

argument that a particular type of drama, one that solicits sympathy for vulnerable women, informs Smith's conception of sympathy. Theater, and not just the theatricality that critics have come to associate with Smith, is a crucial influence because it simultaneously engages sympathy's visceral and abstract elements. Smith's model of sympathy appears as medical conceptions of sympathy are gradually declining, and Emily Cock's study of rhinoplasty offers an illuminating case study that physicalizes theories of both medical and social sympathy.

Authenticity is one of this volume's key terms. Amelia Dale argues that George Colman's farce *Polly Honeycombe* (1760), whose heroine reads novels on stage, confronts the private act of novel-reading with the publicity of the stage. Here, if there is an "authentic self" we might ascribe to the dramatic character, "it is a 'self' produced by a layering of legible, external surfaces" (167). Authentic emotions are contested in the public discussion of suicide that Eric Parisot investigates. Conservative commentators who deny the legitimacy of suicidal despair and worry that printed suicide notes might prompt an increase in the self-destructive act reject in their rhetorical strategies "the civilizing trajectory from visceral disgust to socio-moral contempt" (191). With this claim, Parisot illustrates one way that the history of emotions can supplement intellectual history.

In individual essays, Glen Pettigrove and Michael L. Frazer turn to transitions in methodology and style that characterize the *oeuvres* of Francis Hutcheson and David Hume, respectively. Carefully differentiating Hutcheson's terms, Pettigrove identifies a tension in Hutcheson's early work that his proclivity for the mathematical analysis of emotions produces. Frazer provides a new account of the well-known transitions (or, as some readers have thought, failures) in Hume's career by arguing that the dry "anatomical" style of *The Treatise of Human Nature* (1738) gives way to the warm "painterly" prose of his *Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary* (1741) and two *Enquiries* (1748, 1751) in response to the increasing belief that participation in print culture necessitated appeals to readers' emotions.

In an illuminating afterword, Conal Condren situates previous essays' discussions of eighteenth-century emotions against the backdrop of the lingering effects of the previous century's political upheaval. In English translations of Homer, Condren discovers a moderation of violent passions and a shift towards the socializing phenomenon of sympathy, a shift that identifies, through the literary history of the lexicon of anger, "a change in emotional regime" that promises to nuance historical accounts of early eighteenth century culture (245).

The volume's disciplinary range signals the promise of the history of emotions to have an impact on and unite multiple fields. The conceptual span of its essays—passions, sympathy, print culture, and authenticity—at times holds similar promise but, especially in the varied meanings of authenticity different essays invoke, at other times lacks cohesion. Overall, this collection's essays indicate that the history of emotions stands to enhance and challenge our understanding of eighteenth-century British culture.

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DMITRI LEVITIN. *Ancient Wisdom in the Age of the New Science: Histories of Philosophy in England, c. 1640–1700*. Ideas in Context 113. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015. Pp. xii, 670. \$140.00 (cloth).

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On one hand, Dmitri Levitin's *Ancient Wisdom* is a work of impressive erudition; it seems unlikely that any similarly thorough history of seventeenth-century English approaches to ancient philosophy will soon appear. On the other, despite an affected reticence about "overarching 'argument[s]'" (546), it is a highly polemical work. Among its targets are a

slew of historiographical labels whose accuracy and explanatory value Levitin challenges: “*prisca theologia*,” “Cambridge Platonism,” “Epicureanism,” “latitudinarianism,” “ancients vs. moderns,” and, especially, the “early Enlightenment.” More fundamentally, Levitin rejects what he sees as a forced and reductive political contextualization of scholarship—originating in nineteenth-century Whig historiography and now exemplified by J. G. A. Pocock and Jonathan Israel—that misconstrues seventeenth-century intellectual change and its legacy. Instead of a transformative crisis of conscience c. 1680–1720, Levitin sees “the true revolution in attitudes” (8) that made historical contextualization de rigueur in discussions of ancient knowledge and belief as the fruit of humanist engagements beginning a century earlier.

His introductory chapter emphasizes that rather than disciplines or ideologies, Levitin is interested in the contingencies shaping how the people who mostly wrote and read philosophy in the seventeenth century did so, in the “intellectual culture” of institutions and of scholarly reception. In the ensuing chapters he traces in meticulous detail a series of historical engagements with different aspects of ancient wisdom. In chapter 2 he deals with discussions of Zoroaster and Near Eastern learning (particularly astronomy) from historian of philosophy and early fellow of the Royal Society Thomas Stanley to orientalist Thomas Hyde; in chapter 3 he deals with the relation between Mosaic and Egyptian wisdom in the work of greater and lesser clergymen and philosophers (among whom Henry More is singled out for historiographical demotion, and the “Cambridge Platonism” he purportedly represented for demolition). In both chapters, Levitin is at pains to remove the blinkers of sixteenth-century *prisca theologia* and eighteenth-century Enlightenment in order to see seventeenth-century scholarship on its own terms. The payoff Stanley sought in comparing pagan and Christian beliefs was not a timeless wisdom that swallowed both but a congruence with Joseph Scaliger’s chronology and ideas of natural law; Mosaic primacy fell victim not to heterodox “syncretism” but to erosion by new sources and critical techniques.

