

Book Reviews

Opium, State and Society: China's Narco-economy and the Guomindang, 1924–1937. By EDWARD R. SLACK. [Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2000. xiii + 240 pp. ISBN 0-8248-2278-1.]

Opium Regimes: China, Britain, and Japan, 1839–1952. Edited by TIMOTHY BROOK and BOB T. WAKABAYASHI. [Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000. 458 pp. \$24.95; £17.95. ISBN 0-520-22236-9.]

Modern China and Opium: A Reader. Edited by ALAN BAUMLER. [Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press, 2002. 190 pp. £16.50; \$22.95. ISBN 0-472-06768.]

A report for the Foreign Policy Centre recently published by Rowena Young has called the drug policies of New Labour and previous governments in Britain a “resounding failure.” ‘War on drugs,’ as police officers, government officials and independent observers are increasingly discovering, engenders the very problems which are meant to be contained: the best way of winning the war is to stop fighting it, as criminalization hands over the production and distribution of psychoactive substances to organized criminals. War on drugs also endangers the health of consumers by promoting social exclusion and encouraging the spread of adulterated products: heroin, for instance, is often considered as a relatively benign substance; the scouring powder with which it can be cut less so. The shift away from prohibition towards regulation not only characterizes the drug policies pursued by countries like the Netherlands and Switzerland, but also informs a new generation of scholarship on the history of drugs. Scholars like Mike Jay (*Emperors of Dreams*, 2000), Ted Goldberg (*Demystifying Drugs*, 1999) and Jordan Goodman, Paul Lovejoy and Andrew Sherratt (*Consuming Habits*, 1995) are among the pioneers seeking to question the conventional assumptions which have underpinned the narcophobia of the 20th century, including the very use of the term of ‘drugs.’ These authors have moved away from an emphasis on ‘abuse’ and ‘addiction,’ in themselves historically contingent terms which tend to demonize ‘drugs,’ towards use and context, showing the different social practices and cultural meanings assigned to a diversity of psychoactive substances by consumers.

Precious little of this revival in the study of ‘drugs’ has reached the shores of the China field, where recent scholarship continues uncritically to reproduce the opium myth constructed by the missionaries at the end of the 19th century. A good example is the edited book by Timothy Brook and Bob Wakabayashi. A collection of papers on the history of opium in China and Japan given at a conference held in Toronto in May 1997, it contains chapters on drugs and taxes in South-East Asia (Carl Trocki), the Hong Kong opium revenue (Christopher Munn), opium in Xinjiang (David Bello), drug operations by resident Japanese in China

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(Motohiro Kobayashi), opium and leisure in Shanghai novels (Alexander Des Forges), opium and modern state-making (R. Bin Wong), opium and the state in Sichuan (Judith Wyman), anti-opium crusades in Fujian (Joyce Madancy), the National Anti-Opium Association (Edward Slack), the 1935 opium suppression plan (Alan Baumler), the responses of opium growers to eradication campaigns (Lucien Bianco), opium and collaboration in central China (Timothy Brook), Japan and the Wang Jingwei regime (Motohiro Kobayashi), resistance to opium in wartime China (Mark Eykholt), and the anti-drug crusade in the PRC (Zhou Yongming).

Some of these articles are well researched and make an invaluable contribution to the existing scholarship; others tend to be less firmly based on original research, as is inevitably the case with most edited conference volumes. However, conspicuously absent from the volume is the only contribution to the conference which questioned some of the very premises of research on the 'opium question' in China. Richard Newman, incidentally an historian of India, questioned the highly tendentious portrayal of China's psychoactive past. In his pioneering 1995 article ("Opium smoking in late imperial China: a reconsideration," *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 29, No. 4) he also referred to historians of modern China as "victims of the [opium] myth," stating that "an essential first step in demythologizing the Chinese opium problem is to understand the [lack of] scientific evidence about the drug's impact ... upon the health of the individual consumer." His meticulous research, based on a wide range of hitherto untapped archival and printed sources, demonstrated that the consumption of opium was innocuous, if not medically beneficial, when used in moderation by the majority of smokers in imperial China. Newman's research is granted one sentence in the entire volume, and the reason for this summary dismissal is not difficult to guess: the entire history of modern China is built on the idea that foreign imperialism enslaved the country by peddling opium. While there is no doubt that many of the contributions add new knowledge to the existing field, the volume as a whole consolidates rather than questions the link between opium and China in the popular imagination. Few if any of the contributors mention that any respectable person in Europe or America could walk into a chemist in 1900 and routinely buy a range of hashish pastes, exotic psychedelics or morphine together with a handy injection kit, while opium was widely available from most cornershops in Britain. As outlined by Virginia Berridge (*Opium and the People*, 1999), opium fulfilled a crucial role before the availability of modern synthetic drugs: it was a medical panacea for the many in 19th-century England.

While the majority of articles in *Opium Regimes* are related to 20th-century China, the exclusive focus on opium also misses another crucial fact: heroin, morphine and cocaine flooded the market after 1900, and countless new psychoactive substances were snorted, smoked, chewed or injected. The existence of these substances – many used in conditions which were far more harmful to health than opium smoking – escapes the confines set by the 'opium myth' and hence the gaze of the contributors. However, even a cursory perusal of primary sources reveals that anti-

opium campaigns which appeared in the first decade of the 20th century encouraged, however inadvertently, the development of new substances, as well as the existence of criminal gangs who relied on official anti-narcotics policies for their prosperity: prohibition contributed to create a 'drug problem' where none existed.

Some of the more insightful contributions to *Opium Regimes* are extracts from new books, the publication of which coincide with that of the edited volume itself. One example is Edward Slack's solid study of the economic dependence on opiates created by a narcotic economy in Republican China. In *Opium, State and Society: China's Narco-economy and the Guomintang, 1924–1937*, Edward Slack uses rich primary sources to analyse the rapidly changing policies, which vacillated between prohibition and legalization. The author's systematic approach sheds light on the crucial role of opium as a source of revenue for the Kuomintang (KMT) and examines the many tensions which appeared between pragmatic policies aimed at imposing a government monopoly over the distribution of opium and calls by nationalist elites for radical prohibition. Instead of morally condemning Chiang Kai-shek's shift in 1935 from opium prohibition to the establishment of a government monopoly as an exercise in deception – a common strategy of contemporary critics and conventional historiography – he highlights that his policies were inflected by practical determinants, including the enormity of the opium economy, the weakness of the central government, the existence of extraterritoriality and a global economic depression. The author judges the KMT's achievements to have been "impressive, to say the least," although he nonetheless continues to envisage Chiang Kai-shek's attempts to regulate the opium trade in terms of a spectacular "failure" to fully implement "prohibition." In light of recent research on the many problems engendered by 'war on drugs,' historians less encumbered by the opium myth might actually judge the KMT to have successfully anticipated by more than half a century the drug policies pursued today by a number of governments critical of prohibition.

Useful as these recent studies may be with regard to the economics and politics of opium in modern China, they tell us next to nothing about the reasons for which opium and morphine – rather than cannabis, coffee or cocaine – were so successful in China. The missionary paradigm holds that supply determines demand: inanimate substances are granted agency, while human beings become passive objects. As a consequence, very little attention has been given to the social practices and cultural meanings which structure consumer choices. A consumer-centred approach has been at the heart of the revival in drugs studies: historians and sociologists no longer seriously consider all users to be 'addicts' in the iron grip of physical dependence but rather complex human beings whose social experiences should be given precedence if we are to understand substance-influenced behaviour. Researchers in the China field, however, continue to look exclusively at issues of supply and policy. Alan Baumber's source reader on opium in China includes many worthwhile memoirs, diplomatic reports, newspapers and journals from the Qing to the

PRC, but has very little on the key agent of historical change: the consumer in person. *Modern China and Opium* is a very timely and much needed addition to the existing literature, providing a set of documents which will introduce many readers to some of the key developments in the economy and politics of opium. However, most of the 19 texts provided – ranging from the debate on the legalization of opium in 1836, the 1906 Guangxu edict on opium, the link between opium and imperialism, Sun Yat-sen's 1924 statements on opium, the anti-opium crusader Mei Gongren, to opium control in Manchuguo – focus on the politics of opium suppression, taking the link between 'opium' and 'China' for granted. However, pipes and needles, in China as elsewhere, do not have lives of their own: they are granted social lives by their users, the sentient beings who have disappeared behind the smoke screen of a missionary paradigm which continues to structure the China field to this day.

FRANK DIKÖTTER

The Chinese. By JASPER BECKER. [London: John Murray, 2000. xi + 464 pp. £25.00. ISBN 0-7195-5439-X.]

This is a frustrating book to review. On the one hand, the author, formerly the bureau chief of the *South China Morning Post* in Beijing, has travelled extensively, talked to countless people, is a keen observer, and therefore what he has to report is worth reading. On the other hand, when he tackles issues that require research in written sources, the reader has to be on guard against innumerable errors, misleading or inconsistent statements, gross overstatements, and sloppy editing, all of which make it impossible to recommend the book to serious students of China.

The book's 15 chapters cover virtually all imaginable topics: rural poverty and oppression, the new wealthy class, the insecurities of private entrepreneurs, the wretched state of education, the crisis of medical care in rural China, the decline of the military industrial complex, the SOE crisis, the failings of the legal system, and the inadequacies of the rulers. Often they are richly informative. Poignant stories on the unemployed include a case of a company Party secretary leading a protest (p. 152). Chapter 11 raises the important question of why harshly persecuted intellectuals retained faith in the Party and its ability to reform. The emphasis is on the negative, but important achievements are noted and some chapters end on a positive note.

Commendably, Becker endeavours to situate his material in historical context. The introduction provides a brief historical overview from the Qin dynasty onwards and many chapters include discussion of historical background. Sometimes this works well, as when Becker reminds us of Mao's 1945 espousal of coalition government and Deng Xiaoping's 1941 rejection of one-party rule (pp. 253–4). But more often than not, errors abound. Becker seems to believe that nothing much changed between the despotism of the Qin state and the present, evidently taking his cue from

Fu Zhengyuan's book, *Autocratic Traditions and Chinese Politics* (1993), which is listed in the bibliography. The imperial government was totalitarian as is today's state. Under the Han, peasants didn't own the land. They still don't, but Becker ignores the intervening millennium of private ownership of land (p. 8). Only after the collapse of the Qing, we are told, did Republican China move away from state control of the peasants towards a market system (p. 49).

His evaluation of Chiang Kai-shek's rule on the mainland is, to put it mildly, strange and inconsistent. He acknowledges that Chiang became increasingly dictatorial but that he sought to establish elements of a modern liberal Western state:

The crushing hand of the central state was lifted. For the first time in thousands of years there came into being in China independent schools and universities, a free media, an independent judiciary, independent trade unions, competing political parties and a capitalist system of competitive enterprise, and for the first time the Chinese enjoyed freedom of movement within the country and the freedom of assembly (p. 14 and p. 246).

But on p. 92, he states that the Chiang's government tried to reintroduce the imperial *baojia* system of mutual control and surveillance and incredibly, on p. 375, he equates the Communists and the Nationalists as having brought about "the death of democracy."

Becker extends his sledgehammer approach to the Mao era: "Mao's kingdom in Yan'an was closely modelled on that of Stalin's Soviet Union" (p. 15). On the same page, "The ruling classes, capitalists, landlords and even the wealthy peasantry had to be destroyed before an egalitarian Utopia could be built," but on p. 157 they appear to have survived: "Even after they had been stripped of all their property, Mao still treated all capitalists and landlords as incurable criminals." Mao launched the hundred flowers movement in response to the death of Stalin (p. 248). And, on p. 158, we are told that "under Mao, many peasants were arrested just for growing vegetables in their own backyards," but two pages later we learn that peasants were allowed to own one pig. Elsewhere, "A manager would not even move a piece of machinery or reassign a worker without written permission from Beijing" (p. 139). Becker does say something nice about the Mao era when he writes that Snow White was "formally rehabilitated" in 1970 and perhaps the Seven Dwarfs as well (p. 200).

