

## REVIEW ESSAY

# Two Ways of Knowing International Law

VILJAM ENGSTRÖM\*

---

Jan Klabbers, *International Law*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013, 378 pp., ISBN 9780521194877, £65.00 (hardback); ISBN 9780521144063, £29.99 (paperback).

James Crawford, *Brownlie's Principles of Public International Law*, 8<sup>th</sup> edition, Oxford Oxford University Press, 2012, 888 pp., ISBN 9780199654178, £130.00 (hardback); ISBN 9780199699698, £44.99 (paperback).

In looking for a textbook to use for educational purposes, the teacher in international law has a number of excellent alternatives to choose from. First of all there are general single author works that cover practically every area of international law. The comprehensiveness of these books makes them voluminous, but at the same time rich in detail and therefore invaluable as information sources. For students yet to be exposed to international law, these textbooks ensure acquaintance with all the basic concepts of international law.<sup>1</sup>

Second, there are equally comprehensive edited works. Since these books allow authors of single chapters to focus on their own areas of expertise, the style of presenting international law is commonly more critical. Whereas single author textbooks are rarely that inspiring to read from cover to cover, edited volumes pay more attention to cutting-edge insights and controversies. Through this focus the edited volume becomes more enjoyable to read. However, by inviting several authors to present their own areas of expertise there will inevitably also be variation in both style and comprehensiveness between different chapters.<sup>2</sup>

Then there are books (still voluminous) that are explicitly written with an educational purpose in mind, combining explanatory text and practical learning features with extracts from legal materials. These works do not even attempt to set out doctrinal debates in depth, but emphasize ease of access to the international legal system.<sup>3</sup> While this helps the student to absorb the basics of international law and

---

\* D Soc Sc (international law), LLM, university teacher of constitutional and international law, Åbo Akademi University, Finland [viljam.engstrom@abo.fi]. I wish to thank the anonymous reviewers for their comments which not only helped me improve the text, but also gave me valuable food for thought in developing this review into a more comprehensive discussion on legal education.

1 See, e.g., M. N. Shaw, *International Law* (2008).

2 See, e.g., M. Evans, *International Law* (2010).

3 See, e.g., A. Abass, *Complete International Law: Text, Cases, Materials* (2011).

to put that knowledge into practical use, accessibility may sometimes come at the cost of depth and detailed analysis.

Shorter expositions of international law must always make compromises. Where shorter overviews often excel their longer counterparts, is in the lucidity of the text. As it is clear from the outset that the aim is not to present international law in all its detail, this gives the author the freedom to tell the story of international law in his or her own words. While condensing the presentation down to 300–400 pages certainly makes the presentation more manageable, at the same time the restricted number of pages included requires cutting down on the legal niceties, omitting some areas of international law altogether, or referring more theoretical debates to further reading.<sup>4</sup>

Two of the most recent entries in the category of international law textbooks are Jan Klabbers' *International Law*, published by Cambridge University Press in 2013, and the eighth edition of Ian Brownlie's *Principles of Public International Law* from 2012, now written by James Crawford. The former is a newcomer in the category whereas the latter is an update of what has unquestionably been one of the most important handbooks on international law since its first publication in 1966.

Both books have a clear educational function. In his foreword Crawford recognizes that generations of Anglophone international lawyers have absorbed their understanding of international law from *Principles* (p. xvii). Klabbers on his part sees his book as growing out of his extensive teaching experience (p. xxii). This is also more or less where similarities end. Given that Klabbers already in his foreword explicitly distinguishes the approach of *International Law* from the more comprehensive format of *Principles*, a straightforward comparison of the two books would hardly do either one justice. It is clear from the outset that not only have the authors of the books chosen completely different approaches to present international law; they also have at their disposal very different number of pages in which to make their presentation. The main concern of this review essay will therefore not be how the two works deal with the substantive issues of international law. Instead, this review explores the books with the teaching/learning conundrum in mind. The obvious differences between the books opens up a discussion on the nature of legal expertise, conceptions of learning, and invites the teacher of international law to reflect upon the role of the expositions in both individual courses and the curriculum at large.

