

The promotional state and Canada's Juno Awards

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Abstract

The scholarly literature on popular music has rarely addressed music awards shows and the role of the state with regard to popular music. In an effort to deepen what is known about both sets of issues, this article utilises the concept of a promotional state to examine Canada's Juno Awards. A promotional state employs state intervention to support domestic popular music, and the promotional state in Canada has been connected to the Junos in three ways (through Canadian content regulations, public broadcasting and government funding). The historical, political economic analysis in the article considers how the role of the promotional state has undergone changes with regard to the Juno Awards. There has been some 'hollowing out' of the promotional state's role since the Junos began in 1971, but the article contends that (in the interests of private capital) the role of this state has continued and even increased in some respects.

Introduction

There has been little analysis of music awards shows in the scholarly literature on popular music, but these shows are important to investigate for at least two reasons. First, as promotional vehicles, they offer insight into promotional issues associated with the sound recording industry. Second, while some music awards shows have an international dimension (such as the World Music Awards), they are usually linked to particular countries or regions within countries and can therefore reveal much about nation-states in relation to popular music. As Cloonan (1999, p. 193) notes, nation-states have likewise been underplayed in the literature since studies have largely focused on the global and the local (or conflated the local and the national).

As part of an effort to correct this situation, Cloonan draws attention to three ways in which nation-states are connected to popular music. In particular, he identifies the role of the state in different contexts. Cloonan writes that the *authoritarian state* features 'generally strict control of recording, a licensing system for live musicians and strict control of imports' (Cloonan 1999, p. 203). He illustrates this with reference to the nation-states of the former Soviet bloc. Cloonan also describes the *promotional state*, which faces domination by Anglo-American music. It 'will try to devise policies, such as radio quotas and promotion of domestic music, to combat this' (Cloonan 1999, p. 204). Canada and France are mentioned as being among such nation-states. Finally, Cloonan refers to the *benign state*. The practice here is to 'generally leave popular music to the market'. Censorship and broadcasting laws exist in this state, but the tendency is to see 'the state's role as being to referee between competing business interests rather than controlling or

promoting popular music' (Cloonan 1999, p. 204). Cloonan cites Britain as an example of the nation-states in this category. However, he explains that there can be some overlap between his three concepts as they apply to particular nation-states (Cloonan 1999, p. 204).

The present article draws upon some of the concepts that Cloonan discusses while examining issues associated with the nation-state of Canada and the Juno Awards for the Canadian sound recording industry. As Cloonan recognises, Canada has a promotional state in relation to popular music. However, the components of this state are not clear. What forms of intervention have been used by the state in Canada to promote domestic popular music, and how has this state intervention been linked to the Juno Awards? Another question concerns changes in the amount of intervention by the promotional state as a result of neo-liberalism. Has state intervention pertaining to the Juno Awards and the Canadian sound recording industry decreased as the market orientation associated with the benign state has increased, or has there been a deepening and extension of intervention by the promotional state? Both questions will be answered through the historical, political economic analysis in this article.

The components of the promotional state

The Juno Awards are Canada's principal music awards ceremony. The event has a more general orientation than other music awards shows that were later established to celebrate music in particular areas of Canada or in certain genres (such as the East Coast Music Awards and the Canadian Country Music Awards). Those who have won Junos over the years include Canada's best-known pop music stars (Anne Murray, Bryan Adams, Céline Dion and Shania Twain, among others). The annual ceremony has also been popular with Canadian music fans. For example, in 2003, the Juno Awards drew a larger television audience in Canada than the American-based Grammy Awards did that same year (Powell 2003).

The beginnings of the Juno Awards can be traced back to the emergence of *RPM*, Canada's first music trade magazine. *RPM* was started in 1964 by Walt Grealis, a former record company promotional representative. Along with his friend Stan Klees, a record producer, Grealis soon came up with the idea of conducting a poll through *RPM*. In December 1964, the magazine's subscribers were invited to vote on notable Canadian artists and industry figures in a poll called the *RPM* Awards. The results were published later that month along with some editorial comment from Grealis. The *RPM* Awards became an annual feature of the magazine, but there were no actual awards for the winners and no ceremony. That eventually changed, as did the name of the awards; the *RPM* Gold Leaf Awards were presented to the winners of the December 1969 poll at a reception in Toronto during February 1970. Klees designed the awards, which took the form of metronome-shaped trophies (*RPM* 1996, pp. 8, 10).

The further evolution of what became the Juno Awards is tied to the emergence of a promotional state for popular music in Canada. Up to the late 1960s, there had been little state intervention directed at supporting Canadian popular music (Wright 1991, p. 306). As it began to take shape after that point, the promotional state in Canada developed three components that were connected to the Junos: CanCon regulations, public broadcasting and government funding.

CanCon regulations

During the 1960s, Canadian music was rarely heard on Canadian radio. In 1968, it was estimated that only four to seven per cent of the musical selections on private Canadian radio stations were Canadian (Audley 1983, p. 193). Private stations dominated Canadian radio and preferred to play fare that was foreign, particularly American.

This led to the emergence of Canadian content regulations for radio in the early 1970s, a decade after similar regulations were established for television. The Canadian Radio-Television Commission (CRTC), a federal government agency responsible for regulating broadcasting, proposed new Canadian Programming Regulations in February 1970. The CRTC and its Chair, Pierre Juneau, planned regulations that called for an increase in the amount of Canadian music broadcast by AM radio. A minimum of thirty per cent of the musical selections would have to meet at least two of the following criteria: the playing or singing of the composition was principally by a Canadian artist; the music was written by a Canadian; the lyrics were written by a Canadian; and the production was recorded in Canada. The CRTC scheduled a public hearing for April 1970 and invited comments on the proposed regulations. The comments received by the CRTC revealed deep conflicts; the regulations were strongly supported by Canadian record companies and other groups, but they were challenged by private radio broadcasters. Nevertheless, after making some minor changes that had been suggested at the hearing, the CRTC announced the new Canadian content regulations for AM radio in May 1970. These CanCon regulations (as they became known) were put into effect during January 1971 (CRTC 1971, pp. 16–20).

