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Les fins du Canada : selon Macdonald, Laurier, Mackenzie King et Trudeau

Stéphane Kelly

Montréal : Boréal, 2001, 288 p.

Après avoir publié en 1997 *La petite loterie, comment la Couronne a obtenu l'appui du Canada français après 1837*, Stéphane Kelly se penche maintenant sur *Les fins du Canada, selon Macdonald, Laurier, Mackenzie King et Trudeau*. En guise d'introduction, le sociologue annonce que « quelque chose ne va plus dans notre expérience démocratique » (9); il se propose « de chercher les causes du désenchantement politique actuel dans notre propre tradition politique » (9; je souligne). Kelly prend pour acquis que ses lecteurs connaissent ce *quelque chose* qui ne va plus et qu'ils comprennent instinctivement de quoi relève le « désenchantement politique actuel ». Or, non seulement il n'explicite jamais ces notions, mais il ne reviendra pas, ne serait-ce qu'une seule fois dans le développement ou la conclusion, sur ce qui est pourtant annoncé prématurément comme le principal objectif de la recherche.

À peine énoncé, le désenchantement politique est donc relégué aux oubliettes et l'auteur annonce plutôt vouloir identifier « nos idéaux politiques » (je souligne), bref, vouloir « procéder à une enquête sur les fins du Canada » (9). Dans un prologue, Kelly définit deux visions concurrentes du devoir-être étatique canadien, soit les idéaux jeffersonien et hamiltonien (du nom de deux pères fondateurs des États-Unis). Chez nos voisins du sud, un âpre conflit a opposé les tenants de ces deux orientations politiques depuis les débats qui ont accompagné la rédaction de la Constitution (1787-1789). Selon la définition proposée par Kelly, les jeffersoniens sont partisans d'un fédéralisme fondé sur le respect du principe de la souveraineté étatique (ou de l'autonomie provinciale, au nord du 48^e parallèle), alors que les hamiltoniens sont centralisateurs et nationalistes. Sur le plan économique, et toujours suivant Kelly, les jeffersoniens préconisent une économie égalitaire s'appuyant sur les petits propriétaires fermiers, alors que les hamiltoniens sont les porteurs d'un idéal d'une économie capitaliste moderne (division du travail, industrialisation, etc.). Pour les jeffersoniens, l'État ne doit pas intervenir dans l'économie, alors que pour leurs adversaires cet interventionnisme est nécessaire à la construction d'une identité nationale. Ces deux idéaux diffèrent également au niveau de la politique étrangère. Alors que l'idéal jeffersonien est isolationniste et s'oppose à une croissance démesurée des dépenses militaires, l'idéal hamiltonien est interventionniste et militariste, voire impérialiste. Enfin, l'auteur ajoute un dernier attribut à l'idéal hamiltonien: le recours, pleinement assumé, au patronage et à la corruption. À quelques nuances près, le lecteur de *La petite loterie* reconnaîtra dans cette dichotomie le parti *Country* (jeffersonien) et le parti *Court* (hamiltonien). Selon Kelly, le conflit qui oppose ces visions politiques aux États-Unis se solde, à la fin du 19^e siècle, par la victoire des hamiltoniens.

Le livre compte quatre chapitres consacrés respectivement à chacun des quatre premiers ministres énumérés dans le titre de l'ouvrage. Lauréats du palmarès de longévité politique en tant que premiers ministres du Canada, ces hommes ont présidé aux destinées du pays pour plus de la moitié de son existence. La durée étant pour Stéphane Kelly une « finalité fondatrice de ce pays » (10), l'étude de la carrière politique de ces hommes d'État s'imposait donc – selon lui – pour cerner les idéaux politiques qui définissent le Canada. Les quatre chapitres, soit quatre biographies à la chaîne, serviront à illustrer que « la tradition politique canadienne est fortement hamiltonienne » (12), et ce, depuis les tout débuts de la Confédération. L'hypothèse que souhaite

défendre l'auteur est limpide: l'histoire du Canada depuis sa création est celle d'une continuité. Le fil conducteur, à chaque époque, est l'adhésion à l'idéal hamiltonien. Toujours selon Kelly, si le Canada est aujourd'hui menacé «c'est moins parce qu'il s'inspire du modèle américain que parce que les États-Unis sont de plus en plus hamiltoniens» (12). Kelly ne précise pas en quoi consiste la menace, sinon en suggérant au passage que, sans un idéal politique distinct, l'existence même du Canada serait en jeu. Rien selon lui, ni la géographie, ni la langue, ni la religion ne justifiait l'émergence d'un nouveau pays à côté des États-Unis. La thèse côtoie celle d'un auteur comme George Grant, pour qui le Canada était menacé de disparition parce que, conservateur par nature, le pays adhérerait maintenant aux idéaux libéraux des Américains. Pour Kelly, le constat est partiellement inversé. Si le Canada est menacé de disparition, c'est que, suite à de longs combats politiques au dix-neuvième siècle, les Américains adhèrent maintenant aux mêmes finalités que celles qui ont toujours caractérisé son voisin du nord. Bref, au niveau des idéaux politiques, les Canadiens ne s'américanisent pas, ce sont les États-Unis qui se sont progressivement «canadianisés», si bien qu'aujourd'hui «les États-Unis et le Canada sont devenus, au XX^e siècle, deux variantes de l'idéal hamiltonien» (12).

Cette thèse, qui a le mérite d'être clairement formulée, s'obscurcit en cours de démonstration. En effet, une équivoque profonde traverse le livre. La dernière phrase du prologue annonce selon moi cette ambiguïté. Kelly écrit: «dans les prochains chapitres, nous allons voir comment Macdonald, Laurier, Mackenzie King et Trudeau se sont conformés à l'idéal hamiltonien *pour dominer leurs adversaires* sur la scène politique fédérale» (20; je souligne). Alors qu'initialement l'auteur proclame son intention de discourir sur les fins du Canada (qu'il définit lui-même comme étant si fondamentales qu'elles ont une valeur ontologique et que sans elles, la survie même du pays est en jeu), son argumentation repose plutôt sur le caractère strictement utilitaire des idéaux précédemment mentionnés. Bref, la réflexion annoncée sur les idéaux définitionnels des Canadiens cède bientôt la place à un exposé sur les tactiques, manœuvres et compromis employés par les quatre premiers ministres pour assurer leur pérennité politique.

Les arguments invoqués à l'appui de la thèse sont donc constamment en dissonance par rapport à l'hypothèse avancée, bien que l'auteur ne semble pas avoir lui-même pris conscience de ce décalage analytique. À preuve, un exemple parmi d'autres: le scandale du Pacifique est pour Stéphane Kelly «un événement clé qui permet de saisir *le style hamiltonien* de Macdonald» (47; je souligne). Le recours au patronage par les hommes politiques devient ainsi subrepticement une adhésion assumée à un *style* politique (que l'auteur définit lui-même comme étant *hamiltonien*). Non seulement est-on ici à mille lieues de l'hypothèse défendue sur les fins dernières du pays, mais l'épisode permet plutôt de contredire les prétentions de l'auteur. En effet, que la chose ait provoqué un «scandale» incite plutôt à conclure que la population canadienne n'appréciait guère le recours à de telles pratiques. On pourrait évoquer aussi un autre exemple, celui où Kelly relate un épisode célèbre de la crise d'octobre 1970. Il écrit: «Jusqu'où était-il prêt à aller, lui demanda un journaliste. Trudeau répondit par *l'argument hamiltonien* [. . .] 'well, just watch me' » (210; je souligne). Malheureusement, le saupoudrage de l'adjectif qualificatif «hamiltonien» sert fréquemment d'ersatz à une démonstration soutenue. On se rend vite compte que la tentative d'illustration de l'hypothèse (c'est-à-dire que le Canada est un pays dont l'horizon politique est hamiltonien depuis son origine) repose essentiellement sur deux preuves principales: les quatre premiers ministres ont tous, bon an mal an, accentué la centralisa-

tion politique et économique du pays, et ils ont tous eu recours à une forme ou à une autre de corruption ou de patronage. De là à conclure que tout cela correspond aux fins visées par les Canadiens est un pas que je ne saurais franchir.

