In other words, people exhibit so-called in-group bias, favouring their own kind. Out-group *derogation* is a related phenomenon, in which an out-group is perceived as being threatening to the members of

an in-group, which often accompanies in-group favouritism (Hewstone et al. 2002).<sup>2</sup>

As argued by Shayo (2009), the relative size of the out-group can matter for social preferences. Preferences for redistribution in a country can decrease with the size of the out-groups; the reason being that increased distance to other agents (e.g. migrants) in the original group of identity (e.g. low-income class of natives) makes identification with a less redistributive group (e.g. high-income class/the nation as a whole) more attractive. Furthermore, some studies have found that the size of the migrant population – the “out-group” – directly affects discriminatory attitudes and feeling of perceived threat (e.g. Gijsberts et al. 2004; Kunovich 2004; Semyonov et al. 2006). Related to this finding, it has been argued that in-group members believe that the welfare system disproportionately benefits ethnic minorities (Gilens 1995; Alesina and Glaeser 2004), which again can trigger welfare chauvinistic preferences. In fact, Mau and Burkhardt (2009) find support for a negative relationship between the share of non-western immigrants and the willingness to grant equal social rights to foreigners.

Previous research on the relationship between how immigration affects social preferences has mostly focussed on general immigration. However, it is not unlikely that intra-EU immigrants are perceived differently by the native population than non-western (non-EU) immigrants. Some features of the former can make them less threatening to natives than the latter. Most importantly, traditional asylum and family reunification immigrants represent more of an out-group than intra-EU immigrants, the latter creating (comparatively) less heterogeneity. Furthermore, labour immigrants are in the host country to work; this is their *raison d'être* as immigrants. Studies show that they contribute (much) more to the financing of the welfare state than they take out (e.g. Dustmann and Frattini 2014). Refugee and asylum immigrants, on the other hand, do not migrate primarily for economic reasons. They have often fled armed conflict or persecution and are recognised as needing of international protection because it is too dangerous for them to return home. Because of this, natives can come to believe that labour immigrants contribute more to the welfare system and that they exploit it less, and therefore that they represent less of a threat.

However, other factors can make natives view non-western immigrants as less of an out-group than intra-EU immigrants. It has been argued that citizenship constitutes the basis of eligibility for welfare (Marshall 1950).

<sup>2</sup> Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014) in a review of the relevant literature find that immigration attitudes are less shaped by threat (e.g., the economic impact of immigration) than by sociotropic concerns about the cultural impact of immigration.

The state's welfare programmes are for its members. And it can be argued for a majority of the natives, asylum/refugee immigrants are seen as being more "members" of the host society than intra-EU labour immigrants, primarily because they aspire to become citizens – the primary purpose of their migration is precisely to acquire citizenship (in order to escape persecution/danger). However, this is not the case for intra-EU labour immigrants; they are primarily in the host country to maximise income for a period of time before returning to their home country. Thus, in terms of citizenship, asylum/refugee immigrants are more of an "in-group" than intra-EU immigrants.

### *Intergroup contact theory*

Contrary to the in-group/out-group theory, intergroup contact theory holds that immigration can help to weaken welfare chauvinistic attitudes. According to intergroup contact theory, first proposed by Allport (1954), increasing contact between members of different groups can work to reduce prejudice and intergroup conflict. Related to our research question, this would mean that welfare chauvinism decreases with the amount of immigration (Mewes and Mau 2013) – under the assumption that more immigration also implies more (positive) contact, which is likely. Indeed, one of the two prevailing measures of intergroup contact is precisely the size of a minority group, the other one being personal contact between members of the majority and minority groups (Stein et al. 2000, 285). Stein et al. (2000) find that the two measures are positively correlated: a higher proportion of immigrants increases the probability of intergroup contact, i.e. that people are more likely to have contact with immigrants when there are relative more of them. This finding is supported by Wagner et al. (2006).

Allport (1954) suggested that positive effects of intergroup contact occur in contact situations characterised by four key conditions: (1) *Equal status*: While difficult to define precisely (Pettigrew 1998), it implies that both groups must engage equally in the relationship – members of the group should have similar backgrounds, qualities and characteristics (Riordan 1978); (2) *Intergroup cooperation*: Groups need to work together in the pursuit of common goals (Aronson and Patnoe 1997); (3) *Support of authorities, law or customs*: Both groups must acknowledge some authority that supports the contact and interactions between the groups (Pettigrew 1998); and (4) *Common goals*: Both groups must work on a problem/task and share this as a common goal – exemplified by interracial sport teams (Pettigrew 1998). These key conditions seem overall applicable to intra-EU migrants, as they immediately take part in regular life within the new country since they integrate in the labour force.

However, empirical studies have established that contact can reduce prejudice even when these four conditions are not present, i.e. contact between in-group and out-group members reduces prejudice and intergroup conflict even in situations that are not characterised by equal status, common goals, etc. (see Pettigrew 1998 for a review of this literature).

At the cross-national level, some empirical studies explicitly support the argument that (a) intergroup contact indeed increases with the amount of immigration, and (b) this, in turn, softens anti-immigrant stances and leads to less prejudice (Wagner et al. 2006; Schlueter and Wagner 2008). Another study by Mewes and Mau (2013) explicitly examines how intergroup contact directly affects *welfare chauvinism*, but find little evidence. However, their study operationalises intergroup contact rather differently than ours. Most importantly, they measured intergroup contact through the ‘Konjunkturforschungsstelle’ (KOF) *Personal Contacts index*, which contains components such as the country’s percentage of international telephone traffic, international tourism, etc.<sup>3</sup> The KOF index was developed to measure an extent of globalisation, and it taps into how connected a country is to other countries. Furthermore, the KOF index cannot separate the possible effects of specific types of immigration (e.g. intra-EU immigration), something that we are particularly interested in. The share of immigrant population is a different operationalisation of intergroup contact than the KOF index, and one that fits our research aim better.