Grealis and Klees, the two creators of the *RPM* Gold Leaf Awards, played key roles in relation to CanCon regulations. Through *RPM*, Grealis had pushed for government measures to get more Canadian music on the radio. He wanted the amount of Canadian music to be set at fifteen per cent since he thought that private radio broadcasters would concede this figure (Batten 1972). In another way, Klees also played an important role. After the CRTC finalised its CanCon regulations, Klees created the MAPL acronym and logo for *RPM* (*RPM* 1977, p. 19). The acronym was based on the four criteria that the CRTC established to qualify as CanCon (Music, Artist, Production and Lyrics). The logo was used by *RPM*, and later by record companies, to identify CanCon records (Klees 1978, p. 6). The MAPL system was also adopted by the CRTC.

The emergence of CanCon regulations led to a name change for the *RPM* Gold Leaf Awards. In May 1970, *RPM* held a contest which invited its readers to come up with a name for the metronome-shaped awards designed by Klees. The magazine later revealed that the winning entry had suggested that the trophy be called the 'Juneau' to honour the Chair of the CRTC for establishing CanCon regulations. Grealis liked this idea, but he wanted a name that was shorter and easy to remember. Consequently, the name was changed to 'Juno' (*RPM* 1996, p. 10). The first Juno Awards ceremony was held in February 1971, and Grealis arranged for Juneau to be honoured at this ceremony as the 'Canadian Music Industry Man of the Year' (*The Toronto Star* 1971).

Public broadcasting

Like CanCon regulations, public broadcasting is an aspect of the promotional state which has been associated with the Juno Awards. The Canadian Broadcasting

Corporation (CBC), the English-language arm of the national public broadcasting service, has long helped to promote Canadian musical talent. The CBC has played Canadian artists on radio and shown them on television, but it has also produced Canadian records (featuring classical and popular music) through CBC Enterprises (Canada 1982, p. 241). Since the Canadian subsidiaries of international record companies did little to develop Canadian music, a government-appointed task force once noted that 'the CBC and independent producers bear a disproportionate burden of the recording and promoting of Canadian musical talent' (Canada 1986, p. 125). Nevertheless, it was some time before the CBC became linked to the Juno Awards.

After the 1971 Juno Awards, record companies began pursuing their promotional interests by pressuring Grealis to get the ceremony on television and make other changes. Grealis only saw the Junos as an industry event, but the Canadian Recording Industry Association (CRIA) wanted the ceremony turned into a television show that would provide a promotional opportunity. The CRIA, which primarily represents the subsidiaries of foreign record companies, also wanted at least some of the awards to be based on sales. Continuing resistance from Grealis finally led the CRIA to declare in 1974 its plan to start the largely sales-based Maple Music Awards and put them on television. Grealis then gave in, agreeing to include some sales-based awards and arrange for a television broadcast (Martin 1975; *RPM* 1996, p. 11). Grealis and Klees approached the CBC as well as CTV, a private television network, and eventually secured an agreement with the CBC to have the ceremony shown (*RPM* 1996, p. 11).

In order to ensure their promotional interests through the televising of the Juno Awards, record companies slowly took control of the ceremony away from Grealis. The concessions that Grealis made to record companies had also included giving them more involvement in the Junos (*RPM* 1996, p. 11). This involvement was apparent by the time the CBC first televised the ceremony in 1975. The Canadian Music Awards Association (CMAA) was established to administer the awards that year in co-operation with Grealis. The CMAA included representatives of the CRIA as well as other music industry associations. After the 1975 ceremony, the plan was for the CMAA to transform into the Canadian Academy of Recording Arts and Sciences (CARAS). Grealis would be a consultant to CARAS, and the system of voting would be modified so that only CARAS members (rather than subscribers to *RPM*) selected the award winners (Martin 1975). After CARAS assumed responsibility for the Junos, a division of labour emerged between the organisation and the CBC in the preparation of the annual ceremony; CARAS lined up the talent that would appear on the Juno Awards while the CBC produced the television broadcast in-house (Goddard 1977).

In the 1980s, the CBC became further involved with the Juno Awards through Radio Canada International (RCI). RCI was established in 1945 as a shortwave radio service that the CBC used to present Canadian perspectives to numerous countries in various languages. From 1946 onward, RCI also produced records (featuring Canadian music and artists) that were distributed through Canadian embassies and agreements with broadcasters in foreign countries (Canada 1982, p. 241). During the early 1980s, RCI started to produce compilation albums of annual Juno winners for distribution as promotional items to radio stations around the world (CARAS 1982, 1985B). In the late 1980s, RCI was involved with more of these compilations (in the compact disc format) that would be played worldwide and distributed by the federal

Department of External Affairs to Canadian embassies and consulates (CARAS 1987, 1988).

Government funding

Government funding is the third aspect of the promotional state which is connected to the Juno Awards. Since the federal government provided most of the budget for the CBC, public money was behind the production and broadcast of the ceremony as well as the compilation albums of Juno winners that RCI produced. CARAS indirectly benefited from this government funding to the CBC, but the organisation also benefited directly from public funding through financial assistance that came from different levels of government.

