for all. After all, this is the tyranny of genius: that an entirely unique and idiosyncratic form of life or value demands to be the value or form of life for all and for all time; anything less is not genius but merely achievement.

Freedom and Solidarity: Toward New Beginnings.

By Fred Dallmayr. Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2016. 232p. $60.00.
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— Renate Holub, *University of California, Berkeley*

It has been the signature of Fred Dallmayr's major intellectual inquiries over the past 50 years or so not only to critique fundamental aspects of the paradigm of trans-atlantic modernity but also to reassess those of its values which lend themselves to integration into a humanistic democratic vision. In earlier publications, Dallmayr predominantly focused diasapprobation on philosophical knowledge formations excessively organized around the Cartesian concepts of individual rationality in order to philosophically overcome the dualistic separation of mind from matter, the subject from the object, culture from nature, and thought from spirituality. Thereby, he had critically assessed the limits of the beliefs in the virtues of the scientific control and manipulation of nature, of secularism, and individual liberalism. Over the past 20 years or so, he has predominatly inquired into ways in which Western ethnocentricity, a major pillar of the paradigm of modernity, can be overcome by practices that involve nongovernmentally organized intercivilizational dialogues with important leading intellectuals from practically all global regions.

The publication under review is, from my perspective, nonetheless unique among Dallmayr's intellectual accomplishments to date in that it constitutes his most interdisciplinary approach to modernity's scarred relations between freedom and solidarity, on one hand, while simultaneously participating in the construction of a global coalition of intellectuals for assessing the conditions of possibility for reconciliations between Eastern and Western experiential forms of freedom, solidarity, and spirituality, on the other hand. Through this humanistic coalition, which includes leading figures such as Martin Luther King, Nelson Mandela, Mahatma Ghandi, John Dewey, Ashis Nandy, Henry David Thoreau, Albert Camus, Leo Tolstoy, Raimon Pannikar, Tu Weiming, and the so-called renaissance traditions from within Islamic thought (Al Farabi, Ibn Sina, Ibn Ruschd), Dallmayr explores the construction of solidarious relations on a global scale in order to overcome the traditional tensions between individual freedom and solidarity embedded in Western mainstream political, social, economic, and cultural thought.

Both Dallmayr's *critique* of modernity and the *construction* of a global intellectual and spiritual coalition on the subject of conciliatory relations between freedom and solidarity is framed by fundamental philosophical assumptions derived from Martin Heidegger's famous inquiries on the *Seinsfrage*, or on the question of *Being*. In this context, where one reaches out toward the meaning of *Being*, one cannot but share one's freedom through collective existence, or *Mitsein*. Here, the Cartesian separation of ego from society, of the subject from the object, of the *res cogitans* from the *res extensa*, of mind from spirituality, of culture from nature, no longer holds. It can be overcome. The assumption of such a Heideggerian position lends itself to a critique of the laissez-faire market triumphalisms of neoclassical and neoliberal macroeconomics, respectively symbolized by the twentieth-century Austrian and Chicago schools of economics. In addition, the author argues that to the extent to which oligarchic corporate and financial elites attempt to control and manipulate the political, social, and cultural conduct in the daily lives of the masses of the people, democracy has turned into a fragile system. When, furthermore, politicians are purchased by the highest bidder, or when citizens are predominantly valued on account of their individual buying power, then Dallmayr recalls Karl Polanyi's unexampled analysis of the dangerous separation of the economic sphere from culture, history, and ethics, while observing the simple fact that only individuals with the means to participate in consumerism exercize individual choice. Finally, Dallmayr critically addresses the pervasive cultures of violence by confronting them with a promotion of cultures of nonviolence, as evidenced by an entire series of public intellectuals and writers from the East to the West over the past two centuries. Central in this context are the reappraisals of Ghandi's practices of nonviolent disobedience, Camus's rejection of violence as part of the human condition, Tolstoy's holistic view of the multiple relations between human communities and their environments, and Dewey's pragmatic design on the relations between the self and society.

Under the impulsions of such diverse traditions, all pointing in various degrees to foundational reassessments of the predominant Western conceptions of the relations between individual freedom and solidarious practice, Dallmayr concludes that a paradigm shift is impending (p. 111) in that a consciousness rooted in individual self-interest, secularism, and anthrocentrism is increasingly poised to allow for greater ethico-religious considerations. Hinduism and Buddhism in particular lend themselves for exploring a liberation of the self from forms of Western rationality tied to utilitarian and individualistic pursuits. Combining so many traditions from all corners of the globe enabled Dallmayr to design the contours of a relational concept of "person" as the ensemble of multiple social, spiritual, and cosmic relations. But it also enabled him to offer to his readers an extraordinarily rich and productive text.