We want to emphasise that intra-EU immigrants embody a diverse group of immigrants, e.g., they represent 28 different countries. It is therefore plausible that the effect of intra-EU immigration on welfare chauvinistic sentiments depends on from which geographical area in the EU that the immigrants come from. More concretely, it has been argued that in particular Eastern European immigration has been politicised; it is specifically this group of intra-EU immigrants that has been the target of media attacks (Johns 2014). In particular, Eastern European immigrants have been accused of putting downward pressure on wages and of abusing the welfare system, receiving benefits they are not entitled to. Right-wing parties, but also mainstream politicians and government agencies, have often reinforced these stereotypes (Johns 2014). Furthermore, the Eastern European immigration has been abrupt and escalated dramatically since

<sup>3</sup> The KOF Personal Contacts index contains the following components: “the country’s percentage of international telephone traffic (in minutes per person, index weight: 26%), international tourism (incoming and outgoing: 26%), international letters per capita (sent and received: 25%), the percentage of foreigners in the population (20%), and government and workers’ transfers (received and paid, in per cent of GDP: 2%)” (Mewes and Mau 2013, 6).

the enlargement in 2004.<sup>4</sup> Both these features of the Eastern European immigration, the sudden escalation and its politicisation, are the two conditions put forth by Hopkins (2010) for an out-group (such as immigrants) to be seen as threatening, and to become the target of political hostility (2010, 40). This can have theoretical implications. With respect to the in-group/out-group theory, one can expect Eastern European immigrants to be seen as more threatening than western immigrants, i.e. as more of an out-group. Regarding the intergroup contact theory, one can expect the softening impact of contact (on welfare chauvinism) to be less pronounced when the contact is between natives and Eastern European immigrants, than when it is between natives and western European immigrants. Recall that the positive effect of intergroup contact is particularly pronounced in situations where the natives and the immigrants (out-group) have equal status, and the negative stereotyping of Eastern European immigrants can cause the natives to perceive of them as being of lower status.

The United Kingdom's (UK) withdrawal from the European Union (known as "Brexit") is one illustration of the perceived tension between natives and in particular Eastern European immigrants. In the (UK) public perception, the rapid growth in immigration to the UK has been typically associated with the two rounds of EU *eastern* enlargement that took place in 2004 and 2007; and this immigration is one of the major explanations for why the UK chose to leave the EU (Alfano et al. 2016).

### *Expectations*

According to the in-group/out-group theory, welfare chauvinistic attitudes should increase with immigration, and thus,

H1: Higher levels of immigration are likely to lead to attitudes that are more welfare chauvinistic.

It can, however, be expected that this negative association is particularly pronounced for nationals of East European countries compared to other EU migrants. As emphasised, politically charged debates related to welfare chauvinistic issues have often focussed on labour immigrants, especially from Eastern Europe.

According to the *intergroup contact* theory, however, it is expected that welfare chauvinism is decreasing with the amount of immigration, because

<sup>4</sup> The origin and spatial distribution of intra-EU immigrants across Europe is not balanced. In 2013, half of the intra-EU immigrants were from the new member states that joined the EU in 2004 (Eurostat Statistics Database).



intergroup contact reduces prejudice and softens anti-immigrant stances; and thus,

H2: Higher levels of immigration are likely to lead to attitudes that are less welfare chauvinistic.

We expect that this negative association might be less pronounced when the focus is strictly on Eastern European immigrants, simply because Eastern European immigrants are profiled as more threatening (due to, as argued above, its sudden escalation and degree of politicisation), and therefore that the positive effect of contact is less evident for this immigrant group.

Furthermore, we expect that in welfare states where benefits tend to be proportional to previous income and social security contribution, welfare chauvinism will be lower than in welfare systems providing flat-rate benefits and financed through general taxation (for ease of terminology, we refer to the former system as *Bismarckian* and the latter as *Beveridgean*).<sup>5</sup> The argument for this expectation is as follows: we know from previous literature that people differ in their support for various groups of “needy” people (e.g. Van Oorschot 2006). However, we also know that people’s attitudes towards group support seem to be strongly affected by the extent to which the different groups are seen as deserving or underserving, and one of the most important deservingness criteria is *reciprocity*, i.e. building up a personal entitlement to benefits through working/paying contribution (Van Oorschot 2000, 2006). Therefore, in Bismarckian welfare states it is likely that immigrants will be seen as more “worthy” recipients than in Beveridgean welfare states. We thus control the extent to which a country is Bismarckian, measured by how much of the total amount of social spending is financed by social insurance rather than general taxation (see the Method section for details).

This expectation has implications for our hypotheses. Our first hypothesis – that EU-migration strengthens welfare chauvinistic attitudes – should be particularly pronounced under Beveridgean systems, and less so

<sup>5</sup> According to Bonoli (1997), classifications of welfare states are of two broad types, focussing on different dimensions of social policy: (a) the Anglo-Saxon tradition, which has tended to focus on the “quantity” of welfare provision (e.g. Esping-Andersen 1990), and (b) the continental European tradition, which has tended to focus on the “how” dimension (differences in the way that welfare states are financed and deliver provision). The latter focusses on the extent to which a system is Bismarckian or Beveridgean: “Bismarckian social policies are based on social insurance; provide earnings-related benefits for employees; entitlement is conditional upon a satisfactory contribution record; and financing is mainly based on employer/employee contributions. In contrast, Beveridgean social policy is characterised by universal provision; entitlement is based on residence and need (or only residence); benefits are typically flat-rate and are financed through general taxation” (Bonoli 1997, 257).

under Bismarckian systems. We thus include a second, conditional expectation to Hypothesis 1:

H1b: The effect of intra-EU immigration on welfare chauvinistic attitudes becomes stronger with the increase in the proportion of welfare financing coming from general taxation.

