

The uses of history by the Polish democratic opposition in the late 1970s

Siobhan Doucette*

Independent Scholar

(Received 6 August 2016; accepted 22 November 2016)

During the late 1970s, members of the Polish democratic opposition revised and reinterpreted key elements in the Polish past in support of their contemporary ideas about Polish society and opposition. The birth of the independent press in Poland in 1976 provided these debates with a medium for wide dissemination and discussion. Analysis of democratic opposition debates in the independent press on the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, historic Polish–Russian relations, and the struggle for and achievement of independence in the early twentieth century shed light on the ways in which the democratic opposition perceived Polish society and the legacy of tolerance, diversity, nationalism, and socialism within it. It also reveals the major divisions within the democratic opposition and its primary tactical proposals prior to the birth of the Solidarity trade union in 1980. Forty years later, these debates continue to reverberate.

Keywords: Poland; democratic opposition; civil resistance; independent press; nationalism

Introduction

The coalescence of the Polish democratic opposition and its creation of a widespread independent press led to new battles in the war for the Polish past.¹ From 1976, the independent press provided an arena for free historical debate within Poland.² Editor Mirosław Chojecki claimed that his preeminent independent publishing house, NOWa, had been founded because he and his colleagues could no longer remain idle as Polish history was falsified by the state authorities (Chojecki 1980, 16). Publications that dealt with events in the Polish past, over which the communist regime had decreed a veil of silence, were quickly produced.³ More provocative were works that reinterpreted and reassessed the Polish past to discuss pressing contemporary issues, such as the nature of Polish society and the best means for achieving democracy and independence. From 1976 to 1980, discord mounted within the rapidly growing ranks of the democratic opposition, and debates over the past became heated; history became a stand-in for the major divisions within the democratic opposition. These divisions continue to reverberate in Polish political life.

Just as the communist authorities selected specific individuals and events in Polish history for particular censure and revision, activists in the democratic opposition tended to concentrate on specific historical periods, topics, and figures when revisiting Polish history within the independent press. Although the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth

*Email: siobhandoucette@hotmail.com

had ceased to exist in the eighteenth century, references to it appeared in the independent press in deliberations on the legacies of democracy, tolerance, and diversity in modern Poland. The democratic opposition examined historic relations with Russia in order to propose means for achieving independence from the Soviet Union. The main focus for historical references and debates within the independent press was the struggle for independence prior to 1918 and the interwar Polish state. The emphasis on this period was understandable given the democratic opposition's prioritization of independence and democracy: 1918 was Poland's most successful bid for independence while the interwar state was the last time democracy had existed in Poland. Through debates and comments about the 1905 uprising and the independent Polish state created in 1918, the democratic opposition expounded on nationalism, socialism, and tactics for attaining democracy and independence.

To explore the various ways in which those in the Polish democratic opposition used the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, Polish–Russian relations, and the successful struggle for independence in the early twentieth century, this article analyzes publications by Jacek Kuroń, Adam Michnik, Antoni Macierewicz, Leszek Moczulski, and Aleksander Hall within the independent press. Although these five men all studied history in university, they were selected not due to their historical skills, but rather because of the substantial and specific role each played within the democratic opposition and its press. Kuroń, Macierewicz, and Michnik were at the forefront of the Committee for the Defense of Workers (KOR), the most significant oppositional group in Poland; Kuroń and Michnik were connected with the majority, socialist-leaning wing of KOR, and Macierewicz was central to KOR's secondary Głos group (Lipski 1985, 201). Both Moczulski and Hall were original signatories of the Movement for the Defense of Human and Civil Rights (ROPCiO), which, after KOR, was the most noteworthy milieu within the Polish active opposition. Moczulski was a ROPCiO leader while Hall was pivotal to ROPCiO's youth circle in Gdansk. By 1979, ROPCiO splintered and both Moczulski and Hall split from it. Moczulski became head of the Confederation for Independent Poland, the opposition's first political party, while Hall was important to the Movement of Young Poland (Waligóra 2006, 54, 69–70). Each of these five men published widely in the independent press, edited important periodicals, and entered into diverse debates on the Polish past.⁴ Spanning the democratic opposition's political spectrum, these authors' works reflect the ways in which history was reevaluated to expound upon and bolster various contemporary views. And the authors themselves, in many ways, personify the legacy of this period in post-communist Poland.

Polish–Lithuanian commonwealth

The Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth and pre-partition Poland generally emerged, within the pages of the independent press, as bastions of tolerance and democracy. More contentious was the inheritance of these traditions in contemporary Poland. Also controversial was the legacy of diversity within the Polish nation and state. To explore considerations on this period, publications by Jacek Kuroń and Leszek Moczulski will be analyzed. Both Kuroń and Moczulski were older than the other authors under consideration and were treated as senior in KOR and ROPCiO, respectively. Their ruminations thus shed light on the division between KOR and ROPCiO.

Kuroń⁵ presented a historical vision of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth that underlined parliamentary democracy and pluralism. Kuroń ([1976] 2010a, 84) explained that in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and again briefly in the eighteenth century, Poles had experienced parliamentary democracy. He claimed ([1979] 2010d, 176) that

Polish culture “grew out of traditions from the Commonwealth of Many Nations and included integral elements of European culture so that it embraced pluralism and universalism.” Similarly, he insisted that the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) was formed “in the name of the highest values of European culture” (Kuroń and Starczewski 1979, 44). By aligning the Commonwealth with parliamentary democracy and pluralism, he sought to show that each was part of Polish tradition, and suggested that these were sources of strength, since the periods he invoked were times when the Commonwealth was at its most celebrated. By providing an analogous cultural provenance for the PPS, he indicated that socialism ought to be treated as native.

Kuroń also turned to Polish history to emphasize tolerance and national diversity. He insisted that limiting Polishness to the ethnic, Catholic sense would mean creating a Polish identity without the Jagiellonians, Adam Mickiewicz, Frederic Chopin, and Tadeusz Kościuszko ([1978] 2010c, 135–136). Yet, according to Kuroń, this is largely what happened when in interwar Poland, the national question was not solved “in the spirit of the Republic of Many Nations.” By listing widely recognized Polish luminaries who were not ethnic Catholic Poles, Kuroń put names to his contention that national diversity was a boon to Polish culture and society. His claim that the traditions of diversity and tolerance, which he associated with the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, were not maintained by the interwar Polish state reflected his belief that these traditions lost their dominance in twentieth-century Poland as modern nationalism took root. According to Kuroń, however, they were not entirely dead: he singled out the socialists for allegedly maintaining such traditions (1979, 44). A self-described social democrat, Kuroń, as was common within the independent press, linked his current political allegiance with the historical traditions he celebrated (Kuroń [1987] 1995, 305). Leszek Moczulski⁶ (1976, 3, 7) referenced the *szlachta*’s “golden freedoms” and the *liberum veto* to argue that Poland had a long history of democracy and tolerance. While Kuroń described the Commonwealth’s tolerance as an important element in the Polish cultural tradition, Moczulski presented it as the sole, overriding Polish tradition. Moczulski’s remarks about the Commonwealth thus leave the reader with a sense of cultural unity; a unity that, he insisted, continued to exist in Poland (Moczulski 1976, 2). As such, while Kuroń’s historical considerations emphasized diversity and carried the implicit (and at times explicit) contention that toleration needed expansion within modern Poland, according to Moczulski, Polish society was inherently tolerant. Furthermore, although Moczulski, like Kuroń, had joined the Communist Party in his youth, he did not identify with socialism and did not link democracy and tolerance with the political left, as did Kuroń.