The reform era material is equally troubling. In each year since 1997, per capita peasant incomes fell on the average by an incredible US\$200.00–240.00 (p. 196). Only ten foreign films have been permitted to be shown in China (p. 198). On p. 26 "No one can enter a Chinese city without permission, and those that do so are soon caught and expelled," but on p. 55, peasants "could even leave their villages to seek work in urban areas." On p. 61 the author reports that satellite imaging shows that China has 50 per cent more arable land than officially reported, but on p. 106, where there is a telling discussion of the loss of arable land, this point is not mentioned. Most embarrassingly, Becker confuses the meanings of

two homonyms: “Workers in SOEs are called gong ren or ‘public people,’ that is people working for the common good” (p. 157).

Innumerable unsupported statements require the reader to do research: during the Tiananmen demonstrations did Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji really “summon” Shanghai workers to go out on the street “armed with clubs” (p. 136)? Did Deng really reverse “decrees” by Jiang Zemin “forbidding the children of officials from taking part in business” (p. 170)? Is it really true that as of 1999 “the state still employed 250,000 scholars of Marxism” (p. 303)?

It is incomprehensible to me why the author didn’t ask a graduate student to read through his manuscript prior to publication.

THOMAS P. BERNSTEIN

Challenging the Mandate of Heaven: Social Protest and State Power in China. By ELIZABETH J. PERRY. [Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 2001. xxxii + 343 pp. \$27.95. ISBN 0-7665-0445-0.]

From feuding and rebellions in rural China (chapters one to four, and nine), working class protests in Shanghai (chapters five to eight), to the 1989 pro-democracy movement (chapter ten), Elizabeth J. Perry’s book covers a wide range of topics on China’s social protests from the mid-19th century to the present. All the chapters of this book have been previously published, but when they are placed in a single volume, several major themes in Perry’s writings can be better discerned. First, the book shows convincingly that the reaction of the Chinese people to the structural changes in Chinese state and society (such as state decline and centralization or collectivization and economic liberalization) has been a crucial factor behind the rebellions and social movements in China. This was just as true during the fragmented imperial/Republican China as during the highly unified Communist China. Furthermore, a large portion of the Chinese population was actually never fully incorporated by the Communist regime even during its heyday, thus creating tensions and space for collective resistance. Secondly, in the past 150 years, the Chinese state has always tried to institute local organizations to extend its control. During the imperial and Republican period, such local organizations took the form of state-sponsored militia in the rural areas and gangster-controlled unions in industries. Under Communist rule, the local organizations took the form of all-inclusive state apparatuses (the commune system in rural areas and work-unit system in cities). Yet, regardless of the nature of such local organizations (be it government-sponsored organizations or trench level state apparatus), they have a tendency to spin off from government control and thus provide organizational bases and resources for collective actions for social movements and rebellions. Thirdly, although we see the emergence of many new forms of protests such as strikes, sit-ins and demonstrations, reactive and competitive collective actions have been the dominant forms of protests in recent Chinese history. This marks a significant departure

for the history of collective actions in Western countries, where in the process of nation-building, state-building and the development of capitalism, reactive and competitive forms of collective actions become less important and proactive forms of collective actions increasingly dominate the scene. Finally, Perry's stories and analyses also convincingly demonstrate that religious and quasi-religious activities have always been important ideological and organizational sources for China's social movements and rebellions, especially for those happening in rural areas.

I would like to point out that, beyond their historical significance, these patterns also throw much light on the nature of protests in contemporary China and on the ways of the Chinese state in its treatment of the protests. For example, we see similarities between Yu Zuomin's Daqiu village community's defiance of the Communist government (see *Model Rebels* by Bruce Gilley) and the Yellow Cliff community's defiance of the Qing authority (chapter three), even though Yu's village eventually surrendered, when facing imminent repression. The historical patterns revealed in Perry's book also give us a better understanding of the Chinese authorities' heavy-handed repression of *falun gong* and other similar emerging religious sects in post-Mao China (introduction). With regard to the more urban-based protests, the historical patterns would help us understand such things as the heavy involvement of Beijing's work-unit officials in what I have called "semi-official mobilization" during the hunger strike period of the 1989 pro-democracy movement, the rising tides of strikes and other industrial protests amid the massive closing and restructuring of China's state-owned industry, and the leading roles that retired cadres and model workers of the work-units have played in the recent workers' protests. Finally, without genuine political reform and democratization, we are going to see a continuing domination of reactive and competitive forms of collective actions in China, punctuated by occasional revolutionary turmoil when things really run bad.

Filled with interesting stories, Perry's book is fun to read. If one is interested in Chinese history, this book provides fascinating narratives. If one is interested in China's labour history and peasant uprisings, the book is a highly informed introduction. Finally, if one is interested in contemporary Chinese politics, the historical patterns revealed in the book surely offer a valuable lens. Perry's book is bound to command a large audience.

DINGXIN ZHAO

Chinese Political Culture, 1989–2000. Edited by SHIPING HUA. [Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2001. 370 pp. Hard cover \$68.95, ISBN 0-7656-0565-1; paperback \$26.95, ISBN 0-7656-0566-X.]

The distinctive political culture of China is often asserted but rarely demonstrated. While many recent studies have used cultural values to partially explain patterns of political participation, the forces that shape political culture in contemporary China are not often explored. This book

provides a useful start to a topic of great theoretical and practical importance.

The book begins with an introductory essay by the editor Shiping Hua on the methodological and empirical issues involved in studying political culture. He argues for using multiple methods to study the multi-dimensional concept of political culture, because both surveys and interpretive studies have their place and their limitations. Although he argues that China is more open to fieldwork in the post-Mao period, he does not address the difficulties many scholars have faced in doing research on values and beliefs, especially using mass surveys.

The remainder of the book is divided into three sections. The first focuses on China's cultural traditions and contemporary political culture. Kam Louie describes how the construction of masculine identity using Confucius as a role model no longer concerns education and morality, but now entails economic management and entrepreneurship. Godwin Chu parses the concept of loyalty (*zhong*), arguing that Chinese people were traditionally fatalistic, submissive to authority, and made few demands on the state. In the post-Mao period, however, they have become more assertive, perhaps as a reaction to Maoist excesses. Roger Ames looks at the meaning of "new Confucianism," as well as how to study both ancient and modern interpretations of Confucius's teachings.

The second part of the book concerns how the Chinese are socialized through ideology, popular literature and the media. Edward Friedman describes how the media's distorted messages and limited information intensified anti-foreign emotions in the 1990s. He is critical of both Chinese nationalists and foreign analysts who downplay the likelihood that "Chinese nationalism could spark a major war." Kalpana Misra traces the search by the Party and other intellectuals for an ideological rubric and a "coherent set of core beliefs and values" as a guide for policy in post-Mao China. Peter Moody offers a careful reading of several short stories to elaborate the "anti-politics" of the post-Mao era, which he describes as the rejection of politics, especially from personal lives. Jonathan Jian-Hua Zhu and Huixin Ke use survey data to analyse how mainland Chinese think about Hong Kong, and how print media and television have different impacts on these attitudes in different parts of the country.

The third section of the book is the best, and is the only section truly focused on political culture in China. Cheng Li looks at the diversification of private entrepreneurs and claims that the emergence of this new social elite is creating cultural pluralism. Alan Liu argues that the renewed publishing of local gazetteers reflects the desire to either assert or create distinctive provincial identities and local political cultures. Chih-yu Shih compares participation in local elections in minority areas of China and Taiwan, as well as the meanings attached to that participation, for example, whether voting is an act of individual expression or ethnic cohesiveness. This chapter is the best example of the interpretive approach to political culture. The final two chapters, in contrast, are the best examples of the value of survey research to reveal cultural change and

variation. Wenfang Tang compares the extent of religious belief in China and Taiwan, and compares the impact of government policy, traditional culture, and modernization on religiosity. He also shows how Catholics and Protestants in China and Taiwan tend to have values more supportive of democracy and capitalism than the more numerous followers of Buddhism, Taoism, and folk religions. In the final chapter, Chu Yun-han and Yu-tzung Chang compare attitudes toward the state and the regime in China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. Among their findings, they note that support for the political system is not always accompanied by support for the incumbent government. In both China and Taiwan, increased levels of education and democratic values are associated with regime support but also with a willingness to criticize the government, making people more likely to work for change within the existing regime than to try to reform the system itself.

Inadvertently, much of the book reveals how little we know about political culture in China. While there are insightful chapters on the decay and diversification of official ideology, the rise of new social elites, the creation of provincial identities, nationalism, and other important trends, all of which undoubtedly influence cultural beliefs and norms, we do not learn how these actually affect political culture in contemporary China. Similarly, the significance of changes in political culture is not addressed in much detail, often only in brief concluding remarks. Political culture may influence governability, the stability of the regime, the willingness to engage in protest and other forms of collective action, and other types of political behaviour, but the consequences of changing culture too often go unexplored. Many of the chapters are more impressionistic and reflective than interpretive, which requires immersion in empirical detail.

Given the diversity of theory and method in the book, it is surprising how few chapters directly address scholarly debates on the concept of political culture. Tang's chapter on religion and Chu and Chang's chapter on legitimacy stand out as exceptions in this regard. They link their studies to the more general scholarly literature on political culture, and make useful observations on both the common and unique aspects of Chinese culture. They also try to speculate on the behavioural consequences of the values they measure, making Chinese political culture not simply something to be explained, but more importantly an explanation for other effects.

The chapters in this volume are uniformly insightful and well-written. It will be a useful addition to classes on contemporary China and as a guide to further research.

BRUCE J. DICKSON

Alternate Civilities: Democracy and Culture in China and Taiwan. By ROBERT P. WELLER. [Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999. xvi + 172 pp. \$28.00. ISBN 0-8133-3931-6.]

Robert Weller has given us a virtuoso display of theoretical sophistication

combined with rich primary data in a densely packed yet consistently stimulating volume. Recognizing the controversy over the applicability of the concept of “civil society” to areas outside the West, he elaborates the idea of an “alternate civility,” by which he means forms of association between the family and the state deeply rooted in society at the grassroots level (therefore not broad-based enough to qualify as “civil”) that, in his view, have provided the basis for Taiwan’s democratic transition, and may provide the seeds for a similar political transformation in mainland China. He calls this the “informal social sector” and contrasts it with a sector comprising formal organizations, which are more likely to be co-opted by the state.

Comparing Taiwan and the mainland is risky business, yet Weller argues persuasively that common cultural and institutional legacies provide a basis for doing so. In particular, horizontal ties of trust permeate both societies, a position which flies in the face of the conventional wisdom of pervasive mistrust of anyone outside the family or kin group. He argues commonsensically for seeing culture as neither immutable (“the ancient curse” approach) or infinitely variable (“the Etch-A-Sketch” theory), but rather evolving through a constant dialogue with economic and political forces.

Neither the authoritarian state or individualizing market forces have completely penetrated or destroyed these particularistic forms of association or culture, he argues. On the contrary, “there is always an informal sector that embeds market ties and that finds the free space in any regime of state control” (p. 19). This informal sector possesses social capital which can be converted into action or formal organizations, given a conducive environment.

The empirical chapters offer both the author’s own fieldwork data as well as a reinterpretation of secondary literature to demonstrate aspects of these horizontal linkages and the roles they play in changing social environments. He looks at three sectors of social life: business, religion and social movements.