Levitin pays rewarding attention throughout to the “astonishing level of integration” (80) between humanism and natural philosophy. Stanley’s work furnished philosophers with a “store of previous opinions” and historical perspective on their development (77); fragments of ancient learning underpinned new theories of the earth, which in turn provoked scholarly responses that increasingly distinguished natural from sacred history. In chapters 4 and 5, Levitin turns to the historiography of natural philosophy itself, first in terms of ancient methods and then respecting physical doctrines. In chapter 4 he contrasts the efforts of humanist-influenced medical authors—including Francis Glisson, Thomas Sydenham and William Petty (not often granted a humanist pedigree)—to link their practice to ancient methods, with shallower attempts by proponents of experiment such as Thomas Sprat and Joseph Glanvill to interpret the history of Greek philosophy in anti-Aristotelian terms. In chapter 5 Levitin reexamines Pierre Gassendi’s influence in England. The key to this was not his empiricist reading of Epicurean method or his recuperation of materialism, but the scholarly example that his contextualization of these subjects established.

In chapter 6 Levitin turns to the history of the early church and its links with pagan learning. Explorations of the Platonist vocabulary of the ante-Nicene fathers created problems for Anglicans eager to maintain both orthodox trinitarianism and a patristic identity for the church, but unable to anchor their doctrine in later church tradition and thereby close the door to charges of Socinianism. Here, again, the intellectual upshot was a common resort to contextual inquiry: not a sudden triumph of revolutionary ideas clearing the road to Enlightenment, but the institutionalization, over many decades, of humanist scholarly practices. In a brief conclusion Levitin restates his major claims while hinting at a previously unexplored question: the transformation of the philosopher’s “persona” (546).

The foregoing does scant justice to the detail in Levitin’s account; one of the book’s overt points and great strengths is the density of scholarly culture and the necessity of getting beyond the big names and big-ticket ideologies that give the subject a place in grand narratives of scientific revolution and Enlightenment. Levitin’s readings of his sources are close and

convincing, a contrast with the procrustean tendencies of some of his targets. But one may ask whether so polemical a work should not engage those targets with more care; it is one thing to ditch grand narratives as a matter of methodological principle, another to lump together and collectively dismiss such different accounts as Israel's and Pocock's—to say nothing of others. The nuance that distinguishes Levitin's reading of seventeenth-century histories is less evident when he turns to more current work.

Levitin's dismissal of political context also invites examination. Perhaps universities pursued learning "without ... any political implications" (15) and "historiographical conclusion[s] developed in one context" (418) were appropriated in others for their scholarly rather than their ideological qualities. Still, neither claim necessitates treating "politics" and "scholarship" as mutually exclusive contexts for "intellectual life" (16); and if attacks on Henry More were motivated by concern for episcopacy (138) or John Spencer's *De legibus Hebraeorum* by "a desire to attack non-conformist scripturalism" (164), or if "Interregnum divines" were able to abandon the anti-Nicene fathers beloved of Laud (460) while Episcopalians remained committed, the distinction begins to seem unhelpful. The meaning and scope of "intellectual culture" could likewise use clarification: when denying their links to "liberalism," Levitin identifies his subjects as "a grouping of elitist *érudits* concerned primarily with their own scholarship" (15). Later, this scholarship concerns "the wider literate elite" (447); by the end of the book, humanist history of philosophy is held to have been central "to almost all intellectual culture" (542). If "Anglophone historiography" has "extolled the disenfranchised" (543) too long, equating intellectual culture with elite historical erudition risks overcorrection.

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DANIELLE MCCORMACK. *The Stuart Restoration and the English in Ireland*. Irish Historical Monographs. Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2016. Pp. 197. \$65.00 (cloth).
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Danielle McCormack's *The Stuart Restoration and the English in Ireland* is a welcome addition to a surprisingly thin field of studies devoted to the Restoration period in Ireland and, indeed, the Restoration in the Three Kingdoms as a whole. Drawing from her dissertation completed at the European University Institute Florence in 2013, in this the book—though short at only 168 pages of text—McCormack delves deeply into the turbulent waters of post-Restoration political strife by focusing largely (though by no means exclusively) on the highly influential yet perpetually anxious position of the English in Ireland. This, in itself, proves something of an elusive category throughout the book: it elides more familiar categories of "Old English" and "New English," as well as "Old Protestant" and "New Protestant" interests. The first of these pairings, made familiar some time ago through the work of Aidan Clarke and Nicholas Canny, was employed contemporaneously to distinguish "recent" English (largely Protestant) settlers in Ireland, largely under the Elizabethan regime, from their Anglo-Norman, and usually Catholic, counterparts. The second of these—less commonly employed but nonetheless present in the work of Sean Connolly and Toby Barnard—separates the "low church" Calvinists who adhered to the Church of Ireland from the "innovators" of the Cromwellian invasion and Interregnum settlement. The broad group to which McCormack turns—the "English in Ireland"—is thus one made all the more interesting for its ambiguities and indefinite sense of unity beyond a common distrust of the Gaelic or "native" Irish.

Over six broadly thematic chapters, McCormack largely focuses on what one might call the period of "unsettlement" that spanned the early stages of the Dublin Convention in 1659–60 to the forced resignation of James Butler, duke of Ormond and lord lieutenant of Ireland, in