In what were largely cursory remarks on the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, Kuroń and Moczulski disclosed much about their contemporary convictions. Kuroń’s argument that, historically, tolerance was but one element within Polish political culture indicated his desire to strengthen this strand. In contrast, Moczulski, by treating tolerance as an overriding norm, suggested that it did not require fortification. Moczulski’s depiction of pre-partition Poland conveyed a sense of cultural unity that contrasted significantly with Kuroń’s focus on diversity. Kuroń’s association of the Commonwealth’s cultural traditions with the political left exposed his current political views and his desire to revitalize socialism by associating it with historical trends that were distinct from the discredited ruling regime. Moczulski, who did not identify with the political left, made no such connections. Despite their other differences, it is significant that both Kuroń and Moczulski underlined the democracy of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth.

Differing valuations of the past can be linked to differing proposals for opposition. Kuroń ([1976] 2010a, 87–88; [1978] 2010b, 100–102), who celebrated historical diversity and

pluralism, endorsed an amorphous, pluralistic opposition that would spread certain values and thus bring about evolutionary change in society and the state. Moczulski (1978a, 22) disapproved of divisions within the democratic opposition and alleged that they conjured images of historical “Polish anarchy” in the general populace. He sought a unified and even hierarchical opposition in order to confront the state authorities (Moczulski 1976, 16, 24; Moczulski 1978c, 38). His proposals aimed directly at the creation of an independent Poland, which he believed would be innately democratic; Kuroń sought the expansion of democratic values on the path to a democratic and independent Poland.

Poland and Russia

Because the Soviet Union was understood by those in the democratic opposition to be the guarantor of the Polish People’s Republic, Poland’s geopolitical position and the ways in which it could and should interact with the Soviet Union became a frequent point of discussion. Because this was not the first time a foreign power had blocked Polish democracy and independence, historical interpretation often took center stage in debates. A 1976 essay by Kuroń, a 1977 article that was coauthored by Kuroń, Michnik, and Macierewicz, as well as a 1979 exchange between Macierewicz and Hall demonstrate the ways in which relations with the Soviet Union were envisaged and how history shaped proposals for Poland’s relations with its neighbors. They also reflect the radicalization of demands within the opposition.

Kuroń, in 1976, put forward the idea of Finlandization, meaning that Poles could, like Finland, seek parliamentary democracy with limits on internal and external politics in relation to direct Soviet interests. Kuroń thought this was possible because he believed Soviet reliance on Western economic ties inhibited invasion. So while Poland’s totalitarian regime had been foisted upon the people by the Soviet Union with the acquiescence of its Western allies, according to Kuroń, those countries could now play a role in Poland regaining its sovereignty ([1976] 2010a, 80, 92, 95).

In the first issue of the KOR serial, *Głos*, Kuroń, Michnik,⁷ and Macierewicz⁸ co-wrote an article insisting that “the realistic program for Polish sovereignty” was predicated upon solidarity with Poland’s eastern neighbors (Ukraine, Lithuania, and Belarus) in their struggles for independence (1977, 23–24). This article reflected a point of concord, transcending the split within KOR among Macierewicz, Kuroń, and Michnik. It also seemed to negate Kuroń’s proposed Finlandization, as support for sovereignty for any Socialist Republic infringed upon the idea of a neutral Poland.

Macierewicz expounded further on Poland’s relations with Russia in a 1979 article in *Głos*, in which he described Soviet imperial goals as a continuation of those of tsarist Russia. He wrote that just as the tsars had sought control of the Black Sea, a Baltic port, and a border on the Vistula, so too did the Soviets. Furthermore, he insisted that the Soviet methods of expansion were those of the tsars (1979a, 40). Macierewicz argued that the Russian long-term goal to colonize Poland and its eastern neighbors (Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine) had been confirmed at Yalta due to betrayal by Poland’s allies (43). Macierewicz placed the contemporary Polish independence struggle within the context of an enduring contest between Poland and its neighbors against the Russian state and its modern variant, the Soviet Union. This historical interpretation justified Macierewicz’s support for cooperation with Poland’s neighboring nations against the USSR.

Hall⁹ (1979c, 13) agreed with Macierewicz that, from the partitions to the present, Russia was the main opponent to Polish independence, yet Hall proposed a program of

future reconciliation between Poles and Russians. Hall (14) contended that World War II had demonstrated that the West could not be counted on and that the sacrifice of millions of Polish lives still could result in Polish vassalage to Moscow. Hall (16) argued that in the future, whether the Polish and Russian states remained direct neighbors or not, Russia would be a powerful nation so that the “normalization of relations with Russia” was in the Polish interest as long as Russia recognized the Polish right to independence and disclosed the truth in historical Polish–Russian relations. Hall continued that the ideal situation would be having Poland surrounded by independent nation-states (Czech, Ukrainian, Lithuanian, etc.) with whom Poland could pursue friendship and cooperation. However, in all likelihood, a future Polish state would border the Soviet Union. Hall claimed, therefore, that the Polish nation had to decide if when independent, it would stay out of Soviet internal affairs or if it would attempt to destroy the USSR as a “prison of nations.” Hall concluded that while morally Poland would have to voice support for the independence and freedom of all nations, politically, each nation decides its own fate, and the USSR would never agree to an independent Poland that aimed to become an “anti-Russian Piedmont” (17–18).

In these debates the contemporary and the historical fully intertwined. Kuroń’s support for Finlandization was predicated on his conviction that the Soviet Union would not, based on its past behaviors, concede to full independence, but that democratization was a possibility. Although innovative in 1977, this proposal, by 1979, was treated by some in the democratic opposition as feeble, if not treacherous (Moczulski [1979] 1994, 551–552). Already by 1977, the endorsement of Poland’s eastern neighbors’ struggles for independence meant that Kuroń as well as Michnik and Macierewicz were suggesting that a future Poland was not to be as unaligned as was Finland. Active support for the sovereignty of Ukraine, Lithuania, and Belarus was one of the few points of accord among Macierewicz, Michnik, and Kuroń. Hall disagreed, suggesting this stance was “romantic.” However, according to Macierewicz’s presentation of historical Polish–Russian relations, Hall was unrealistic in imagining that the Soviet Union would ever freely acknowledge Poland’s right to independence. These exchanges bore striking similarities to disputes in Poland prior to the achievement of independence in 1918; Hall’s belief that an arrangement could be worked out with the Soviet Union echoed the views of the National Democrats vis-à-vis the Russian Empire, while Macierewicz’s distrust of the Soviets and support for sovereignty for Poland’s neighboring nations placed him within the political legacy of Józef Piłsudski, interwar Poland’s first head of state.

The struggle and achievement of Polish independence

Mentions of Poland’s struggle for independence in the early twentieth century and the interwar Polish state were particularly censored by the communist authorities.¹⁰ Polish emigration publications and, from 1976, the independent press, were extremely important mediums for assessing this period and its main activists. All of the five authors under discussion published on this topic, expounding on nationalism, socialism, and the contemporary struggle for democracy and independence.

In 1973, the Józef Piłsudski Institute in London held an essay competition on the topic “Józef Piłsudski in the Eyes of Young Poles.” The winning entry was Michnik’s “Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors,” subsequently published in the Paris-based *Kultura* in 1975 and then in the Polish independent press in 1977 as a pamphlet by NOWa (1987a, FN201). It raises the major points of contention related to the early twentieth-century Polish

history and so provides a valuable point of departure for debates within the democratic opposition on the Polish struggle for independence and interwar Poland.