Legal education (at least in Finnish universities, but also in many other countries) has been guided by the idea that there is a vast amount of information that any student needs to master in order to become a good lawyer or legal expert. The reason for this is of course that the curriculum is designed to prepare students for work in many different areas of law. At the same time, the way in which students are prepared for dealing with this vast amount of knowledge often leaves many things to be desired. For example, the approach to learning has been markedly behaviouristic. The main function of teaching has been to deliver information to students, who for their part acquire that information with the purpose of being able to reproduce it

4 See, e.g., M. Dixon, *Textbook on International Law* (2013).

(commonly tested through summative assessments that mainly measure the ability to memorize).<sup>5</sup>

From the point of view of educational theory, it is today undeniable that such a behaviouristic conception of learning has lost out to a constructivist approach. Learning has come to be seen as an active process which is situated in context and culture. Students are envisioned as intellectually generative with the capacity to question, develop solutions to problems, and reconstruct knowledge. As teaching is geared towards developing the legal thinking of students, also the locus of authority shifts from the teacher to the discourse in the classroom. This shift goes hand in hand with a disobjectifying of knowledge and turns interest to the non-cognitive in learning.<sup>6</sup>

Once learning is seen as a cumulative process that requires combining earlier knowledge with new knowledge, mere distribution of information is no longer sufficient. Instead, information needs to be constantly constructed (and reconstructed). The role of the student changes from a mere recipient of information to a participant or apprentice. As to the learning situation, interest is turned towards encouraging and developing the abilities of students to engage in discourse and put their knowledge into active use, therefore also requiring a move towards a participatory and active approach to teaching.<sup>7</sup> Rowland talks about the difference between a behaviouristic and constructivist approach to learning as one between 'learning to comply or learning to contest'. In the former case information is passed from the full vessel of the teacher to the empty vessel of the student. In the latter case students are seen as active constructors of knowledge.<sup>8</sup>

There is undoubtedly a need to master a certain amount of information, especially when new to a subject matter, in order to be able to participate in the discourse within the discipline. This, however, is not the end of the story. Learning to relate to previous knowledge, to critically assess, and to reconstruct the information passed are equally important skills. In fact, these skills could be considered preconditions for the development of a creative approach to lawyering.<sup>9</sup> This means that although an important part of becoming a lawyer or legal expert consists of attaining knowledge of norms and procedures, the way in which a student is introduced to the topic of international law will also have a fundamental impact on how that student will think about and relate to the subject first as a learner and later as a legal professional. What is at stake in other words is not only the achievement of a good learning result,

5 For one interesting study, see S. Hakalehto-Wainio, 'The Challenges in Teaching Law – Tort Law as an Example', (2009) 3–4 *Tidskrift utgiven av Juridiska Föreningen i Finland (JFT)* 269. Similar findings are at the heart of e.g. C. Maughan, 'Why Study Emotion?', in P. Maharg and C. Maughan, *Emerging Legal Learning: Affect and Legal Education: Emotion in Learning and Teaching the Law* (2011) 11, at 28, and M. H. S. Jacobson, 'A Primer on Learning Styles: Reaching Every Student', (2001) 25 *Seattle University Law Review* 139, at 139–40.

6 See E. MacLellan and R. Soden, 'Expertise, Expert Teaching, and Experienced Teachers' Knowledge of Learning Theory', (2003) 35 *Scottish Educational Review* 110, at 112, and A. Sfard, 'On Two Metaphors for Learning and the Dangers of Choosing Just One', (1998) 27 *Educational Researcher* 4, at 10.

7 See Sfard, *ibid.*, at 6–7.

8 S. Rowland, *Enquiring University* (2006), at 17–18.

9 See Maughan, *supra* note 5, at 29.

but also the development of the learning and thinking of students, and with that, the nature of their legal expertise.

In approaching the two books with this intriguing question of educational theory in mind, it should be noted that Klabbers is very clear on what the reader can expect to find in his presentation. In *International Law* the reader will not (only) gain an overview of international law, but also a set of tools by which to begin a process of active questioning. Klabbers is very explicit in distancing his approach from that of *Principles* (pp. xxi and 19). Crawford, on his part, sets out to present international law as a system (p. xviii) and to provide an analysis of international law ‘when the law is being applied in a framework of normality’ (p. xixi). Klabbers has his mind set on presenting international law from a particular angle, whereas for Crawford the goal is to present international law ‘as it is’.