For business, he shows how economic activity remains embedded in personal connections (*guanxi*) on both sides of the strait. While not comprising an autonomous lobby for the business community (though this is changing in Taiwan), Weller shows the strength of informal ties independent of the state.

Although published before the rise of *falun gong*, Weller’s discussion of types of religion-based linkages accurately foreshadows the way that grouping has become formalized and offers a direct challenge to the Communist state.

The final empirical chapter examines the rise of the environmental protection movement in Taiwan as an example of the way in which horizontal ties, often based in local temples, have the potential to mobilize individuals for social action even under authoritarian political control. Weller warns us that none of this provides a “guarantee of democratic transformation.” There is no way to predict a tipping point where a critical mass of associations or actions will compel an authori-

tarian state to undertake fundamental reforms. Market-based modernization is also not going to bring about civil society automatically, and just as scholars discuss East Asian variants of “capitalism,” they should expect alternate forms of civility and modernity as well.

One of the book’s many contributions is to bring women into the discussion. Weller pinpoints the role of women in the informal economy, in religious life (the prominence of Ciji Compassionate Relief Merit Society in Taiwan is a good example) as well as the environmental movement.

Although already jam-packed, the book might have elaborated the key concept of “social space,” and the role of the international discourse on civil society and of the demonstration effect of popular movements elsewhere in Asia on Taiwan and the mainland.

During a recent trip to Taiwan, some of my friends were bemoaning the death of civic engagement there, just as people sounded the death knell of political change on the mainland after Tiananmen. Weller’s book shows us that we have often been looking in the wrong place for the seeds of potential forces for democracy.

THOMAS B. GOLD

Making China Policy: Lessons from the Bush and Clinton Administrations. Edited by RAMON MYERS, MICHEL C. OKSENBURG and DAVID SHAMBAUGH. [Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001. 314 pp. Hard cover \$79.00, ISBN 0-7425-0963-X; paperback \$29.95, ISBN 0-7425-0964-8.]

This volume asks the right questions about the forces shaping US policy toward China during the Bush and Clinton administrations, focusing respectively on the roles of the two presidents, of the Congress and US interest groups, of Taiwan both as an issue and as the source of a significant lobbying effort, and of other countries in Europe and Asia, including China itself. The authors include scholars (Robert Ross, Sei-ichiro Takagi, Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Wang Jisi, Wang Yong, and Michael Yahuda), people with experience in the American government (Robert Sutter, Kerry Dumbaugh and Richard Bush), and one correspondent (James Mann). This combination of subjects and authors works well to provide an interesting, rounded view of the formation of United States policy toward the People’s Republic of China.

In broad outline, the story told in these pages is familiar. Various authors point to the seminal importance of the Tiananmen massacre of 4 June 1989, in shaping the politics of America’s China policy during the ensuing decade. This tragic development, followed soon after by the collapse of the Soviet bloc and then of the Soviet Union itself, put China into a new and harsh light and removed China policy from the strategic cold war framework in which it has been firmly nested.

Many chapters detail the various ways in which the US Congress played an increasing role in China policy during the course of the Bush

and Clinton presidencies. Members of Congress acted sometimes on the basis of personal beliefs, sometimes to please various interest groups and supporters, and sometimes simply to score partisan points against the occupant of the White House. Overall, the Congress made it more difficult to develop and sustain a coherent policy toward the PRC.

The chapters that focus on American interest groups highlight how extraordinarily permeable the policy process on China has been to the efforts of a very wide array of NGOs. Kerry Dumbaugh provides a 22-page appendix simply to present minimum data on the key NGOs that became involved in China policy during the 1990s!

Taiwan was both an object of and an active participant in America's China policy formation. As this volume demonstrates, Taiwan's democratization during the 1990s vastly enhanced its stature on Capitol Hill, providing it with levels of support it otherwise could not have attained. In addition, Taiwan under Lee Teng-hui very actively sought to influence the Congress in order to constrain the White House during parts of the 1990s.

The authors who look at the influence of Europe and of Asia outside of the PRC and Taiwan find, on balance, that these countries exerted very little impact on America's China policy formation. These other countries were certainly very interested in what the US did, but never developed the means to exert significant or consistent influence on the American political process. The one partial exception proved to be Hong Kong's US Chamber of Commerce efforts in the early 1990s on behalf of annual MFN renewal. But even here, the key actor was a group of American firms, not the Hong Kong government itself.

Taken together, these chapters portray a policy deeply influenced by a wide array of domestic actors, buffeted by conflicting forces within the US government, and thus often subject to considerations that had at best a very tangential relationship to America's national interests when dealing with the PRC. Those who have followed US–China relations since the late 1980s will find this a very familiar story, albeit with some interesting details. Those who are new to this subject will learn a great deal from this volume about the extent to which national interest views of foreign policy formation do not adequately capture the realities on a subject as large, emotional, symbolic, and controversial as US–China relations.

While this volume covers the right array of topics, it suffers from some limitations. First, with very few exceptions (the chapters by Richard Bush on Taiwan and by Wang Jisi and Wang Yong on China's views), the contributions are workmanlike but do not place the issues in broader historical or conceptual perspective. While the book's subtitle, somewhat incongruously, is "Lessons from the Bush and Clinton Administrations," most of these chapters are not written to produce lessons, and the book as a whole leaves it to the reader to derive them.

Secondly, the editors were not consistent in specifying a temporal frame for the book. As a result, for example, one chapter looks ahead to the uncertain outcome of the vote on granting China Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) status and then comments on the changed policy

dynamic resulting from the elections of George W. Bush and of a Republican Congress months after the PNTR vote actually took place.

Thirdly, the book unintentionally highlights just how difficult it is to try to provide an accurate analysis of policy making before the documents from a period are available. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker's interesting retrospective on the Clinton administration, for example, never mentions the Asian financial crisis as an influence on the administration's China policy during 1998 and early 1999. But this crisis dominated thinking about Asia and privileged the leaders of the Treasury Department in interagency deliberations, with very significant policy results. Analysis of decision-making within the Executive branch requires, by its very nature, a considerable number of years to pass before authors can be confident they have the story right.

In sum, this volume would have benefited from a stronger editorial hand in pushing authors to place their topics in a broader framework and in establishing greater temporal consistency. But the book as it stands is very useful and provides an excellent introduction to the many forces that during the 1990s shaped America's policy towards the PRC.

KENNETH LIEBERTHAL

Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century. By JOHN W. GARVER. [Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 2001. 450 pp. £35.50. ISBN 0-295-98073-7.]

John W. Garver's book on the history of Sino-Indian relations and the consequences for the region could not be more opportune. While India and Pakistan are again engaged in brinkmanship threatening nuclear confrontation, the *New York Times* reports (10 June 2002), in separate articles, that China has pledged unspecified aid to the Nepali government's war against Maoist insurgents, and that closer Indian-US military ties allow the United States greater influence in South Asia, giving India further leverage against growing Chinese power in the region. Readers of this book will immediately comprehend the significance of these events in their broadest historical context.

Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century is an examination of Sino-Indian diplomatic relationships from the time both nations extricated themselves from foreign domination. Employing a sweeping analysis, Garver interweaves all the determinants which played a role in that association: the cold war, Tibet, shared boundaries, rivalry for influence in neighbouring states, relationships with Pakistan, influence/hegemony in the Indian Ocean, the United States and nuclear weapons.

Garver's discussion of the Indo-Pakistani conflict over Kashmir – situated at the confluence of India, Pakistan and China – and the nuclear weapons programmes of all three nations, is particularly compelling and timely since China is rarely mentioned in the current crisis. But Garver sees a trilateral association detailing the extremely

close Sino-Pakistani relationship (Pakistan was the only non-communist state permitted to maintain normal diplomatic relations with Beijing during the Cultural Revolution (p. 205)) and reporting that during the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war China was on the verge of engagement on the side of its ally (pp. 199–204).

As to the general themes of this relationship, Garver contends that:

[T]here are two tap-roots of PRC-ROI conflict. One is conflicting nationalist narratives that lead patriots of both sides to look to the same arenas in attempting to realize their nation's modern greatness. The second, and more substantial, root is a conflict of fundamental national security concepts resembling a classic security dilemma (p. 11).

Garver acknowledges that over the past half century the main objective for both nations has been domestic economic development while in foreign affairs the pre-eminent concern had to be the cold war and their place in it. Nevertheless, Garver sees the "Sino-Indian geopolitical conflict in the arc of land and waters lying between and alongside China and India" (p. 5) as crucial to understanding contemporary developments for, he argues, concern about the other's military objectives play a major role in decision-making in both capitals.

While the book is thorough, there are some notable omissions, the most egregious being the paucity of maps. There is not even a single sketch of the entire Sino-Indian border. In other instances, omissions preclude a more nuanced analysis.

Garver underestimates the aim of India's actions towards Tibet immediately upon independence which, I believe, was to maintain imperial privileges. This policy was promoted by Hugh Richardson, the influential British colonial official in Lhasa who, overnight, became the Indian colonial representative, simply replacing the flag in front of this Lhasa residence in 1947.

In his discussion of Sino-Nepali relations Garver fails to consider the Tibetan guerrilla base in Mustang which, for 14 years, housed thousands of anti-Chinese rebels who raided across the Chinese frontier. And, in his discussion of Bhutan, there is no mention of the 1973 aborted coup by Tibetan refugees to overthrow the monarchy in hopes of using Bhutan as a staging area for raids into Tibet, perhaps with Indian encouragement.

For the most part Garver is clear when describing the official views of various nations and when he is expressing his own. But at times his views colour the narrative. His characterization of Chinese rule in Tibet, which varied greatly, is too simplistic, and his description of the Indian annexation of Sikkim is quite benign, neglecting Indian encouragement of Nepali immigration into that country in order to outnumber the indigenous population.

And while Garver makes a strong case concerning China's aid to Pakistan's nuclear programme he is silent about external aid to India from Canada and Britain and, perhaps, the United States. A former CIA officer, the late William R. Corson, claimed that the US trained several hundred

Indian nuclear scientists in return for Nehru's welcoming the Dalai Lama into India in 1959.

Is there a solution to the heightened tension in the region? Garver thinks so and hopes for one, "... thereby ushering in a new era of predominately co-operative, nonconflictual Sino-Indian relations" (p. 368). While acknowledging the possibility of numerous scenarios for the future, he makes the case for two: China agrees to India's predominance in South Asia and the Indian Ocean or India recognizes China's growing military and economic power and accepts a role for Beijing. Both of these, Garver asserts, could develop into a partnership over security issues, thereby lessening tensions.

Whatever its few shortcomings, this is an excellent guide to a very complex diplomatic history. It is skilfully argued, well documented and bound to stir debate.

A. TOM GRUNFELD

China's Entrepreneurial Army. By TAI MING CHEUNG. [Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. xiv + 312 pp. £40.00. ISBN 0-19-924690-4.]

While working as a correspondent for *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Tai Ming Cheung was one of the first to write at length about the commercial activities of the Chinese military. His new book, *China's Entrepreneurial Army*, goes well beyond his earlier journalistic endeavours and is an outstanding piece of scholarship on a difficult yet fascinating subject.

Cheung's book begins with a comprehensive historical analysis of the origins of Chinese military commercialism. His analysis provides even more compelling evidence that PLA, Inc. was an extension of an internal military economy begun in the pre-liberation guerrilla period, with a significant number of legacies from even the imperial period. The author then provides a deep structural dissection of the military commercial economy. He outlines the administrative oversight mechanisms in the PLA, as well as the corporate lattices. Cheung introduces the reader to the key military and economy personalities involved, and outlines the business interests of the PLA by sector and geography in great detail, including the military's foreign subsidiaries.