Such financial assistance was necessary due to the economic difficulties that CARAS experienced. In the early 1980s, the non-profit organisation admitted that it faced expenditures which were out of line with its income (Farrell 1982). Traditionally, CARAS had relied on two sources of funding; the organisation had revenues from the fees paid by individual members and receipts from the gala dinner that accompanied the annual ceremony. However, by the mid-1980s, CARAS was also securing government grants (Stern 1986). The federal Department of Communications provided grants through its Cultural Initiatives Program, and the Toronto-based organisation obtained additional funding from the Government of Ontario through its Ministry of Citizenship and Culture (CARAS 1986). In 1988, CARAS received a total of \$63,000 in federal and provincial grants. Some of the money was put into promotional activities, including a cross-Canada press tour by Juno organisers and a video on the Juno Awards that would be shown at international exhibitions or trade shows to raise foreign awareness of Canadian talent (RPM 1988).

The decreasing role of the promotional state

The promotional state for popular music that developed in Canada has undergone changes since the 1980s. There have been changes to its various components (CanCon regulations, public broadcasting and government funding). The task in the remainder of the article is to interpret these changes and their implications. The changes can be understood in at least two different ways, both of which will be assessed against the case of the Juno Awards.

One way of seeing the changes points to the decreasing role of the promotional state. In this view, the intervention that characterises the promotional state has decreased while the market orientation associated with the benign state has increased. Such a perspective is consistent with many arguments that have been made about the impact of neo-liberalism on the role of the state. For example, Strange (1996, pp. 100, 104–5) argues that the decline of state power has partially resulted from policy changes such as deregulation and privatisation. She also argues that there has been less government involvement in production and subsidisation (Strange 1996, p. 55).

Along these lines, the case of the Juno Awards offers some support for the notion that the role of the promotional state in Canada has decreased. Policy changes by the state have resulted in less intervention with regard to the ceremony or associated matters. Less intervention has also resulted from the efforts of CARAS to move away from reliance on the promotional state. These factors are reflected in three

developments connected to the Juno Awards: privatisation through the emergence of independent television production; the growth of corporate sponsorship relative to government funding; and the shift from public to private broadcasting.

Independent production

In the early 1980s, federal government policy generated the growth of independent television production as well as the partial privatisation of the CBC. The push towards privatisation came from the Federal Cultural Policy Review Committee. The Committee had recommended that, with the exception of news operations, the CBC should eliminate its in-house television production in favour of acquiring programmes from independent producers (Canada 1982, p. 292). The notion of having the CBC rely more on independent producers was soon taken up in a new broadcasting policy established by the federal government (Canada 1983, p. 20). As Raboy (1996, p. 187) notes, 'this meant the privatization of a large part of the production activity formerly performed by the CBC'.

The federal government's policy shift had an impact on CARAS, which decided in the mid-1980s to move from in-house production of the Juno Awards by the CBC to independent production by private companies. According to Peter Steinmetz, the President of CARAS at the time, there were two reasons for this move. To begin with, Steinmetz indicated that CARAS wanted more creative control over production of the Juno Awards ceremony. However, Steinmetz added that 'the real motivating force' was the federal government's 'thrust towards independent production' (quoted in CARAS 1984B).

CARAS proceeded with independent production of the Juno Awards after production ties to the CBC were no longer in effect. A co-production agreement with the CBC ended in 1983, leaving CARAS free to pursue other options in preparing the ceremony (Canadian Press 1983). A five-person committee of CARAS officials drafted a document to guide independent production companies in their bids for the 1984 Juno Awards. This committee included Steinmetz and out-going CARAS President Brian Robertson, who was also President of the CRIA. Norman Perry, the Vice-President of Concert Productions International (CPI), was also on the committee (LaPointe 1983). After sifting through the bids that came in, CARAS perhaps not coincidentally settled on CPI. Although CPI was primarily involved with concert promotion, the company had also moved into video production (with several concert specials and other television programmes to its credit). While CPI would produce the 1984 Juno Awards, an agreement was reached with the CBC to broadcast the ceremony (CARAS 1984A).

Corporate sponsorship

A shift in emphasis from government funding to corporate sponsorship of CARAS and the Juno Awards also suggests the decreasing role of the promotional state. While CARAS was securing government funding in the mid-1980s, the organisation was also beginning to focus on attracting corporate sponsorship. The organisation turned to corporate sponsorship since it was concerned about the stability of government funding. According to a representative of CARAS, such funding was 'fragile support' since it could disappear or diminish if there were shifts in a government's cultural concerns or objectives (quoted in Stern 1986, p. 1).

CARAS approached Molson Breweries due to its history of sports/entertainment sponsorship and worked out a deal with the company in 1985. The monetary value of the three-year deal was in the six-figure range (Rowland 1987). In return for this financial support, CARAS agreed to acknowledge Molson's as a corporate sponsor on all of its written communications and during the televised Juno Awards ceremony. CARAS also agreed to give the brewery representation on its Advisory Board and its Promotion and Publicity Committees (Stern 1986). As a result of participation in these committees, Molson's became involved in the Entertainer of the Year Award. The latter was introduced in 1987, and the winner was selected by the public. After CARAS established the nominees, Molson's distributed the ballots and conducted a promotional campaign for the award (Canadian Press 1987). The award continued for several years with the support of Molson's, which stayed on as the sole corporate sponsor of CARAS and the Junos beyond its initial three-year deal (CARAS 1992).

By the mid-1990s, CARAS was moving even further towards reliance on corporate sponsorship or other forms of private funding rather than government funding. Since federal and provincial governments were trying to reduce their budgets during a difficult economic period, CARAS President Dave Charles was concerned about placing a burden on these governments (CARAS 1994A). Consequently, after Molson's indicated a desire to reduce its commitment to the Juno Awards, CARAS developed a new approach to funding. CARAS continued to get funding from fees paid by individual members, but it began encouraging corporations in the sound recording industry to become 'patron members' at one of three levels: silver (under \$10,000), gold (between \$10,000 and \$25,000) or platinum (over \$25,000). Because of its long association with CARAS, Molson's also became a patron member of the organisation. While securing patron members, CARAS still planned to seek corporate sponsors (CARAS 1994B). In 1996, CARAS utilised multiple corporate sponsors for the first time. General Motors, Columbia House and Subway were sponsors of the 25th anniversary Juno Awards (CARAS 1996). By the end of the 1990s, CARAS had embarked on a strategy that called for further increasing corporate sponsorship (LeBlanc 1998).