This difference between the books also stands out from just browsing through the table of contents. Klabbers does not discuss the history but the ‘setting’ of international law, not the sources but the ‘making’ of international law, there is not a chapter on environmental law but one on ‘protecting the environment’, and so on. This labelling of chapters is not undertaken merely to sound fancy, but is indicative of an active approach to international law, focusing on how international law is used and how it affects us. It is of course possible that also Crawford would have opted to rename several chapters if it were not for the weight of tradition and respect for the status that Brownlie’s *Principles* has attained over decades (however, there has been considerable restructuring of the chapters). On the other hand, by only looking at the chapter headings of *Principles* the reader knows exactly what to find. This is indispensable in order for a book that covers 800 pages to be practical. After all, not all those who purchase *Principles* will be interested in reading it from the beginning to the end but will rather use it for reference purposes.

In his first chapter Klabbers outlines a brief history of international law as well as his own approach to the subject. The basic tenet of the book – that international law is not politically innocent – should come as no surprise to anyone familiar with the work of Klabbers. International law, as presented in *International Law*, is all about a constant struggle to find justification for action on the sliding scale between community and state interests. On this scale any claim of the international lawyer will always be based on underlying ideas and assumptions (p. 13). This makes for ‘a critical perspective’ on international law (p. 19).

True to his point of departure, Klabbers pictures the history of international law not only by introducing Hugo Grotius, but by claiming that freedom of the seas served to further Dutch interests (hereby providing a context for the writings of Grotius). By also showing how imperialism and colonialism have been central to the evolution of international law, and by demonstrating how much of international law is related to the economy, the basic message sent is that international law is a central part of our social relations and a tool by which to structure social life. It is also from new developments in our social relations (such as globalization, combatting international crimes, and migration) that the current challenges to international law arise.

In starting to read *Principles* no introduction or setting is provided. The only guidance that the reader is offered is that international law ‘has been and remains

a *system*' (p. xviii), and that the book is written with a view to provide a coherent account of the core of international law (p. xix). It is only natural, therefore, that the brief description of the development of the law of nations spends more time on explaining developments in the intellectual history of Europe, than on the internal struggle for influence between European powers. As the importance of international law, in Crawford's words, derives from its provision of a 'set of techniques for addressing' collective action problems (p. 19), both authors seem to share an instrumental approach to international law. In the substantive discussions of international legal issues *Principles* is however more geared towards stating the law than towards discovering avenues through which international actors can make use of these 'techniques'. While both authors share an image of international law as a system in constant and necessary change, they deal with this change in different ways. Whereas *Principles* sets out to display where change has brought us so far, *International Law* is looking to pinpoint the mediators of change.

Moving on to the fundamentals of international law, the reader is immediately confronted with how these different points of departure materialize in the treatment of legal issues. In Klabbers' presentation of the structure of international law, the reader learns about the myth of international legal obligation through the *Lotus* and *Wimbledon* cases, Article 38 of the ICJ statute, and about treaties and customary law as expressions of sovereign state consent. *Principles* similarly departs from the idea that the standard international legal relation consists in the bilateral rights and duties between states (p. 16). An interesting point of difference is, however, how the two books relate to current challenges to international law. In addition to introducing the sources of international law, Klabbers also discusses (at equal length) the problem of the persistent objector, the emergence of customary law, and how new modes of global governance turn interest from traditional conceptions of law into exploring the normative effects of a broader variety of acts than Article 38 encompasses. For Klabbers globalization and the exercise of authority outside regular legal structures not only creates challenges for international law but has forced the international legal system to start adapting to those challenges (at least by way of a presumption, p. 37–40). Crawford, on his part, while recognizing that decisions of international organizations can contribute to the development of the traditional sources doctrine, finds little evidence 'that the foundation of international legal obligation and the basic character of the legal system . . . have been significantly modified' (pp. 17 and 192).

In teaching international law to students who are at an early stage of their studies, a feature that never stops amazing is the students' strong faith in the capacity of law to solve practically any international dispute. This faith covers both substantive disputes as well as matters of interpretation. There is a strong conviction that, since the answer to international problems can be found in predefined rules (except, of course, where there are no rules), consequently for example interpretative disputes should find a solution in the correct application of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. This means that students come to the learning situation with a strong preconception on the function of law. When confronted with the fact that the Vienna Convention can contain arguments supporting the claims of both parties

to a dispute and that the convention itself does not always offer the means by which to prefer one or the other, these students often react with suspicion or even despair. An image of law as open-ended and even inherently contradictory does not simply correspond to their pre-existing knowledge structure.

