

his understanding of the moral capacity for self-rule. Mill was also a well-known champion of the rights of workers and women to participate in politics. Marwah argues that Mill acknowledges the possibility that people with more and less rational capacity can exist in any society, regardless of racial composition. Take Mill's description of the proclivity of the unformed masses in *Considerations on Representative Government*, regardless of the society in which they are found: "they can be induced to lay their liberties at the feet even of a great man, or trust him with powers which enable him to subvert their institutions; in all these cases they are more or less unfit for liberty... a people may be unwilling or unable to fulfill the duties which a particular government requires of them" (quoted at p. 139). In situations such as this, representative government exacerbates the pathologies of self-interested and short-sighted citizens by enabling them to destroy their own democratic institutions.

I must confess I had just put down an account of the most recent British general election when I read this chapter. Boris Johnson is such a buffoon that he hid in a freezer to avoid an interview in the closing days of the campaign. I am not sure he need have bothered, as what political figures do and say seems to hold no sway on the way citizens behave. Take your pick whether we are witnessing groups of voters engaging in magical thinking or just purely self-destructive impulses. But I had to give Marwah and Mill some credit for prescience in light of recent voting behavior. As Marwah puts it, "A citizenry that cares little about institutions of law, that fails to stop crimes when they see them performed, that is unmotivated to learn about political representatives, and that is generally indifferent to public life cannot, he [Mill] argues, maintain a democratic state" (p. 139). Amen.

This does not mean, however, that I am going to adopt Mill as one of my guiding lights, and let me explain why. In his chapter, "Complicating Civilization and Barbarism," Marwah tries to disentangle Mill's ideas about what it takes to maintain a democratic structure from his ideas about civilization and barbarism. Marwah points out that ultimately Mill did not see the two terms as a stark binary: "barbarians" lurked within civilization, and "civilized" elements lurked within even barbarous individuals. To say that this is a tool of measurement that can be applied within and between populations and even individuals does not fundamentally change the overarching dynamic, however. For example, it is hard not to think that part of the complacency of large segments of the contemporary British and US voting populations might originate from their sense of superiority. They assume that their systems stand as beacons to the rest of the world and that the rule of law is so well established within their borders that lawbreaking by their elected officials is a mere detail. The language of civilization is an inherently comparative one, and it has been used to claim morality and capacity where they do

not exist, and to obscure them where they have existed for centuries through a vast array of lenses, including gender, class, religion, race, language, and nation. The term itself contributes to the miseducation of citizens. Ultimately, Mill's thought does not escape the traps of "civilization," and Marwah's resuscitation of Mill's thinking meets its upper limit here.

Nonetheless, this book, largely about Kant and Mill, should manage to interest and inform the most reticent of readers. It deserves a wide readership because it wrestles with the realities of domination and power. Mill's descriptions of representative government gone bad resonate and seem particularly valuable at this historic juncture. Mill may offer the correct diagnosis of the ill; however, it could be that Millian liberalism—just as Marxism has so long been accused of—provides better tools for critique than remediation.

Justice and Reconciliation in World Politics. By Catherine Lu. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018. 336p. \$105.00 cloth, \$32.99 paper.
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Catherine Lu's book *Justice and Reconciliation in World Politics* offers a theoretically rich, original, and comprehensive normative account of redress for colonial wrongs that constitutes a major contribution to political theory. Her analysis moves beyond existing literature by articulating an account of repair that is explicitly transnational in orientation with an emphasis on structural wrongs. Lu's argument is illustrated throughout by extremely detailed discussion of historical cases, from the Versailles peace process following the end of World War I to the cultural destruction of indigenous peoples in North America. *Justice and Reconciliation in World Politics* is essential reading for anyone interested in the morality of responding to political wrongdoing, both past and present.

The wrongdoing of colonialism and the harm it wrought, Lu argues, cannot be adequately captured by what she terms an interactional conception of wrongdoing. In this conception, you can identify specific perpetrators (either individuals or groups) who wrong specific victims (either individuals or groups) in a particular interaction. Justice in remedying interactional wrongdoing is captured by standard accounts of corrective justice and retributive justice. You settle accounts generated by wrongdoing through measures of reparations from perpetrator to victim and other mechanisms of accountability for perpetrators. This conception of wrongdoing is not apt for colonial wrongdoing, Lu claims, because it overlooks precisely what must be the focus: the structural terms of

colonial interaction themselves. Such terms and the background conditions structuring interaction go unchanged and unchallenged in the interactive picture.