Michnik's presentation of Piłsudski was personal; in describing his relationship to Piłsudski, Michnik traced his own maturation and departure from Communist allegiance. Michnik ([1975] 1987b, 202) explained that as a young man he was raised in a Communist family and had accepted the official portrayal of Piłsudski as a "dictator," author of a fascist constitution, [and] an enemy of progress. Michnik added that he had believed that post-1956 Poland was an independent, socialist state. The year 1968 changed everything for Michnik (203). In that year, student protests dovetailed with an intraparty struggle in the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR) between the supporters of PZPR First Secretary Władysław Gomułka and those of Mieczysław Moczar, who espoused an anti-Russian and anti-Semitic nationalism. During the protests, students faced anti-intellectual and anti-Semitic attacks by not only the state authorities, but also members of the general public. In the wake of the protests, many of the remaining Jews in Poland were coerced into immigrating (Eisler 1991; Raina 1978, 169–170; Snyder 2010, 275).

The attacks on Polish intellectuals and students in 1968 (particularly those with Jewish ancestry) as well as the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia destroyed Michnik's illusions about the Polish People's Republic (Michnik [1975] 1987b, 203). In searching for analogies with the present, Michnik looked to the past and happened upon a 1905 letter in which the National Democratic leader, Roman Dmowski, argued to the Russian premier, Sergei Witte, that the revolutionary movements sweeping across Poland were the work of Jews. Dmowski claimed that if the Russians handed Warsaw over to the National Democratic Poles, they could put an end to the socialist fighting squads that were causing unrest; the head of these squads was Józef Piłsudski (205). Thus begins Michnik's reappraisal of Piłsudski.

Michnik emphasized Piłsudski's alleged tolerance and appreciation for diversity, while suggesting that these values were lacking within both the Polish nationalist tradition and the contemporary regime. Michnik ([1975] 1987b, 208) insisted that Piłsudski "condemned the direction of nationalist feeling into anti-Semitism." Instead, Michnik (213) claimed, "Piłsudski saw Poland as the motherland of many nations, a commonwealth of many cultures." Michnik (214) contrasted these views with the "National Democratic mode of thought adopted by the ruling communists [that] commands pride in national uniformity."

Michnik used Piłsudski to stress the positive role played by socialists within the Polish struggle for independence and the desirability of peaceful struggle. He contended that Piłsudski "understood perfectly that the defeat of Russia would hardly restore sovereignty ..." so that Piłsudski's Polish Socialist Party (PPS) "sought to train Poles in the spirit of independence." Michnik underlined the importance of the socialist paper *Robotnik*, of which Piłsudski had been editor. According to Michnik, "[a] society in captivity must produce an illegal literature because it must know the truth about itself" ([1975] 1987b, 207.) Although Michnik acknowledged Piłsudski's armed struggle, he focused on Piłsudski's advocacy for education through publishing.

Piłsudski the interwar leader is less favorably treated by Michnik than the prewar revolutionary. Still, Michnik argued that although independence was possible in 1918 due to the international situation, it was won thanks to Piłsudski's Legions and the PPS. Additionally, he claimed that current "opposition to Sovietization is possible in large measure because of the cultural heritage of the Second Republic," which Piłsudski's victory over the Soviets in 1920 bequeathed to contemporary Poles ([1975] 1987b, 219). However, Michnik (221–222) did condemn Piłsudski's 1926 coup, the 1930 Brześć Affair (which saw the arrest of political opponents), and the political camp at Bereza.

Michnik's essay is as much about contemporary Poland and Michnik's loss of faith in the regime as it is about Piłsudski. Indeed, at the beginning of the essay, Michnik ([1975] 1987b, 202) contended that Poland is a country where history has often served as a pretext for disputes about the present. Michnik's stress on Piłsudski's tolerance and idea of Poland as diverse and inclusive underline Michnik's own views. Michnik's extremely positive portrayal of the PPS and its juxtaposition with the National Democrats, whom Michnik tacitly treated as the precursors to the PZPR and the anti-Semitic outburst in 1968, point to a controversial rewriting of history. Equally controversial is the emphasis Michnik placed on Piłsudski's struggle for independence through education and publishing. While Piłsudski was indeed the editor of the underground paper *Robotnik*, he was, and is, rightly most associated with armed struggle. Michnik, in electing to highlight Piłsudski's support for the production of independent literature, is providing his own proposals for opposition (non-violent social and educational initiatives; see Michnik [1977] 1987c) with the imprimatur of tradition, rather than providing an accurate historical analysis of Piłsudski's independence struggle.

Michnik's essay provoked a direct response from Hall, who identified, in part, with the National Democratic tradition. Hall challenged what he described as Michnik's portrayal of the Socialists as patriots and the National Democrats as propagators of racial hatred and collaborators with the Russians. Hall also took issue with Michnik's linking of the National Democratic tradition with Poland's communist regime (1978a, 14).

Hall claimed that Piłsudski, in Michnik's essay, became a symbol to contrast against the similarly emblematic National Democrats and their leader, Dmowski. Hall contended that by focusing on Piłsudski in tandem with the events of 1905, Michnik had highlighted, to a misleading degree, both Piłsudski's socialism and the nature of the 1905 protests. Hall pointed out that not long after 1905, Piłsudski had split from the PPS. Furthermore, he argued that while Piłsudski did seek to resurrect an independent Polish state in 1905, this was not true of many who participated in the 1905 protests. Hall claimed that numerous protesters in 1905, including those in the Marxist movement Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania (SDKPiL), saw revolution in Poland as serving Russian revolution and that, for them, the struggle was about class, not nation. "With certainty Polish matters were closer to the heart of Dmowski than [SDKPiL activist] Rosa Luxemburg," he wrote (1978a, 15–16). The inference is that Dmowski's opposition to the 1905 protests was directed less at Piłsudski than at figures such as Luxemburg, who notoriously had not endorsed Polish independence (Luxemburg [1896] 1976). Luxemburg was used almost as shorthand by some in the democratic opposition for those who betrayed the cause of Polish independence.

Hall rejected the coupling of the nationalist tradition with the PZPR and instead, more conventionally, aligned the PZPR with the socialists. He explained that those from the PPS who espoused a different vision than Piłsudski later formed the Communist Workers' Party of Poland (KPRP) and the Communist Party of Poland (KPP). The KKP with the PPS in 1948 formed the PZPR. Furthermore, Hall maintained that, like the PZPR's humanist phraseology, its nationalist rhetoric was instrumental and was, in fact, employed in anti-patriotic ways (1978a, 16). Hall's response to Michnik provides a secondary line of argumentation about the Piłsudski–Dmowski division in 1905 along with a differing theoretical basis for the PZPR. These differences point to Hall's effort toward rejuvenating the Polish nationalist tradition.

Hall entered into an additional polemic with Michnik in late 1978. For the first issue of the independent journal *Krytyka*, both Michnik and Kuroń (1978) wrote brief articles on the 1968 protests that raised the specter of nationalism in contemporary Poland. Michnik (1978, 25–26) wrote of not only the national chauvinism of the authorities in 1968 but also singled

out articles from that time condemning the student protesters in xenophobic terms, which Michnik contended had been coauthored by Leszek Moczulski. These allegations are crucial to understanding the division between KOR and ROPCiO as well as the focus by some in the democratic opposition on Poland's prewar nationalists. For Michnik (and Kuroń), the national chauvinism expressed in 1968 was not an aberrant strand of nationalism deriving from the PZPR, but was instead the continuation of a tradition that dated to the prewar nationalists and persisted.