It is a recognized phenomenon across disciplines that instruction at university level often satisfies itself with producing inert abstract knowledge. This leaves learners in difficulties, for example, when required to apply their knowledge to new situations that differ from the context in which they first acquired their knowledge.<sup>10</sup> Legal expertise (or expertise in general), on the other hand, does not only consist in the possession of knowledge. Since that knowledge cannot be applied to new situations in an automated manner, legal expertise also requires socialization with and participation in the discourse within the discipline. In other words, to be a legal expert is not solely to know the paragraphs, but also to master the legal language and be able to present claims through that language. Expertise is about being able to reflect on one's own knowledge and performance, and about reassessing and refining one's representation of knowledge.<sup>11</sup> Also qualities such as intuitive problem-solving skills and ethical/social awareness can be considered important elements of the professional role of lawyers.<sup>12</sup>

Strong preconceptions of the legal system (and of legal education) can however prevent the learning of new knowledge and therefore negatively affect the development of the expertise of the student.<sup>13</sup> In order to overcome this problem a strong case can be made that 'refutational texts' are needed. At some point of university studies a transition should take place from mechanical learning of facts, to active challenging and argumentation. In fact, some research indicates that reading refutational texts throughout the studies better induces the reader to conceptual change.<sup>14</sup>

In introducing the reader to one of the areas upon which students of international law place much faith – the law of treaties – Klabbers is within his own comfort zone. There is therefore a comparably comprehensive treatment of the topic in *International Law*. In addition to introducing the reader to a number of issues at the heart of the law of treaties, two of the most useful themes by which to demonstrate the very nature of treaties are reservations and interpretation. These themes are also particularly useful in a process of refutation. The fact that there may be multiple objects and purposes to a treaty, the fact that both parties may build competing claims on the same object and purpose, the fact that textual and teleological interpretation are

10 See, e.g., R. Stark et al., 'Overcoming Problems of Knowledge Application and Knowledge Transfer', in H. P. A. Boshuizen, R. Bromme, and H. Gruber (eds), *Professional Learning: Gaps and Transitions on the Way from Novice to Expert* (2004), 1 at 1.

11 See, e.g., P. J. Feltovich, M. J. Prietula, and K. A. Ericsson, 'Studies of Expertise from Psychological Perspectives', in A. K. Ericsson et al., *The Cambridge Handbook of Expertise and Expert Performance* (2006), 41–67, as well as many other contributions in the same book.

12 See, e.g., Maughan, *supra* note 5, at 29, and T. Walsh, 'Putting Justice Back Into Legal Education', (2008) 17 *Legal Education Review* 119.

13 G. Sinatra and L. Mason, 'Beyond Knowledge: Learner Characteristics Influencing Conceptual Change', in S. Vosniadou (ed.), *International Handbook of Research on Conceptual Change* (2008), 560.

14 An introduction, albeit not in the field of legal research, is provided by C. D. Tippett, 'Refutation Text in Science Education: A Review of Two Decades of Research', (2010) 8 *International Journal of Science and Mathematics Education*, 951.



actually part of the same general rule on interpretation of the Vienna Convention, and that these interpretative methods serve to express preferred construction of a treaty (rather than provide closure), are useful eye-openers in challenging overly formal conceptions of international law.

While Crawford also discusses reservations and interpretation at some length, there are clear differences in how the nature of treaty law is pictured. Klabbers spends much time on demonstrating that the function of reservations is really to facilitate co-operation in face of disagreement, and how this takes the form of a question of compatibility with the object and purpose of a treaty. In *Principles* the uncertainties surrounding reservations are pictured as a result of the immaturity of the law and practice with regard to reservations (p. 375). Crawford also seems to be more appreciative of the most recent developments in the law of treaties and the adoption of the *Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties* by the ILC, whereas for Klabbers the work of Allain Pellet as special rapporteur on the matter is only one of many attempts in addressing the problem of objectionable reservations (p. 51).<sup>15</sup>

In respect of interpretation, both authors recognize that interpretation of a treaty is not a technical exercise and admit that principles of interpretation often leave the interpreter with multiple alternatives. While for Crawford this means that considerations of policy cannot be kept out (p. 384), for Klabbers the very act of interpretation is from the outset a way of clothing political preferences in legal terms (p. 54). Space naturally allows Crawford to be much more informative and detailed, and the references provide a valuable guide as to how principles of interpretation have been used in international law. It is revealing that while *Principles* is packed with case references, Klabbers' chapter on interpretation lacks references to international case law altogether. Instead, in demonstrating the nature of legal interpretation as a 'social practice', he builds on the insights of Wittgenstein in the philosophy of language and the related work in the sphere of literary theory by Stanley Fish (p. 54).