Furthermore, the expectation that intra-EU immigration leads to less welfare chauvinistic attitudes, as formulated under our Hypothesis 2, would be specifically pronounced in systems that more resemble the Bismarckian system. Hypothesis 2 can thus be specified to include:

H2b: The effect of intra-EU immigration on welfare chauvinistic attitudes becomes stronger with the increase in the proportion of welfare financing coming from social security contributions.

### Empirical strategy

In order to investigate the relationship between intra-EU immigration and welfare chauvinism, we adopt a multilevel approach. Welfare chauvinism is measured at the individual-level with a survey question, and immigration is measured at the country-level as the percentage of immigrants living in a country. Below we further discuss the operationalisation and methodology we use, and discuss how we address some of the challenges that come with those.

The individual-level part of the analysis is based on the fourth wave (2008) of the European Social Survey (ESS wave 4). This wave is particularly relevant for the study of welfare chauvinism because of its rotating module on welfare attitudes.<sup>6</sup> Indeed, the reason for using this specific survey is because it includes a question that indicates welfare chauvinism – to our knowledge, there are no other surveys that tap the concept of welfare chauvinism *and* cover such a broad range of EU countries. Furthermore, other waves of the ESS do not include this relevant question. The 2008 ESS thus offers us a unique possibility to study the multilevel nature of the relationship between welfare chauvinism and intra-EU immigration.

In addition, we supplemented these data with various data on immigration, as well as a number of other relevant country characteristics. The data from the ESS in combination with the availability of the supplemented country-level data allow us to include 21 relevant European countries: Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France,

<sup>6</sup> The second module on this topic is planned for module 8, which will be in the field in 2016 (see also [http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/docs/round8/ESS8\\_project\\_specification.pdf](http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/docs/round8/ESS8_project_specification.pdf)).

Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK.

### *Welfare chauvinism*

Welfare chauvinism is tapped in the ESS 2008 with the following question: “Thinking of people coming to live in [country] from other countries, when do you think they should obtain the same rights to social benefits and services as citizens already living here? Please choose the option on this card that comes closest to your view”. People can then choose one of the following answers: (1) Immediately on arrival; (2) After living in [country] for a year; (3) Only after they have worked and paid taxes for at least a year; (4) Once they have become a [country] citizen; and (5) They should never get the same rights.

### *Main independent variables*

Our main independent variable is intra-EU immigration. Eurostat provides data on the number of people living in an EU country who originate from another EU country. This number is then translated into a measure reflecting the percentage of the population. As a further robustness check, we include a second measure of intra-EU immigration. Here, we calculated the percentage of respondents from the ESS 2008 that reported having been born in another EU country, or in Norway or Switzerland. The two indicators of intra-EU immigration are with 0.945 very highly correlated.

Furthermore, the analyses include some other indicators for immigration. The reason for this is twofold. First, when looking at the effects of intra-EU migration, it is important to *control* for non-EU migration. This allows us to check whether it is intra-EU migration that drives the results, and not a possible correlation between different forms of immigration, i.e. that some countries simply attract more immigrants in general. This is particularly important since the indicator for welfare chauvinism does not specify a specific type of immigration. Second, it is pertinent to examine whether general or non-intra-EU migration has differential effects on welfare chauvinism.

We thus include a variable that indicates the number of all immigrants relative to the population (% migrants), as well as one that indicates the number of immigrants who do not originate from the EU (% non-EU migrants). The World Development Indicators of the World Bank provide data on these measures. Furthermore, as with the measurement of intra-EU migration, we use the ESS 2008 as a basis for a second measure of general

and non-EU immigration as a robustness check. The correlation between the two indicators for general immigration is 0.807, and that of the indicators for non-EU immigration 0.587. The Appendix further details the measurement of immigration.

### *Conditioning variable*

We want to test whether the relationship we find holds for all countries equally, or whether the relationship is conditional on specific country characteristics. Following our expectations, we focus on the extent to which a country has a welfare system where benefits are proportional to previous income/contribution. There exist no readymade index for this; however, the percentage of social protection that is financed through social insurance contributions (as opposed to general taxation) is argued to be a good proxy (Bonoli 1997). The higher this percentage, the more Bismarckian is the welfare system (and, thus, the more likely the system is to offer earnings-related benefits). Conversely, the lower the percentage, the more Beveridgean the system is (and the more likely the system is to offer flat-rate benefits financed through general taxation). Data are provided by Eurostat (see CESifo 2008).

### *Control variables*

Besides the level of intra-EU migration, other factors are likely to affect welfare chauvinism. Therefore, we included a number of alternative variables in order to control for their effects – the inclusion of these variables also helps to isolate the effect of interest here, that of intra-EU migration. However, they do not constitute the main interest in this study. For this reason, we only shortly discuss the control variables here, and include information about their measurement in the Appendix. We will not report or discuss the results regarding these explanations. The results are fully reported in the Online Supplement, in Tables S1 and S2.

The control variables include both individual- and country-level indicators. We emphasise different types of individual-level variables that previous research identified as affecting welfare chauvinistic attitudes (see, e.g. Coenders and Scheepers 2003; Reeskens and Van Oorschot 2012; Mewes and Mau 2013): *political orientation* (on a left-right scale); *individual characteristics* (gender, age, education, income, employment status and whether a person thinks s/he is likely to need some form of welfare assistance); *interpersonal trust* (as well as how socially active a person is); and lastly, *attitudes towards the EU, and whether the government should be in charge of providing welfare benefits*.