À la fin du livre, on ignore toujours en quoi consistent « nos » idéaux politiques. Les exemples historiques invoqués à l'appui de l'hypothèse, loin d'étayer les prétentions de l'auteur, indiquent plutôt que la pérennité politique au Canada (qui est le critère retenu par l'auteur pour justifier son principal choix méthodologique) n'a été possible, dans la majorité des cas, que par le renoncement partiel ou total aux idéaux politiques des principaux intéressés, ainsi que par les nombreux compromis et alliances (souvent contre nature) que provoque la dualité linguistico-religieuse du pays. L'auteur semble s'être lui-même rendu compte des limites de son analyse. Après un bref résumé de trois pages, sa conclusion bifurque rapidement sur d'autres conditions nécessaires à la réussite politique au Canada, que l'auteur a découvertes lors de ses recherches; il note ainsi que chaque premier ministre avait un « lien écossais », était « homme de loi », avait obtenu « l'appui d'un bloc canadien-français » et, enfin, tentait de se retrouver au centre de l'échiquier politique afin de plaire à la majorité de l'électorat. Ces deux dernières conditions nous semblent beaucoup plus pertinentes pour comprendre la pérennité politique de ces élus.

J'ajoute que l'auteur attribue une importance, disons démesurée, à certains événements de la vie politique canadienne. Par exemple, traitant de l'élection québécoise de 1939, il écrit : « Mackenzie King était conscient des répercussions dramatiques d'une victoire de Duplessis sur la position canadienne à l'échelle internationale. Une défaite des libéraux *galvaniserait les forces de l'Axe et déprimerait les Alliés* » (157; je souligne). Il est pour le moins audacieux d'affirmer aujourd'hui que ce résultat aurait eu de pareilles conséquences, même s'il est vrai que la propagande militariste et antiduplessiste de l'époque s'employait à répandre cette idée.

Cela étant, et bien qu'on puisse également reprocher à l'auteur d'avoir omis quelques épisodes importants de l'histoire du Canada (pourtant pertinents à l'illustration de son hypothèse, comme la Nouvelle politique énergétique à l'ère Trudeau), le lecteur profitera, outre quelques erreurs factuelles, de quatre biographies relativement complètes.

En somme, le livre est décevant. L'ambition de l'auteur de discourir sur les *Fins du Canada* en partant du point de vue des quatre premiers ministres se révèle moins féconde que ce qui est annoncé.

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Political Parties, Representation, and Electoral Democracy in Canada

William Cross, ed.

Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. v, 249

William Cross is making a substantial contribution to our understanding of Canadian political parties. The filament of political participation ties this edited collection together. The 14 chapters by 18 contributors are divided into two parts, "Political Parties" and "Representation." Seven of the contributors are from Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, where Cross labours, and two of the chapters deal with that province. There is also a chapter by Brian Tanguay on the 1999 Ontario election. It demonstrates how long-established interests—commercial, industrial, labour—are being complemented by new formations such as the centre-left grass-roots coalition of forces that mobi-

lized, with no apparent effect, to oust the governing Conservatives. There is relatively little on Quebec, although the book provides some intriguing survey findings. One, in the chapter by the principal investigators of the 1997 Canadian Election Study, is that 60 per cent of Quebecers opined that “all federal parties are basically the same,” while only 40 per cent of other Canadians agreed (77). This is counterintuitive in light of the Bloc Québécois engaging in a different and separate discourse than its federalist counterparts within and without Quebec. Perhaps Québécois do not think of the BQ as a “federal party.”

Some leading students of Canadian politics are represented in this collection and there is a mix of provincial, regional and federal-level studies. The chapter serving as an anchor, not specifically written for this volume, is taken from Cross’s co-authored monograph with R. Kenneth Carty and Lisa Young, *Rebuilding Canadian Party Politics* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2000). It insightfully observes that right-wing parties—the Reform/Alliance and now the Conservatives—have embraced individual, rather than group, participation in party affairs. This contrasts with the representational quotas and consciousness of the Liberals and the New Democratic party. Two chapters deal with leadership selection, two others with populism—one Maritime, the other western. One chapter connects the process of leadership choice with the populist theme. The definition of populism (87–88) by Roger Gibbins and Jennifer Stewart seems inapplicable to New Brunswick although Chedly Belkhodja strives to connect them. That province’s Loyalty, elitism and linguistic/ethnic divide militate against the celebration of abstract individual equality common in the West’s multicultural and new society setting. The flirtation with the Confederation of Regions party proved to be not so much a radical departure as it was a temporary refuge for life-long anglophone Conservatives whose party had been discredited. They are now back in office while COR has faded. There is good material on the different dynamics at work when direct voting mechanisms, rather than now old-fashioned delegate conventions, are used to anoint leaders. Three of the seven chapters in the “Representation” section are devoted to women. Meanwhile, one struggles to find references to Aboriginals anywhere in the book. More on them might have been instructive. In the two jurisdictions where Aboriginals constitute a majority, Nunavut and the North West Territories, they have constructively demonstrated contrary to conventional wisdom that representation, electoral democracy and the Westminster model can move forward without parties. The chapter with the strongest institutional grounding is John Courtney’s lucid piece on the electoral system and voter registration regimes. Jennifer Smith and Herman Bakvis examine the federal election-expenses regime, the clashing values that inform the rationale for and assaults on it, as well as some of the related jurisprudence.

The book’s operative premise is that party politics are increasingly in disrepute because of representational, democratic deficits. One wonders whether parties ever did bask in a golden age of public involvement, trust and efficacy. Organizationally and in other ways, parties are less exclusive and arguably more open to outsiders today than they have ever been. Voter turnout has trended down markedly of late (only 61 per cent in 2000), but so have response rates to surveys, the same surveys that purport to measure faith in party politics. We know little of this large cohort of survey non-respondents, a group larger than non-voters. Paradoxically, citizens want more “democratization” of politics yet are less engaged with it through democracy’s icon, the ballot box. Cross disparages “brokerage-style politics” and contrasts it with “meaningful grassroots participation” (11), whatever that

means. That the public is wary of parties and politicians comes as no surprise. Political leaders feed such sentiments. Consider the 1996 revisions to Ontario's election legislation, trumpeted by the premier as the "Fewer Politicians Act" and eventually enacted as the *Representation Act*.

Overall, this somewhat disjointed collection contains solid individual chapters. Cross's introductory chapter extracts themes and findings in them. Strong on their own, their collective impact is centrifugal, heading in numerous directions. The most distant from the central themes, although well done, is Denis Stairs's chapter relating transnational pluralism to Canadian foreign policy. Collectively, however, the book offers neither the breadth nor depth of Hugh Thorburn and Alan Whitethorn's long-running reader, *Party Politics in Canada* (8th ed.; Toronto: Prentice-Hall, 2001).

NELSON WISEMAN *University of Toronto*

Vivre la citoyenneté. Identité, appartenance et participation

Yves Boisvert, Jacques Hamel et Marc Molgat, sous la direction de
Montréal : Liber, 2000, 188 p.

Cet ouvrage réunit les diverses communications présentées à l'Université Laval, l'Université de Sherbrooke et l'Université du Québec à Montréal lors de forums organisés dans le cadre de la Semaine sur la citoyenneté, qui s'est tenue du 8 au 12 novembre 1999. Ces forums avaient trois grands thèmes : les fondements historiques du concept de citoyenneté au Québec, la citoyenneté au Québec aujourd'hui et la question de l'appartenance politique. Dans les trois cas, la question porte sur la nature du lien social et civique. Le livre se divise en trois grandes parties : la première est consacrée aux aspects théoriques, la seconde propose des études de cas, et la dernière expose les considérations politiques et les perspectives d'avenir de la citoyenneté au Québec.