The second half of the book addresses the consequences of the military's role in the economy. He begins by outlining the many benefits of the PLA commercialism to the military itself, both financial and organizational, and then addresses the serious negative trends of corruption, profiteering, and smuggling. Cheung examines the interrelationship between the military economy and the defence-industrial base, analysing the disparate synergies and contradictions between the two systems. Finally, he lays out a persuasive account of the circumstances and process of the military's 1998 divestiture from commerce, closing with a thoughtful assessment of the legacy of PLA, Inc. for overall Chinese economic

development, military professionalism, Sino-US relations, and other entrepreneurial militaries.

The strengths of this book lie in the author's unparalleled access to the inner workings of the military commercial economy. The footnotes clearly reflect extensive interviewing among PLA bureaucrats and corporate officers, and the author should be lauded for his heavy reliance on primary source military and statistical materials. Moreover, the author's treatment of this trove of data displays great analytical and theoretical depth.

There are not many things wrong with this book. One can always wish for more comprehensive data, but this desire is tempered with painful knowledge of the opacity of the Chinese military. Nonetheless, this is a remarkable book, and a testament to the author's longtime pre-eminence in covering the issue. I wholeheartedly recommend *China's Entrepreneurial Army* to anyone interested in Chinese military affairs, civil-military relations, or corruption.

JAMES MULVENON

The Economic Development of Modern China (three volume set). Edited by JOSEPH C. H. CHAI. [Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, 2000. Vol. I, *Prewar Economic Development*, xlii + 683 pp; Vol. II, *Socialist Modernization, 1949–78*, x + 680 pp; Vol. III, *Reforms and Opening up Since 1979*, viii + 671 pp. ISBN 1-84064-054-5.]

Multi-volume collections of published academic journal articles and book chapters have recently become increasingly popular among publishers, especially in the social sciences. By their very nature, the price of such collections lies beyond the purse of most individual purchasers. Instead, they are targeted at the academic institutional market. By implication, their scholarly *raison d'être* lies in the pedagogic contribution of giving undergraduate and postgraduate students access to published materials that not only inform, but also offer insights into important academic and policy debates.

Judged by such criteria, Joseph Chai's collection succeeds triumphantly. If the aim of the exercise is pedagogic, its outcome is refreshingly free from mere didacticism. Its scope masks a comprehensive reading of English-language sources that span the entire period of 'modern' (post-1840) China. As such, the choice of materials from this vast literature reflects the editor's expertise not just as an economist, but also as an economic historian. Indeed, launching the collection with a lecture by Joseph Needham offers a salutary reminder that a proper understanding of modern China's development demands more than knowledge of just the disciplines of development studies, economics and econometric techniques. The need to address what Chai calls the "Needham puzzle" – the apparent inability of such a technologically advanced country, as China had been in the 14th century, subsequently to generate a modern industrial revolution – has a relevance that transcends the boundaries of

the pre-modern history of Chinese science. Mark Elvin's notion that pre-modern China was caught in a "high-level equilibrium trap" and the debate to which this notion gave rise – both well represented in volume one of the collection – are evidence enough of this.

The events which give identity and character to each of the three volumes in this collection reflect an economic chronology, marked by familiar watersheds: the opening of China to the West (1840) and the social, economic and political dislocation to which, directly and indirectly, this process contributed during the next hundred years; the victory of the Chinese Communist Party (1949); and the beginning of the transition from a centrally-planned to market-orientated economic system (1978). One of the major strengths of the collection is its historical depth and the reminder this long-run perspective provides of important historical continuities that cut across these watersheds. All students of economic development in post-1949, or post-1978 China should have at least a passing acquaintance with the work – most of it dating from the 1970s – of such influential writers as Robert F. Dernberger, Ramon H. Myers, Dwight H. Perkins, Thomas G. Rawski, Carl Riskin *et al.*, all of whom are well represented in volume one of this collection. Not least, they will find that many of the current economic preoccupations of both scholars and the current Chinese leadership have their echoes in those of a century or more ago.

Volumes one and two have similar structures, designed to highlight the economic rationale, as well as the impact of development strategies pursued under Mao (the period of "socialist modernization") and during the post-Mao era (that of "reforms and opening up"). In the former, Chai's choice of materials highlights the tension and changing balance between external influences and indigenous approaches in shaping China's development trajectory. Implicit in this dichotomy is a comparison between the strengths and weaknesses of the borrowed Soviet model, and those of the more radical, even heterodox stances signalled by the two great Maoist adventures – the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. Among the publications used to explore this comparison are three seminal papers by Kenneth R. Walker (on collectivization (1966)), Nicholas R. Lardy (on centralizing and decentralizing in fiscal management (1975)) and Barry Naughton (on the 'Third Front' (1988)). Mao Zedong himself is also represented through the inclusion of his influential 1956 speech, "On the ten major relationships." The final part of volume two investigates the impact of China's far from consistent choice of policies on its development path through the eyes not only of academic analysts, such as Gregory C. Chow, Lardy, Rawski, Riskin and others, but also those of the World Bank.

Because it deals with events that are still unfolding, the third volume takes readers into what is probably more familiar territory to them – that of the post-1978 reforms that have edged China ever closer to a market-orientated economic system. Chai's collection offers a comprehensive review of associated policies and trends, embracing agricultural and rural non-agricultural development, enterprise reform, foreign trade and for-

eign investment, monetary and fiscal issues, and labour market adjustments. It also introduces a comparative element, designed to highlight some of the lessons for other countries that may be learned from China's experience as an economy in transition.

For those who like lists, the authors most often cited by Chai are Dwight Perkins and Nicholas Lardy, each of whom is represented by five entries. Mainland Chinese authors feature much less, although there are three entries by Justin Yifu Lin – one of them, dating from as recently as 1995, addressing that “Needham puzzle.” Cited articles have been extracted from both mainstream area studies and disciplinary journals, the single most frequently used source being *The China Quarterly*, with ten entries. Interestingly – whether also reassuringly, others must decide – there turns out to be a significant overlap between Chai's choice of materials for volume three and those used in two other recent collections (Robert Ash and Anne Booth (eds.), *The Economies of Asia, 1950–1998: Critical Perspectives on the World Economy* (2000); Ross Garnaut and Yiping Huang (eds.), *Growth Without Miracles: Readings on the Chinese Economy in the Era of Reform* (2001)).

In making his compilation, Joseph Chai inevitably offers himself as a hostage to fortune. Nobody is going to endorse every single entry, whereas everybody will point to an author or topic that has been left out. In my own case, I wish – *pace* the excerpt from Kang Chao – that there had been more consideration of the *demographic* context in which China's modern economic development has taken place, through inclusion of the important work of Ho Ping-ti, John Aird and/or Judith Banister. But such complaints are trivial when set against the breadth and richness of this collection of English-language materials. It is an outstanding compilation, judiciously chosen and representative of varying, though never merely trendy, views of the nature of economic change in modern China. University libraries – above all, that increasing number of institutions offering courses on China, but which do not possess a specialized literature on it – should ensure that several copies of the three-volume set are prominently displayed for use by both their undergraduate and postgraduate students.

ROBERT ASH

The Asian Financial Crisis and the Ordeal of Hong Kong. By Y. C. JAO.
[Westport: Quorum Books, 2001. 227 pp. £54.50. ISBN 1-56720-447-3.]

This well-narrated book consists of five parts: the Asian financial crisis; the impact on Hong Kong; “Two puzzles;” the role of China; and an epilogue entitled “Lessons and reflections.” The author is a veteran scholar on banking in Hong Kong. The first part documents the genesis of the Asian financial crisis through its propagation from Thailand to the rest of East Asia. The second part is really the main body of the book, comprising five chapters out of a total of 12. The book is rich in details, with plenty of tables and illustrative figures.

This carefully researched book is no doubt a handy reference if one wants to know *how* the contagion of mismanagement of the financial and

monetary affairs in one country spread to other countries. In comparison, the book is not as successful in providing a convincing explanation of *why* things happened the way they did.

Jao systematically categorizes the various prevailing theories that attempted to explain why the Asian financial crisis (AFC) took place. The approaches are called, respectively, “self-fulfilling financial panic theory,” “crony capitalism theory,” “financial mismanagement and financial sector fragility,” and the “eclectic view.” He explains, convincingly, why the third view “is the most satisfying,” and goes on to draw up a very interesting schema of the AFC. Indeed “crony capitalism” cannot explain the financial panic. Surely “self-fulfilling financial panic” could not occur if the financial sector were not fragile and if there was no mismanagement in the first place. Mismanagement is no doubt very much at the centre of the explanation behind the genesis and the turn of events throughout the crisis. The reader is tempted, upon reading the book, to ask further: “what exactly is the nature of this mismanagement?”

Related to this are two equally intriguing questions: why was Hong Kong hit so badly by the AFC, and why did Hong Kong recover so slowly in its aftermath? These two questions are addressed in the section that is titled “Two puzzles.” According to the author, “there was no pervasive financial mismanagement, no reckless borrowing internally or externally. Hong Kong’s banking system was one of the best supervised in the world.” Yet what hit Hong Kong in 1998 was more like a depression than a recession, using the author’s own words. The author’s key explanation is that a sudden reversal in market psychology caused a serious credit crunch, with borrowers cutting back their borrowing while lenders cut back their lending. The puzzle remains, however, as to why the economic outlook suddenly grew so dim that it even surpassed what happened during the Cultural Revolution of the 1960s and the oil price shocks of the 1970s. High real interest rates and real exchange rates cannot be the only explanation, as really high real interest rates caused by deflation did not set in until the latter part of 1998, while the real exchange rate appreciation from 1997 to 1998 was relatively modest.

Overall, the book must be credited with faithfully documenting the background to and the course of the crisis, how the SAR Government dealt with the crisis, and particularly how mainland China was characterized by “an extraordinary mixture of external strengths and domestic weaknesses” (cited from the Fitch IBCA Report on p. 198). The detailed discussion of China’s response to the crisis and its ability to weather the storm are all of great interest. To Jao, “China had avoided the trap of overhasty exchange liberalization that caused massive capital inflows, which in turn fuelled domestic credit expansion and asset bubbles in many Asian countries just before the AFC” (p. 184). One wonders, after reading Jao’s book, if the “financial mismanagement” was the “overhasty exchange liberalization” that characterized many of the countries hit by the crisis.

LOK SANG HO

The China Dream: The Elusive Quest for the Greatest Untapped Market on Earth. By JOE STUDWELL. [London: Profile Books, 2002. 359 pp. £15.00. ISBN 1-86197-370-5.]

“They came like sheep, and they were sheared,” writes Joe Studwell of foreign investors. That in one short sentence is the theme of this book. His is a tale covering 2,000 years during which many came to the middle kingdom to make their fortunes by selling things to the Chinese. Merchants, builders, and others have chased the “China dream,” as Studwell calls it, for as long as they knew there was such a place called China.

As Studwell shows us, these particular sheep wanted to be fleeced or at the very least deserved it. We see the arrogance, naivety, and folly of foreigners as they misperceived China through the centuries but especially since the onset of the reform era in 1978. His thoroughly-researched book examines how and why they have come, failed, and eventually left – only to be replaced by new ones eager for a piece of what is considered the world’s largest market.

Perhaps the most eager of them all is General Motors, the giant American vehicle manufacturer. Studwell, editor-in-chief of the respected *China Economic Quarterly*, pays special attention to that company’s single-minded quest to build a vehicle for a market that did not exist – and which could not be developed during the careers of any of the executives involved. Even after the obvious failure of its plans, GM was still deceiving itself. “This is a success story and should be presented as such,” said Stan Clemens, a GM manager at a pick-up truck joint venture that had produced only a few hundred vehicles in seven years. The willingness of foreigners to suspend their critical faculties was a testament to the intoxicating effect of the China dream. No wonder the Chinese were able to attract over US\$300 billion of foreign investment in the 1990s.

