of class, gender, sexuality, and ethnicity in diverse contexts of political struggles. Neither women nor states are disassociated from these characteristics during local and international contestations that surround social ranking processes. These differences affect how women as well as institutions are encountered locally and internationally. In turn, this matrix also carries ramifications for the approaches that both people and institutions employ to position themselves in negotiations.

Furthermore, the discussion of the state's "feminine" and "masculine" character in the concluding chapter appears both out of place and hastily constructed. Towns successfully identifies norms as social hierarchies through a discussion of women's political status on a global scale. An attempt to address the state's gendered character, however, falls out of the book's stated scope: "There are also reasons to argue that adding women has disrupted some of the prior masculinist foundations of the state by inserting presumably female traits" (p. 200). Through this claim, the problematic dichotomy between "masculine" and "feminine" is reinstated. Moreover, this argument, which stands in opposition to most feminist studies that emphasize the multiplicity of and fluidity between the two constructs, hardly relates to the book's previous seven chapters, which focus primarily on *women* and not on gender or sexuality. This short section also risks the danger of conflating females with the "feminine" and males with the "masculine."

Nonetheless, Towns has made a noteworthy contribution to interdisciplinary studies of international relations and enhanced our understanding of the interplay between women's status, state behavior, and international relations. The study's innovative theorization of international norms as social hierarchies distinguishes *Women and States* as a work that can bridge conceptual gaps between academics and practitioners. Researchers and teachers in the social sciences will appreciate the book's introduction of women's political identities as a site for making international norms and an underlying theme of global governance, as well as its convincing demonstration of the contentious interaction between norms and transnational relations.

—Shirin Saeidi

Shirin Saeidi is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Politics and International Studies at Cambridge University, UK.

Briefly Noted

> ***Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin***, Timothy Snyder (New York: Basic Books, 2010), 544 pp., $29.95 cloth.

"When meaning is drawn from killing," observes Timothy Snyder, "the risk is that more killing would bring more meaning." Although Nazism and Stalinism are ostensibly separated by an ideological gulf, this brute fact binds the

https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7093.2010.00283_1.x Published online by Cambridge University Press

human nightmares unleashed by both. As Snyder notes, both Stalin and Hitler saw themselves as victims of an international conspiracy—for Stalin, the threat was capitalist encirclement and infiltration; for Hitler, it was the cosmic menace of the Jewish people—which thus justified the wanton slaughter of millions of innocent people according to a logic of self-defense. For both men, killing became self-justifying, leading to more murder, and more death.

For instance, Stalin's decision to starve millions of peasants in Soviet Ukraine in 1932–1933 in order to export grain and thereby increase the Soviet Union's foreign currency reserves was subsequently portrayed as evidence of the treason of the Ukrainian peasantry (to starve was to resist). When many of those Ukrainians who were "merely" sent to the Gulag for failing to meet their grain quotas were released in 1937–1938, Stalin saw their release as threatening—their time in the Gulag was evidence of their potential for future disloyalty—and subsequently ordered the murder of over 70,000 Ukrainian "kulaks" as part of the Great Terror.

Neither solely a history of Nazi atrocities nor of Stalinist terror, *Bloodlands* examines the intersection of territory, ideology, and economy in the region of Eastern Europe and the western Soviet Union where *fourteen million* civilians and prisoners of war were killed by the two regimes between 1933 and 1945. The major contribution of this book is that it examines these atrocities as part of a continuum, refusing to compartmentalize the crimes of either regime, and in doing so it exposes the reader to the ebb and flow of mass murder within a relatively compact physical space. Where Soviet agents terrorized hundreds of thousands of Poles one year, the fires of the Nazi extermination camps burned the next.

Meticulously researched and ambitious in scope, *Bloodlands* provides an engrossing, if highly disturbing, account of some of the greatest evils of the twentieth century.

How Enemies Become Friends: The Sources of Stable Peace, Charles A. Kupchan (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2010), 448 pp., $29.95 cloth.

The transition from enmity to halting cooperation and, eventually, to lasting friendship between states begins, according to Charles Kupchan, "amid peril." Faced with multiple strategic threats and a scarcity of the resources necessary to counter them, a state gambles on a unilateral offer of an outstretched hand to an adversary. If the offer is rebuffed, the parties return to geopolitical rivalry, which is, after all, the default setting of international relations. If, on the other hand, the offer is read as a genuine invitation to a handshake (rather than, say, a duplicitous scheme for delivering a sucker punch), the two countries can begin to move down the delicate path toward stable peace—the defining characteristic of which is the banishment of armed conflict from the tool kit of legitimate statecraft.

Loyalists to one or another school of international relations may chafe at this ambitious and conceptually diverse work of stable peace theory-building. Kupchan—a professor of international relations at Georgetown and Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations—draws explicitly,