Hall, in response to the first issue of *Krytyka*, answered the lingering charge of intolerance and racism levied against the National Democrats, the allegation that their nationalism could be linked to those who attacked Jewish citizens in 1968, and the additional charge that some in ROPCiO could be linked to Mieczysław Moczar's nationalism in 1968. "Polishness was never restricted only to the biological, racial sphere, but was defined above all else as a chosen attitude, determined primarily upon actions, consciousness, and spirit," Hall wrote. He insisted that this was the traditional thought of the National Democrats and Dmowski and was visible in nationalist assimilationist policies toward minorities (except Jews). Hall added that although the National Democratic platform was admittedly "anti-Jewish," its anti-Semitism was not racist but was instead predicated on political, economic, and civilizational foundations (1978c, 12). Tackling the purported connection between the events of 1968 and the National Democrats, Hall claimed that different types of nationalist ideology exist so that making connections between the National Democrats and Moczar was a gross simplification. Hall argued that while one may dislike the National Democrats, it is absurd to suggest that they and Moczar embraced the same kind of nationalist ideology (13). Furthermore, Hall (14) concluded that his cosignatory in ROPCiO, Leszek Moczulski was a neo-Piłsudskite and could not be linked to Moczar's nationalism.

Hall's historical presentation of early twentieth-century Poland, like Michnik's, is most helpful in revealing his own ideological commitments. Hall's implication that Dmowski opposed Piłsudski in 1905 by default as a result of his opposition to Luxemburg and her ilk, like his insistence that National Democratic anti-Semitism was based on civilizational differences rather than racism, is contentious at best. While one could challenge Michnik's ([1975] 1987b, 203, 204) assertion that in 1968 an "anti-intelligentsia and anti-Semitic pogrom... conducted with the active consent of a significant part of the population" occurred, by questioning how "significant" popular support was, Hall's (1978a, 17) counter that "our patriotism never transformed into aggressive, intolerant chauvinism" and references to Moczar's nationalism in 1968 rather than society's is specious (Gross 2006). What Hall's arguments do prove is his desire to prevent the nationalist tradition from being besmirched by a negative legacy of anti-Semitism, association with the regime, and opposition to Piłsudski. His treatment of Moczulski likewise demonstrates his goal of dividing negative aspects of the nationalist tradition from his current sympathies. Similar efforts to separate anti-Semitism from the National Democratic tradition continue in Poland.¹¹

Not only Hall's and Michnik's differences, but also their similarities are enlightening. Both, while not associating ideologically with Piłsudski, presented him in a fairly positive light; they thereby pointed to his decisive role in Polish national consciousness and the contemporary desire within the democratic opposition to align with, if not appropriate, his legacy. It is surely noteworthy that Hall, in defending Moczulski, linked him to Piłsudski. Both Michnik and Hall rejected racism. Michnik did so by associating it with the political trend he opposed, while Hall attempted to detach it from the tradition he embraced. Both sought to resurrect and redefine political traditions from the early twentieth century and

link them to contemporary Poland; for Michnik this meant reinterpreting the Socialist past while for Hall it was the Nationalists who were reassessed.

Macierewicz, in an apparent reference to such exchanges, argued that the establishment of the Polish People's Republic was such a caesura that drawing connections from the present opposition to past political trends was problematic. He insisted that such attempts at association were often ahistorical and made to discredit others within the opposition. Macierewicz pointed out that in 1905 the nationalist leader, Dmowski, supported organic work rather than armed uprising, arguably aligning him programmatically with KOR, and yet KOR was generally coupled with the political left, not the right, and never with Dmowski (1978a, 21–22). Furthermore, while the left historically had struggled against particularism, those in the opposition who identified with the left contemporaneously sought to limit state power (Macierewicz 1978b, 14). Labels such as left and right and claims of continuity from these traditions were therefore often baseless, according to Macierewicz.

Although he may have cautioned against linking pre-World War II political traditions to those within the contemporary democratic opposition, Macierewicz's treatment of Poland's struggle for independence in the early twentieth century revealed much about his current plans for opposition. Rather than focusing on the role of Piłsudski's Legionnaires and the armed independence struggle in 1918, Macierewicz (1977, 2) claimed that "most important" in winning independence was the existence of groups such as the PPS and the National Democrats, who, despite "different methods and world views," aimed to create an independent Polish state. Later, Macierewicz (1978d, 6) argued that the road to independence in 1918 had come through the rebuilding of society through educational activities, societal work, and physical struggle. His enumeration of educational and societal work prior to physical struggle reflected his contention that the current struggle for independence depended on civic activism and the rebuilding of society. Macierewicz (1979b, 7) claimed that Poles "have a rich tradition of struggling for independence" and had, during World War II, exhibited exceptional heroism, solidarity, and courage. However, they lacked the tradition of peacefully working for the rights of citizens. As such, he endorsed an election boycott in order to school the contemporary generation in collective action and civic struggle aimed at independence.

Macierewicz's historical reflections shed light not only on his proposals for opposition, but also on what was for some the primary division within the democratic opposition, that in KOR (Eisler 2003, 171). Unlike Hall, Macierewicz did not fervently champion the nationalist tradition, but also unlike Kuroń and Michnik, Macierewicz's historical analyses show a real appreciation for it. In crediting the National Democratic contribution to independence in 1918 and claiming that KOR could be linked programmatically to Dmowski, Macierewicz distanced himself from Kuroń and Michnik. Both Kuroń and Michnik were anxious about the Polish nationalist tradition and anti-Semitism within it, but Macierewicz (1978c, 38) claimed that "anti-Semitism is not particularly close to the Polish national tradition." Macierewicz worried less about the nationalist tradition than the Communist tradition, which, he said (1978b, 14), was visible among not only the state authorities, but also those who identified with the "non-Communist left." Suspicion of those who had previously identified with Communism, including Michnik and Kuroń, was rife within the KOR *Głos* group in which Macierewicz was central (Grochola 2006, 100; Kuroń 2009, 415, 420, 493–494, 496; Romaszewski 2008, 463, 522–523).

Kuroń, who warned against the sacrilization of history, is the only author discussed here who did not positively depict Piłsudski in his contributions to the independent press. Kuroń ([1979] 2010d, 178) claimed that "for Piłsudski, Poland was a kind of holy entity, for which

only he could speak. His whole life he served Poland but also for her he ... broke the will of the Polish citizenry.” Kuroń ([1978] 2010c, 117, 127) insisted that Piłsudski’s successor, the Sanacja regime, essentialized and spoke for the state, which Kuroń warned could lead to dictatorship. Kuroń saw an analogous tendency in the writings of Leszek Moczulski, due to what Kuroń presented, as Moczulski’s focus on the state rather than the individual. Here we see, first, the linking of a contemporary rival with a historical tradition that is being discredited and, second, Kuroń’s overriding emphasis on the individual.

Kuroń’s major historical critique was directed not at Piłsudski but at the nationalists. He thus penned an open letter to the editors of *Bratniak* (among whom was Hall), who sought to “decode new values” from the National Democratic tradition (Eisler 2003, 142–143). In his letter, which was printed in *Bratniak*, Kuroń ([1979] 2010d, 159, 160) insisted that in Poland “anti-Semitism was a significant element of national ideology.” While acknowledging that he did not perceive the racism and excesses of the interwar nationalists in the pages of *Bratniak*, Kuroń ([1978] 2010c 127; [1979] 2010d, 157, 159) still called on its editors to disavow this history just as he had denounced the totalitarian elements in the left’s historical program. Furthermore, Kuroń raised the issue of the difference between the theories espoused in *Bratniak* and their potential practice. He questioned whether those who were not part of Hall’s “moral, spiritual, and cultural” Polish nation still had a place in the Polish state. He expressed apprehension that the editors of *Bratniak*, by arguing that intolerance is “foreign to the Polish national spirit,” implied a unity of ideals that Kuroń did not believe existed in any society. Kuroń worried that such statements could result in the exclusion of those individuals not defined as part of the communal whole (Kuroń [1979] 2010d, 161–162). Kuroń (138) argued succinctly that “we hope to create in Poland, a fatherland for all people, who want to live in it.” For Kuroń, the goal was a pluralistic opposition that would help to engender a pluralistic and democratic Poland.