In addition to these individual-level controls, we include different country-level controls.<sup>7</sup> Most notably, we include an indicator for the size of the welfare state in terms of the percentage of the gross domestic product (GDP) that is spent on social benefits. It has been argued that generous and expansive welfare states seem to foster tolerance towards immigrants and also produce less welfare chauvinism (e.g. Crepaz and Damron 2008; Reeskens and Van Oorschot 2012). This is our main and key control variable. Data for this measure are again provided by Eurostat.

There are other variables that may affect welfare chauvinism. However, with just 21 countries, not all of these can be included simultaneously. For each model we include a maximum of three country-level variables, meaning that we need to substitute some controls for others in order to assess their impact. We therefore reanalyse the main model, also including economic inequality, wealth and unemployment rate. Furthermore, it has been observed that *unemployment rates* are linked to welfare chauvinism (e.g. Mewes and Mau 2012), and so we control for unemployment. The Appendix details the measurement of these indicators, and the Online Supplement provides the results of the models that include these alternative controls (Table S3).

### *Estimation process*

In order to test our expectations, we use a multilevel ordered logit regression model. The dependent variable that we use is a variable with categories that can be ordered. The distances between the categories, however, are not necessarily of equal distance, and the values attached to the categories do not mean anything except for the order in which they are placed. An ordered logit model does not assume that the distances are meaningful as such, and therefore offers a better option to analyse the data than an ordinary least squares regression, for example.

Moreover, because we are interested in testing a model that includes both country and individual-level indicators, we use a multilevel approach to analyse our data. We explicitly model the multilevel structure of the data in order to avoid too small standard errors, but also as to allow for variation in the level of welfare chauvinism at the country-level. We therefore use a random-intercept model. All models of interest are compared to a simple null-model where no independent variables are included. Both the

<sup>7</sup> One interesting country-level control that we do not have data on is the extent to which migration is politicised. Arguably, in countries where migration is highly politicised one could expect migration to have less effect on welfare chauvinistic attitudes than in countries where this issue is not politicised.

country-level variance of the null-model and the models of interest are reported, as to allow for a comparison in terms of how well a model performs in terms of explaining this country-level variance.

We thus employ random-effects ordered logit regression in order to analyse the data. This procedure estimates an underlying score as a linear function of the independent variables as well as a number of cut-points. The latent linear equation to be estimated is as follows:

$$Y_{*iu} = x_{1iu}\beta_1 + x_{2iu}\beta_2 + \dots + x_{\rho iu}\beta_\rho + z_{1iu}u_{1u} + z_{2iu}u_{2u} + \dots + z_{\phi iu}u_{\phi u} + \epsilon_{iu} \quad (1)$$

where  $x_{iu}\beta$  are the fixed effect for  $i$  individuals and  $j$  countries based on the independent variable,  $z_{iu}u_u$  are the random effects based on the variance in the dependent variable on the country-level, and  $\epsilon_{iu}$  are the errors which are distributed as logistic. The outcome of the estimated model described in (1) returns values that can be interpreted as changes in the odds ratios, i.e. for a unit change in  $x$ , the odds from going to a higher outcome change with  $\beta$ . While the  $\beta$ s can be interpreted in terms of their sign and significance, and the size of the value can be compared within models, the value cannot be interpreted meaningfully without the cut-points. Since we are mainly interested in whether intra-EU migration has a positive or negative significant effect, and whether the effect is different from that of general or non-EU migration, we focus on the interpretation of this latent linear equation.

In addition, we discuss the predicted probability for the different categories of welfare chauvinism to further assess the substantive meaning of the results. On the basis of Equation 1, and using the cut-points that are estimated by the model, the predicted probabilities can be calculated as follows:

$$\Pr(y_{iu} = v \mid v, u_u) = \Pr(v_{v-1} < x_{\rho iu}\beta_\rho + z_{\phi iu}u_{\phi u} + \epsilon_{iu} \leq v_v) \quad (2)$$

where  $v_v$  is the  $v$ th cut-point. In our case, we have five outcomes for the dependent variable, implying that just four cut-points are estimated. In addition, it is assumed that  $v_0 = -\infty$  and  $v_5 = +\infty$ . The predicted probabilities are illustrated for some of the models. The models do not estimate a constant since the cut-points already absorb the constant.

As an additional check for the robustness of the models that we discuss here, we included a replication of all models using a different statistical technique. While a multilevel ordered logit model is the most appropriate for the data that we use, it is also possible to estimate the models with a linear multilevel model, with random intercepts. The results of the replications with this different technique are reported in Table S4 in the Online Supplement, and further support the findings discussed below. Furthermore, we checked whether the results are driven by a particular

country by rerunning the analyses excluding one case each time. The results remain largely the same, suggesting that not one case is an outlier with too high leverage.

## Results

Before discussing the results of the multivariate analysis, we present the data for the main concepts in our study, by country. Table 1 includes the values for our dependent variable, welfare chauvinism, and for the main explanatory and conditioning variable, general migration, intra-EU migration (both total and only East European) and the social security system. The table is divided in three sections: section one includes the countries with the lowest level of welfare chauvinism, the second includes those with a medium level and the third has the highest level. Each section ends with an overall average of that section for each variable. First of all, it