Daniel Weinstock propose l'idée d'une « citoyenneté différenciée ». Quels seraient, demande-t-il, les valeurs et les idéaux d'une telle conception de la citoyenneté ? Puisque le lien social n'est plus constitué par une seule chaîne de valeurs communes mais plusieurs, il serait peut-être préférable de passer de l'appartenance à l'État-Nation à l'appartenance aux valeurs communes que nous partageons au-delà des frontières. À ce moment-là, la citoyenneté ne serait plus un obstacle à la redistribution des richesses sur le plan international, par exemple, mais participerait à sa réalisation. Thierry Hentsch analyse, quant à lui, la dualité du concept de citoyenneté, entre réalisme politique et valeur morale. L'exercice de la citoyenneté semble voué à l'échec, mais sa valeur morale demeure incontestable. Hentsch nous convie à un voyage intellectuel et historique qui, du *Protagoras* de Platon, nous conduit du côté de chez Kant, en passant par Rousseau et Descartes, et enfin chez Freud, pour revenir à Platon. Si l'autonomie, la raison, est indépendante du rapport à l'autre, comment pouvons-nous espérer associer citoyenneté et raison ? On le devine, c'est par l'intermédiaire de la critique du sujet que Hentsch interroge la pertinence du concept de citoyenneté.

Pour Jules Duchastel, c'est sur le concept de « citoyenneté incorporée » qu'il faut maintenant se pencher pour sortir des impasses des conceptions traditionnelles de l'esprit civique. Cette métaphore exprime, nous dit l'auteur, l'analogie qu'il faut désormais établir entre la conception classique de la personne morale, habituellement attachée à l'individu, et celle des corps sociaux-économiques. L'incorporation de la citoyenneté suppose un ensemble de droits que ces nouvelles personnes morales peuvent faire valoir devant la cour mais aussi devant les divers paliers gouvernementaux. Les grandes corpora-

tions jouissent maintenant de droits civils comparables à ceux des individus. Au Québec, ce phénomène est également très présent, et il faut espérer que ce qu'on constate dans les faits ne sera jamais complètement accepté dans le droit. Jules Duchastel expose clairement cette nouvelle citoyenneté, sans jamais s'en faire l'avocat. Un rempart possible contre les dangers de ces nouvelles formes de citoyenneté réside peut-être dans le renouvellement de la solidarité civile. André Lacroix propose une conception inclusive de la citoyenneté, où la solidarité civile pourrait être pensée indépendamment du « repli identitaire ». Il défend une conception sociocritique de la nation, où une majorité d'individus partage une langue, une culture et une histoire. La nation ne se limite pas à la souveraineté de l'État, mais exprime plutôt la manière dont un peuple se représente lui-même. Cette « représentation » que la population se fait d'elle-même étant en perpétuel mouvement, ce nationalisme ne saurait être considéré comme attaché à des modèles anciens. Cette citoyenneté inclusive serait à même, nous dit André Lacroix, de répondre aux questions soulevées notamment par Daniel Weinstock, mais non pas, comme lui, par une transformation cosmopolitique de la citoyenneté, mais plutôt par une conception de la nation sociopolitique où le rôle des communautés locales est mis de l'avant.

Le texte de Jacques Hamel est un plaidoyer pour l'inclusion des jeunes dans la démocratie québécoise. Le passage à la vie adulte est aussi un passage à la citoyenneté, et il est du devoir des dirigeants de favoriser l'insertion politique des jeunes dans la société québécoise. Or, cette insertion politique ne peut qu'aller de pair avec une insertion socio-économique, laquelle exige, notamment, l'abandon des clauses « orphelins ». De même, l'auteur en appelle à la plus grande prudence dans la redistribution des richesses et la réduction des impôts prônées par certains partis politiques. La citoyenneté sous l'angle du passage à la vie adulte est également étudiée par Marc Molgat, qui montre que les décalages sociaux ont pour effet de déchirer un tissu social qui est déjà fort mal en point. Mais dans quelle mesure pouvons-nous parler de lien social lorsque les femmes n'ont pas la place qui leur revient dans nos sociétés modernes ? Yolande Cohen rappelle que les théories féministes ont contribué au débat sur la citoyenneté en dénonçant l'exclusion des femmes de la politique. Cohen fait l'historique des luttes sociales menées par les femmes au Québec, en s'intéressant particulièrement à leur rôle au sein de la Société Saint-Jean-Baptiste. Des années 1920 aux années 1940, les gains politiques réalisés par les femmes sont obtenus par l'appel à la reconnaissance des valeurs familiales. Ce sont d'abord les mères qui sont reconnues citoyennes. Puis, dans les années 70, les revendications politiques des femmes ne passeront plus par ces systèmes de valeurs mais par leur reconnaissance en tant qu'individus. Le prochain chantier social devrait être celui de la parité politique, sans laquelle, avance Yolande Cohen avec raison, on voit mal comment une société peut aspirer à une vie civique digne de ce nom, où les femmes peuvent se dire citoyennes sans compromission.

Jocelyne Lamoureux s'interroge, quant à elle, sur la présence des mouvements communautaires dans les débats sociaux. Son étude se fonde sur le rapport qu'elle a rédigé à la suite d'une recherche menée auprès de quatre organismes communautaires. Ce rapport montre d'abord que l'étude de la citoyenneté ne peut faire abstraction des obstacles sociaux qui se dressent sur le chemin de la citoyenneté. L'exclusion sociale est un obstacle réel au processus de citoyenneté, et le grand mérite du rapport de Lamoureux est d'avoir insisté sur la nécessité de contrer l'exclusion sociale par tous les moyens. Ce texte ramène l'ensemble du débat à une question fondamentale qui est celle du respect des engagements qu'une société prend au moment où elle signe

son contrat social. Par l'intermédiaire des mouvements communautaires, les « sans-voix » s'expriment enfin et il est alors permis d'espérer que ce que nous nommons l'espace public soit autre chose qu'une chimère de philosophe. Le texte de Vivian Labrie peut être lu à la suite de celui de Lamoureux. Il présente le travail d'un Collectif pour une loi sur l'élimination de la pauvreté (la proposition de loi du Collectif peut être consultée à www.pauvrete.qc.ca). Cette proposition condamne une « citoyenneté de l'argent », qui est l'obstacle à la véritable citoyenneté. L'égalité civique est une coquille vide lorsqu'il existe une aussi grande disparité économique entre les membres de la société québécoise.

Un apport important de l'étude de Carole Lévesque est de faire comprendre la transformation du sentiment d'appartenance des autochtones au Canada. La dispersion des membres de la communauté autochtone a affaibli le tissu social de la communauté. Mais la reconnaissance progressive des droits civiques a également permis un nouveau sentiment d'appartenance. Ainsi, le Québec est la seule province à reconnaître juridiquement l'existence des « nations » autochtones. De même, le Québec a reconnu un droit à l'autonomie des autochtones. Toutefois, ce droit n'implique aucune atteinte à l'intégrité du territoire québécois, ce qui est jugé inacceptable par les autochtones puisque le droit à l'autonomie semble alors purement formel. La problématique de l'identité et de la citoyenneté autochtone ne peut être posée dans le seul cadre juridique. De même, il reste beaucoup à faire dans le domaine de la discrimination à l'égard des femmes autochtones.