Like Michnik, Kuroń attempted to use interwar history to rescue the socialist legacy and divide it from that of the ruling party in order to justify contemporary tactics, alignments, and aims for the opposition and society. He argued (1979, 44) that during the interwar period, the PPS was the greatest defender of parliamentary democracy in the face of the “anti-parliamentary fascism of the nationalists” and the “autocratic tendencies of the Sanacja.” He avowed that the majority of the PPS had rejected Communism and that even those who sought cooperation with the Communists had not approved of Soviet Communism. Instead, Kuroń (1978, 21) treated the interwar nationalists as precursors to the current regime when he argued that Communism had become ideologically empty so that it was “national totalitarianism” that posed the greatest ideological threat to the democratic opposition.

Kuroń’s portrayal of interwar Poland reinforced his contemporary views and clarified divisions within the democratic opposition. Echoing his depiction of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, he again heralded parliamentary democracy, pluralism, and toleration, associating them with the socialists. In contrast, Piłsudski (who in this period was not linked to the PPS) is criticized as a betrayer of democracy while Dmowski and the National Democrats are presented as racists and linked to the PZPR. Differences with both Macierewicz and Hall over the threat of nationalism reflect a significant point of disagreement within KOR and between KOR and ROPCiO. By equating Moczulski with those he opposed historically, Kuroń seconded Michnik’s suspicions of Moczulski and underlined the distance between Moczulski and the grouping within KOR that included Michnik and Kuroń.

Hall (1979b, 31) responded to Kuroń’s open letter to *Bratniak*, reiterating his belief that nations are not determined by ancestry or race. Hall (32) claimed further that while he and

his milieu embraced elements of National Democratic thought, they also drew inspiration from Gaullism and Romantic-independence thought, implying that since he derived influence from a variety of sources, there was no need for him personally to denounce National Democratic anti-Semitism. Indeed, Hall, who often repeated that he was part of a younger generation,¹² had earlier insisted that “mechanically” referring to nineteenth-century ideas to explain current discourse led to a false understanding of reality since an entirely new discourse was being devised (1979a, 6). Furthermore, in their founding declaration, the Movement of Young Poles claimed to connect (not through an affinity for National Democracy, but) through their common efforts to “strengthen Polish national bonds,” respect human rights, promote Christian ethical norms in public life, and seek an independent Polish state (RMP 1979, 3). At the same time, it was an ideological association that Kuroń called on Hall’s milieu to reject, not personal behavior.

In his response to Kuroń, Hall indicated his contemporary tactics for winning independence: engendering national sympathies and building a common front within the opposition. Hall (1979b, 32) asserted that it was time to value the positive role played by the National Democrats in spreading Polish national consciousness and the impact this had on winning independence in 1918. Hall saw a similar role for himself. He argued (33) that the defense of the nationalist tradition in *Bratniak* was about historical truth and insisted that it hurt the struggle for democracy and independence to denounce the nationalist tradition, as he alleged that Kuroń and Michnik had done. Hall also took umbrage with Kuroń’s treatment of Moczulski. Hall (34) argued that Kuroń was unnecessarily dividing the democratic opposition. He claimed that, rather than making insinuations against ROPCiO and its signatories, what was needed was mutual respect, and if possible friendship across the democratic opposition.

Hall’s cosignatory in ROPCiO, Leszek Moczulski, scoffed at the contemporary use of Piłsudski within the democratic opposition and instead aligned Piłsudski with his own proposals for opposition. Possibly aiming at Michnik, he argued that some thinkers’ emphasis on Piłsudski’s aim to “radically transform society in the spirit of socialism” while fighting anti-Semitism revealed a “great ignorance of history” (Moczulski 1978b, 23). Instead, Moczulski (1976, 26) called on contemporaries to reflect on a letter Piłsudski had written to Dmowski in 1918 expressing hope that they would move above party, clique, and group interests. For Moczulski, this letter indicated that the traditions associated with Piłsudski and the nationalists were not inherently hostile and therefore bolstered his appeal for unity within the opposition.

Moczulski’s and Michnik’s assessments of Piłsudski’s 1926 coup, which elevated the military and toppled the elected government, underline the ways in which each interpreted Piłsudski as a symbol for his own ideals and the differences between these ideals. For Michnik ([1975] 1987b, 221–222), Piłsudski (like himself) had fought for individual freedom and therefore independence for the country. In this telling, Piłsudski turned his back on this essential freedom when he overturned the democratic process in 1926. In Moczulski’s estimation, the coup was a model to be copied. Seemingly fashioning himself as a modern Piłsudski, Moczulski indicated that, (like Piłsudski) he understood when and how best to achieve independence. He called for a five phase “constructed revolution,” which would erect a parallel state structure, take power from the state authorities, and create an independent Polish nation-state based on an “unwavering democratic style, supporting rights and freedoms for all people” (Moczulski 1976, 3; Moczulski [1979] 1994, 559).

Moczulski ([1979] 1994, 572), in the wake of articles by Kuroń and Michnik alleging a theoretical link between him and Moczar, argued that the “secular left,” with which Michnik self-identified, ought to be linked not with Piłsudski, but instead with the

SDKPiL (of which Rosa Luxemburg had been a member). Moczulski (573) claimed that the secular left is different from other oppositional milieus due to its radical Marxist provenance. He asserted that it has “difficulty separating itself from the idea of ‘directing man,’” which according to Moczulski never gained hold in Polish society because of “our Christian civilization.” He claimed further (574) that inherent in the secular left “is an arbitrary tone, a lack of tolerance, an obsessive search everywhere (except with itself) for nationalism and totalitarianism.” He concluded that it does not understand Polish society. While Macierewicz had expressed suspicion of former Communists in the democratic opposition, Moczulski openly claimed a connection between such people and those who historically opposed Polish independence, while also indicating that these individuals were foreign to Christian Polish society.

Poland’s pre-World War II national movement and its legacy in Poland were a source of conflict within the independent press in the late 1970s. Michnik depicted the national movement as chauvinistic and racist. He believed that its vestiges remained in Polish society as manifested in the 1968 anti-Semitic outburst, which he insisted had the support of not only PZPR elites, but also of wide swaths of the general public (including some in the democratic opposition). Kuroń shared Michnik’s apprehension about Poland’s nationalist tradition and its contemporary inheritance. Hall was diametrically opposed to Kuroń’s and Michnik’s analyses of both the past and the present. He stressed the importance of the prewar Nationalists, argued that their nationalism had nothing in common with that expressed in 1968 (since the Communists had destroyed the national movement), and called for the rebirth of national sentiments in contemporary society. Although neither Macierewicz nor Moczulski underlined the need to spread national values in society, they both acknowledged the positive role played by the prewar nationalists in the struggle for Polish independence in the early twentieth century and did not see nationalism as a threat to contemporary Polish society. Rather, their misgivings were directed at the Marxist legacy.