Private broadcasting

In relation to the Juno Awards, a final indication of the decreasing role of the promotional state involves a shift from public to private broadcasting. After twenty-six years of having the ceremony shown by the CBC, CARAS made the decision to move the Junos to the private television network CTV. In 2001, CARAS gave CTV the rights to broadcast the 2002 and 2003 Juno Awards. CTV was also given first right of refusal on all future ceremonies (CARAS 2001).

The move to CTV had a great deal to do with the promotional interests of CARAS, which are closely linked to the promotional interests of the sound recording industry and the corporate sponsors that the organisation depends upon. The capacity to satisfy these interests had been diminishing due to the shrinking role of the CBC amidst the growth of specialty channels or other (usually private) services on Canadian television, and CTV was seen as providing better promotional opportunities as a result of convergence. CTV was owned by Bell Canada, the telecommunications company, and the television network formed part of the Bell Globemedia system. As the comments of a CTV executive suggest, the properties

within this system helped CTV to secure the Junos: 'We offered a few things I take it the CBC was not able to match, a lot of that being promotions and our specialty channels' (quoted in Young 2002, p. 2).

The 2002 Juno Awards ceremony was promoted through various properties associated with Bell Globemedia. These included: CTV and its programmes, such as the morning news show *Canada AM* and the late night talk show *Open Mike With Mike Bullard*; the specialty channel TSN, which features sports programming; the online portal Sympatico; and Canada's self-proclaimed 'national newspaper', *The Globe and Mail* (Young 2002).

The continuing and increasing role of the promotional state

As noted earlier, there are at least two ways of interpreting changes in the promotional state. One perspective, which suggests that the role of the promotional state has been decreasing, is consistent with the more general view that neo-liberalism has resulted in a hollowing out of the state through processes such as deregulation and privatisation. This way of seeing changes in the promotional state has some theoretical value when applied to Canada and the case of the Juno Awards. It draws attention to the growing role of the private sector relative to the state with regard to the production, funding and broadcasting of the ceremony. It also shows how some of these changes, such as the shift from public to private production of the Juno Awards, have been connected to policy which encourages privatisation. Although this particular theoretical approach has some merit, there is a more useful perspective which poses a direct challenge by pointing to the continuing and increasing role of the promotional state.

The latter perspective is derived from the rethinking of deregulation and privatisation in the critical political economy literature. Salter and Salter (1997, pp. 67–8) argue that 'regulatory change is far more complex than the term "deregulation" suggests, and privatization involves more than the contracting out of services previously performed by governments to the private sector'. While these terms describe some developments, they obscure others. Preston (2001, p. 182) expands on the latter point by indicating that 'the restructuring of the state's role cannot be understood as some singular "deregulation" process or rolling back of the state's role'. Rather, 'the contemporary restructuring process involves a highly selective "hollowing out" of certain aspects of the state's role accompanied by an expansion of other functions'. While the role of the state has been reduced in some areas, including the provision of social welfare, 'the state is more rather than less involved in establishing the general conditions favourable to private capital investment and profit making'. There has been 'a significant redirection' in the role of the state rather than a significant withdrawal (Preston, 2001, p. 182).

The concept of infrastructure has been connected to this redirection in the role of the state. Whitfield (2001, pp. 199–200) contends that 'the nature of state intervention has changed' since it has increasingly turned towards 'ensuring the provision of a business friendly financial and operational infrastructure'. The 'financial infrastructure' includes subsidies and grants to business while the 'operational infrastructure' includes market regulations and governance structures. Salter and Salter (1997) have also drawn upon the concept of infrastructure, arguing that 'the new infrastructure' is a term that best describes the changing relations between capital and the state. They contend that deepening state involvement through funding, along with the growth of

state/capital partnerships in governance, are among the components of 'the newly emerging infrastructure of social and economic relations' (1997, p. 69).

All of this suggests the need to address the continuing and increasing role of the promotional state, which is reflected in several developments regarding the Juno Awards and the Canadian sound recording industry. These developments are: the public-isation of independent television production; changes in CanCon and other CRTC regulations; federal government funding and policy; and provincial or municipal government involvement in the Junos.

The public-isation of independent production

As traditionally understood, the concept of privatisation is challenged by current developments associated with the state. Even when state functions are transferred to the private sector, there may still be state involvement in some form. This phenomenon is captured by Raboy (1996, p. 178), who notes that the privatisation of the public sector in Canadian television can simultaneously be understood as the 'public-isation' of the private sector. While taking on tasks in television broadcasting that were previously performed by the CBC, private firms have been 'increasingly reliant on public funding and public policy measures' (Raboy 1996, p. 179). Independent production companies are among the private firms that have benefited from the state's financial and operational infrastructure. Through revisions to broadcasting policy and the creation of the Broadcast Program Development Fund (BPDF), the federal government enabled these companies to enjoy partial public financing for specific television projects (Raboy 1996, pp. 187).