Denise Helly se penche sur la question de la responsabilité du citoyen. Son étude consiste moins à avancer une thèse qu'à exposer l'état de la recherche et les principaux courants de pensée sur la question. Elle décrit les problèmes liés à l'éducation civique, en insistant sur les recherches et les pratiques américaines et françaises. Elle présente ensuite les vues de droite et de gauche quant aux conditions de l'avènement d'une responsabilité civique. La question est de savoir dans quelle mesure les programmes publics visant à aider les milieux économiquement défavorisés auront un effet sur la responsabilisation des citoyens. Pour la nouvelle droite néolibérale, la citoyenneté passe par l'autonomie financière. Or, n'est pas autonome celui dont les ressources dépendent en grande partie de l'État. Une seconde alternative, proche de la première, repose sur l'idée de l'éducation aux vertus civiques (éthique du travail, vie personnelle saine, et ainsi de suite.). La gauche voit dans ces programmes d'éducation une manière de rejeter la responsabilité des échecs sociaux sur les victimes d'une société qui ne fait que très peu de choses pour les aider. La responsabilisation du citoyen devrait plutôt passer par la décentralisation du pouvoir: la « démocratie locale » permet aux citoyens de retrouver un sentiment d'appartenance qu'une situation matérielle difficile leur avait fait perdre. Enfin, une autre école de pensée propose un retour à une forme de démocratie directe, où l'engagement du citoyen passe par des organisations privées (clubs, associations, et ainsi de suite).

Claude Bariteau exprime ses vues sur ce que pourrait être la citoyenneté québécoise. Selon lui, la citoyenneté québécoise devrait être fondée sur une culture politique commune où la langue française ne serait que langue de communication et ne constituerait pas la garantie même de cette culture politique commune. La citoyenneté ne peut et ne devrait pas être définie de manière substantive, mais plutôt par la participation des citoyens: l'action commune est une construction, un projet commun, et non l'identification plus ou moins volontaire à un modèle social prédéfini. Nicole Van Schendel et Denise Helly réfléchissent également sur le sens de la citoyenneté au Québec, mais en s'appuyant essentiellement sur une étude réalisée auprès de 84

adultes, dont 12 sont d'ascendance canadienne-française et les autres sont immigrés. Les résultats de l'enquête montrent qu'il existe encore une division profonde entre ceux qui croient faire partie de la communauté politique québécoise et ceux qui s'en disent exclus. Si les immigrés se sentent souvent « avec » ou « parmi » nous, il reste encore beaucoup à faire pour que disparaissent les obstacles à leur réelle intégration.

Jacques Beauchemin appelle à une éducation civique organisée sur le modèle des sciences sociales, où la société englobe les pratiques des individus. Beauchemin pense que les sciences sociales seraient les plus aptes à fournir les instruments nécessaires à la formation civique des jeunes du secondaire. Une telle éducation, dit-il, devrait également insister sur la différence entre économie et politique, afin de ne pas laisser les diktats de la première déterminer nos choix politiques. Dans le même esprit, Jean-Herman Guay espère de profonds changements dans les pratiques de la citoyenneté au Québec, trop souvent limitées à l'exercice du vote.

L'ensemble des textes réunis ici ne présente pas de solutions définitives aux problèmes de la citoyenneté, de l'appartenance et de la participation. Mais ce collectif a le mérite de nous offrir un panorama des débats sur ces questions dans des contributions bien documentées. On regrettera, encore une fois, l'absence d'index.

CHRISTIAN NADEAU *Université de Montréal*

Canadian Nuclear Energy Policy: Changing Ideas, Institutions, and Interests

G. Bruce Doern, Arslan Dorman and Robert W. Morrison, eds.
Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001, pp. x, 220

Governments have always enacted public policy that has distributive implications for both existing and future generations. Given the nature of its benefits, costs, risks and uncertainties, nuclear energy exemplifies the relationship between policy and international and intergenerational distribution. In nuclear energy policy, this relationship is particularly problematic because the stakes are high in what is being distributed. Indeed, it may be that maintaining the current standard of living in Canada and the United States will depend on the "nuclear energy option." However, the capital costs as well as the social and environmental risks are potentially enormous. It is thus not surprising that the institutional sites and processes of the policy areas of nuclear energy and nuclear fuel waste are characterized by competing ideas about and interests in just distribution.

G. Bruce Doern, Arslan Dorman and Robert W. Morrison capture some of the interplay of ideas, interests, institutions and policy in what they call "a reasonably comprehensive view" of the recent evolution of Canadian nuclear energy policy. Drawing expertise from a range of disciplines including physics, engineering, politics and economics, and from the realms of both academia and the civil service, their volume provides insight into the forces propelling changes in this policy area and the challenges confronting the nuclear energy industry.

The collection examines the following five key nuclear policy questions: (1) who will pay for research and development, and long-term waste management; (2) what regulatory models will govern nuclear energy; (3) what are Canada's prospects for marketing reactors and uranium; (4) will a renewed federal-Ontario nuclear partnership be reconstructed; and (5) can new forms of trust and transparency be built between the Canadian public and the insti-

tutions that govern nuclear energy? Responses to these questions shed light on the future of nuclear energy in Canada; moreover, they provide policy advice to promote the health of the Canadian nuclear industry in ever-evolving local and global energy markets.

The strength of this volume lies in its setting of the institutional stage for nuclear energy and high-level nuclear waste policies in Canada. Chapters by Doern et al. and by Morrison on Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) and by David Jackson and John de la Mothe on the Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB), now the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, offer concise overviews of these federal entities. Monographs on AECL and AECB exist (Robert Bothwell [Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988]; Gordon Sims [Ottawa: Government of Canada, 1981]), but they are dense and dated. Rick Jennings and Russell Chute survey current electricity policy, the structure of the nuclear industry and the impact of a competitive energy market in Ontario, Canada's largest nuclear province. Donald Dewees provides a detailed review of Ontario's restructured energy market, focusing on the wholesale market. The chapter by Doern describes and assesses the provincial regulatory agency, the Ontario Energy Board, in light of the province's competitive energy regime. Peter Brown and Carmel Létourneau touch upon directions in Canadian nuclear fuel waste policy. Although providing no special insight into the federal policy on nuclear fuel waste management, their contribution summarizes the government's position. Steve Thomas' chapter offers a useful comparative perspective, drawing from an historical-institutional analysis of nuclear power and deregulation in the United Kingdom, to highlight the challenges facing the nuclear industry in a competitive energy market.

The weakness of this volume is that it does not fully explore the complex relationships among ideas, interests and institutions that frame negotiations concerning the distributive impacts of nuclear energy and nuclear waste policies. Indeed, the volume lacks a sustained discussion of the ideas and interests held by often vociferously competing stakeholders. This is a serious omission because members in this policy community represent often opposed views on fundamental issues. For example, individuals representing the federal government, the provincial governments, the nuclear industry and environmental NGOs express what are frequently incommensurable perspectives on the safety and acceptability of nuclear energy and waste management options. These perspectives translate into incommensurable views on how the benefits and burdens of nuclear energy ought to be distributed.

Nuclear energy and nuclear fuel waste policies will have distributed consequences for so many people, both existing and future. Because of the nature of these policies, they give rise to a wide set of moral stakeholders, that is, those who should be involved in some way in the formulation and implementation of policy because their interests will be affected by the policy's output. Yet, nuclear energy and waste policies in Canada tend to be based on consultations with a set of selected stakeholders, and thus tend to reflect their ideas about and interests in distribution. *Canadian Nuclear Energy Policy* leaves unaddressed numerous questions relating to how our institutions and political processes facilitate the expression in policy of certain ideas and interests, but not others. The policy community around nuclear energy and its waste, and the ideas and interests its members represent are more complex and more agonistic than this volume suggests.

GENEVIEVE FUJI JOHNSON *University of Toronto*

Le pari de la démesure. L'intransigeance canadienne face au Québec

Michel Seymour

Montréal : L'Hexagone, 2001, 309 p.