Apprehensions about, and antipathy toward, Communist traditions and those who had identified with them were connected to historical interpretations. Moczulski, and to a lesser degree Macierewicz, expressed the fear that those whose intellectual pedigree was Communist, even when they broke with Communism and instead associated with socialism, still betrayed an intellectual affinity with the prewar SKDPiL and thus were not committed to Polish independence. Aware of such concerns, both Michnik and Kuroń provided a political genealogy for the contemporary left that linked it to the PPS (which had sought Polish independence) rather than the SKDPiL (which had not pursued Polish independence). Michnik even emphasized the affinity between his contemporary views and those of Piłsudski.

Piłsudski was a controversial figure within the independent press, as some in the democratic opposition sought to justify their current beliefs by tying them to the father of independent Poland. In Michnik’s telling, Piłsudski was a socialist who employed education to champion tolerance, diversity, democracy, and independence. For Moczulski, Piłsudski understood how and when to lead the struggle for independence and that discord within the opposition should be transcended in that struggle. Kuroń’s portrayal of Piłsudski was not inherently dissimilar to that of Moczulski, but his valuation was. Moczulski depicted Piłsudski as a man of unusual perspicacity who effectively achieved and maintained Polish independence (albeit by overthrowing the elected regime), while for Kuroń, Piłsudski betrayed the cause of Polish democracy. Although Moczulski and Kuroń championed both democracy and independence, their analyses of Piłsudski point to the different emphases each placed on these goals. It is surely significant that despite all the dissimilarities across the democratic opposition, Marshall Piłsudski’s military persona was downplayed, reflecting the democratic opposition’s rejection of armed resistance.

Conclusion

Forty years since the founding of the Polish independent press, Polish intellectuals and politicians discuss the fortification of democracy and independence, rather than their attainment, yet history remains a point of popular debate. Poland's Law and Justice (PiS) party has, since its electoral victory in October 2015, pursued an activist "historical politics." Interventions by the PiS government into historical matters have led to allegations that it is, like the former communist regime, attempting to commandeer the nation's past for its own ends (Harper 2016; "The Use and Misuse" 2016). However, as this article makes clear, it was not only the communists who used Polish history prior to 1989.

Presentations of Polish history within the democratic opposition in the 1970s were a means by which views on contemporary Poland were enunciated and ideals expounded upon. Michnik and Kuroń both celebrated diversity and tolerance; Kuroń associated each with the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth while Michnik tied them to Piłsudski and the prewar socialists. They also both insisted that a xenophobic strand of nationalism, which derived from the national movement in the early twentieth century, continued to plague Polish society. Macierewicz did not perceive historical nationalism as a threat to contemporary Polish society, but did express concern about former communists. He also expressed anxiety about, if not antagonism toward, Russia. Moczulski argued that Polish society, from the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth to the present, was characterized by an affinity for democracy and tolerance. He was suspicious of Marxist traditions rather than nationalist traditions. Hall was distinct in his focus on the importance of the Polish nationalist tradition, which he believed was in crisis in contemporary Poland. While Hall celebrated the history of Poland's nationalists, he did not betray any significant worry about former communists, and even expressed respect for Michnik (Hall 1978a, 17).

Despite their differences, all of these individuals called for non-violent struggle and stressed education. Michnik and Kuroń supported an amorphous opposition, which would school the population in toleration and democratic values and thus move toward a democratic and ultimately independent Poland. Macierewicz sought to educate society in the methods of civil struggle in order to spur it into directly striving for independence and democracy. For Hall, the cultivation of national sentiments would help to achieve an independent democratic Poland. Moczulski sought a hierarchical opposition that could help engineer a national revolution modeled on the early twentieth-century struggle led by Piłsudski. As for international relations, Macierewicz, Kuroń, and Michnik employed Polish history to call for common struggle with Poland's neighbors to the east while Hall rejected active involvement in Poland's neighbors' independence struggles.

These debates from the 1970s, and even some of their participants, remain relevant. Macierewicz is the Minister of National Defense within the ruling PiS government of which Michnik, the editor-in-chief of one of Poland's most important newspapers, is an outspoken critic. Macierewicz's treatment of historical Polish–Russian relations helps to clarify his vociferous backing of the theory that Russia was responsible for the 2010 Smolensk plane crash that cost the life of President Lech Kaczyński. It also elucidates his support for close ties with Ukraine, support that Michnik has also expressed in recent years (Imielski 2015; "Polska będzie" 2016; Świerczyński 2016).

The legacy of the PZPR and concerns about those who may or may not have supported it remain topical, as demonstrated by the current public uproar over the release of files from the communist security forces indicating that the former leader of Solidarity, Lech Wałęsa, was an informant in the early 1970s (Plucinska 2016). Macierewicz has led efforts to uncover and penalize former collaborators with the communist security services, which

he argues is necessary to protect Polish democracy and independence (Macierewicz undated). Michnik (2007) has denounced Macierewicz's lustration schemes, describing them as a part of a PiS effort "to undermine the country's democratic institutions." These erstwhile KOR cosignatories personify two extremes within contemporary Polish political life and the contrasting visions of Poland embraced by the adherents of each. Moczulski's writings in the 1970s seemingly presaged a similar stance to Macierewicz toward former communist collaborators. However, in 1992, released security service papers led to the charge that Moczulski had been a paid informant from 1969 to 1977. While Moczulski has insisted that these papers were forgeries, he has been sidelined politically because of them ("Ruszyła ponowna" 2013). The past remains present in Polish political life.

Nationalism and questions about whether Poland should embrace diversity or unity have been particularly impassioned of late because of the refugee crisis. Kuroń, before his passing in 2004, like Michnik, continued to endorse a multicultural Poland. Macierewicz, in contrast, describes multiculturalism as a "potential source of terrorism" and supports a more active political role for the Catholic Church ("Christian roots" 2016). Hall, the staunchest defender of the national tradition in the 1970s, has since broken with it. He is now an academic who has written about Charles De Gaulle (Górlkowski 2016). Though this may seem odd at first, his writings in the 1970s made clear that it was a specific nationalist strain that he embraced, one largely distinct from that of the pre-World War II nationalists. It turns out that it is also distinct from the nationalism supported by Macierewicz today. Deliberations within the democratic opposition on nationalism remain germane.

Although activists in the Polish democratic opposition surely used Polish history for their own ends, it is necessary to conclude by underlining the fact that they did not foist their views on others. While the communist authorities, through their control of the mechanisms of power, ensured that only state-sanctioned historical analyses reached the public, those in the democratic opposition had no apparatus with which to censor the views of their opponents. There is also a key difference between historical debates in the 1970s and those today, even when the participants are the same; that difference is power. These were the opinions of a beleaguered minority of revolutionaries, not government ministers or newspaper editors. History was surely used and perhaps even abused by those in the democratic opposition; however, thanks to cooperation and prevailing commitments to pluralism, differing views were readily expressed as the democratic opposition struggled to lay the groundwork for a democratic and independent Poland. Critics of the PiS government are concerned that its "historical politics" are infringing upon Poland's hard-won freedom of speech.

Notes

1. When the Soviet-backed communist authorities took control of Poland at the end of World War II, they launched a broad rewriting and even erasure of significant elements of the Polish past. In 1946, the Censorship Office (GUKPPIW) was established. In 1948, at the First General Congress of Polish Historians, Marxism-Leninism became the sole ideological basis for interpreting Polish history. The same year, at the First Methodological Conference of Polish Historians, Marxist methodology became the official methodology for Polish historians (Curry 1984, 14; Tomaszewski 1994, 232–236).
2. Between 1976 and the summer of 1980, dozens of independent publishing houses and 80 serial titles were established, and 160 books were printed. The regular readership for the independent press was estimated to be 200,000 by 1979 (Bernhard 1993, 149; Brzeski and Roliński 1995, 221; Jastrzębskie 1993, 103–107; Olszsek 2012, 49).
3. *Katyń* by Ryszard Zieliński (under the pseudonyms Jan Abramski and Ryszard Żywiecki) was printed several times in the 1970s.