And no wonder the Chinese have felt no compulsion to improve the investment climate in their country: money continued to come from the outside despite what happened to the previous batch of foreigners. *China Dream* not only relates the trials and tribulations of investors but manages to place it in the context of what is wrong with Chinese society today. Consequently, it gives us a more accurate picture of the People’s Republic than Nicholas Lardy’s *Integrating China into the Global Economy*, a book that has often been compared with *China Dream*. Lardy offers a much more optimistic view of China because, like many analysts, he fails to consider the stagnation of the political process and the unrest simmering at the lower rungs of the Chinese social order. Studwell’s gloomy vision of the future appears far more realistic. *China Dream*’s main contribution is that we are forced to see the People’s Republic the way it actually is – and not the way we want it to be.

And what will China be like in the future? Although acknowledging the possibility of calamity, Studwell instead argues for a “long-term low growth scenario.” He is, however, justifiably more sanguine about one

portion of the economy: during the next decade China will continue to “rise as a global manufacturing base for exporters.”

Studwell’s generally downbeat vision of the future prevents his book from seeing the long-term change that China’s membership in the World Trade Organization can bring. The sweeping accession agreement Beijing signed can lead to an eventual restructuring of the economy. China will become less Chinese as the country is further shaped by more vigorous foreign competition. When that happens, many of the obstacles that Studwell so accurately describes will give way.

And if he is wrong about his view of foreign investment, what will happen? Studwell himself supplies the answer: “Like all dreams, the Chinese one could still come true, even if it is in the nature of most dreams not to do so.”

GORDON G. CHANG

Foreign Direct Investment in China: Determinants and Impact. By YINGQI WEI and XIAMING LIU. [Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2001. xiii + 208 pp. £49.95. ISBN 1-84064-494-X.]

The most striking feature of this book is the extensive use of econometric modelling techniques in identifying and quantifying the determinants and impact of foreign direct investment (FDI) in China. The authors set up an empirical model for each of the five research questions they have selected for this study, which include the determinants, regional distribution, productivity spillover, regional economic convergence, and FDI–trade interrelations. It is quite appropriate for the authors to adopt the panel data approach to tackle the issues since the limitation of Chinese data has prevented them from using time series analysis and cross-section estimation meaningfully. But in terms of the structure, it could be more concise and tidier. For example, the first two chapters could be merged.

The authors claim that they have made an important contribution to the study of FDI by conducting a special investigation into productivity spillovers from FDI and the interaction between the level of FDI inflow and the foreign trade intensity. Admittedly, the latter is an important and relatively new subject in the field and the World Trade Organization (WTO) published a special report on the issue in October 1996 (Press/57). The authors’ finding, that intense investors tend to be intense trading partners, mirrors that in the WTO report.

The issue of productivity spillovers from FDI, however, is not entirely a new subject, although how to measure the spillover effect remains controversial. The research on externality, with which spillover is associated, emerged as early as the 1950s. Later, some scholars started describing the impact of FDI on the host country as linkage effect, which can be further divided into forward and backward linkage, according to different input–output relations. Various indicators, such as the ratio of domestic contents or domestic sales, have been used to measure the

impact of FDI on the local economy. This book should benefit from these early studies.

The authors conclude that the impact of FDI on the improvement of Chinese labour productivity is very “limited,” which echoes most studies on FDI in the past. They seem to blame it mainly on the “relatively low” share of FDI in China’s total domestic investment (p. 159). This may be true to some extent, but more fundamentally the lack of strong industrial and technological links between the FDI sector and the local economy in most cases should be responsible for the disappointing performance. That is to say, most of the foreign-invested operations China has attracted over the last two decades are engaged in “enclave-type” operations, heavily reliant on the overseas market for inputs and/or outputs. Many such foreign firms are vertically integrated into their parent corporations outside China and hence are not interested in linking up with the local Chinese companies.

The weakness of this book is its reliance predominantly on data released by the Chinese authorities. These data often are not very accurate for some known reasons, as admitted by the authors themselves. It is a pity that as scholars coming from China, the authors could not incorporate more first-hand information, data or even anecdotes from their own field surveys in China into the study.

Overall, this is a well-researched volume, containing a great deal of important information about FDI in China, despite the fact that three of the five core chapters have already been published separately in three different journals. It can be used by both undergraduate and postgraduate students of Chinese business and economics to supplement their core reading.

QI LUO

Cadres and Corruption: The Organizational Involution of the Chinese Communist Party. By LU XIAOBO. [Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000. xvii + 368 pp. ISBN 0-8047-3958-7.]

Another book on corruption? Almost invariably, every book on contemporary China is about corruption. However it is described – “patron–client relations” (Oi) or “organized dependence” (Walder) or *guanxi* relations – corruption is not a new phenomenon in China; indeed it can be traced back to imperial times.

Therefore, much is expected from Lu Xiaobo to provide something new. After a lengthy discussion of his theoretical framework in the opening chapter, Lu proceeds in the next two chapters to deliver the data on corruption from 1949 until the end of the Mao era. The next two chapters (five and six) are primarily devoted to corruption since the beginning of reform (1978) until today. Throughout these chapters, Lu tries to piece together all reports of corruption within the context of the political environment of the day. This is particularly useful for readers not familiar with Chinese politics.

As “corruption” is defined as broadly as possible, the book is filled with

anecdotes of bribery, embezzlement, backdoor deals, nepotism, patronage and statistical falsification. Lu makes full use of written documents, both open and internal (*neibu*); only occasionally does the author provide data from interviews. Those engaging in corruption range from ordinary to high-level cadres, and not exclusively Party members. As presented in this book, the scale of corruption in China is indeed massive.

This level of corruption would not have occurred if the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had not undergone an “organizational involution.” Corruption, in Lu’s mind, results when an organization (the CCP) fails to live up to the standards that it sets for itself. If the CCP had succeeded in maintaining the “revolutionary values” which they had before they came to power, there would have been no corruption. After coming to power, nevertheless, Party members as well as cadres were simply unable to live according to the prescribed norms, and allowed the practice of “informal modes of operation.” They lost their revolutionary spirit, and were never able to develop a rational bureaucracy. To make matters worse, Mao and subsequent leaders were highly critical of “bureaucratism” and its failure to produce bureaucratization and routinization, something vital for a modern state.

Lu rejects the argument that China belongs to the category of ‘soft state’ (Myrdal) due to strong societal forces. In his view, “the communist state becomes ‘soft’ because it has been captured by its own agent” (p. 246). In other words, the blame falls upon the CCP, not the society. But the CCP is not to bear the whole burden either because, according to Lu, this “organizational involution” is the result of being in power. In the final analysis, it is the taste of power that makes Party members corrupt. “Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely,” as Lord Acton said.

This argument, however, becomes problematic because Lu seems to assume that the CCP was an immaculate organization, consisting of members of high moral standards, until it came to power. Looking back at the history of the CCP, corruption (as defined by Lu) existed within the Party even before it came to power. The Party rectification campaign (1943) during the Yan’an period, for instance, was clearly intended to root out corruption which had reached a scale that frustrated Mao as well as many critical intellectuals.

These criticisms aside, this book is rich in information, and can be used at undergraduate level as a good introduction to all different types of official corruption in China.

IGNATIUS WIBOWO

Chinese Professionals and the Republican State: The Rise of Professional Associations in Shanghai, 1912–1937. By XU XIAOQUN. [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. xv + 328 pp. £40.00; \$64.95. ISBN 0-521-78071-3.]

Xu Xiaqun’s book, which deals with the role of professionals and

professional associations in Republican Shanghai, fills an important gap in the history of Chinese social history and Chinese modernization. It illuminates the relationship between state and urban society at a time of rapid economic and political transformation. In his analysis, the author does not use the Western-derived concept of civil society, but that of “symbiotic dynamism” between state and society. He puts the emphasis on the motives, initiatives and strategies on both the part of social actors and the part of the Republican state. He rejects the notion of social autonomy embedded in the concept of civil society and substitutes for it that of interaction and interpenetration between state and urban society, considered as key elements of modern state-building.

The book is divided into three parts. In part one, “Professions and professionals,” Xu examines how modernization spawned new occupations, and describes the wide economic transformations which in early 20th-century Shanghai made possible the emergence of “self-employed professionals” (*ziyou zhiyezhe*) such as lawyers, medical doctors and journalists, who make up the three groups analysed in the book. The total number of these professionals amounted to 18,000 in 1936. Their educational attainments, income, and life-style made them part of the urban middle-class, but their expertise and their professional commitment distinguished them from other urban elites – intellectuals, merchants, gentry – and gave them a specific social identity. They generally kept aloof from politics and officialdom: most of them preferred to contribute to China’s salvation in their job-defined roles.

Part two, “Social institutions, state action and professionalization,” deals with the role of the Republican state in the definition of professional expertise and the building up of professional associations. According to Xu, professionalization and modern state-building are two intertwined processes. Historically, voluntary associations were part of the Chinese social fabric and the Chinese state often distrusted them as subversive to its authority and public order. After the 1911 revolution there was an explosive development of public associations, many of them rapidly suppressed by the dictatorial government of Yuan Shikai. Later on, societal organizations and popular activism took advantage of the weaknesses of the Beiyang government (1917–1927). After Chiang Kai-shek came to power, the Kuomintang (KMT) regime proceeded to rein in these associations and regulate them strictly. According to the KMT corporatist vision, the main role of the government-approved associations was to channel societal initiative into serving the official policy.

From the start, the Republic government paid a great deal of attention to the legal profession. The Shanghai Bar Association was established in 1912 and reorganized and put under KMT supervision in 1927. The intervention of the state in Chinese medical professionalization came later and was made less effective because of the rivalries between Western-style doctors and native practitioners. However, despite their efforts to dominate society, the Republican governments accepted the legitimacy of professional associations and thus provided professionals with space to promote their own, as well as public, interests.

The politicization of these associations under the influence of rising nationalism, and their efforts to maintain balance between political struggles and defence of professional identities, called for many interactions with the state which are analysed in part three: “Professionalism, nationalism and politics.” No longer “literary men” (*wenren*), journalists, whose association was founded in 1921 and re-established in 1927, struggled against censorship and demanded freedom of expression as a necessary condition under which to carry out their activities and to ensure national salvation. In the case of medical doctors, the conflict was mainly between modern and traditional practitioners over the legitimation of their respective activities by the state. It was fought by the former in the name of science and modernization, and in the name of national essence and patriotism by the latter, who finally won the contest and gained full recognition.

The Shanghai Bar Association was the most active in the public arena. Sometimes lawyers’ own interests coincided with national policy, for example in 1926, when the Chinese government struggled for the rendition of the Shanghai Mixed Court. Later on, the Shanghai Bar Association assumed the role of a public pressure group pushing the Nanjing government to adopt a resistance policy against Japan. Four of the “seven gentlemen” arrested by the KMT government in November 1936 were members of the Association.

This book is richly documented: the author has used a wide range of Chinese sources (archive materials, newspapers, government documents, yearbooks) as well as interviews with professionals. Xu Xiaoqun is also well acquainted with American and European historiography and familiar with Western concepts. His work represents a valuable contribution to the history of Republican China. It provides a solid basis for comparative analysis of state–society relationships in China and in the West. Although the main themes of Xu’s analysis have become quite familiar to China specialists, they nevertheless will enjoy the new and convincing evidence presented here. The book will also make a rewarding read for students of China’s 20th-century political and social revolution.