Michel Seymour nous présente un « essai de philosophie appliquée » portant sur les tumultueux rapports Québec-Canada. Sans cacher le caractère partisan de sa démarche intellectuelle, il cherche néanmoins à jeter un regard lucide, du point de vue du philosophe politique, sur les questions de l'identité et sur le caractère multinational à la fois du Canada et du Québec. Il se penche aussi sur des questions plus pointues qui ont contribué à redéfinir significativement la place du Québec au sein du Canada et sur les possibilités d'accommodement à long terme qu'elles favorisent ou contribuent à bloquer, à savoir l'avis de la Cour suprême sur la sécession du Québec et la loi sur la « clarté » qui fut adoptée par la suite par le gouvernement fédéral. Il aborde également les implications philosophiques et politiques du courant partitionniste. Son essai se termine par des réflexions de nature prescriptive avec un chapitre qui s'intitule simplement « Que faut-il faire maintenant? ».

On le comprendra, l'essai que vient de publier Seymour se veut polémique. Comme philosophe, il place la problématique de ce qui est « juste » au cœur de sa réflexion. Son approche ne se limite pas à l'analyse des courants politiques, de leurs origines, des intérêts en jeu, des positions tenues par les acteurs, des forces qui les alimentent et des idées qui dominent le débat public. Son intention est moins de peindre et d'expliquer la réalité canado-québécoise dans toute sa complexité que de chercher à redéfinir les termes du débat. Il se situe autant dans le monde de ce qui « est » que dans celui de ce qui « devrait être ». Ces deux réalités se chevauchent et s'entrecroisent, mais les dimensions prescriptive et programmatique prennent souvent le dessus. Seymour adopte clairement une conception civique de l'identité québécoise et s'oppose à une conception culturelle de la nation, qu'il juge dépassée, ce qui ne signifie pas qu'elle n'est pas présente dans le discours politique et dans une certaine représentation que se font bon nombre de Québécois de la nation. La dimension culturelle n'est toutefois pas évacuée de la réflexion, comme le font les tenants d'une citoyenneté constitutionnelle, puisqu'il existe une majorité nationale unique de francophones québécois.

L'approche de Seymour n'est malheureusement pas exempte d'ambiguïtés. Par exemple, en lisant que « les membres de la nation québécoise sont alors les citoyens du Québec qui se représentent comme Québécois » (29), on ne peut que se demander comment il faut tenir compte de tous ceux qui ne se « représentent » pas comme tels. S'excluent-ils eux-mêmes de la nation, qui n'est plus une réalité objective mais la somme des subjectivités déterminées par les représentations individuelles et collectives? L'auteur résout ce dilemme en soutenant que les membres de la minorité nationale peuvent être inclus en dépit de la représentation qu'ils se font d'eux-mêmes. Cette inclusion se réalise du seul fait qu'ils veulent être traités comme Québécois à part entière (41). Le subjectif, à savoir la représentation liée à l'appartenance, se confond donc avec certains critères objectifs comme celui de se comporter en citoyen à part entière. Si ces individus refusent de se concevoir comme Québécois, ils font preuve de préjugés, d'irrationalité et de manque d'ouverture. L'identité civique commune s'explique par le fait que la langue, la culture et l'histoire de la majorité nationale sont communes à l'ensemble des Québécois et que tous ont accès aux institutions communes de langue française. Pour se démarquer du républicanisme jacobin, l'auteur en appelle à la reconnaissance de la minorité nationale, des minorités issues de l'immigration ou des nations minoritaires qui habitent sur le territoire québécois. Même si les gouverne-

ments québécois de toutes allégeances politiques semblent souscrire à cette approche, il est loin d'être certain qu'il en va de même pour l'ensemble des Québécois, comme en font foi les multiples tensions avec la minorité anglophone et les minorités racisées. Certaines affirmations, comme celle qui soutient que «la majorité des Québécois ne se conçoit pas comme formant une nation ethnoculturelle» (38), auraient mérité d'être soutenues par des données empiriques tirées de sondages d'opinion.

L'ouvrage discute aussi les différentes conceptions de la nation présentes dans la littérature et démontre qu'elles comptent des éléments de subjectivité, que le concept est polysémique, que les chercheurs qui se sont arrêtés sur cette question sont marqués par leurs propres expériences et que la représentation identitaire varie d'une communauté à l'autre. Se dégage de cette revue de la littérature le constat que « nous devons accepter un principe fondamental de tolérance à l'égard des diverses représentations identitaires entretenues par différentes populations» (85), principe qui doit déboucher sur une politique de la reconnaissance. C'est sur cette base que la reconnaissance des composantes nationales rend viable l'existence d'un État multinational et que cette existence doit se traduire par des arrangements politico-juridiques particuliers. À l'échelle du Canada, le principe de tolérance implique que la conception sociopolitique de la nation québécoise soit acceptée par ceux qui adhèrent à une conception civique de la nation canadienne. Ceci suppose un changement de mentalité, mais la politique de la tolérance et de la reconnaissance doit aussi se traduire dans le cadre institutionnel canadien. Pour ce faire, pas moins d'une dizaine de changements majeurs sont nécessaires, au point qu'il est légitime de se demander si les conditions seront jamais réunies pour qu'une telle métamorphose de la culture politique canadienne se matérialise : reconnaissance officielle de l'existence du peuple québécois (pourquoi le peuple et non la nation?) dans la constitution; rejet du principe de l'égalité des provinces pour le Québec; acceptation du principe de l'asymétrie; admission de la responsabilité du gouvernement du Québec en ce qui a trait à la protection et la promotion de la langue française; responsabilité exclusive de l'État québécois en matière de culture, de communications, d'immigration, d'assurance-chômage et de formation de la main-d'œuvre; limitation du pouvoir fédéral de dépenser; obtention d'un droit de veto sur toute modification constitutionnelle; participation au processus de nomination des juges de la Cour suprême; présence accrue de l'État québécois sur la scène internationale. Compte-tenu des besoins exprimés par plusieurs provinces canadiennes, les réformes ne doivent pas s'arrêter en si bon chemin. Il faudrait, en plus, réduire les pouvoirs du Premier ministre canadien, changer le mode de financement des partis politiques et modifier le système électoral. Même si l'auteur reconnaît l'énormité de la tâche et admet que la réalisation de ce projet de réformes ne peut se faire que par étapes, il admet volontiers que le Canada tend plutôt à rejeter son caractère multinational et s'est reconstitué sur la base des principes de l'égalité des provinces et d'une conception territoriale du fédéralisme. C'est cette entreprise de *nation-building* qui est examinée dans les chapitres suivants du livre.

Seymour s'attarde longuement à analyser l'avis de la Cour suprême sur la sécession et la loi sur la clarté adoptée par le gouvernement fédéral. Sur le premier, il montre que l'avis s'accorde avec la démarche souverainiste, mais souligne aussi plusieurs points de désaccord, notamment sur le fait que l'avis évite de se prononcer sur l'existence du peuple québécois alors que la Cour n'hésite pas à parler de la nation canadienne. Il questionne aussi le fait que le principe d'une double majorité n'ait pas été invoqué lorsque la Constitution canadienne fut rapatriée sans le consentement du Québec et critique le fait

que le plus haut tribunal du pays s'enferme dans une rhétorique légaliste alors que le processus qui a abouti aux événements de 1982 souffre d'un manque de légitimité pour l'une des deux majorités. En somme, l'interprétation de la Cour suprême ne fait que renforcer l'ordre constitutionnel canadien, ce qui n'est guère surprenant, dois-je ajouter. Quant à la loi sur la « clarté » (C20), le verdict est sans appel. Après avoir montré de façon très éloquente que C20 ne respecte ni l'esprit, ni la lettre de l'avis, Michel Seymour rappelle que la législation fédérale a créé, à plusieurs égards, des obstacles qui ne figurent pas dans l'avis de la Cour et a débouché sur une attitude d'intransigeance à l'endroit du projet sécessionniste québécois.