Another example of a point of divergence is the way in which the two books deal with the individual. The differences in how the authors relate to the question of the individual illustrate that, behind diverging ways of presenting (or teaching) a particular subject, there may also be an ideological dimension. Klabbers devotes an entire chapter to address the 'Individual in International Law'. That discussion leads Klabbers into issues such as the institutionalization and proceduralization of human rights law, self-determination, nationality, and refugees. The aim of the discussion is to demonstrate how individuals may have rights (as well as obligations) in international law, which can be enacted without the intermediary of the state. Klabbers also makes a strong claim for discarding the subject-object divide as a threshold question altogether. Even if we could agree that individuals are nowadays subjects of international law much in the same way as in respect of the personality of international organizations, such a categorization does really not reveal what rights and duties individuals enjoy at the international level. In a focus on how

<sup>15</sup> Report of the International Law Commission, Sixty-Third session (26 April–3 June and 4 July–12 August 2011), General Assembly, Official Records, Sixty-Sixth session, Supplement No. 10 (A/66/10).

international law works from the perspective of the individual the ‘subject’ abstraction is simply unhelpful, the argument goes (p. 123).

Crawford devotes three entire chapters to a discussion of the protection of individuals and groups. Out of these especially the chapter on international human rights not only provides a thorough oversight of the human rights field, but also engages in a more analytical discussion on the nature of human rights. Many of these discussions can be found in earlier editions of *Principles* (such as the remarks on the principle of proportionality and the margin of appreciation).<sup>16</sup> In the current edition, however, some of these issues seem to have acquired an additional twist. The contested nature of human rights is illustrated, for example, by showing how the framing of action in terms of human rights law or humanitarian law can make all the difference between legality and illegality (p. 654), and by bringing in the counter-majoritarian critique of international human rights tribunals (pp. 669–70). Such notes on the theme of the ‘politics of framing’ even add a sense of convergence of the approaches of the two books (cf. *International Law*, p. 217).

Even if it is not his overreaching theme, Crawford also recognizes that individuals may have rights and duties under international law (and, hence, be legal persons) (p. 17). However, this is a qualified subjectivity, applicable only ‘for a particular purpose’ (p. 126, emphasis in original). Interestingly, Crawford also considers the ‘subject’ characterization as unhelpful. The reason for discarding it in respect of individuals is however exactly the opposite to that of Klabbers. Whereas for Klabbers a ‘subject’ status is unhelpful due to its abstract and uninformative nature as a source for the identification of the rights and duties of individuals, for Crawford subjectivity stands out as a container of rights, which can be falsely attached to individuals if it is granted that individuals are ‘subjects’ (p. 121). Crawford explicitly acknowledges the criticism that has been directed towards the notion, but submits that the concept of ‘subjects’ still has value as a ‘ticket’ for entering the international arena (p. 126).

The final chapters of the first part of *International Law* discuss matters of responsibility, dispute settlement and judicial bodies, and sanctions, countermeasures and collective security. Klabbers neatly lays out the fundamentals in these areas, with thought-provoking conclusions to wrap up the different parts, challenging the reader to further reflection. All of these issues are also comprehensively dealt with in *Principles*. It would of course be impossible to provide an introduction to international law without addressing the mechanisms by which that law has its impact and effect. Whereas Klabbers can spend 65 pages, Crawford is allowed to use around 220 pages for his presentation. This enables Crawford to go far into the detailed niceties of the law of responsibility, for example, and make full use of his extensive knowledge on the topic. The reader is once again provided with an extraordinary amount of detail, with rich case law and academic references to back up the text.