The private production of the Juno Awards is connected to public-isation in two ways. First, independent companies that were behind the production of the television ceremony qualified for some financial support through the BPDF (Canadian Press 1983). Second, the state began to play a role in another way after the 1984 Juno Awards. The ceremony that year was independently produced under the full responsibility of CPI, but CARAS had some concerns about the way that CPI handled it (CARAS 1985A; LaPointe 1985). This helps to explain why independent production companies were not given complete responsibility for the ceremony in subsequent years. Instead, while these companies were involved, there were also co-production agreements between CARAS and the CBC. The last of these agreements was reached in 1998 and covered the 1999, 2000 and 2001 Juno Awards (CARAS 1998). The CBC had representation on CARAS' TV/Talent Committee, as did the head of the private production firm that had been hired (CARAS 1999B). This was usually either Lynn Harvey of Twist Productions or John Brunton of Insight Productions (Foley 2001; CARAS 2002). After the committee selected and confirmed the talent for the CBC broadcast, the independent production firm worked out the details of the show (CARAS 1999B). The CBC then supplied the crew that worked with the firm to put on the television broadcast, except in 1999 when freelancers were hired to replace striking CBC technicians (Foley 1999). This arrangement continued until 2002, when the Junos moved to the private television network CTV. Insight Productions was again hired, and the 2002 Juno Awards marked only the second time that an independent production firm had been given full responsibility for the ceremony (CARAS 2002). Until then, through the selection of talent and the provision of production assistance by the CBC, state involvement had remained crucial to the private production of the Junos.

Changes in CanCon and other CRTC regulations

Like privatisation, the concept of deregulation does not capture the complexity of current developments involving the state. Babe (1990, p. 245) and others have noted that the term obscures ongoing intervention for private capital. Indeed, adopting an alternative way of viewing changes in the state's operational infrastructure, Murdock (2000) eschews deregulation and refers instead to 'reorienting regulation'. He points out that there has been 'a shift in the basic rationale for intervention, from a defence of the public interest to a promotion of corporate interests and from cultural goals to economic priorities' (2000, pp. 40–1).

This accounts for changes in the CanCon regulations that have long been associated with the Juno Awards. The emergence of a thirty per cent CanCon quota for AM radio in 1970, and the beginning of the Junos a year later, reflected the cultural nationalism of the time (Wright 1987/88, p. 30). CanCon regulations were also later applied to FM radio, with the amount of CanCon varying by programming formats. The CanCon quota for FM stations playing popular music was increased from twenty to thirty per cent in 1990, and the amount of CanCon for other formats was also increased (CRTC 1991, p. 13). However, the nature of regulation by the CRTC altered as the cultural nationalism of the 1960s and 1970s receded and was partly overshadowed by economic nationalism in the 1980s and 1990s (Parnis 1998, p. 178). CanCon regulations had been regarded to be in the 'public interest', but they remained crucial as the emphasis of the CRTC shifted toward corporate interests. Parnis (1998, p. 188) argues that '“Cancon” endured, not so much for its significant contribution to Canadian cultural unity and identity formation, but for its increasing role in helping to generate domestic and export revenue'. This pursuit of revenue is one reason why the CRTC enhanced the regulations under its 1998 Commercial Radio Policy, which required commercial AM and FM stations playing popular music to increase their CanCon from thirty to thirty-five per cent. The CRTC noted that the playing of Canadian music on the radio contributes to the cultural goals of broadcasting legislation, but the agency also referred to promotional and economic goals when justifying the increase in CanCon. According to the CRTC, the higher requirements would 'expand the exposure given to Canadian artists and provide increased support to the Canadian music industry' (CRTC 1998, p. 28). The strengthening of CanCon regulations poses a significant challenge to the notion that the role of the promotional state has been decreasing through deregulation. It is true that the CRTC has introduced 'flexibility' in its approach to CanCon regulations for radio (see, for example, CRTC 1993), and the agency has even relaxed CanCon requirements for particular radio broadcasters under exceptional circumstances (CRTC 1998, p. 28). However, with a growing focus on economic rather than cultural objectives, the trend in regulatory reform over the last thirty years has been to extend CanCon regulations in order to promote Canadian music.

The deepening role of the promotional state is also suggested by aspects of regulatory reform which had implications for private promotional initiatives and, in turn, the Juno Awards. The 1980s had seen the emergence of the Foundation to Assist Canadian Talent on Records (FACTOR) and a French-language equivalent known as MusicAction. These private sector agencies, which provided funding for Canadian independent record companies, had been set up by private radio broadcasters to meet CRTC requirements regarding financial support for the development and promotion of Canadian talent (Wright 1991, p. 308). The CRTC later initiated requirements that

financial benefits would also flow to the development of Canadian talent when there were ownership transactions in the radio broadcasting industry, but the CRTC set no guidelines on the value of these benefits. In the 1998 Commercial Radio Policy, the CRTC added specification to its benefits policy while permitting the ownership of more than one AM and one FM station operating in the same language and in the same market (Canada 1998, p. 18 and pp. 7–12). When there were transfers in the ownership of profitable radio undertakings, the CRTC expected that benefits equivalent to at least six per cent of the value of the transaction would be committed to Canadian talent development. Three per cent of this total contribution would be put into a new promotional fund for Canadian music while two per cent would go to the purchaser's choice of either FACTOR or MusicAction. The remaining one per cent would be given, at the discretion of the purchaser, to either of the latter initiatives or to other Canadian talent development initiatives (Canada 1998, pp. 20–1). The changes in the ownership regulations during 1998 generated a wave of industry consolidation and injected approximately \$26 million into these various promotional initiatives, with FACTOR and MusicAction sharing about one third of that amount (Bélanger 2002, p. 170). The influx of funding to FACTOR made it easier for the agency to deepen its involvement in the Juno Awards. In 1999, several years after first becoming the sponsor for the Best New Solo Artist and Best New Group awards (Littlejohn 1994), FACTOR increased its commitment to the Junos by joining General Motors and the Eaton's department store as a 'full corporate sponsor' (CARAS 1999_A, p. 2).

Federal government funding and policy

Although corporate sponsors have become connected to the Juno Awards, federal government funding points to the continuing and increasing role of the promotional state with regard to the ceremony as well as the sound recording industry in Canada more generally. The federal government has played an ongoing role in funding CARAS while taking on the additional role of funding independent record companies and other segments of the industry.