Le pari de la démesure (avec ce qui précède, on peut facilement comprendre qui fait preuve d'un tel excès) se termine par des considérations d'ordre stratégique. L'auteur critique les propositions d'action prônées par Jean-François Lisée, ancien conseiller politique des premiers ministres Jacques Parizeau et Lucien Bouchard, dans un ouvrage publié en 1999. Il passe en revue les propos d'Alain Dubuc, ancien éditorialiste au journal *La Presse*, qui avait publié une série d'articles reprenant le discours affirmationniste en vogue chez les Libéraux provinciaux, qu'il qualifie de fuite en avant. Il propose que le gouvernement du Parti québécois adopte des politiques plus progressistes, notamment au chapitre de la mondialisation. Seymour termine son ouvrage en rappelant une ligne de force de sa réflexion, à savoir que la souveraineté partenariale est une stratégie qui mérite d'être plus largement débattue pour en démontrer non seulement la justesse au plan de la stratégie, mais aussi au chapitre des principes philosophiques qui l'alimentent.

Écrire un essai tient toujours du pari, celui de la pertinence et de la justesse du propos. Celui que nous propose Michel Seymour mérite que nous nous y arrêtions à plus d'un égard : pour sa réflexion sur les notions d'identité et de nation, même si parfois le propos prend la forme d'une ènième justification du caractère civique du nationalisme québécois contre les accusations d'ethnicisme; pour la prise en compte des questions philosophiques que soulèvent les tensions entre le Québec et le Canada; pour son analyse approfondie des implications de l'avis de la Cour suprême et de la loi C20 sur lesquels trop peu de choses ont été écrites à ce jour.

FRANÇOIS ROCHER *Carleton University*

Why Canadian Unity Matters and Why Americans Care: Democratic Pluralism at Risk

Charles F. Doran

Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001, pp. xv, 300

Charles Doran, a political scientist at Johns Hopkins University, apparently wrote this attack on the sovereignty movement in Quebec because he views the growing strength of “divisive nationalism” in many parts of the world as a threat to liberal democracy. Liberal democracy, he tells us, is based on “democratic pluralism,” but states embodying this principle are threatened by “a resurgence of cultural consciousness and a deepening of solidarity at the communal level” (ix). Furthermore, “the undoing of modern liberal democracy is the proclamation, increasingly heard, that a single ‘nation’ *must* or *should* underlie the polity, and that the citizens of the polity *must* or *should* assimilate towards a single language and a single culture” (xi). The struggle to maintain Canadian unity matters to Americans, according to Doran, because its failure would cast doubt on the viability of liberal democratic pluralism throughout the world.

This basic theme of the book, succinctly expressed in the preface, is presented at greater length in the first and last chapters, which are primarily theoretical. The six intervening chapters (37-224) deal specifically with the case of Quebec and Canada. Chapter 2 suggests some additional reasons why Americans disapprove of the Quebec sovereignty movement: they are haunted by memories of their own civil war, and they worry about the impact of an independent Quebec on North American trade and defence. Chapter 3 tries to explain Quebec nationalism, which Doran attributes mainly to resentment, fear and the loss of religious faith during the Quiet Revolution. (Confidence in Quebec's ability to govern itself is mentioned briefly but he does not seem to consider it particularly important.) Chapter 4 ponders whether the rest of Canada could form a viable state without Quebec, but reaches no clear conclusion. Chapter 5 considers external influences on Quebec nationalism, and concludes that it is mainly caused by local circumstances rather than by tendencies inherent in the present state of international relations. Chapter 6 argues, in a rather unconvincing manner, that Quebec would suffer economically from independence. Conveniently for Canadian federalists, Doran identifies a population of twenty-five million as the "integration threshold" where economies of scale become significant (185)! Chapter seven examines the process by which a secession might take place, the ways in which Canada might try to prevent it through constitutional change (he sees more autonomy for all the provinces as the most likely outcome, but would prefer more emphasis on intrastate federalism) and what the United States should do about it. He concludes that the US should stay out of the Canadian unity debate, but should make its preference for a united Canada clear to the Québécois—a rather subtle distinction. If Canada "unravels" after secession it should offer "regional affiliation" (but not formal annexation) to the "fragments" (211). They would have control over their own "domestic policy," whatever that means, but complete economic integration with the United States, which would also assume responsibility for their security.

The book is generally free of factual errors, apart from a bizarre statement that the American Civil War ended "a few feet from where the initial shots were fired" (44), a reference to Brian Mulroney as a francophone (103), and a paragraph implying that Quebec accepted the Social Union Framework Agreement (217).

Doran's critique of Quebec nationalism, and his explanation for its existence, are almost identical with those presented in the early polemical writings of Pierre Elliott Trudeau, before Trudeau became a federal politician. Like the early Trudeau, he perceives the nation-state, in the strict sense of the term, as inherently threatening to liberalism and pluralism. However, he somewhat confuses the issue by using the term "nation-state" to refer to entities like Canada or the United States which, according to him, embody the contrary principle of "democratic pluralism."

Doran's "democratic pluralism" is itself not lacking in ambiguity. Recognizing the cultural identity of ethnic groups within the state is apparently good, up to a point, but not if the groups begin to take it seriously and to recognize its political implications. Thus he tells us that "multiculturalism" as defined by the Canadian state is a good thing, but "multiculturalism" as allegedly defined by people in the United States has become an "ideology" and is a bad thing (7). Similarly, Doran accepts the inclusiveness of both Canadian and American nationalism at face value, but is deeply sceptical when a similar inclusiveness is proclaimed, and to a large degree practised, by the Parti Québécois. Democratic pluralism, like beauty, seems to be in the eye of the beholder.

Edward Gibbon's *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* is often interpreted as a warning about the future of the British Empire, and John Dryden satirized the English ruling class in *Absalom and Achitophel*, which is nominally about Israel in the reign of King David. Similarly one suspects that Charles Doran's book about Canada is really a book about the United States. With Afro-Americans no closer to assimilation than ever, with communalism rearing its head in Puerto Rico and even Hawaii, and with Mexican immigrants gradually reclaiming the territory that Mexico lost in 1848, his fears may have some foundation. But readers seeking an introduction to the national question in Quebec should look elsewhere than to this book.

GARTH STEVENSON *Brock University*

Canadian Federalism: Performance, Effectiveness, and Legitimacy

Herman Bakvis and Grace Skogstad, eds.

Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. viii, 336

Dissatisfied with the constitutional politics focus of available textbooks on Canadian federalism and intergovernmental relations, Herman Bakvis and Grace Skogstad decided to assemble "a collection that could draw our students' attention to the equally important, if often less heralded, developments underway in our federation over the past decade" (vii). A textbook focused on recent developments in the policies, processes and institutions of Canadian federalism is precisely what this volume delivers. Each chapter contains useful links to relevant websites; many also include a glossary of terms. The contributors—almost all established Canadian political scientists—met at a conference in May 2000 and Bakvis and Skogstad compiled their essays into seventeen chapters divided into three sections.

The first section of the book considers the institutions and processes of Canadian federalism. Bakvis and Skogstad's opening chapter is a condensed version of the book as a whole: the sections on performance, effectiveness and legitimacy correspond to the book's threefold division. The editors conclude their chapter by sketching three scenarios for the development of Canadian federalism: incremental change, greater devolution, or major constitutional change. In light of recent informal and non-constitutional intergovernmental bargains, Gerald Baier promotes increased judicial review in order to encourage accountability, protect weaker provinces, and generally safeguard the constitutionally guaranteed division of powers. Along related lines, Jennifer Smith contends that recent informal constitutional developments have been detrimentally anti-federal because the provinces do not enjoy exclusive jurisdiction over social matters and because a hierarchy of provinces has emerged. After explicating the history of fiscal federalism, Douglas M. Brown raises similar themes in describing the recent move to decentralization and a focus on efficiency over equity as provinces become ever more fiscally autonomous.