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More than 80 years ago, Antonio Gramsci, one of the leading critical intellectuals of the twentieth century, wondered what would happen when the global economic axis moved from the Atlantic to the Pacific, when historically unprecedented masses of Asian peoples entered the spheres of industrial production, exchange, and consumption. Gramsci did not bring up the question of intellectuals in this context or how the shift in the global economic axis, and the challenges it would pose to transatlantic economic interests, would potentially involve challenges to transatlantic intellectual interests. *Freedom and Solidarity* indirectly touches on such intellectual challenges in that this book is a stark reminder of the fact that intellectuals in one territory used to impose their beliefs in particular virtues and ethics on the peoples and their intellectuals in other territories. It is also a reminder that an international division of intellectual labor in a hierarchical structure of domination and subordination controlled access to the organization of intellectual production, exchange, and consumption. In this sense, Dallmayr's study is symptomatic of a paradigm shift in critical consciousness because it indeed points to new beginnings in a globally coordinated organization of an ethics of solidarity.

It is to the author's credit that in *Freedom and Solidarity*, he views these new beginnings as part of a process in which intercivilizational actors have many tasks to consider on the subject of reconciling cultural and social practices of injustice, discrimination, and oppression—which do exist among practitioners of all major world religions—with visions of global democratic ethics. What enabled him to do so was that indigeneous intellectuals everywhere, and Tu Weiming is an excellent example, have already pointed the way in that direction. The same can be asserted with regard to Dallmayr himself. For even a cursory overview of the unexampled current revolutions in discursive formations on the subject of "global civil society," "global civics," "human rights." and "cosmopolitan justice" will bring home the fact that Dallmayr's enduring participation in intracivilizational dialogues has produced a most significant contribution to discourses on "spiritualized forms of cosmopolitanisms." By doing so, he again built bridges, as so often happens, among differently situated groups with different traditions. No doubt, critical thinkers inspired by Dallmayr will expand their own bridges in the future with environmental justice and indigenous knowledge activists—among whom Vandana Shiva surely stand out—and this is be welcomed.

Images of Anarchy: The Rhetoric and Science in Hobbes's State of Nature. By Ioannis D. Evrigenis. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014. 299p. $32.99

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— Theodore Christov, *George Washington University*

Despite its centrality to the social contractarian tradition in political theory, the "state of nature" remains "an elusive concept" (p. i): Should it be understood hypothetically as a purely heuristic device, rather than historically as descriptive of the life of man outside civility, or perhaps a nuanced combination of these interpretations? Ioannis D. Evrigenis defends the latter approach and argues that to understand the development of the "state of nature" is, effectively, to trace Hobbes's own intellectual development. The invention of the term and its subsequent association with anarchy was famously attributed to Hobbes (although his predecessor Hugo Grotius had already made use of the term), who "composed a different account of the state of nature in each of his several political treatises" and "in ways that confuse, rather than clarify" (p. 2). As Evrigenis shows, however, not only do these "images of anarchy" reveal "a series of turns" in Hobbes's own thinking (p. 6), but they also constitute a "general rhetorical strategy" (p. 130) in his preoccupation with peace. When taken together, they describe an intellectual trajectory of "a rhetoric of science" and "a science of rhetoric" (p. 22) that is far more consistent and holistic than has generally been recognized.

Divided into four main parts, *Images of Anarchy* is structured thematically, beginning with Hobbes's sources from antiquity (Part I) and how they inspired him in developing his political philosophy (Part II), followed by contemporary American and scriptural accounts of the natural condition (Part III) and his science of rhetoric (Part IV). The first part disassociates Hobbes from the tradition of humanism, in which he has frequently been placed, and instead traces his engagement with the works of the ancient Greeks, particularly that of Thucydides (in Chapter 1) and Aristotle (in Chapter 2). Understanding Hobbes as a "A Graecian," versed in the wisdom of Greek antiquity, rather than rendering him as a Renaissance humanist, allows for a less monolithic and more comprehensive view of his thought. If Thucydides taught Hobbes how to write true and impartial history, then Aristotle showed him the power of persuasion, especially "persuasion for order" (p. 58), and their works contributed most to Hobbes's own political thinking. While his genuinely political treatise would not emerge until years later, when Hobbes was in his early fifties, but the Greeks had already firmly planted the seeds for his embarking on "civil science."

The second part (Chapters 3–5) engages the "state of nature" chronologically, as it appeared in his writings, in an attempt to reconstruct the intellectual trajectory of the term as Hobbes himself used it in his three major political works. His *Elements of Law*, structured on the contrast between "reason and passion" (p. 63), conceives of the state of nature as a form of privation of "everything that is beneficial to human society" (p. 68) and as the antithesis of "commodious living." It was also historically grounded, as the lives of contemporary Amerindians and the ancient Germanic tribes illustrate. But the state of nature, as *De Cive* makes clear, also acts as a heuristic tool that enables the mind to imagine, almost as a thought experiment, what human

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