4. Michnik and Kuroń were both on the editorial board of *Krytyka*. Macierewicz edited *Głos*. Hall was on the editorial board of *Bratniak*, while Moczulski was alternatively on the editorial boards of *Opinia*, *Droga*, and *Gazeta Polska*.
5. Kuroń (b. 1934) was a graduate of Warsaw University's history department, a one-time member of the PZPR, and a veteran of the communist scout movement; he had been a scout leader to a number of future democratic opposition activists. In 1964, Kuroń was expelled from the PZPR and then imprisoned due to an open letter he had co-written. He was re-incarcerated from 1968 to 1971 for his role in the 1968 protests. He was a co-founder of KOR (Raina 1978, 82–83).
6. Moczulski (b. 1930) first joined communist student groups and then the party in the 1940s. He was expelled from the PZPR in 1950. He went on to graduate from Warsaw University's history department and in the 1960s and 1970s wrote for various official journals. In 1977, he was at the forefront of the founding of ROPCiO and in 1979 helped to create the Polish Independence Confederation (Biernacki).
7. Michnik (b. 1946) was raised in a communist family. From the age of 11, he participated in the communist Walterowcy scout group, which Kuroń led. In 1964, Michnik was expelled from the ZMS (the official communist student association), suspended from Warsaw University, and imprisoned for two months for disseminating Kuroń's Open Letter. Michnik was again expelled from Warsaw University and then imprisoned from 1968 to 1971 due to his leading role in the 1968 student protests. Michnik ultimately completed his history degree at Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań. At the time of the founding of KOR, Michnik was in France, on the invitation of Jean-Paul Sartre (Michnik 1993, 234; Schell 1987, xix–xx).
8. Macierewicz (b. 1949) was raised in a non-communist family. As a young man, Macierewicz was active in the non-communist scout group *Czarna Jedyńka* and studied history at Warsaw University. He was arrested in 1968 for his role in the student protests. Macierewicz was a driving force behind the formation of KOR (Łatkowska and Borowski).
9. Hall (b. 1953) graduated from the history department at Gdansk University in 1977. An original signatory of ROPCiO, in 1979 he helped to form the Movement of Young Poles (Kazański and Borowski; Zaremba 2000, 29, 84).
10. For instance, Józef Piłsudski was all but erased from the historical record in the 1940s. He was not mentioned in *Kwartalnik Historyczny* until 1956 when he was described as “bourgeois,” “a left-wing Mussolini,” and an “imperialist.” The first biography of Józef Piłsudski was not published until 1978. Such was the interest in him that when Andrzej Garlicki's biography finally appeared, it quickly sold out (Garlicki 1995, xiii–xvi; Jabłoński 1956, 442, 442, 455).
11. See, for instance, the writings of Rafał A. Ziemkiewicz.
12. Hall's frequent insistence that he was from a younger generation merits comment. Macierewicz was only five years older than Hall while Michnik was six years older than Hall. There was something akin to a generation gap within the opposition between those who had witnessed and participated in the protests of 1968 and those who had not (Hall 1978a, 17, 1978b, 4, 1978c, 10, 1979a, 5).

References

- Bernhard, Michael H. 1993. *The Origins of Democratization in Poland: Workers, Intellectuals, and Oppositional Politics, 1976–1980*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Biernacki, Krzysztof, and Leszek Moczulski. *Encyklopedia Solidarności* online.
- Brzeski, Jan, and Adam Roliński. 1995. “Wydawnictwa drugiego obiegu w zbiorze Biblioteki Jagiellońskiej; Katalog wydawnictwa ciągłe 1976–1980.” *Biuletyn Biblioteki Jagiellońskiej* 45 (1/2): 221–227.
- Chojecki, Mirosław. 1980. “Wystąpienie Mirosława Chojeckiego.” *Biuletyn Informacyjny* 38: 16–18.
- Christian Roots “Solution” to EU Problems: Polish Defence Minister. 2016. *Radio Poland*, September 8. Accessed April 18, 2017. <http://www.thenews.pl/1/10/Artykul/270010,Christian-roots-solution-to-EU-problems-Polish-Defence-Minister>.
- Curry, Jane. 1984. *Black Book of Polish Censorship*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Eisler, Jerzy. 1991. *Marzec 1968. Geneza, przebieg, konsekwencje*. Warsaw: PWN.
- Eisler, Jerzy. 2003. *Co znam zostało z tych lat ... Opozycja polityczna 1976–1980 z dzisiejszej perspektywy*. Warsaw: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej Komisja Ścigania Zbrodni Przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu.