Antonia Maioni opens the second part of the book, devoted to the social and economic union, with a look at health care, crediting federalism with helping to build a coherent health care model across the provinces. Next, Linda A. White questions federalism's capacity to achieve desirable social policy outcomes, concluding that the fiscal and ideological factors that delayed the development of a national child care programme in the past are now a lesser constraint to successful child-care policy development than federalism. Mark S. Winfield describes the federal government's weakening authority to set national environmental policy at the same time as domestic

pressures and international obligations point in the opposite direction. The Agreement on Internal Trade exemplified the trade-offs between the requirements of economic union and federalism, argues Mark R. MacDonald, and internal trade policy exhibits both competition and co-operation. Investigating international trade policy, Skogstad contends that latent intergovernmental tensions are managed by the mechanisms of executive federalism, mitigating a potentially competitive dynamic. In the related area of financial services, William D. Coleman reveals an increasing federal regulatory role and appeals for a clarification of policy responsibilities. Examining Ottawa's bilateral negotiations with the provinces in 1996 and 1997 to turn over responsibility and funding for labour market development policy, Bakvis analyzes the variations in outcomes: devolution, co-management, and (in the case of Ontario) failure to reach agreement. Frances Abele and Michael J. Prince exhort scholars not to ignore recent changes in Canada-Aboriginal relations, arguing that Aboriginal self-government and constitutionally entrenched Aboriginal and treaty rights may deeply transform Canadian federalism and intergovernmental relations. Finally, Maureen Covell draws on European examples to explore the relationship between federalism and minority-language policies and sketch some implications for Canada.

The third part of the book considers reform and legitimacy. Examining municipal governments, Andrew Sancton concludes that Canadian federalism seldom works in the best interests of Canadian cities and that provincial governments make the key decisions concerning urban areas. Focusing on the Social Union Framework Agreement, Richard Simeon and David Cameron query the relationship between intergovernmental relations and democracy, concluding that multi-level governance poses immense challenges to democratic participation and accountability. Along similar lines, A. Brian Tanguay argues that Canada's federal party system fails to ensure democratic accountability, feeds voter alienation and disengagement, and bolsters executive federalism. Since parties have proven unable to ease the democratic deficit and integrate the country, Tanguay proposes proportional representation and a restructured Senate. Finally, Alain-G. Gagnon and Can Erk promote constitutional ambiguity to bridge what they describe as the two incompatible views of the Canadian federation that result from different notions of political community and legitimacy in English Canada and Quebec; since neither subsidiarity nor consociational democracy can resolve this permanent disagreement, Canadians should leave vague the precise terms of the federal arrangement.

A common complaint levelled at edited works is that chapters are too concentrated on their disparate subjects to share a common focus. This book is not immune to such criticism, although the editors have laboured to make the contributions fit under the tripartite division of institutional performance, policy effectiveness and democratic legitimacy. As the brief descriptions above emphasize, some chapters describe increased or unchanged federal power while others point to a growing role for provinces or other actors, leading to divergent conclusions about the direction of Canadian federalism. Surprisingly, there is little reference to the operation of federalism outside Canada; more examination of similarities and differences with concurrent developments in comparable federal systems might have strengthened the book. Furthermore, there is not much attention to developments in theoretical approaches to federalism as opposed to empirical changes. Of course, at 17 chapters, the book is already fairly comprehensive. The volume's main strength is also its chief limitation: the policy focus of the book may disappoint some readers. A final minor quibble is that the index is not as complete

as it might be. Instructors may choose to assign select chapters, but the entire tome is perhaps too specialized for survey courses on Canadian politics. Nevertheless, Bakvis and Skogstad have superbly achieved their goal of assembling a collection of essays that examine the institutions, processes and recent policy outcomes of Canadian federalism as a whole. This volume is an appropriate textbook for graduate or advanced courses on federalism and intergovernmental relations in Canada.

WILLEM MAAS *Yale University*

Inventing North America: Canada, Mexico and the United States

Guy Poitras

Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2001, pp. v, 205

Guy Poitras asks: “Does North America really exist?” (35). The answer he provides is “at most a tentative yes” (36), though he suggests later on the same page that “at some point North Americans must begin to think and act as if they are more than neighbors living behind their own fences—they must do things with one another that they do not do with others.”

What is never explicated is how far we are along the road to “inventing North America” or how we will know when it has been invented. Nor are we told what kinds of things North Americans might do together. In other words, Poitras does not provide his own vision of North America nor a path by which it might be attained. Moreover, he does not explain why participation in a preferential trading arrangement should necessarily generate a common identity among the signatories. Is there the implicit expectation that North America should follow the example of the European Union? At the end of the book Poitras suggests some uncertainty about the benefits of a new North America (176).

The title of book is intriguing, leading the reader to wish for an explanation of its choice. Is it intended to remind readers of a similar one used in the discussion of a different region—*Inventing Eastern Europe* by Larry Wolff (Stanford: Stanford University Press 1994)? If so, the concept of “inventing” in the North American context could be more complex than Poitras suggests. Wolff argues that the construction of Eastern Europe was done by those in Western Europe for their own purposes—to contrast their post-Enlightenment economic, political and cultural attainments with the more limited ones to the east. Eastern Europe was a construct for comparison, not a region from which there was an expectation of collective identity, let alone action. In some respects it may be others who “invent” North America, to the extent that Europeans and others often see little to distinguish the two northern members of North America, a perspective with which most Canadians take umbrage.

Poitras’ book is one of a small number that address the next steps in the evolution of North America, presumably through the North American Free Trade Agreement. What is frustrating is that when creative thinking on the subject is badly needed, with the exception of the last chapter, this book restates old ground. Much of what the book considers is familiar—the changing global political and economic environment, the specific histories, politics and economies of Canada, the United States and Mexico, the move in all three countries to an interest in and receptivity to free trade, some of the complexities of NAFTA, the impact of NAFTA on the signatories, the tension between regionalism in North America and regionalism in the hemisphere, and North America between east and west. The author includes far too many topics in a short book, with the result that much of the analysis is superficial

and some of it is very dated. Moreover, the author does not indicate which of the subjects he considers is more critical to the invention of North America. One would think that what is happening in and between the three countries would be far more significant to the outcome of the project than, for example, relations between North America and Europe or Asia. Given the availability of data, it is remarkable that there is so little data in the book. Moreover, Poitras does not consider the behaviour of multinational corporations, surely among the critical actors in the shaping of North America and among those advocating for measures that will deepen integration at least between Canada and the US. Nor does he address some of the current issues on the agenda—management of the borders (an issue long before the events of September 11, 2001), whether deepening of NAFTA must be trilateral or whether some issues can be addressed bilaterally, the trade-offs between facilitating economic exchanges and the maintenance of sovereignty, whether Canada and the US should assist Mexico in meeting some of domestic challenges it is now facing, and so forth.

It is in his conclusion that Poitras finally addresses some issues of substance with respect to the future of North America—those of governance, the impact of regionalism on role of the state, who wins and who loses from regional integration, and civil society opposition to growing integration. Alas, these are considered all too briefly.

In sum, Poitras' book may be useful to those who know little about North America and the decisions that have led to a rapid increase in connectedness amongst its members over the 1990s. It may also force attention to whether the concept of a continental identity is useful or attractive. But it will make only a limited contribution to the unfolding debate over where North America is heading.

MAUREEN APPEL MOLOT *Carleton University*

Le grand récit des Amériques. Polyphonie des identités culturelles dans le contexte de la mondialisation

Donald Cuccioletta, Jean-François Côté et Frédéric Lesemann, sous la direction de
 Québec: Les Presses de l'IQRC, 2001, 192 p.