Also on these general topics there are clear differences in the substantive treatment. Hence, Klabbers not only focuses on state responsibility, but also on the responsibility of international organizations and individual responsibility, hereby

16 I. Brownlie, *Principles of Public International Law* (2008), at 575–8.



distinguishing his approach from that of Crawford. Klabbers not only discusses the jurisdiction of the ICJ, but also the possibility for the ICJ to review UN Security Council decisions, and the discussion on UN Security Council sanctions is coupled with a discussion on how to limit the Council. These are matters that Crawford does not engage with. Furthermore, whereas Klabbers, runs through the basics of state responsibility at high-speed in order to come to the issues that he finds more intriguing – how a focus on state responsibility can be oversimplifying, the ad hoc nature of international individual responsibility, or how to hold institutions accountable – Crawford barely touches upon these questions (although he does note a general absence of control concerning acts of organizations). What the reader gains in reading Klabbers' exposition on the law of responsibility is a fast and easily accessible overview of main principles, coupled with thoughts on the function and potential of the responsibility regime. On the other hand, Crawford's opportunity to be more detailed adds a further level of nuance. So while Klabbers discusses the attribution of conduct to the 'state and its organs', Crawford addresses differences between those state organs (distinguishing between executive and administrative organs, armed forces, federal, provincial, legislative, and judicial organs). Crawford also offers more examples, demonstrating how the law of responsibility has been applied in practice.

Apart from the basic concepts and procedures of international law, it seems that any textbook must also contain a section on the substance. The tricky thing with overviews of different areas is that they seem necessary in order to show how international law works in practice. At the same time such overviews can never be exhaustive, rarely engage the reader, and are therefore often quite uninspiring. *International Law* focuses on the use of force, humanitarian law, criminal law, the spatial dimensions of international law, environmental law, and the global economy. These are among the usual suspects found in any textbook, and the inclusion of all of them can easily be defended. It is also in this part of the book where Klabbers fluid and lucid style of writing pays off particularly well, making his expositions enjoyable to read. By also being sure to include several matters of controversy (such as the responsibility to protect, humanitarian intervention, international organizations and humanitarian law, humanitarian law and privatization, wars against phenomena, combatting transnational crimes, and the undemocratic nature of the global economy), the reader is handed the hot potatoes of international law on a silver plate.

The one question that can be raised concerning the overview (and that will inevitably arise for any textbook of such a condensed format) boils down to the question of comprehensiveness. Whereas *Principles* is a firework of international legal material, Klabbers often confines himself to rather sweeping statements and sparse references. But is the reader really provided with enough basic background information in order to be able to relate to the dilemmas identified? At times it seems as if in *International Law* topical issues would have benefited from being offered a bit more space. For example issues of reconciliation are left only at an anecdotal level (p. 233) while the broader matter of transitional justice would well have complemented the approach of the book. Likewise the question of 'global

commons' (or 'common heritage') is only scratched upon whereas the broader issue – the politics of making commonality claims – is reduced to a rather blunt concluding note (p. 251). To point out that something is missing from a book of limited scope may seem to be missing the point with the book, especially as Klabbers explicitly states that the book is not a commentary on current events (p. xxi). However, the reason for pointing out the occasional brevity of reasoning is not to claim that this would make *International Law* terribly flawed, but rather goes to show the differences of the two books when used for teaching purposes. After all, the differences between the two textbooks should above all be looked at from the perspective of their primary target audience: student learners.

Educational research has identified different patterns in student learning. Students with an undirected learning pattern have been noted to have difficulties in coping with large amounts of material since they are unable to discern what is more and less important. Instead, in making this choice they rely to a large extent on teachers. Reproduction-directed learners go through a subject matter stepwise and learn a lot by heart. These learners too are guided, and need guidance, by external sources. Learning becomes a process where externally present knowledge is transferred to students. Meaning-directed learners use a deeper processing strategy. These students look for relationships between parts of the subject matter, try to structure the knowledge and are critical towards what they read. Learning becomes a process of constructing knowledge. Finally a category of application-directed learners has been identified. These students direct their interest to the subject matter and the surrounding world, and seek to apply the abstract material in practice.<sup>17</sup> Given these differences students with various learning patterns will, as a point of departure, relate differently to the books by Crawford and Klabbers. While fully meeting the individual needs of different student learners may be an impossibility, a strong case can be made that all students should be guided towards becoming increasingly self-regulated. Vermunt suggests that key features of 'powerful' teaching and learning environments should include: that they prepare students for lifelong, self-regulated, co-operative, and work-based learning, foster high-quality learning, and change the teaching methods as well as the complexity of the problems gradually.<sup>18</sup>

