

Imre Lakatos and the Guises of Reason. By John Kadvany. Durham: Duke University Press. 2001. Pp. xx + 378. \$23.95. ISBN 0-8223-2649-3.

Imre Lakatos (1922–1974) is best known as a philosopher of science, who, along with his contemporaries Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend, and Karl Popper, changed the understanding of scientific method and practices during the philosophy and history of science debates in the 1960s and 1970s. The volume under review is not a biography of Imre Lakatos, but rather an analysis of Lakatos's English-language works in order to prove that there is a covert (Hegelian) philosophy embedded in the writing of a pupil of Karl Popper. Lakatos's philosophy of science and mathematics contains "an original and instructive account of historical rationality deriving from Hegel, Marx, and the Hegelian-Marxism of one of Lakatos's teachers in Hungary, Georg Lukács" (p. 1). John Kadvany, a principal at the management consulting firm Policy and Decision Science in California, paints a picture of a very talented, fascinating, and complicated mind — that of Imre Lakatos. "Lakatos's philosophy is such a puzzle inside a riddle inside an enigma" (p. 7).

Lakatos uses Hegel, much of whose work he only knew through the writings of Karl Marx and Georg Lukács, to historicize the philosophy of mathematics and science. According to Kadvany, the Hegelian substratum in Lakatos's work has three perspectives: "the philosophy of mathematics contained in *Proofs*, the philosophy of science of Lakatos's methodology of scientific research programs, and the distinctive irrationalism of Stalinist Hungary" (p. 14). Lakatos makes history central to scientific reason, and *Proofs*, his great philosophical achievement, is mathematics as history. Lakatos borrows Hegel's philosophical historiography and makes historiography the organizing idea for all of his philosophical works. Lakatos also replaces the traditional search for certainty with a historical portrayal of different conceptions of proof changing over time.

Imre Lakatos employs Hegel's footnote apparatus "to detail actual history, criticize other historians, and comment on the dialogue" (p. 38). Footnotes allow Lakatos to provide the time of "actual history" in his understanding of three overlapping sequences of historical time; the other two being: reconstructed time of the dialogue and the reader's and narrator's present time. Lakatos often expressed this understanding by way of a joke that "history of science is frequently a caricature of its rational reconstructions; that rational reconstructions are frequently caricatures of actual history; and that some histories of science are caricatures both of actual history and of its rational reconstructions" (p. 213). According to Lakatos and Hegel, caricatures represent the imperfections of historical knowledge and the dependence of history on interpretative theory. Popper, as well, believes in the fallibility of scientific knowledge, but Kadvany emphasizes that for Lakatos this also applied to historical knowledge.

Lakatos and Hegel believe that historiography is a reconstruction of representations, not events (p. 219).

Kadvany successfully argues that Lakatos's work leads back to the years of Stalinist Hungary before the 1956 revolution. The last chapter on the Hungarian revolution is "an object lesson in a type of irrationalism that is intimately related historically and conceptually to much in Lakatos's work" (p. 3). The goal of this chapter, "Hungary 1956 and the Inverted World," is to use Lakatos's dual philosophy as a means to understand the 1956 revolution as well as Hungarian Stalinism in general. Kadvany provides a thorough background on the individuals and Hungarian communism during this time, especially by emphasizing the falsity that pervaded Hungarian life. "Stalinist Hungary was a complete *Lebenslüge*: a life of lies in politics, culture, business, industry, agriculture, and everyday life" (p. 269).

During the years after the Second World War, Imre Lakatos was a devout Stalinist; he was a "cog in the Soviet-Hungarian power machine" (p. 288). The great educator, Lakatos was the main individual behind destroying the Eötvös College, as well as the person associated with the suicide of Éva Izsák, whose overcoat was appropriated by Lakatos's future wife. This Lakatos has been all but forgotten when Lakatos fled to England after the war and supposedly changed his views.