- Garlicki, Andrzej. 1995. *Józef Piłsudski, 1867–1935*. Translated and edited by John Coutouvidis. Hants: Scolar Press.
- Górlikowski, Marek. 2016. "Aleksander Hall: Każdy dzień rządów PiS-u szkodzi Polsce." *Gazeta Wyborcza*, May 14. Accessed April 18, 2017. <http://wyborcza.pl/magazyn/1,124059,20069318,aleksander-hall-kazdy-dzien-rzadow-pis-u-szkodzi-polsce.html>.
- Grochola, Wiesława, ed. 2006. "Słowo jak dynamit." *KARTA* 49: 82–125.
- Gross, Jan. 2006. *Fear: Anti-semitism in Poland after Auschwitz: An Essay in Historical Interpretation*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Hall, Aleksander. 1978a. "Polemika." *Bratniak*, March–April 6–7.
- Hall, Aleksander Hall. 1978b. "Wypowiedzi o współczesnym Polskim patriotyzmie." *Bratniak*, July–August 10–11.
- Hall, Aleksander. 1978c. "Krytyka Krytyki." *Bratniak*, November–December 14.
- Hall, Aleksander. 1979a. "Myśl polityczna opozycji." *Bratniak*, March–April 16.
- Hall, Aleksander. 1979b. "W odpowiedzi Jackowi Kuroniowi." *Bratniak*, March–April 16.
- Hall, Aleksander. 1979c. "Polacy wobec Rosji." *Bratniak*, September–October 19.
- Harper, Jo. 2016. "Poland Turns History into Diplomatic Weapon." *Politico*, 19 February. Accessed April 18, 2017. <http://www.politico.eu/article/duda-poland-holocaust-history-walesa-gross/>.
- Imielski, Roman. 2015. "Michnik: Putina można zatrzymać tylko siłą. Powinniśmy dobroić Ukrainę." *Gazeta Wyborcza*, February 15. Accessed April 18, 2017. http://wyborcza.pl/1,76842,17413909,Michnik_Putina_mozna_zatrzymac_tylo_siła_Powinnismy.html.
- Jabłoński, Henryk. 1956. "Z tajnej dyplomacji Władysława Grabskiego w r. 1924." *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 63 (4–5): 440–445.
- Jastrzębskie, Marek. 1993. "Underground Prints of the Martial Law Period." *Polish Libraries Today* 3.
- Kazański, Arkadiusz, and Adam Borowski. "Aleksander Hall." *Encyklopedia Solidarność* online.
- Kuroń, Jacek. 1978. [Untitled]. *Krytyka* 1, Summer.
- Kuroń, Jacek. (1987) 1995. "Interview with Janka Jankowska. 'In Every Situation I Look for a Way Out.'" In *From the Polish Underground: Selections from Krytyka, 1978–1993*, edited by Michael H. Bernhard, 289–322. Philadelphia: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Kuroń, Jacek. 2009. *Autobiografia*. Warsaw: Krytyka.
- Kuroń, Jacek. (1976) 2010a. "Myśli o programie działania." In *Kuroń opozycja, Pisma polityczne, 1969–1989*, 77–95. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Krytyka.
- Kuroń, Jacek. (1978) 2010b. "Uwagi o strukturze ruchu demokratycznego." In *Kuroń opozycja, Pisma polityczne, 1969–1989*, 99–107. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Krytyka.
- Kuroń, Jacek. (1978) 2010c. "Zasady ideowe." In *Kuroń opozycja, Pisma polityczne, 1969–1989*, 108–139. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Krytyka.
- Kuroń, Jacek. (1979) 2010d. "List otwarty do zespołu redakcyjnego pisma młodych Bratniak." In *Kuroń opozycja, Pisma polityczne, 1969–1989*, 157–179. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Krytyka.
- Kuroń, Jacek, Antoni Macierewicz, and Adam Michnik. 1977. "Sprawa Polska–Sprawa Rosyjska." *Głos* 1, October.
- Kuroń, Jacek, and Stefan Starczewski. 1979. "Od redakcji." *Krytyka* 4: 44–46.
- Łątkowska, Mirosława, and Adam Borowski. "Antoni Macierewicz." *Encyklopedia Solidarność* online.
- Lipski, Jan Józef. 1985. *KOR: A History of the Worker's Defense Committee in Poland, 1976–1980*. Translated by Olga Amsterdamska and Gene M. Moore. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Luxemburg, Rosa. (1896) 1976. *The Polish Question at the International Congress in London*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Macierewicz, Antoni. 1977. "Rocznica." *Głos*, November 2.
- Macierewicz, Antoni. 1978a. "toni. 1978 ityczne w PRL." *Głos*, January–February 4.
- Macierewicz, Antoni (Scriptor). 1978b. [Untitled]. *Głos*, May 7.
- Macierewicz, Antoni. 1978c. "Odpowiedź." *Głos*, May 7.
- Macierewicz, Antoni (AM). 1978d. "Dążenia i Postulaty." *Głos*, November–December 11–12.
- Macierewicz, Antoni. 1979a. "ZSRR wobec Europy środkowo-wschodniej." *Głos*, April 15.
- Macierewicz, Antoni. 1979b. "toni. 1979." *Głos*, November–December 20–21.
- Macierewicz, Antoni. "Lustracyjny kryzys." *Głos*. Accessed April 18, 2017. http://ojczyzna.pl/ARTYKULY/Macierewicz-A_Lustracyjny-kryzys.htm.
- Michnik, Adam. 1978. "Reminiscencje niesentymentalne." *Krytyka* 1, Summer.

- Michnik, Adam. 1987a. *Letters from Prison and Other Essays, 201-222*. Translated by Maya Latynski. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Michnik, Adam. (1975) 1987b. "Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors." In *Letters from Prison and Other Essays*, 135–148. Translated by Maya Latynski. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Michnik, Adam. (1977) 1987c. "New Evolutionism." In *Letters from Prison and Other Essays*, Translated by Maya Latynski, 135–148. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Michnik, Adam. 1993. *The Church and the Left*. Edited, Translated, and introduction by David Ost. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Michnik, Adam. 2007. "The Polish Witch-Hunt." Translated by Irena Grudzinska Gross and Olga Amsterdamska. In *New York Review of Books*, June 28. Accessed April 18, 2017. <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2007/06/28/the-polish-witch-hunt/>.
- Moczulski, Leszek. 1976. *Memoria*. In KARTA AO III/18.10 Dziaicles/2 Publicystyczna Leszka Moczulskiego o tematyce politycznego historycznej”i.
- Moczulski, Leszek. 1978a. "Wielki Tygiel." *Droga* 1, June-July.
- Moczulski, Leszek. 1978b. "Układnie mozaiki." *Droga* 3, October.
- Moczulski, Leszek. 1978c. "Michnikowi w odpowiedzi." *Droga* 3, October.
- Moczulski, Leszek. (1979) 1994. "Rewolucja bez rewolucji." In *Opozycja demokratyczna w Polsce 1976, 1980: Wybór dokumentów*, edited by Zygmunt Hemmerling and Marek Nadolski, 502–507. Warsaw: Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego.
- Olaszek, Jan. 2012. "Przed Sierpniem, lata 1976-1980." In *N jak Nowa: od wolnego słowa do wolności, 1977-1989*, edited by Wojciech Borowik and Tomasz Kuczborski, 45–52. Warsaw: Stowarzyszenie Wolnego Słowa.
- Plucinska, Joanna. 2016. "Tusk Dismisses Wałęsa Controversy." *Politico*, February 19. Accessed April 18, 2017. <http://www.politico.eu/article/donald-tusk-lech-walesa-poland-kaczynski-communism-secret-police/>.
- Polska będzie zbroić Ukrainę. Macierewicz podpisał umowę. 2016. *Wprost* online, July 9. Accessed April 18, 2017. <https://www.wprost.pl/szczyt-nato/10014429/Polska-będzie-zbroić-Ukrainę-Macierewicz-podpisał-umowę.html>.
- Raina, Peter. 1978. *Political Opposition in Poland, 1954-1977*. London: Poets and Painters Press.
- RMP. 1979. "RMP Komunikat 1." *Bratniak* 18, July–August 1979.
- Romaszewski, Zbigniew. 2008. *NiepoKORni: Rozmowy o Komitecie Obrony Robotników*, edited by Andrzej Friszke and Andrzej Paczkowski, 522–528. Krakow: Znak.
- Ruszyła ponowna autolustracja Leszka Moczulskiego. Były lider KPN: teczki TW "Lecha" SB sfabrykowała w latach 80. 2013. *Wpolityce.pl*, October 4. Accessed April 18, 2017. <http://wpolityce.pl/polityka/167843-ruszyla-ponowna-autolustracja-leszka-moczulskiego-byly-lider-kpn-teczki-tw-lecha-sb-sfabrykowala-w-latach-80>.
- Schell, Jonathan. 1987. "Introduction." In *Letters from Prison and other Essays*. Translated by Maya Latynski, xvii–xlii. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Snyder, Timothy. 2010. *Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin*. New York: Basic Books.
- Świerczyński, Marek. 2016. "Macierewicz: Smoleńsk był aktem terroryzmu." *Polityka online*, March 13. Accessed April 18, 2017. <http://www.polityka.pl/tygodnikpolityka/kraj/1654066,1,macierewicz-smolensk-był-aktem-terroryzmu.read>.
- Tomaszewski, Jerzy. 1994. "The Different Histories of Twentieth Century Poland." In *Conceptions of National History, Proceedings of Nobel Symposium 78*, edited by Erik Lönnroth, Karl Molin and Ragnar Björk, 226–241. New York: Walter de Gruyter.
- The Use and Misuse of History in Poland. 2016. *Financial Times*, May 2. Accessed April 18, 2017. <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b59698fa-0e02-11e6-b41f-0beb7e589515.html#axzz4KSA41pe6>.
- Waligóra, Grzegorz. 2006. *ROPCiO, 1977–1981*. Warsaw: IPN.
- Zaremba, Piotr. 2000. *Młodopolicy: Historia Ruchu Młodej Polski*. Gdansk: Wydawnictwo Arche.