MARIE-CLAIRE BERGÈRE

The Haunting Fetus: Abortion, Sexuality, and the Spirit World in Taiwan.

By MARC L. MOSKOWITZ. [Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2001. viii + 206 pp. \$24.95. ISBN 0-8248-2428-8.]

Marc L. Moskowitz’s first book *The Haunting Fetus* explores a contemporary and new phenomenon in Taiwan: the appeasement/exorcism of foetus spirits. This phenomenon, which emerged in the mid-1970s and grew substantially in the mid-1980s, has parallels with similar practices in Japan as well as local, traditional antecedents. *The Haunting Fetus* contains considerable ethnographic information drawn from various sources such as religious tracts, interviews and visual media, and ranges

across different accounts of foetus spirits, their appeasement and sorcery, from the perspectives of female and male 'clients,' and Daoist and Buddhist religious masters.

Moskowitz links the emergence of foetus-spirit appeasement to traditional conceptions (i.e. the preference for sons in order to continue the family line), and the traditional structure of sexual relations. He also connects the prevalence of foetus-spirit appeasement with changing sexual behaviours and shifting power structures between generations. Moskowitz considers foetus-spirit appeasement as a type of new practice, which yet retains important features of traditional Chinese beliefs and practices. For example, like other ghosts, aborted foetus-spirits have the harmful effects of *yin* energy on the living, in particular their family. According to Confucianism, in killing a foetus one is perceived to mutilate familial flesh and to harm the property of one's parents and ancestors, which is an unfilial act. According to Buddhism, in having an abortion, one has killed the soul of a person whose fate is intrinsically connected with one's own.

Moskowitz's primary argument is to write against the thesis that foetus-spirit appeasement constitutes a form of profiteering based upon the exploitation of women and men, who feel guilty or show fear of their aborted foetus-spirits and wish to make amends for the 'sinful' act of abortion (Hardacre, 1997). They sometimes pay considerable sums of money to religious masters to have their foetus-spirits appeased, exorcised or sent on to the next life. He argues that while instances of exploitation do exist, the services provided by religious masters constitute a form of therapy that is in some sense comparable to the services provided by psychologists in the US. He also argues that the function of a belief in foetus spirits is to discourage the pursuit of individual pleasure by emphasizing responsibility for one's children, thus re-affirming familial ties and the social order as a whole in an environment that increasingly allows space for individualism. As such, Moskowitz's understanding sits within a tradition of interpretation of Taiwanese/Chinese practices and belief in spirits as a form of therapy (e.g. Arthur Kleinmen, 1975, 1982) and the structuralist framework of Mary Douglas (1966) about the ordering of sexuality and sex relations.

Ultimately, however, I feel that, while Moskowitz has conducted research in an interesting new area, the argument that structures the book is essentially weak, and the evidence he has collected actually points to a much more nuanced account of an encounter between 'traditional' beliefs and practices and 'modernity.' For example, Moskowitz cites (but ultimately dismisses) evidence from Thompson (1988) and Wolf (1974) that 'traditional' values prohibit the offering of food and incense by seniors to juniors. Foetus-spirit appeasement reverses this parent-child hierarchy suggesting that it is a site where such values are being negotiated and contested. The ambivalence of this site of conflict between 'traditional' and 'modern' values emerges in Moskowitz's own assertion that, "[foetus-spirits] are considered to be young spirits in need of assistance from their living parents" (p. 166). Ironically, then, it may be

that the practice of foetus-spirit appeasement also functions as a means of re-inscribing traditional values between juniors and seniors. Moskowitz entirely rejects the position whereby certain religious beliefs and practices may have a 'protest' function, stating "religion protest does not seem to fit the case of Taiwan" (p. 160). His conclusion, that foetus-spirit appeasement has primarily a psychological or therapeutic function, tends to shift the practice out of a complex social context of competing social, political, economic and religious values.

FANG-LONG SHIH

Every Step a Lotus: Shoes for Bound Feet. By DOROTHY KO. [Berkeley: University of California Press and the Bata Shoe Museum, 2001. 162 pp. \$24.95. ISBN 0-520-23284-4.]

Dorothy Ko, in her masterly *Teachers of the Inner Chambers: Women and Culture in Seventh-Century China* (1994), stressed the positive side of footbinding as a central element in women's culture which "prepared a girl physically and psychologically for her future role as wife and a dependent family member" (p. 149). She noted that "a pair of nicely shaped small feet represented the triumph of individual willpower and effort" and was "the most important aspect of a woman's beauty that she could have control over" (p. 171). To underline footbinding's role in women's relations with each other, she quoted poems they wrote to each other praising small feet. She did not directly challenge the view popularized by Howard Levy in *Chinese Footbinding: The History of a Curious Erotic Custom* (1967) that footbinding had erotic appeal, but she shifted attention away from what it apparently meant to men to what it must have meant to women.

Ko's new book, *Every Step a Lotus*, extends her revisionist interpretation, this time giving more attention to the labour women expended making shoes. Ko curated an exhibit of shoes for bound feet for the Bata Shoe Museum in Toronto and this volume was prepared to accompany the exhibit. With about half the space taken up with high-quality colour photographs, the book is physically gorgeous and should appeal not only to those interested in footbinding but also those with an interest in Chinese handicraft, especially embroidery.

The relatively brief text of *Every Step a Lotus* is divided into five chapters. The first sketches the historical and cultural background of footbinding, beginning with archaeological evidence and myths in which small feet figure and going on to references to women's feet in Tang poems. From this brief treatment, I was left wondering whether Ko is arguing that feet played a larger role in the imagination in Tang China than in other societies, or that in Tang poems women's feet received more attention than their faces or hair. Ko promises another book on the cultural history of footbinding, which presumably will treat these topics in more detail.

The next three chapters deal with features of footbinding in its heyday,

which Ko sees as the 18th century. Ko argues that footbinding grew steadily more popular from the Song period on, but by the 19th century had become so popular that it was a vulgar rather than a refined practice. In these chapters Ko makes material culture her primary focus, examining how shoes were constructed and decorated. It was through bodily labour, she emphasizes, that women bound their feet and made their shoes. Ko does not retell the by now familiar story of the campaigns against footbinding in the late 19th and early 20th century, but in her last chapter looks at the changes in shoe style that accompanied these changes in the meanings given to bound feet.

As Ko is certainly aware, her social and cultural history goals do not overlap completely with those of the collectors who acquired the shoes illustrated in this book. For instance, Ko wants to think about bound foot shoes as everyday objects, but those now in the Bata Museum are in pristine condition. The ones with beautifully embroidered soles (e.g. p. 73), in particular, seem never to have been worn. Were these shoes important as parts of gift exchanges, rather than as foot coverings? Or were they samples of fine needlework, never intended for use?

This is the second lavishly illustrated book on bound foot shoes, coming only a few years after Beverly Jackson's *Splendid Slippers: A Thousand Years of an Erotic Custom* (1997). The availability of bound foot shoes for sale in Chinese antique stores and flea markets undoubtedly lies behind both the formation of collections and the publication of books illustrating them. Some people are repelled by the sight of bound foot shoes; in others they arouse a voyeuristic fascination. Ko tries hard to teach us to view them as artifacts of women's culture and examples of women's art.

PATRICIA EBREY

Red Sorrow. By NANCHU. [New York: Arcade Publishing, 2001. 275 pp. \$25.95. ISBN 1-55970-569-8.]

The definitive Cultural Revolution memoir can probably never be written; the movement was too complex and regionally diverse to be captured in a single account. New personal stories of the era are thus to be welcomed, as each adds to our understanding of one of history's extraordinary political and social tragedies. However, some such memoirs are better than others, depending on writing quality, character interest and originality, representativeness of experience, and depth of analysis and self-reflection.

In terms of subject matter, Nanchu's *Red Sorrow* makes a contribution to the literature. It is one of the first English-language memoirs to touch on the experience of the two million educated youth sent to the frontiers to join the military in construction–production army corps (*shengchan jianshe bingtuan*), where they were tasked with preparing for war while transforming nature and themselves. The book is also one of the few

accounts by a “worker–peasant–soldier student” selected for college directly from the countryside in recognition of her political performance and, to read Nanchu’s account, popularity with her peers. However, it disappoints in other important respects, particularly literary merit and thoughtfulness. Those interested in the important emerging genre of “educated youth literature” (*zhiqing wenxue*), which has produced several hundred heartfelt, reflective, and moving volumes in Chinese, will have to wait or seek elsewhere.

Nanchu, the daughter of a rector and a school administrator at Shanghai’s Hudong University, opens her tale with a familiar story of criticism of parents, Red Guard search raids, and family anguish. As the 13-year-old child of jailed and ostracized parents, she resorts to cadging butcher scraps for herself and her younger brother while dodging abusive neighbourhood children. Eventually, Nanchu herself becomes a Red Guard, earning revolutionary glory even as her parents are victimized. As was the pattern for her generation, she then “volunteered” to go to the countryside, winning, through impassioned letters, a spot in the Heilongjiang Military Farm in Northeast China’s “great northern wilderness.”

The second section of *Red Sorrow* details harsh labour and living conditions, sexual harassment and enticements from officials who have access to good food, and complicated political jealousies. Nanchu’s attraction for a male youth is dangerous and she restrains her feelings; romantic relationships may bring execution. The book’s dramatic high point occurs when Nanchu is nearly burned to death while attempting to save comrades from a fire; her heroism paves the way for her nomination in 1973 to Shanghai’s East China Normal University. The final section of the book details latter-Cultural Revolution political intrigues in Shanghai, the resolution of Nanchu’s romantic conflicts, and her departure in 1986 for the University of Georgia.

Despite her willing participation in Red Guard victimizations and a highly politicized college selection process, Nanchu conveys little introspection or self-doubt. A graver problem is her hackneyed writing, punctuated with clichés and odd imagery: “Dust raised by countless feet hung in the air like a foggy curtain. The vigorous Beijing teenagers poured into Shanghai by the trainload like swarms of locusts” (p. 3). Someone is described as having eyes like grapes. The lack of basic historical and political context will leave most students and general readers more puzzled than edified; there is little explanation given, for example, of the political chaos and denunciations with which the book opens. Copy-editing is also a problem: within as many sentences, three provinces are misspelled as Yuan Nan, Xingjiang, and Laoning (p. 113).

The dramatic story of suffering, fortitude, and resilience that Nanchu tells in *Red Sorrow* is but one voice from a whole generation of sent-down youths. Students seeking to understand two million young people’s army corps experience might also appreciate Ma Bo’s gripping fictionalized memoir, *Xuese huanghun* (translated by Howard Goldblatt as *A Blood-red Sunset*), while those interested in the broader educated youth experience (which involved closer to 20 million) will enjoy Dai

Sijie's delightful new novel, *Balzac and the Little Chinese Seamstress* (translated from the French by Ina Rilke) which provides a whimsical window onto the lives of youths sent to rural villages. For authoritative sociological analysis of the production–construction army corps, China scholars should seek out the brilliant and thorough 1996 study *Zhiqing beiwanglu: Shangshan xiexiang zhong de shengchan-jianshe bingtuan* (*Educated Youth Memoirs: The Production–Construction Army Corps in the Rustification Movement*), by former corps members Shi Weimin and He Gang.

JUDITH SHAPIRO

Red Is Not the Only Color: Contemporary Chinese Fiction on Love and Sex between Women, Collected Stories. Edited by PATRICIA SIEBER. [London and Boulder: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001. 201 pp. \$21.95. ISBN 0-7425-1137-3.]