In order to analyse issues connected to the state's financial infrastructure, it is useful to draw upon the concept of 'corporate welfare'. Whitfield (2001, p. 13) defines corporate welfare as 'a widening web of tax relief, subsidies, credits, guarantees, incentives and concessions to business'. Corporate welfare is not a new development since the state has long subsidised business. However, it is being given a new priority due to growing state/capital partnerships and the needs of private capital in a global economy (Whitfield 2001, pp. 13, 155).

Corporate welfare emerges and continues due to business pressure, which has notably been present with regard to federal government funding for independent record companies in Canada and promotional vehicles such as the Juno Awards. Whitfield (2001, p. 157) indicates that the corporate sector 'has ensured its own "welfare" regime is sustained and developed. Business and trade organisations have built a web of organisations to lobby for and to protect these subsidies'. The Canadian Independent Record Production Association, which represents Canada's independent record companies, is one of the organisations that pushed for direct government support to this segment of the sound recording industry (Quill 1984). In the mid-1980s, the federal government began to consult independent firms on policy initiatives. Representatives of these firms indicated that a lack of financing was the most important issue they faced, but the difficulty of investing in promotion at the

desired level was among other key constraints (Canada 2000, p. 13). In 1986, the federal government began to provide funding for independent record companies and other organisations through the Sound Recording Development Program (SRDP).

The SRDP had several components, some of which were connected to promotional activities. The various components provided funding support in four main areas: the production of sound recordings and promotional videos; the production and distribution of specialised music; marketing, including touring; and business development (Canada 2000, p. 6). The business development component aimed to support 'the development of professional and management capacities of sound recording companies'. However, it could also be used to support 'initiatives and large-scale events which work towards the promotion and/or marketing of the Canadian sound recording industry' (Canada 2000, p. 85). Despite its name, the business development component was more commonly used in the latter capacity of facilitating promotional events. Since CARAS is responsible for the Juno Awards, it was one of the 'regular beneficiaries' of funding through this component of the SRDP (Canada 2000, p. 86). The 20th annual Juno Awards was one of the ceremonies that received support (DOC 1992, p. 43).

The business development component of the SRDP underwent privatisation, but this does not mean that federal government involvement in funding the Juno Awards disappeared. Salter and Salter (1997, p. 96) indicate that 'privatization is closely linked to decentralization . . . Regulatory, administrative and governmental functions are dispersed among a plethora of different bodies, some private, some public and many a mixture of both'. Despite the reliance on private bodies, 'there continues to be state involvement, even if the state's presence is muted or mainly invisible' (Salter and Salter 1997, p. 96). This is reflected in the SRDP. From the beginning, the administration of the SRDP's different components was divided between public and private bodies. The former were the Department of Communications (DOC), which later became the Department of Canadian Heritage, and the Canada Council for the Arts. The latter were FACTOR and MusicAction, which handled the majority of the components. This emphasis on the private sector increased as some components (including business development) eventually moved from the DOC/Canadian Heritage to FACTOR and MusicAction. However, the DOC/Canadian Heritage and the Canada Council were never without responsibility for at least one component of the SRDP (Canada 2000, p. 9). State involvement also continued to be important in terms of funding for FACTOR and MusicAction. Between 1986 and 1998, the money that the DOC/Canadian Heritage put into the SRDP accounted for about sixty-eight per cent of the total combined revenue of FACTOR and MusicAction while the remainder came from contributions by radio broadcasters as well as other sources of revenue (Canada 2000, p. 96). The promotional state in Canada was rendered less visible as some of its functions moved to private management, but it continued to provide public funding for the Juno Awards and other aspects of the sound recording industry.

Further changes in the operational and financial infrastructure of Canada's promotional state have also had implications for the Juno Awards. Salter and Salter (1997, p. 95) note that the 'mechanisms of regulation and administrative governance', including policy and various boards, now make 'explicit reference to how they will promote industry and competitiveness'. The Canadian Sound Recording Policy, which was introduced in 2001, stresses that the promotion of Canadian music is all the more important now due to the greater competition created by globalisation. More

specifically, the policy indicates the need to 'help promote viable Canadian music firms and make Canadian choices more widely available in the new borderless world' (Canada 2001). Such policy goals are supported by the Canada Music Fund (CMF), which aims 'to ensure a healthy and competitive Canadian sound recording industry' (Canada 2002). The CMF replaced the SRDP with eight programmes that take a more comprehensive approach to developing the industry (moving beyond support that was primarily aimed at independent companies to invest in songwriters, etc.). One aspect of the CMF is the Collective Initiatives Program, which provides funding for awards shows such as the Junos. FACTOR and MusicAction are responsible for the administration of this programme, but most of the programmes are under public bodies (Canada 2001). The various programmes will be carried out with the assistance of the Canada Music Council (CMC). The CMC is a group of music industry representatives that was formed to advise the Minister of Canadian Heritage on the implementation of the CMF (Canada 2002). Like the private bodies associated with the SRDP and the CMF, the CMC shows how new groups have become connected to the management of public funding for the sound recording industry in Canada.

Provincial and municipal government involvement

The growing role of the promotional state with regard to the Juno Awards is also apparent from provincial and municipal government involvement in the ceremony. While various groups have joined the federal government in the management of funding for CARAS and the Canadian sound recording industry, lower levels of government have increasingly become sources of funding for the Junos. It is useful to note here the argument of Salter and Salter (1997, p. 93) that 'the new infrastructure' is 'a complex system of interlocking parts involving not just new groups, but also many levels of government'. As they indicate, this is yet another reason why 'it would be wrong to conclude that the state has withdrawn'. However, as with the federal government, 'state involvement is muted, a matter of facilitation, and of providing funding, support and influence' (1997, p. 93). It was indicated earlier that the Government of Ontario had provided some funding for CARAS during the 1980s, but the involvement of lower levels of government in the Juno Awards has since become more extensive and sophisticated.