Table 1. Empirical description of the main concepts

	Welfare Chauvinism	Foreign-Born	EU Migration	East EU Migration	East EU (% EU Migration)	% Social Contribution
Denmark	2.97	7.77	1.49	0.37	15.00	28.80
France	3.01	10.25	2.04	0.24	8.47	65.60
Norway	3.02	8.02	2.41	0.79	21.05	44.10
Portugal	2.90	7.27	0.90	0.13	16.67	47.40
Spain	3.05	10.56	3.93	1.01	21.85	64.50
Sweden	2.78	12.33	2.47	1.10	16.81	49.80
Switzerland	2.85	22.32	12.26	0.67	4.67	59.70
<i>Average</i>	2.94	11.22	3.64	0.62	14.93	51.41
Belgium	3.19	8.42	5.97	0.69	12.24	73.40
Finland	3.26	3.27	0.80	0.46	40	50.20
Germany	3.14	12.85	3.00	2.05	72.73	62.70
Ireland	3.15	14.85	8.11	4.25	36.76	40.00
The Netherlands	3.25	10.63	1.50	0.39	15.91	67.80
Poland	3.32	2.16	0.06	0.06	11.11	50.30
United Kingdom	3.32	9.67	2.39	0.65	19.23	47.90
<i>Average</i>	3.23	8.84	3.12	1.22	29.71	56.04
Czech Republic	3.62	4.44	1.07	1.34	96.43	80.70
Estonia	3.38	14.92	0.50	0.50	61.54	79.40
Greece	3.51	8.78	1.41	0.34	29.17	58.40
Hungary	3.74	3.30	1.00	0.91	87.50	57.90
Latvia	3.63	16.96	0.27	1.47	87.88	64.00
Romania	3.44	0.63	0.03	0.24	83.33	73.20
Slovenia	3.52	8.36	0.15	0.00	0.00	67.40
<i>Average</i>	3.55	8.20	0.63	0.69	63.69	68.71

shows that Sweden is the country with the lowest average level of welfare chauvinism, whereas Hungary has the highest level. Many of the Scandinavian countries fall within the first category, of which the average level of chauvinism is 2.94, whereas there are many of the East European countries in the third category with an average level of 3.55.

It is striking that welfare chauvinism is higher when the average percentage of immigrants, both general and intra-EU, is lower. While Table 1 simply reports averages, it preliminarily suggests support for the contact theory hypothesis. This does not seem to be the case for East European intra-EU immigration: There does not appear to be a particular pattern. When looking at the share of East European migration of general intra-EU migration we observe an opposite trend: countries that tend to have a higher share, tend to have a higher level of welfare chauvinism. However, it needs to be noted that there is substantial variation within each of the sections, especially when it comes to general immigration. Switzerland, e.g., has very high numbers of both general and intra-EU migration, making the average level of immigration in first section much higher. Furthermore, Table 1 illustrates that the countries with a lower level of welfare chauvinism have a slightly more Beveridgean type of welfare system than the countries with a higher level of chauvinism.

### *Welfare chauvinism and immigration: multivariate analysis*

Table 2 shows the results of the multilevel multivariate ordered logit analyses – the full sets of results including the individual-level variables can be found in the Online Supplement, in Table S1. As discussed, the results in Table 2 reflect estimations for the underlying score as linear function, and can be interpreted as changes in the odds ratios. Table 2 shows that immigration has a negative effect: with each percentage increase, the odds of moving up one category, i.e. more welfare chauvinistic, decrease. Models 1 and 2 illustrate that this is the case for general immigration, while controlling for unemployment, social benefits and various individual-level variables. The effects are statistically significant and imply that an increase in general immigration leads to a decrease in welfare chauvinism. Unemployment and the level of social benefits – a broad indicator of how generous a welfare state is – have negative but nonsignificant effects on our dependent variable.

Models 3 and 4 further suggest that it is specifically intra-EU migration that leads to lower levels of chauvinism. Both models 3 and 4 show that the effect for intra-EU migration is negative and statistically significant, implying that chauvinism is lower when intra-EU migration is higher. It appears that the more natives are exposed to immigrants, the more they are



Table 2. The impact of intra-EU migration on welfare chauvinism

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Foreign-born ESS	-0.047 (0.017)***			
Foreign-born		-0.043 (0.020)**		
EU-immigration ESS			-0.075 (0.026)***	
EU immigration				-0.085 (0.030)***
Non-EU ESS			-0.015 (0.023)	
Non-EU				-0.013 (0.024)
Unemployment	-0.053 (0.057)	-0.023 (0.058)		
Social benefits	-0.027 (0.035)	-0.038 (0.038)	-0.041 (0.030)	-0.038 (0.032)
Cut-point 1	-4.505 (0.516)***	-4.495 (0.586)***	-4.301 (0.467)***	-4.243 (0.537)***
Cut-point 2	-3.579 (0.516)***	-3.569 (0.586)***	-3.375 (0.467)***	-3.317 (0.537)***
Cut-point 3	-1.513 (0.516)***	-1.504 (0.586)***	-1.310 (0.467)***	-1.251 (0.536)**
Cut-point 4	0.982 (0.516)*	0.991 (0.586)*	1.185 (0.467)**	1.244 (0.537)**
Individual controls	Included	Included	Included	Included
N	30,829	30,829	30,829	30,829
N countries	21	21	21	21
Log likelihood	-39,390.554	-39,391.771	-39,389.748	-39,390.302
Wald $\chi^2$	1,282.73	1,278.98	1,285.52	1,283.61
Country-level variance (null-model = 0.268)	0.161	0.181	0.149	0.157


Note: Models reflect the results of multilevel ordered logit analyses and standard errors are reported between brackets. The full results including the individual-level variables are reported in the Online Supplement.

ESS = European Social Survey.

\*p < 0.1; \*\*p < 0.05; \*\*\*p < 0.01.

willing to include them in the welfare system of their country. This is contrary to the expectation associated with the *in-group/out-group* theory, where it is assumed that perceived threat increases with more immigration, in turn increasing welfare chauvinism. These findings thus also underline the tentative relations presented in Table 1. Table 2 also shows that the effect of non-EU migration is negative but insignificant, emphasising that the effect of general migration on chauvinism is largely due to intra-EU migration.