Red Is Not the Only Color shows us how much we need new visions of love. While the editor claims her selections “explore alternatives to the familiar plot of female doom and destruction” (p. 18), destructiveness and particularly self-destructiveness weigh heavily in these stories. If the stories share a theme, it would have to be the fragility of love, especially love not supported by social norms and institutions.

In her informative, scholarly introduction, including 121 endnotes, and excellent critical biographies, Patricia Sieber does justice to historical particulars and conflicting discourses that shape understandings of same-sex intimacy, from the Chinese Communist Party's evocation of past oppression to bolster its political legitimacy to a market ideology that encourages citizens to treat as commodities not only women's bodies but “all objects, people, and values” (p. 19).

The eight stories include one from Hong Kong, three from the PRC and four from Taiwan, yet most of the cultural references are to Western writers and consumer products. Six of the authors have spent time in the West, and the characters invoke Western products and writers as markers of a chic identity, from Giordano jeans, a Maidenform bra and an Austin Mini to de Beauvoir, Kristeva and Françoise Sagan. The power of advertising is especially salient in Wong Bikwan's “She's a young woman and so am I” (1994): “She smoked Red Double Happiness, I smoked Menthol Dunhills, both irredeemably wild and wicked brands” (p. 39). Western medical practice claims the protagonist of He An's “Andante” (previously unpublished) who, while studying in Boston, “did not hesitate in the slightest to hand over the responsibility for her emotional health to a psychiatrist and to an antidepressant” (p. 175).

Wang Anyi's “Brothers” (1989) departs from the strong Western focus and offers a long sweep and subtle attention to life aspirations far beyond most of the other stories. Yet the main characters' devoted friendship shatters when, following an accident, one yells at her friend, “Don't touch my child” (p. 136). Zhang Mei's “Record” (1995) holds interest both for

its details about the last surviving self-wedded women and absentee wives among rural silk workers, and for its trenchant reflection on the present: “We also dread marriage, but we get married and then divorce, and after a divorce, we get married again” (p. 90).

The remaining six stories emphasize psychological trauma, hostility to men and sexualized physical beauty. The last is particularly prominent when combined with graphic accounts of oral sex in the stories by the anthology’s three youngest authors: Hong Ling (b. 1971), Chen Xue (b. 1970) and He An (b. 1964), all from Taiwan. In Liang Hanyi’s “Lips” (1986), a young woman rejects her best friend’s unexpected French kiss, exclaiming, “You’re disgusting.” Never visiting her friend again, she brushes her teeth five times a day and flees from all opportunities for intimacy. In Chen Xue’s “In search of the lost wings of the angels” (1995), the protagonist falls in love with a mysterious woman whose “most important weapons were her shamelessness and her indifference” (p. 160), and whose love and eventual disappearance help the protagonist come to terms with her mother’s suicide.

Love between women is not the only casualty of consumer culture. Concern for the environment emerges in Hong Ling’s apocalyptic “Fever” (1995), a story about a “girl vampire” set in 2050, “after the ozone layer in the atmosphere broke” (p. 151). During a plane ride in Chen Ran’s “Breaking open” (1995), the narrator’s lover lulls her to sleep with musings about the American astronaut Armstrong, who “pitied the loneliness and the foolishness of human beings, who do not understand the value of their garden, but on the contrary, could only think of ways to destroy it” (p. 64).

With so much deserving fiction awaiting translation, an anthology such as this one deserves gratitude. Six of the eight stories appear for the first time in English translation and one for the first time in any language. It has to be noted, however, that unidiomatic dialogue, grammatical errors, and some infelicitous phrasing may discourage readers who do not identify personally with the characters.

DEIRDRE SABINA KNIGHT

Christianity in Rural China: Conflict and Accommodation in Jiangxi Province 1860–2000. By ALAN RICHARD SWEETEN. [Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 2001. xii + 273 pp. £35.50. ISBN 0-89264-146-0.]

Sweeten’s new book on *Christianity in Rural China: Conflict and Accommodation in Jiangxi Province 1860–2000* attracts the attention of scholars on church history for a very important reason. He aims at giving a new interpretation to the mission history in China during the late Qing period. He challenges the arguments of established scholars, namely Kenneth Scott Latourette and Paul Cohen, who suggested first that Christian enclaves became *imperia in imperio*, and secondly that the gentry were

often anti-Christian while the populace in general was strongly opposed to Christianity (p. 1).

He dwells on the mission activities and Chinese Catholic life in rural Jiangxi, using research data from documents of the Yongli Yamen, which mediated conflicts between Western missionaries, local Christians and local communities. This data enables Sweeten to paint a new picture of Catholic–society relations in Jiangxi province. He refutes the arguments of established scholars on two key points: first, Sweeten argues that Chinese Christians were not the flotsam of society as suggested by other scholars, but came from various backgrounds and engaged with non-Christians in a wide range of social and business affairs. Secondly, daily and regular contact with non-Christian kin and neighbours indicates that rural Christians did not form enclaves as *imperia in imperio* (p. 1) as suggested by Paul Cohen (1963) and Lu Shiqiang (1966). On the contrary, most Christian Chinese continued to live side by side with ordinary Chinese in rural Jiangxi, and were accepted as members of the local community (p. 2).

In dealing with the question of gentry and their anti-Christian feelings, Sweeten argues that the gentry were not usually involved in cases involving Christians. The so-called Christian cases generally centred not on religion, but rather on secular or personal matters. He further discusses the deeper motivations of gentry who aligned with officials in going against missionaries. By doing so, he turns the accusing fingers of Cohen, Latourette and Lu from the Chinese Christians to missionaries, the gentry's worst critics and greatest rivals.

Recently, public opinion has dwelt on the provocative findings of previous generations of scholars (Cohen, Lu and Latourette) on Christianity. Subsequent authors have demonstrated a sense of guilt about the imperialism of the foreign missionary movement of the 19th century, the so-called “burdened past” (Stephen Uhalley, Gianni Criveller, J. Wayne Flynt and Gerald W. Berkley, Gu Zhangsheng). Sweeten refutes the previous accusation against the enclaving of Chinese Christian by providing a new picture of Chinese Catholics, fully integrated into their own communities. Indirectly Sweeten refutes the prevailing “burdened past” theory.

However, Sweeten fails to overturn Cohen, Lu and Latourette's portrayals of the gentry's complaints against missionaries. He only echoes Lu Shiqiang's argument on the issue of treaty change in Article VI of the Sino-French Convention of 1860. Lu accused the French missionary who served as translator for the French government of surreptitiously adding to the Chinese text of Article VI a sentence not included in the authoritative French version. The additional sentence granted French missionaries the right “to rent and purchase land in all the provinces, and to erect buildings thereupon at pleasure” (p. 101). For this reviewer, Lu's evidence to argue that the missionaries enhanced their activities by changing the Chinese version of Article VI, might not stand. If the intention was to enhance French missionary activities in China, the additional clause needed only to be in the *French* version of the Convention for the French to take action. The additional clause was in the

Chinese version. It might be that in the negotiation of the Convention, the Chinese representative, out of political pressure (the Convention was constructed after a Chinese defeat by the French army), agreed that French missionaries were allowed “to rent and purchase land in all the provinces, and to erect buildings thereupon at pleasure,” as stipulated in the Chinese version. However, the Catholic missionary did not write all this down in the authoritative French version, concealing from the French side the full detail, and subsequently eliminating rights regarding the purchasing of land and erection of buildings.

It can be argued that the act of changing Article VI was an act to protect the Chinese from the encroachment of the French missionaries, but not to enhance the French missionary activities. By further research on the original texts from the French and the Chinese archival offices, it is hoped that in the second edition of this book, a new picture on the French missionaries might be formulated.

BEATRICE LEUNG

Missionary Approaches and Linguistics in Mainland China and Taiwan.

Edited by KU WEI-YING. [Leuven: Leuven University Press and Ferdinand Verbiest Foundation, 2001. 278 pp. ISBN 90-5867-161-5.]

The *Leuven Chinese Studies* series, published by the Leuven Institute for Sino-Mongol Studies and sponsored by the Ferdinand Verbiest Foundation, is well known for the seriousness of its monographs. These consist either of the research of individual scholars or of the proceedings of seminars organized by the Foundation. The present volume is based on papers and discussions from the sixth international conference on Church activities in Qing and early Republican China (Verbiest Foundation, Leuven, 1996) and “offers a series of attempts at analyzing the place of Christianity in traditional Chinese society from the different sociological (cf. C. von Collani and J. P. Wiest), historical (cf. P. Heyns, J. Borao, M. San Roman, T. Pang and G. Sary), theological (cf. G. Criveller) and philological (cf. H. Walravens, A. Heylen, K. Kollmar-Paulenz and D. Heushert-Laage) approaches” (p. 5).

Organizers and participants of scholarly conferences are glad to share with a broader readership the achievements of their research and discussions, particularly when the fields studied or the approaches adopted are less explored by other colleagues. This reviewer, who relies only on the content of the book, wonders nevertheless if the scope of the conference – the theme of which might have been stated as “Church activities in Qing and early Republican China” – was not too broad to allow for a better organization of the topics to be treated by the participants. All are authorities in their fields. The editor is therefore to be congratulated for doing his best in trying to build some order among contributions which had to be placed under two main topics – “missionary approaches” or “linguistics” – and were referring to two main areas – mainland China

and Taiwan. Yet the book has not really found its internal unity nor any real progression. Despite these obvious difficulties, some communications get closer to the aim envisioned by the editor. As far as “missionary approaches” are concerned, the pastoral care during the Qing dynasty for new Christian converts with matrimonial problems is well studied by Claudia von Collani. Similarly, the unique and important role played by the first Chinese bishop, Luo Wenzao (1615–1691), is well presented and documented by Miguel Angel San Román. And Gianni Criveller opens also to the reader some insights on the theology of Giulio Aleni (1582–1649) in his dialogues with scholars and intellectuals of his time in China. For the role of linguistics in religious or missionary activities, and an intercultural approach, Ann Heylen’s study on “Dutch language policy and early Formosan literacy (1624–1662)” on Taiwan is to be recommended, as she ventures in a little known field. As a whole, despite a title that is somewhat misleading, such a book, published in an important series, will appeal to researchers concerned with the above mentioned fields.

YVES CAMUS

Tibetan Nation: A History of Tibetan Nationalism and Sino-Tibetan Relations. By WARREN W. SMITH, Jr. [Boulder: Westview Press, 1996. 732 pp. \$29.95. ISBN 0-8133-3155-2.]

The Dragon in the Land of Snows: A History of Modern Tibet since 1947. By TSERING SHAKYA. [London: Pimlico, 1999. 574 pp. £12.50. ISBN 0-7126-6533-1.]

The internationalization of the Tibet question has resulted in a spate of new or updated political histories of the region. Warren Smith’s is the most ambitious of these, covering Tibet from Palaeolithic times to the 1990s. It is, however, an erudite polemic for Tibetan independence in which Smith disdains to conceal the link between his politics and his scholarship. His main argument is that a Tibetan nation has for centuries existed apart from the Chinese nation and that the key issue is “China’s invasion and conquest of Tibet, its continuing foreign imperialist rule over Tibet and its denial of Tibet’s right to self-determination” (p. xii). He keeps attention focused on this view by portraying pre-1949 Chinese influence in Tibet as inconsequential, all post-1949 Chinese actions in Tibet as deleterious to Tibetan interests, and scholarship with conclusions that differ from his own as unworthy.

Based on English language sources, a few translated from the Chinese, and interviews with émigrés, Smith’s book is a well-written chronology generally not complicated by analysis of divergent viewpoints on Tibet question sub-issues. Thus, Smith “proves” the oft-repeated claim that China is responsible for the deaths of 1.2 million Tibetans without considering conflicting scholarly analyses, such as Stephen Shalom’s, *Deaths from Communism in China: Propaganda vs. Reality* (1984).