In assessing the differences between the two books against the typology of student learners, Klabbers' way of presenting international law clearly gives the student more tools by which to develop the ability to construct and reconstruct knowledge of the international legal system. By reading *International Law*, students learn that all answers to international legal issues cannot be found in the legal materials and that one of the most important tasks of the legal professional is to deal with the inherent dichotomies of international law. The approach could also be seen to support student autonomy and self-regulation: students are challenged to learn

17 J. D. Vermunt, 'The Power of Teaching–Learning Environments to Influence Student Learning', in *Student Learning and University Teaching* (British Journal of Educational Psychology Monograph Series) (2007), 73, at 74–7. For one overview of the discussion of learning styles in the US, see, e.g., E. A. DeGroff and K. A. McKee, 'Learning Like Lawyers: Addressing the Differences in Law Student Learning Styles', (2006) *Brigham Young University Education and Law Journal* 49.

18 See Vermunt, *ibid.*, at 86.

to relate to these dichotomies and to redefine them throughout their careers. A good illustration of this is the topic of international criminal law, where Klabbers deals with questions such as transboundary police co-operation, extradition and deportation, and abduction. These discussions really take the focus of the discussion to the outskirts of international criminal law as conventionally understood and turns the discussion into one about how to deal (or not to deal) internationally with criminals. It is also interesting to note that Klabbers rounds up his account of international law by discussing the ethics of international law and governance, and calls upon those who apply the rules to do so 'honestly, with a modicum of humility and temperance, and in the spirit of justice' (p. 314). As those applying the rules will first and foremost be lawyers, this call underlines the importance for legal educators to take a broad view of what it means to be an international legal expert.

Crawford explicitly states that the textbook sets out to address core issues of international law from a lawyer's perspective (p. xviii). What the book first and foremost offers the lawyer is a vast amount of information by which to build up a personal knowledge base. A student who looks for absolutes can be frustrated with the questioning style of Klabbers. To pinpoint what the student has learned after reading *International Law* will also demand that the student is capable of self-reflection concerning the individual learning process. *Principles*, on the other hand, is outstanding in its clarity and comprehensiveness. In using *Principles* for teaching purposes all students are handed a measurable amount of factual knowledge of the international legal system. However, the meaning-directed learner will at some point be desperate for more food for thought as the book only occasionally contains discussions that would provide the reader with tools to process, reassess, and restructure that knowledge. In short, Klabbers invites the reader to relate to his text; an invitation that nevertheless may require consulting additional sources. Crawford asks the reader to sit back and receive; a task that can get uninspiring without a critical input from the learning environment.

None of the comments above are intended as critiques of either book. It is important to note that the remarks made are limited to the way in which international law is presented in the textbooks, and are in no way indicative of the potential of the books in teaching. *Principles* can perfectly well be used to encourage students to deeper processing of knowledge. What it requires from the teacher is that the text is coupled with assignments and discussions that invite students to experiment, critically assess, and practically apply the vast amount of information offered. As to *International Law*, the aim is set on developing the critical capacities of students. However, because of the style of writing that always points to dichotomies, gaps, and new avenues, the student can be struck by a sense of unease: Departing from the idea that international law is about justification, how can we trust the justifications that Klabbers offers? This is a familiar educational anxiety that enters as soon as we leave the world of mechanical distribution of pre-digested information. It is also exactly the question that students need to learn to cope with in order to become legal experts. In the process, as Klabbers himself recognizes, the student could do worse than to read *Principles* alongside his book (p. xxi).

Both Jan Klabbers and James Crawford share a strong faith in the international legal system. This is reflected in their respective works, both of which are highly valuable for educational purposes. Although the argumentative style of writing of *International Law* may better fit with present-day conceptions of learning, it is of course in the end a matter of course format and level, curriculum design, educational (and legal) culture, and teaching preferences that will affect the teacher in opting for one or the other. After all, not only students but also teachers are individuals. Irrespective of educational trends, the creation of a good learning environment requires that the teacher feels comfortable with the course format. *Principles* and *International Law* represent different possibilities in teaching international law. For this reason alone both presentations are simply indispensable.