Contact theory cannot explain the differential findings of intra-EU immigration and non-EU immigration. Although part of our finding supports the idea that people are less chauvinistic with more interaction with immigrants, it does not provide the full explanation. The driving forces behind contact theory (e.g. reduced xenophobia) can partly be offset by mechanisms related, e.g., to in-group/out-group dynamics (e.g. in-group favouritism), which can reduce the effect of contact. Both softening (e.g. contact) and hardening (e.g. ethnic heterogeneity) forces can affect welfare chauvinism simultaneously. Intra-EU immigration contributes little to ethnic, cultural and religious diversity when compared



**Figure 1** Welfare chauvinism and intra-EU migration in probabilities.

*Note:* The full model on which this Figure is based is reported in the Online Supplement.

to non-EU immigration (Cappelen and Midtbø 2016). Thus, even though contact between natives and intra-EU immigrants, and between natives and non-EU immigrants, has the same softening impact on chauvinism *all else being equal*, the softening impact on the latter can still be weaker because it is mitigated by non-EU immigrants being viewed as more of an out-group. The dynamics of the relationship between immigration and welfare chauvinism is more complex than often assumed, and our findings suggest that different explanations interact to produce a complex outcome.

Figure 1 illustrates the effects of intra-EU migration. For clarity purposes, we illustrate the findings based on a model that uses a dichotomized dependent variable, where people are categorised as either welfare chauvinistic (1) or not (0).<sup>8</sup> It shows the probabilities of someone being chauvinistic or not according to levels of intra-EU migration. The left panel of the *Figure* indicates that the probability of being *not or moderately* welfare chauvinistic is higher when there are relatively more EU immigrants. With zero immigration, there is a chance of just over 50% that someone is not chauvinistic, and this chance increases to just over 80% when there is about 12% of intra-EU immigrants (Switzerland). Conversely, people are less

<sup>8</sup> Outcome 0 includes people that think immigrants should have immediate access, or after one year of living/working in the country; outcome 1 includes those who think immigrants should either be citizens first, or that immigrants should never get access.

Table 3. The impact of East European migration on welfare chauvinism

	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
EU-immigration ESS: east	0.052 (0.100)	-0.078 (0.115)	
EU-immigration ESS: non-east	-0.086 (0.030)***		
Non-EU ESS	-0.003 (0.023)	-0.029 (0.026)	0.000 (0.024)
% East of EU-immigration			0.009 (0.003)***
Social benefits		-0.035 (0.037)	0.010 (0.033)
Cut-point 1	-3.627 (0.194)***	-4.111 (0.585)***	-2.993 (0.562)***
Cut-point 2	-2.702 (0.194)***	-3.185 (0.585)***	-2.068 (0.561)***
Cut-point 3	-0.636 (0.193)***	-1.120 (0.585)*	-0.002 (0.561)
Cut-point 4	1.859 (0.194)***	1.376 (0.585)**	2.493 (0.562)***
Individual controls	Included	Included	Included
N	30,829	30,829	30,829
N countries	21	21	21
Log likelihood	-39,390.004	-39,393.101	-39,389.955
Wald $\chi^2$	1,284.62	1,275.44	1,284.81
Country-level variance (null-model = 0.268)	0.153	0.206	0.152

*Note:* Models reflect the results of multilevel ordered logit analyses and standard errors are reported between brackets. The full results including the individual-level variables are reported in the Online Supplement.

ESS = European Social Survey.


\* $p < 0.1$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ .

likely to be welfare chauvinistic when there are more intra-EU immigrants (right panel).

### *East European immigration and welfare chauvinism*

Following the expectation that welfare chauvinism may be affected differently by nationals of Eastern Europe countries, we tested whether our finding is valid *despite* the inclusion of East European migrants. Put differently, considering the relatively recent inclusion of many East European countries in the EU and the general negative portrayal of immigrants from these countries, the relationship we found might be different for this subset of immigrants.

Table 3 reflects the results for the analyses where EU migration is divided into East European immigration and other EU immigration. Models 5 and 6 show that East EU immigration has no effect on welfare chauvinism, as is the case for non-EU immigration. The effect of intra-EU immigration seems to be due to western European immigrants. This finding highlights again that the explanation of the relationship between welfare chauvinism and immigration does not simply follow one theory. While more contact with East Europeans might soften welfare chauvinistic



**Figure 2** Welfare chauvinism and East intra-EU migration in probabilities.  
*Note:* The full model on which this Figure is based is reported in the Online Supplement.

attitudes, they might be hardened because of the explicit negative (media) portrayal of these immigrants, resulting in stronger in-group/out-group dynamics.

Moreover, while looking at East European immigration *as a percentage of the total amount of intra-EU immigration*, the results are different. Model 7 in Table 3 shows that when this group increases in size, levels of welfare chauvinism tend to be higher. This aligns with our theoretical expectations, that the softening (positive) impact of contact on chauvinism is less pronounced or even absent when the focus is strictly on Eastern European immigrants.

Figure 2 illustrates the effects of East European immigration as a percentage of intra-EU migration. The *Figure* is again based on a model that uses the dichotomised variable of welfare chauvinism. As the coefficient of the immigration variable indicates, the plots in Figure 2 follow the exact opposite patterns as those in Figure 1, which illustrates the effect of intra-EU immigration on welfare chauvinism: probabilities of having a non-chauvinistic attitude decline with the share of Eastern EU migrants, whereas the probabilities of having a welfare chauvinistic attitudes increase with that share. This aligns with both Hypotheses 1b and 2b: an increasing share of Eastern immigration strengthens the negative expectation that immigration leads to welfare chauvinism (in-group/out-group theory), while it weakens the expectation that immigration softens chauvinistic sentiments (intergroup contact theory).