Smith may seldom convince those who have researched the issues he treats, but he will be more successful with a larger audience that will use his book as a reference work. For example, Smith devotes much space to discussing the 1960 International Commission of Jurists reports that accused China of “genocide” in Tibet (pp. 493–494, 510–513). He fails to inform the reader, however, that the ICJ was then in the pay of the CIA, a relationship that Tom Grunfeld discusses in *The Making of Modern Tibet* (1987), a work dismissed by Smith.

What should give pause to those who read Smith carefully, is that he acknowledges, in passing (cf. p. 480), that not a few Tibetans have considered China’s actions in Tibet to not be purely malign. They have participated in China’s project and achieved benefits for the region that Smith ignores. Those who bear in mind that Tibet lacked unity and international recognition, even during the de facto independence of the first half of the last century, will also wonder whether the Tibetan nation is as separate from the Chinese nation as Smith asserts. Theorists of ethnicity and nationalism will query why, given the complexities of the Tibetan case, Smith has barely touched their enormous literature.

Tsering Shakya also wears his politics on his sleeve and these may not differ sharply from Smith’s. Shakya, however, provides a more balanced account of the past half-century of Sino-Tibetan relations. His work is a major contribution to the sparse non-polemical literature on the Tibet question. To the extent that he discusses how different elements of Tibetan society have reacted to political and social change, Shakya adds to the field of ethnic relations as well. He too has conducted interviews among émigrés and Shakya also uses several scores of documents in Tibetan.

Shakya’s treatment of pre-1949 Tibet will be a revelation to those who have not had notions of Shangri-La dispelled by works such as Dawa Norbu, *Tibet: the Road Ahead* (1998) and Melvyn Goldstein *et al*’s *The Struggle for Modern Tibet: the Autobiography of Tashi Tsering* (1997). The same will hold true of Shakya’s account of co-operation in the 1950s between both rich and poor Tibetans and the Chinese Communist Party. The Cultural Revolution, he shows, was just as locally-based in Tibet as elsewhere in China, but without the pitched battles. While underscoring the ill-effects of attempts to graft Han culture onto Tibet, Shakya recognizes the intersection of interest between many Tibetans, including the urban poor and much of the rural population and China’s modernizers.

Thus, Shakya states that after the 1959 uprising “there is no doubt that many poorer sections of Tibetan society welcomed the land distribution” (p. 254) and that “the land reform was genuinely liked by the Tibetan peasantry” (p. 309). Shakya acknowledges that “there was no shortage of Tibetans willing to join the ranks of Chinese cadres” (p. 257), that “many young Tibetans flocked to join the Party’s youth organization” (p. 296) and that “after the Cultural Revolution [the Chinese] began to promote Tibetan peasantry to the centre of leadership” (p. 342). He notes that in the 1980s, before the internationalization of the Tibet Question, Beijing

“had managed to redress many of the Tibetans’ grievances,” that it “was prepared to countenance some degree of local autonomy,” and that “most Tibetans inside the country were willing to accept the limits imposed by the Chinese” (pp. 406–408).

Shakya devotes much space to US cold war efforts in Tibet and too little to discussion of the social changes which have affected Tibetans in the past four decades. There is, however, consideration of the negotiations about negotiations between the émigrés and the PRC. Speaking of the famous Strasbourg Proposal of 1988, which is still the foundation of the émigré position on the status of Tibet, Shakya states that “The type of solution envisaged by the Dalai Lama would have required a radical shift in the geo-political makeup of South Asia and the Himalayan region and there would have to be a total breakdown of the system in China ... for the Dalai Lama’s proposed solution to be realised” (p. 428). Shakya offers no ready answers of his own, but he has helped to advance the cause of a solution to the Tibet question by allowing his reader to gain a more thorough understanding of the political history of Tibet than was heretofore possible.

BARRY SAUTMAN

China’s Tibet Policy. By DAWA NORBU. [Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 2001. 470 pp. £75.00. ISBN 0-7007-0474-4.]

For almost 30 years since his stint as the intrepid editor of *Tibetan Review* and the publication of his autobiography, *Red Star Over Tibet*, Dawa Norbu has demonstrated a capacity for unconventional thinking that courageously questions and challenges accepted wisdom.

His latest contribution offers ample evidence that he remains intellectually unorthodox. *China’s Tibet Policy* takes us, chronologically, through “... an open-minded inquiry into the Tibet Question from the earliest beginnings ...” (p. 1) to the present. Divided into five parts, Norbu investigates and analyses the earliest patterns of the Sino-Tibetan relationship; the evolution of that relationship in war and peace, including an extensive discussion of Tibet’s national status; Tibet as part of the People’s Republic of China which is strong on the 1950s, weak on the 1980s and silent on the 1990s; Tibet in the international arena vis à vis Sino-American and Sino-Indian relations; and finally, the prospects for its future about which he is worried.

China’s Tibet Policy is a compelling read thanks to Norbu’s iconoclasm. In a style devoid of polemics, he explores the complexities of this singular relationship taking pains to understand both the Tibetan and Chinese points of view while undertaking to “locate historical Sino-Tibetan relations within the context of Chinese world order and tribute relations” (p. 29).

Not surprisingly for an exile writing about his homeland, the future of that homeland plays a recurring and central role throughout the book. The history of Tibet is important to Norbu not solely to get the history right

but, more importantly, because, he emphatically argues, a solution to the Tibet Question lies in redefining the historical relationship. The "... two conflicting views of Sino-Tibetan history," he insists, "today stand as stumbling blocks to a negotiated settlement between Beijing and the Dalai Lama ..." (p. 2). Moreover, the history also provides clues to a solution to the dilemma of Tibet's future. "The history of Sino-Tibetan relations reveals," Norbu concludes, "that indirect rule can enjoy maximal Tibetan legitimacy while securing vital Chinese interests ..." (p. 8).

On the issue of Tibet's status as a nation state, Norbu's "... tentative conclusion is that Tibet's historical status vis-à-vis imperial China was never completely independent nor an integral part of the Chinese empire" (p. 101). His "... interpretation departs from the conventional sovereignty-suzerainty dichotomy, because that is essentially a superimposition of Western legal conceptions on a non-Western phenomenon" (pp. 145-146). In its place he presents a view of this relationship imbued with a "Buddhist factor" (pp. 62-63), i.e. Tibet having injected a uniquely Buddhist influence into the traditional Confucian tributary system which is what allowed it a large measure of domestic autonomy.

The book is essentially a collection of previously published articles, some dating back 25 years. While it all fits together to a large degree and while Norbu has tried to update the articles, the problem with such a compilation is that it requires extensive editing to make all the parts fit together in a coherent whole. In this case the editing falls short: there is considerable repetition from chapter to chapter while some chapters begin with an introduction summary of what follows, then the detailed description followed by a summary of what was just said; events of long ago are referred to in the present tense, events from the 1990s are barely mentioned although the book is published in 2001; there are inconsistencies with transliteration (the use of both Deng Xiaoping and Teng Hsiao-ping, Xinhua and New China News Agency) and names are misspelled (Li Peng, Amitai Etzioni).

Nevertheless, *China's Tibet Policy* is an important and assertive book that should be read carefully by everyone interested in the subject but especially in China and among the Tibetan exiles and their supporters who most oppose any compromise solution to the Tibet question. Sadly, these latter groups will probably be the very people who will ignore it.

A. TOM GRUNFELD

The New Tibetan-English Dictionary of Modern Tibetan. Edited by MELVYN C. GOLDSTEIN, with T.N. SKILLING, J.T. SURKHANG and PIERRE ROBILLARD. [University of California Press, 2001. xvi + 1195 pp. £35.00; \$49.95. ISBN 0-520-20437-9.]

Well-known for his works on Tibetan anthropology, biography and modern history, Melvyn Goldstein here adds to his equally impressive list of books on modern Tibetan language by heading a team to produce an 80,000-plus-word dictionary of modern Tibetan.

Each entry is given in Tibetan script followed by a phonetic rendering of the editor's devising; in some cases, mainly verbs, by a grammatical category; and in some cases by a note of linguistic register or language of origin. Some entries have examples of usage. The items have been trawled from a very wide range of sources, from the Tibetan Autonomous region, other parts of China and exilic and Western lexicographic works.

In size, the *Dictionary* rivals the largest of its kind, though in its concentration on the modern language it is not a direct competitor to any of them. Unlike some of Goldstein's other linguistic publications, and very importantly for a dictionary, it is immaculately typeset (under the supervision of Pierre Robillard), clearly printed on high-quality paper and solidly bound. It is certain to become an essential and standard work of reference.

The term "Modern Tibetan," like its predecessors "Modern Literary Tibetan" and "Modern Spoken Tibetan: Lhasa Dialect" is a coinage of the editor. It is here defined only in passing as containing "the core lexical terminology [i.e. lexis] that is used in everyday life and standard modern writing, together with a large corpus of proverbs and sayings that appear frequently in contemporary literary materials" (p. vii). Thus it amounts to a conflation of modern spoken Tibetan – the koine based on the Lhasa dialect – and modern literary Tibetan. The boundary between the latter and classical Tibetan is necessarily vague but generally not difficult to draw in practice, though it should not be forgotten that classical Tibetan, not being a dead language, is also "modern."

The main value of the work is undoubtedly its comprehensiveness. For a large proportion of the entries it will be the only practicable source. One does wonder how many of the items are neologisms which will disappear as quickly as they were coined: still, this is not the fault of the compilers and is hardly a defect in a work which is dedicated to recording the existence of lexical items. Its shortcomings are mostly of omission rather than commission. Thus, for example, while the definitions seem generally to be admirably accurate, many of them are very brief, and given the compilers' knowledge, could surely have been expanded.

While one does not go to a dictionary such as this for pronunciation or grammar, it must be said that the pronunciation guide on p. ix is so rudimentary as to be virtually useless. The "Grammatical introduction" on pp. xiii–xvi is frankly a mess, and linguistically quite unsophisticated. The problems posed by the Tibetan script in demarcating "words" (never defined) and the "constant flux in lexical terminology" (p. xiii) are exaggerated. This is potentially of some consequence as it impinges on the very choice of what to include in the dictionary and where and how to enter it. Perhaps fortunately, this turns out to matter less than it might since the only attempt to give systematic grammatical information in the entries themselves is in the case of verbs. Even here not all verbs are marked as such, and the important distinction between transitive and intransitive verbs is ignored. Surprisingly, honorific items are not regularly marked as such, and no distinction is made between honorific and respectful registers. While similar criticisms of course apply to many,

perhaps most dictionaries, a brief comparison with say, the Oxford English dictionaries or, in the Tibetan sphere, Keith Sprigg's Balti-English dictionary (Curzon Press, forthcoming) will show how much value can be added to a dictionary by systematic and consistent phonetic and grammatical information.

Also in short supply is information on genre, register and regional variation – important here since there is in fact quite a wide lexical divergence of usage between the two main subdivisions of modern Tibetan – the colloquial and the literary; as also between Chinese-influenced and exilic written genres. Only in the case of the so-called *gzhung.yig*. (pre-1959 government jargon – not exactly “modern”) is the register systematically given. Bhutanese items, treated in Goldstein's earlier publications on modern literary Tibetan as part of that language, are now limited to a few entries marked as “Bhutanese language.” Perhaps Bhutanese, now institutionalised as Dzongkha, is no longer seen as part of modern Tibetan.

In short, this work is extremely welcome as a workmanlike and physically well-produced volume with an impressive total of well-defined entries, which could however be greatly improved by incorporating some of the principles of modern lexicographical linguistics.

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