This deepening involvement was initiated when a provincial government's music-related promotional programme led to the Junos being held outside Toronto for the first time. In 1990, the Government of British Columbia launched the promotional programme Music '91. Administered by the Ministry of Tourism, Music '91 was intended to lure tourists to B.C. while also promoting the province's musical talent. Through the programme, \$12 million in lottery funds collected by the provincial government were used to subsidise appearances by B.C. artists and other artists at fairs or festivals held in British Columbia during 1991. However, Music '91 also became the basis for moving the Juno Awards to Vancouver that year. The idea of moving the Junos to Vancouver had been around since the mid-1970s, but it was always regarded to be financially unworkable until the B.C. government offered funding through its music promotion programme. The provincial government agreed to underwrite the cost of moving the ceremony, which was estimated to be between \$300,000 and \$400,000 (Mackie 1990; Lacey 1991).

After the experience with Vancouver, CARAS decided that other Canadian cities could host the Junos if they came up with enough funding to support the ceremony.

CARAS established several criteria to guide potential host cities in their bids for the Juno Awards. Among other things, these criteria called for host cities to cover the costs associated with the transportation of a production team and equipment from Toronto and their accommodation for one month prior to the Junos; a 2,500-seat theatre for the ceremony; a banquet facility for a Juno dinner attended by 2,500; and signs, banners, press conferences, receptions, etc. to promote the Junos and create a local and national media event. After a city was selected to host the Junos, its representatives would negotiate and sign a contract with CARAS (RPM 1993).

Following in the footsteps of the B.C. government, the Government of Manitoba soon became part of an initiative to bring the 1995 Juno Awards to Winnipeg. This initiative was officially launched in March 1993 by the Manitoba Audio Recording Industry Association and undertaken by an *ad hoc* committee that included the province's Deputy Minister of Culture (Ostick 1993A). In November 1993, on the basis of an impressive presentation by the committee (which proposed transforming the ceremony from a small industry-only event to a concert-style event attended by thousands of Canadian music fans), the CARAS Board of Directors voted fourteen to three in favour of moving the Juno Awards to Winnipeg. The committee was given ninety days to finalise the funding arrangements (Ostick 1993B), and the Manitoba government came up with some of the needed funding (CARAS 1994A).

Far from being unproblematic, the use of provincial or municipal infrastructure for the promotional vehicle of the Juno Awards has generated conflicts. Whitfield (2001, p. 199) notes the existence of conflicts over infrastructure, including 'conflicts in resource allocation between business and community needs'. Such conflicts have also been associated with public funding for popular music. Cohen (1991, p. 339) identifies a number of tensions in this area, including 'antagonism towards initiatives which seem to be aimed largely at tourists rather than local residents'. This is reflected in the debate about bringing the Juno Awards to Vancouver through Music '91; while supporters hailed Music '91 and its funding for the Junos as a boon for tourism business in British Columbia, detractors saw the promotional programme as an election ploy that would offer little long-term benefit to the music community or the province (Littlejohn 1990; Dafoe 1991; Lacey 1991). Other kinds of conflicts over financial infrastructure have also been apparent. For example, soon after Winnipeg was given the opportunity to host the 1995 Juno Awards, tensions emerged between CARAS and the city's representatives. A sub-committee of the CARAS Board of Directors spent months working with Winnipeg's organising committee, and agreement was reached on some contentious issues. Nevertheless, Winnipeg's committee failed to meet a February 1994 deadline for securing all of the funding necessary to support the Junos (only part of which was to come from the Manitoba government). Since CARAS was not prepared to take a financial risk, the organisation withdrew its offer to Winnipeg and started making plans to hold the 1995 ceremony in Toronto (CARAS 1994A). Hamilton, a city near Toronto, was later selected to host the ceremony when a venue there was judged to be better equipped and better priced than similar Toronto venues that could accommodate the Junos as a large concert-style event (Krewen 1995).

This marked the beginning of frequent competition among cities for the right to host the Juno Awards, and provincial or municipal infrastructure has been crucial to the competition. Whitfield (2001, p. 199) refers to competition between cities, regions and states over the provision of various forms of infrastructure (including financial and operational infrastructure) as they try to attract capital or other means of

stimulating the economy. The industrial/economic policy adopted by local or regional governments has sometimes attempted to enhance development through the cultural industries and popular music. In addition to drawing tourists, popular music has been seen as generating employment, benefiting the local community and improving the image of a city (Cohen 1991; Street 1993). It is perhaps not surprising, then, that cities and provinces in Canada have been willing to put money into acquiring the ceremony. Hamilton secured the Juno Awards again in 1996 by pledging \$125,000 that was re-allocated from other components of the city's budget (Fraser 1995), and it beat out several unnamed communities for the 1997 ceremony with a promise of over \$150,000 in municipal government funding (Fraser 1996). City officials justified this expenditure of public money with the argument that hosting the Junos would produce economic benefits for hotels, restaurants, limousine services and other businesses in Hamilton (Fraser 1997). After being held again in Vancouver during 1998, with the B.C. government acting as one of the 'associate sponsors' (Littlejohn 1998, p. 1), the Juno Awards made another return visit to Hamilton in 1999 and generated an estimated \$1.5 to \$2 million in direct local spending (Nott 1999). The ceremony was located in either Hamilton or Toronto for the next few years until the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador lured the Junos to St John's for 2002, resulting in an estimated \$2.1 million being pumped directly into the economy of the city (McKibbin 2003). The comparable sum for Ottawa, which hosted the Juno Awards in 2003, was expected to be more than \$5 million (Armstrong and McQueen 2003). These figures do not include the additional millions that were estimated to flow to the cities in tourism and other business as a result of promotional exposure through association with the Junos.