Table 4. Conditioning the relation between welfare chauvinism and intra-EU migration

	Model 8
EU immigration	0.137 (0.153)
Social contribution	0.020 (0.008)**
EU-immigration × social contribution	-0.004 (0.003)
Cut point 1	-2.419 (0.525)***
Cut point 2	-1.493 (0.525)***
Cut point 3	0.572 (0.525)
Cut point 4	3.067 (0.525)***
Individual controls	Included
N	30,829
N countries	21
Log likelihood	-39,388.299
Wald $\chi^2$	1,290.90
Country-level variance (null-model=0.268)	0.130

Note: The model reflects the results of multilevel ordered logit analysis and standard errors are reported between brackets.

\*p < 0.1; \*\*p < 0.05; \*\*\*p < 0.01.

### *Welfare chauvinism, intra-EU migration and the conditioning effect of the social security system*

Lastly, we examine whether our findings hold across all European countries equally, or whether it applies specifically to some countries. We test whether the source of welfare financing (social security/general taxation) conditions the relationship between intra-EU immigration and welfare chauvinism. Therefore, we included an interaction effect between this variable (i.e. the percentage of social protection financed through social insurance contributions, as opposed to general taxation) and intra-EU migration. Table 4 shows the results of this analysis.

Model 8 indicates that the relationship between migration and welfare chauvinism is unaffected by welfare financing. More precisely, the interaction term between migration and the share of social contribution coming from employers is negative, but it fails to be significant.

The positive coefficient of EU migration in model 8 would suggest that in hypothetical “pure” Beveridgean welfare states,<sup>9</sup> welfare chauvinism increases with intra-EU immigration, which aligns with Hypothesis 1b.

<sup>9</sup> Note that “pure” Beveridgean or Bismarckian systems do not occur empirically in the sample: the results in model 8 give the estimation of the overall relationship, and the inclusion of the interaction term allows for the comparison of the hypothetical “pure” systems on the basis of the estimation.

However, the coefficient is not significant. Note that among the cases that we include, the amount of social insurance contributions ranges between 28.8% (Denmark) and 80.7% (Czech Republic).

The relationship between intra-EU migration and welfare chauvinism changes insignificantly according to the share of welfare financing that come from employers. The initial effect of 0.137 (for a hypothetical “pure” Beveridgean system) between immigration and chauvinism is reduced by almost 0.004 for each unit change in the social insurance financing (in percentages; 0–100). This implies that the relationship between EU immigration and welfare chauvinism becomes negative the more a country finances welfare through employer contributions. In a situation where a country would be half financed through social insurance contributions, the effect of intra-EU migration is about  $-0.456$ .<sup>10</sup> As a further illustration, in the extreme and hypothetical case that all welfare is financed through social contributions (a hypothetical “pure” Bismarckian system), the effect of intra-EU immigration would be  $-0.228$ ,<sup>11</sup> significant at the 0.05 level. In essence, the estimation presented in model 8 indicates that the probability of having a nonwelfare chauvinistic attitude increases with the relative number of EU migrants in countries that resemble a Bismarckian system more, but not in more Beveridgean countries. However, as the interaction term in Table 4 is not significant, we cannot conclude that the effects are significantly different according to the amount of social insurance contributions to welfare.

## Conclusion

One of the greatest challenges European welfare states face is the issue of how to include newcomers (Mewes and Mau 2013, 12). In this study, we were interested in how the mounting intra-EU immigration affects people’s willingness to grant equal social rights to foreigners. We argued that that the amount of intra-EU immigration can help explain cross-country variation concerning such willingness, and we posed two contradictory hypotheses. The *in-group/out-group* theory suggests that welfare chauvinism increases with the amount of immigration, whereas from the *intergroup contact* theory it follows that welfare chauvinism decreases with the amount of immigration.

<sup>10</sup> Using the more precise and less rounded-off estimates from the analyses, this is based on:  $0.1372123 + (-0.0036553 \times 50) = -0.0455527$  (see Brambor et al. 2006 for the procedure to calculate and interpret interaction effects).

<sup>11</sup> Using the more precise and less rounded-off estimates from the analyses, this is based on:  $0.1372123 + (-0.0036553 \times 100) = -0.2283177$  (see Brambor et al. 2006 for the procedure to calculate and interpret interaction effects).

We find support for the latter hypothesis; people tend to be less welfare chauvinistic in countries where there are relatively more immigrants.<sup>12</sup> We also found that it is indeed specifically intra-EU immigration that is associated with welfare chauvinism. In other words, welfare state solidarity with immigrants partly depends on whether immigration is driven by EU movement or not. We do not find that the relationship is different for more Beveridgean or more Bismarckian welfare systems: while it appears that the relationship is somewhat more pronounced in countries where welfare is financed more through social insurance contributions, this effect is not significantly different from that in systems where welfare is financed through general taxation.

Finally, we find that the relative size of Eastern European immigration can be vital with respect to how immigration affects attitudes towards welfare chauvinism. More specifically, the larger the size East European immigration relative to immigration from other EU countries, the higher the level of welfare chauvinism. This finding, we argued, can partly be explained by the in-group/out-group theory. When East European immigration dominates, it becomes easier for natives to view them as an “out-group” and to differentiate between “us” and “them”, which can result in welfare chauvinism.

Building on our study, future research should further explore the effects of intra-EU immigration. With an ever increasing mobility of labour within the European Union, as well as the increasing number of asylum seekers, questions about how people react to immigration – and different types of immigration – are important. Over the last decade, Europe has seen the rise of populist, extreme right-wing, as well as Eurosceptic parties. It is thus crucial that this issue is examined further.