To illustrate the idea of structural wrongdoing, Lu discusses at length the ideology of civilization as providing a rationalization for colonial endeavors. The ideology of civilization was predicated on a racialized hierarchical conception of who qualified as civilized and who was in need of civilization. By linking “civilized” with white and European, the ideology of civilization rationalized the wrongful imposition of colonial rule, which was intentionally imposed, and the wrongful marginalization of indigenous sources of knowledge, which, despite the repudiation of colonial rule, continues to be reproduced unintentionally. In the case of such structural injustice, victims are defined by membership in a targeted category or group (e.g., racially, ethnically, on the basis of gender). Such membership renders individuals vulnerable to the harms wrought by structural orders (e.g., the wrongful deprivation of self-determination on the part of a group or community) and also more vulnerable to interactional wrongdoing (e.g., in the form of murder or physical assault).

In what does redress for colonial wrongdoing consist? It consists in the search for both justice and reconciliation, Lu argues. The justice of redress does not look like redress for interactional wrongs in the form of corrective or retributive justice. Legal liability or reparations aimed at correcting specific flawed transactions do not alter or change the terms of interaction themselves. Yet structural change is precisely what redress requires. The site of structural change for Lu is the global order itself. Justice demands redressing structural harm that is transnational in its source and effect. This has backward- and forward-looking dimensions. The backward-looking dimension consists in repudiating wrongdoing facilitated or produced by structural injustice. The forward-looking dimension consists in “eliminat[ing] any continuing unjust effects that structural injustices may produce or reproduce” (p. 19), as well as eliminating the injustice itself.

Remedying structural injustice by settling accounts does not fully redress the harms of colonialism. Redress, in Lu’s view, also requires tending to the demands of reconciliation. Lu’s primary concern is not with reconciliation understood as the repairing of relationships between groups whose relations are damaged as a result of colonialism. Rather, it is the repair of the relationship between victims of colonialism and the institutional order from which they became alienated through colonialism and its legacy. One of the harmful impacts of colonialism, Lu argues, is that colonial subjects were not at home in their social world. Alienation occurred through the absence of recognition of colonial or indigenous subjects as peoples and the absence of recognition of their experiences. Alienation also occurred by preventing colonial subjects from

being able to live authentic lives. Overcoming such alienation is an important objective of processes of reconciliation. What does a reformed world order look like? Lu does not offer a substantive account. Instead, she focuses on some of the characteristics of strategies that the pursuit of such an order will exhibit. They will aim to decolonize, decenter, and disalienate. Tools to pursue this change will include those used to redress interactional wrongdoing, such as reparations. The difference, then, lies in the purpose that reparations serves.

Lu’s analysis leaves unanswered two key questions. The first is, how radical are the implications of her account of structural injustice? On the one hand, the introduction sets the stage for Lu’s discussion of structural injustice in bold terms, suggesting that existing accounts are unable to properly conceptualize wrongs like colonialism. Her detailed critique of the International Criminal Court implies that an interactional account of wrongdoing and accountability is not just incomplete, but also fundamentally flawed when used to deal with cases of structural injustice. On the other hand, throughout most of the book Lu’s claims with regard to the interactional model are much more modest. Her accounts of structural injustice, as well as of both structural and existential reconciliation, are frequently characterized as supplementing, but not replacing, the interactional model. Thus, no clear picture emerges as to whether it is possible for the interactional model of justice and Lu’s model of structural justice to coexist and what that would look like. To call for “greater humility” (p. 112) about what institutions like the International Criminal Court can achieve in their expressive function is one thing. To argue that “different accounts of moral and political responsibility need to be developed that go beyond the individual liability model of responsibility associated with theories of retributive justice and the work of international criminal courts” (p. 108) is quite another.