As the economic benefits of hosting the Junos have become more apparent, vigorous competition has emerged among cities to secure the ceremony. Five cities put in bids to host the 2004 Juno Awards (Williams 2003). Edmonton won with a bid that had funding lined up from different levels of government, including \$250,000 from the Government of Alberta (Sands 2003_{A, B}). Winnipeg has tried again to get the Junos by submitting a bid to host the ceremony in 2005 (Williams 2003). Winnipeg's bid cost \$50,000, with \$32,000 coming from the province and the city and the remainder from the private sector (Landry 2003). In the process of considering such bids, CARAS Chairman Ross Reynolds has stated that the non-profit organisation examines the 'host city's infrastructure'. Financial infrastructure is particularly important since Reynolds stresses 'the ability of the host city to provide the financial support CARAS needs' (quoted in Williams 2003). Given the growing interest among cities in hosting the Junos, the situation that developed with Winnipeg's first bid helps to explain why CARAS has indicated that Toronto and Hamilton will be kept as back-up sites if selected host cities fail to follow through on their financial commitments to the ceremony (Sands 2003_A).

Federal, provincial and municipal government funding for the Junos is contributing to the public-isation of a ceremony that is now fully associated with private television production and broadcasting. A total of \$550,000 in federal government funding went into the 2002 Juno Awards ceremony that was held in St. John's. Of this total, \$400,000 came from the Ministry of Industry through the Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency. The other \$150,000 was funding that the federal government routinely gives to CARAS to support the Junos (Vardy 2001). This funding would have come through the Collective Initiatives Program of the Canada Music Fund. Given that the ceremony itself cost an estimated \$1.6 million to

stage in St John's (McKibbon 2003), the private television network CTV and the independent production company Insight Productions clearly benefited from public subsidisation of the 2002 Juno Awards.

While the role of the federal government in the Juno Awards has continued, the growing role of provincial and municipal governments in relation to the ceremony draws attention to two key changes in Canada's promotional state. First, as lower levels of government have become connected to the Junos, the promotional state has more prominently featured conflicts. It was noted earlier that the initial years of the promotional state included conflicts over CanCon regulations and struggles over control of the Juno Awards. Due to the involvement of provincial and municipal governments, conflicts have now emerged *within* cities (over business and community needs) and *between* cities (over the right to host the ceremony). Second, this competing role of cities in relation to the Juno Awards indicates the deepening relevance of the local within the promotional state. Through different host cities, the local becomes linked to a promotional process that celebrates national culture. At the same time, local culture enjoys promotion through a national media event. The competing role of cities is also significant since it reflects and to some degree mitigates the centre/periphery tensions in Canada. When the idea of moving the Juno Awards to Vancouver first emerged in the mid-1970s, it stemmed from pressure to get the ceremony out of the music industry's power base in Toronto (Lacey 1990). With the ceremony now regularly moving to different cities, CARAS has recognised the need to placate the regions by occasionally moving the Juno Awards to Western Canada or Eastern Canada (Ross 2003).

Conclusion

This article has undertaken a historical, political economic analysis of Canada's Juno Awards in relation to the concept of a promotional state. It has attempted to deepen what is known about music awards shows, specifically the Junos, since these shows have not received much attention in the scholarly literature on popular music. Because the connections between nation-states and popular music have also been neglected in the literature (especially with regard to the role of the state), the notion of a promotional state has been employed to analyse the Junos. In the process of exploring both under-researched areas, two questions have been tackled. It is now possible to review the answers to these questions and discuss some implications.

The first question involved identifying the components of a promotional state for domestic popular music in Canada and the connections of these components to the Juno Awards. When Cloonan developed the concept of a promotional state, he did not elaborate on the various forms of state intervention that might be involved or how they might be linked to a music awards ceremony. This article has mapped out the historical ties between the Juno Awards and three types of intervention by Canada's promotional state: CanCon regulations, public broadcasting and government funding. Consequently, the article has added specification to the concept by pointing to the kinds of mechanisms through which the state's promotional activity operates. The article has also shown how the promotional state in Canada became increasingly complex. Initially concentrated at the federal level, it came to encompass the provincial and municipal levels. Furthermore, indirect assistance to private companies in the sound recording industry (through government funding of CARAS to support the Juno Awards) led to direct assistance for private companies associated

with the Junos or the music industry (through various subsidisation programmes such as the SRDP). The promotional state therefore took on some of the costs and risks associated with private enterprise. A complicated web seems to bind the promotional state and private capital, and it deserves further investigation.

The second question involved identifying the impact of neo-liberalism on Canada's promotional state and the latter's intervention into the Juno Awards or related aspects of the Canadian sound recording industry. While discussing the concept of a promotional state, Cloonan also referred to a benign state in which popular music is largely left to the market. However, it is not the case that the role of the promotional state in Canada has decreased while the market orientation associated with the benign state has increased. This article has argued that Canada's promotional state is continuing, deepening and extending rather than being hollowed out. Although several developments connected to the Juno Awards suggest a turn toward the market, the analysis here reveals something more complicated which cannot be captured through reference to such issues as the 'deregulation' of CanCon or the 'privatisation' of public broadcasting. With the general focus of regulation shifting towards economic and corporate goals, the CRTC has continued to establish regulations which serve the promotional interests of the sound recording industry (as the strengthening of CanCon illustrates). Furthermore, even after state functions are transferred to the private sector, state involvement remains a key element in promotional activities (one example being the private management of public funding for the Junos). The continuing and growing role of Canada's promotional state with regard to the Juno Awards points to the need for further research on music awards shows and nation-states in relation to popular music.

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