One important element here may also be the way in which countries deal with immigration. Different countries have different ways of proposing how (different types of) immigrants need to integrate. It may be fruitful to examine these different regimes and policies, and see whether one is more successful than the other. Furthermore, the speed of immigration can play an important role in how people’s attitudes develop (see also Hopkins 2010). There may be a difference between a steady increase in immigration of several years versus the sudden income of a large amount of immigrants

<sup>12</sup> For a related discussion, see Cappelen and Midtbø (2016), who used a set of survey experiments to measure causal effects of intra-EU labour immigration on attitudes towards welfare spending in Norway. First, they found that intra-EU labour immigration can have a negative effect on general preferences for social spending. Second, by conducting a list experiment they found that (a) welfare chauvinism is a sensitive issue that can be underreported in traditional opinion surveys, and (b) that welfare chauvinistic sentiments are relatively strong in Norway. However, they did not explicitly measure whether the extent of welfare chauvinism depends on the amount of intra-EU immigration.

at one moment in time. These, and more, issues need to be investigated further, as to shed more light on this important topic.

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### Supplementary material

To view supplementary material for this article, please visit <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0143814X17000150>

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## Appendix

Table A1. Operationalization

	Indicator	Value Meaning
Individual-level variables (ESS 2008)		
Welfare chauvinism	“Thinking of people coming to live in [country] from other countries, when do you think they should obtain the same rights to social benefits and services as citizens already living here? Please choose the option on this card that comes closest to your view”.	1–5; 1 = immediately on arrival, 2 = after living in [country] for a year, 3 = only after they have worked and paid taxes for at least a year, 4 = once they have become a [country] citizen, 5 = they should never get the same rights
Left-right	“In politics people sometimes talk of ‘left’ and ‘right’. Using this card, where would you place yourself on this scale, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?”	0–10; 0 = left, 10 = right
Female	Respondent’s gender	Recoded: 0 = male, 1 = female
Age	Age of the respondent	Age
Education	“What is the highest level of education you have achieved?”	1–5, ranging from less than lower secondary education to tertiary education completed
Income (subjective)	“Which of the descriptions on this card comes closest to how you feel about your household’s income nowadays?”	1–4; 1 = living comfortably on present income, 2 = coping on present income, 3 = finding it difficult on present income, 4 = finding it very difficult on present income
Employment status	“Which of the descriptions on this card applies to what he/she has been doing for the last 7 days?”, recoded into a series of dummy variables. Included here: paid work (= reference group); unemployed; disabled/sick/retired; education/military service/ housework, etc.	Paid work (1) Unemployed (1) Disabled/retired (1) Education/housework (1)

Table A1: *Continued*

	Indicator	Value Meaning
EU feeling	“Now thinking about the European Union, some say European unification should go further. Others say it has already gone too far. Using this card, what number on the scale best describes your position?”	0–10; 0 = unification has already gone too far, 10 = unification should go further
Perceived need	“... how likely it is that during the next 12 months you will be” unemployed/take care of family members/have too low income/need health care. Combination of four questions	1–4; 1 = not at all likely, 4 = very likely (any one of these)
Trust system	“... please tell me on a score of 0–10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out ...” Index made out of two objects of trust – <i>National parliament</i> and <i>legal system</i> : variables are added and divided by two	0–10; 0 = do not trust, 10 = complete trust
Trust people	“... would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?”	0–10; 0 = you can’t be too careful, 10 = most people can be trusted
Socially active	“Compared to other people of your age, how often would you say you take part in social activities?”	1–7; 1 = much less than most, 5 = much more than most
Welfare state legitimacy	“People have different views on what the responsibilities of governments should or should not be. For each of the tasks I read out please tell me on a score of 0–10 how much responsibility you think governments should have”. Combined index of: ensure a job for everyone; ensure adequate health care; ensure a reasonable standard of living for the old; ensure a reasonable standard of living for the unemployed; ensure sufficient child care services	0–10; 0 = should not be government’s responsibility at all, 10 = should be entirely government’s responsibility

Table A1. *Continued*

	Source	Indicator	Value Meaning
Country-level variables			
EU migration	Eurostat	% of the population that is a citizen from (another) EU27 country, in 2007	% of the population
EU migration ESS	ESS 2008	The number of people born in another European Economic Area (EEA) country as a percentage of the respondents, based on the question: "In which country were you born?"	% of respondents
Foreign-born	World Bank (World Development Indicators (WDI))	Immigration stock: the total number of people born in a country other than where they live, as a percentage of the population, 2005	% of the population
Non-EU	(See above)	"Foreign-born" minus "EU migration"	% of the population
Non-EU ESS	ESS 2008	The number of people born outside of the EEA area as a percentage of the respondents, based on the question: "In which country were you born?"	% of respondents
East EU migration	ESS 2008	The number of people born in another East European EEA country as a percentage of the respondents, based on the question: "In which country were you born?"	% of respondents
Social benefits	Eurostat	Social benefits and transfers to households, in cash or in kind, by government units, as a percentage of GDP, 2007	% of GDP
Gini	Eurostat	Gini coefficient of equalized disposable income, 2007	0–1; higher coefficients means higher economic inequality
PPP per capita	IMF; economic outlook	GDP in PPP per capita, expressed in 1,000s and dollars, 2007	1,000 dollar-units
Unemployment	World Bank (WDI)	Unemployment as % of the labour force in 2007	% of the labour force
Social insurance finance	Eurostat	% of total social protection that is financed through social insurance contributions, 2005 (see <a href="https://www.cesifo-group.de/ifoHome/facts/DICE/Social-Policy/Pensions/General-Structure/bismarck-beveridge-dicereport408-db6/fileBinary/bsimarck-beveridge-dicereport408-db6.pdf">https://www.cesifo-group.de/ifoHome/facts/DICE/Social-Policy/Pensions/General-Structure/bismarck-beveridge-dicereport408-db6/fileBinary/bsimarck-beveridge-dicereport408-db6.pdf</a> )	The lower the %, the more Beveridgean the welfare system; the lower the %, the more Bismarckian the system

Note: ESS = European Social Survey; GDP = gross domestic product; PPP = purchasing power-parity; IMF = International Monetary Fund.