In viewing the duality of Lakatos (the disciple of Popper and the Hegelian) with the history of ideas of the 1956 Hungarian revolution — "falsification and the quest for truth, personality cult and elites, dissembling and betrayal, and self-criticism" — the English Lakatos wants to portray Hungary as a real danger of irrationalism. The Hegelian Lakatos uses explanations of scientific and mathematical method to criticize Hungarian Stalinism. Kadvany points out that Hungarian Stalinism may be rejected, but he wonders if one should then reject the heroic transformation out of Stalinism via self-criticism. "The value-laden interpretation of caricature as mendacious representation is intrinsic to Lakatos's historicism as a potentially nefarious transformation of ideas" (p. 301).

Some readers of this book may focus on the political and intellectual story of the 1956 Hungarian revolution, since implicit in John Kadvany's explanation of Lakatos's duality and his actions before 1956 is that Lakatos's belief in Hegelian historicism and Hegel's, as well as Popper's understanding of ideas and culture as independent from the individuals who created them (pp. 3, 143), may prevent us from judging Lakatos's actions during Stalinist Hungary. But this reviewer hopes that others will see the real merit in this book and that is Kadvany's description of Lakatos's use of Hegelian ideas to revolutionize our understanding of science and mathematics, as well as most subjects of study.

John Kadvany has written a brilliant study of the English-language philosophy of Imre Lakatos, which should appeal to scholars interested in the philosophy of science and mathematics, Stalinist Hungary, and Hegelian historical

rationality, as well as the individual of Imre Lakatos. Scholars in all subjects should welcome Kadvany's explanation of Lakatos's belief in three overlapping sequences of historical time. Even readers not versed in mathematical proofs and Lakatos's contribution to science, will not be disappointed with this well-written monograph.

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Friedmann, Gutmann, Lieben, Mandl, Strakosch: Fünf Familienporträts aus Wien vor 1938. By Marie-Theres Arnbom.

Vienna: Böhlau. 2002. Pp. 248. EUR 29.90. ISBN 3-205-99373-x.

The author is a Viennese historian who has written the history of five prominent Austro-Jewish families. They came to Vienna from the wider Habsburg realm: Bohemia, Moravia, and Hungary, where most had begun to make their fortunes. Once in Vienna, they tended to settle in the Leopoldstadt Bezirk, the destination of many eastern Jews, until they moved to the choicest areas of town. Arnbom draws a picture of families highly integrated with non-Jewish Viennese society, as some were even ennobled. Integration, sometimes assimilation to the point of giving up the Jewish faith, was key to the self-perception of these Jews as Austrians; one particularly interesting aspect of this is that they preferred peasant costumes such as lederhosen and dirndl dresses when on their sumptuous country estates in the Viennese hinterland. The impression of wealth possessed by these clans is stunning for the reader, but equally stunning is their sudden downfall after March 1938, when only a very few of these rich people could make short-term arrangements with the Nazi rulers, so as to escape abroad, for the price of their vast fortunes. I would have liked to read more about that aspect of the families' history, and also more about how they fared under the growing anti-Semitism of the First Republic, which culminated under chancellors Dollfuss and Schuschnigg. The latter's is a particularly complex case, because he was admired by and friends with several Jews of extreme right-wing proclivities, such as the conductor Bruno Walter.

Arnbom's kaleidoscopic history is brief but fascinating. The Mandls, physicians and merchants, ultimately make a name for themselves as munitions manufacturers. Ignaz Mandl becomes the mentor of the — later anti-Semitic — Karl Lueger, and Fritz Mandl, a Heimwehr supporter, before his emigration to Argentina in 1938 marries and divorces Hedy Kiesler, a beautiful Viennese Jewish girl, who then attains Hollywood fame as Hedy Lamarr. The Gutmanns deal in coal and iron; beyond that they are most active in charity, benefiting Jews and non-Jews alike, especially through the support of medical institutions. In