The second key question Lu’s account raises is how to understand the relationship among structural injustice of different kinds. She is rightly critical of models of structural injustice that are implicitly or explicitly limited to state boundaries, because of their inability to fully capture the transnational wrongs, like colonialism, on which she focuses. But not all wrongs that entail structural injustice are fundamentally transnational, even if they have transnational dimensions. Contemporary cases of conflict like that between the Colombian government and the revolutionary FARC characteristically have transnational dimensions, including third-party actors, such as multinational corporations, playing an important role. But the structural injustice and structural redress on which the Colombian peace process rightly focuses are in the first instance domestic and national. Thus, there is a need to think through how Lu’s transnational model of structural injustice and reconciliation can and should sit alongside not only

interactional conceptions of wrongdoing and injustice, but also statist or in other respects more localized models of structural injustice and repair.

As these questions suggest, Lu's important book opens important avenues for conversation in the search to identify and pursue justice and reconciliation in the aftermath of political catastrophe. As we continue to live with the legacies of previous political catastrophes, and as new ones unfold, the critical need for the kind of normative guidance Lu provides shows no signs of abating.

Creating Political Presence: The New Politics of Democratic Representation.

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Creating Political Presence gives an excellent account of where the constructivist turn in representation is today. The volume examines how representation creates presence, the underlying assumption being that representation performatively constructs what it claims to represent. More specifically, the contributors to the volume examine how democratic representation creates agents who are capable of exercising agency, for instance, by holding representatives accountable.

The volume arises from several years of collaboration and workshops among the editors and contributors, and this is reflected in the high degree of coherence among the chapters. The contributors all subscribe to some version of the constructivist conception of political representation; there are numerous cross-references among the 13 chapters and to previous works by the contributors, above all to the work of Michael Saward. And a very helpful introduction and first chapter by the editors place the volume in the broader context of scholarship on political representation, including Hanna Pitkin's seminal work.

In the editors' introduction, Dario Castiglione and Johannes Pollak argue for disentangling democracy and representation in order to ask how they are related in different forms of democratic practice. It is only then, they argue, that we can ask how representation contributes—or not—to democracy. For the editors and the contributors, the key question is how political representation can be democratic or, put differently, how political representation can create democratic presence: "Is there a way in which political representation can facilitate democratic empowerment and inclusion by providing legitimate and effective channels through which the citizenry is given some form of *presence* (through voice and influence, or by recognition and a sympathetic hearing) in decision-

making and in the administration of power?" (p. 4; emphasis in original).

In the first chapter, the editors argue that, insofar as democracy is a form of self-government, the question becomes how to make present the "self" of the people and individual citizens. Following Pitkin, they take representation as a practice that makes present what is absent; for instance, the will of the people within a political system, where representative institutions at once stand between and help foster and channel the will of the people and the decision-making structures of political institutions. In the end, they say little about how this may be done concretely; that is left to the other contributors to spell out. Having said that, and noting that the volume will also be of interest to scholars interested in the empirical study of representation, it is mainly a work of political and democratic theory.

Like many of the contributors, the editors appropriate Saward's theory of the representative claim. Saward, in his contribution to this volume and elsewhere, treats representation as an event, emphasizing the process of representation rather than the end product. This leads Saward—and, following him, Castiglione and Pollak—to argue that there is no essence to the concept of representation. All we have are different uses of representation. This in turn leads Saward to argue that representation is a liminal concept: "liminality renders as fragile some efforts to fix and limit the concept's meanings and range of reference" (p. 276). However, liminality does not mean that we cannot analyze practices of representation: "we can productively *embrace* representation's liminality, developing fruitful analyses that *track* its changeable character" (p. 276; emphasis in original). The types and roles of representation are resources that representative claims draw on and ameliorate, and it is these representative claims that are the proper object for political scientists who wish to study representation.

Saward goes on to show how representation's liminality affects distinctions such as those between elective and nonelective representatives and between institutional and noninstitutional representation. He uses Nadia Urbinati's work as an example of an approach that draws the distinction between formal and informal representation too sharply. In her contribution to the volume, Urbinati distinguishes decision from judgment, arguing that representative democracy must combine them. She links decision to formal political institutions and judgment to claim-making by citizens. Although representative democracy needs both, it is also clear that there is a hierarchy between them: decision making is prioritized both descriptively and normatively. Only when representation is linked to institutions (including citizenship) that secure equality can representation be democratic empowerment, and Urbinati argues that the claims approach of someone like Saward has little to say about equality and, so, little to say about how to judge representative claims normatively (pp. 74–76).