Ce livre regroupe des communications qui ont été présentées lors d'un colloque organisé par le Groupe interdisciplinaire de recherche sur les Amériques (GIRA). L'objectif de ce colloque était de discuter des répercussions culturelles de l'intégration économique des Amériques qui s'est accélérée avec la signature des accords de libre-échange. Les participants étaient invités à discuter de la transformation des identités culturelles dans le contexte de la continentalisation en se concentrant sur les thèmes de la transculturalité, de l'américanité et de l'hybridité. Le livre propose plusieurs réflexions sur ces questions, qui s'appuient sur diverses disciplines rattachées aux sciences sociales et aux études littéraires. Malgré l'hétérogénéité des perspectives, la plupart des auteurs postulent l'émergence d'une nouvelle américanité qui doit être discutée à l'échelle du continent et non plus exclusivement sur la base des divisions territoriales nationales. Ces discussions doivent prendre en considération la polyphonie culturelle caractérisant les Amériques dans le contexte politique actuel que certains auteurs qualifient de post-étatsunien. C'est ainsi que plusieurs pistes d'analyse sont proposées au lecteur, qui permettraient de mieux saisir le nouveau contexte politique et culturel.

La nécessité de repenser l'identité culturelle américaine de façon à saisir

son caractère polyphonique et hybride constitue l'argument central qui est développé dans l'introduction par Jean-François Côté. S'inspirant de la théorie de Mikhaïl Baktine, l'auteur propose d'adopter un nouveau grand récit des Amériques qui passe par l'élaboration d'une nouvelle poétique historique. Cette dernière devrait refléter la polyphonie propre aux Amériques, au sein de laquelle les récits des Amériques latines et des Caraïbes auraient une résonance. Pour ce faire, l'auteur en appelle à la reconnaissance d'une autorité culturelle continentale qui serait en mesure d'imposer ce nouveau récit des Amériques et, ainsi, aller au-delà des diverses poétiques nationales.

Cette nécessité d'adopter de nouveaux discours et de modifier les institutions existantes est illustrée dans la première partie du volume. Donald Cuccioletta plaide dans son texte en faveur de la mise sur pied d'une citoyenneté continentale et transculturelle qui serait basée sur la reconnaissance mutuelle de l'américanité. Le développement de cette nouvelle citoyenneté permettrait de reconnaître les dimensions culturelles, sociales et politiques du projet d'intégration pan-américaine qui a été jusqu'ici discuté uniquement dans une perspective économique. Pour l'auteur, cette nouvelle citoyenneté se doit d'être transculturelle pour saisir les diverses identités présentes sur le continent américain et permettre la cohabitation entre les appartenances locales et l'appartenance continentale. Pour sa part, Annick Germain souligne que la diversité culturelle a toujours été partie constituante des métropoles et que, de ce fait, elles seront appelées à jouer un rôle déterminant dans le processus d'intégration continentale. Toutefois, même si les métropoles ont toujours été un espace cosmopolite, l'auteure souligne qu'elles ne deviendront pas pour autant des espaces identitaires forts comme le sont les divers États. Elle discute, à cet égard, de la ville de Montréal qui a toujours été une métropole cosmopolitaine dont les bases identitaires étaient floues et changeantes. Cette section se termine par une analyse de Isidro Morales sur la crise du nationalisme mexicain qui est liée à la remise en question des politiques nationalistes et protectionnistes de l'État mexicain, remise en cause à laquelle nous assistons depuis le début des années 1990. L'auteur insiste sur deux événements qui ont confirmé la fin du modèle d'industrialisation mis en place par le Parti révolutionnaire institutionnel (PRI): la signature de l'ALENA et l'insurrection du mouvement Zapatiste au Chiapas. Pour l'auteur, ces événements révèlent la fragmentation de plus en plus grande du territoire mexicain, qui ouvre la voie à une restructuration de l'espace politique et économique par laquelle des acteurs transnationaux ont dorénavant un impact significatif sur la politique mexicaine.

La deuxième partie du livre porte sur les transformations identitaires dans le monde de la culture et de l'éducation. Patrick Imbert constate que nous assistons à une transformation importante des rapports interculturels dans le contexte de la mondialisation libérale et du postmodernisme. À partir d'exemples littéraires et publicitaires, il constate le passage du récit de légitimation monoculturel dualiste, dont l'État a été le principal véhicule, à l'émergence de métalangages valorisant la différence et la production de significations multiples et non-canoniques. Les deux auteurs suivants, puisant dans leurs expériences universitaires respectives, discutent de la nécessité de redéfinir l'identité étasunienne de façon à en saisir le caractère hybride et excentré et, par le fait même, de repenser l'américanité. Robert L. Schwartzwald discute des récents changements au sein des « American Studies » au moment où la base ethnique et raciale de la population des États-Unis se transforme et où la circulation intra-américaine des biens et des personnes s'accroît. Pour l'auteur, ces changements indiquent la nécessité d'adopter une démarche interdisciplinaire et hémisphérique. Il mentionne à cet égard le

récent regroupement de cinq universités dans l'ouest du Massachusetts qui ont créé ainsi un consortium (CISA). L'une des nouvelles conceptions des États-Unis que ce regroupement cherche à promouvoir est celle d'un carrefour où circulent plusieurs réseaux, dont certains intra-américains. Cette volonté de redéfinir l'identité américaine est aussi à la base de l'analyse de Deborah Altamirano. Son expérience dans l'enseignement universitaire lui a révélé que beaucoup d'étudiants ont une conception ethnocentrique et limitée des Amériques qui sont le plus souvent réduites aux États-Unis. Pour l'auteure, cela s'expliquerait par la prédominance de la notion « d'exceptionnalisme américain » qui est devenue prédominante dans la politique américaine. Elle propose à ses étudiants d'adopter une autre conception de l'identité américaine qui prenne en considération l'existence de plusieurs Amériques, découlant d'une représentation multinationale et transnationale de l'hémisphère américain.

La troisième section du livre est tout aussi hétéroclite que les précédentes. Daniel Mato analyse l'impact que peuvent avoir les acteurs globaux sur les représentations politiques adoptées par des acteurs locaux en regardant la situation des peuples autochtones de l'Amérique latine. Il montre que les discours et les représentations introduites par des acteurs globaux sont souvent reprises localement, ce qui permet à des acteurs locaux d'accroître leur poids politique. Pour étayer son argumentation, l'auteur discute du contexte de la signature de la Déclaration de Iquitos en 1990 par la Coordination des organisations indigènes du bassin amazonien (COICA). Cette déclaration proposait de reconnaître le bassin de l'Amazonie comme une zone de biodiversité pour l'humanité et ouvrait du coup la voie à la reconnaissance des territoires des peuples autochtones dans cette région. Quant à Nicholas van Schendel, son article porte sur la signification de la langue française au Québec et, plus précisément, sur sa spécificité américaine. En s'appuyant sur une étude qualitative des représentations de l'américanité auprès de Québécois originaires de pays francophones et non-francophones, il nous montre ce qu'il appelle une « francophonie en émergence » au sein de laquelle la parole française est polyphonique. Cette section se termine par une discussion de Ricardo L. Ortiz sur la reconfiguration identitaire des Amériques, dont le point de départ est son parcours personnel en tant qu'intellectuel homosexuel d'origine cubaine. En conclusion, Gérard Bouchard nous propose de construire un projet utopique à l'échelle des Amériques dans le contexte de la mondialisation, redonnant ainsi un espace de parole aux intellectuels. Il envisage deux utopies possibles, soit de redonner la voix aux dépossédés du Nouveau Monde ou de favoriser la formation d'une coalition des petites nations à l'échelle des Amériques, qui permettrait à l'État d'acquiescer une nouvelle légitimité. Même s'il privilégie cette dernière, l'auteur souligne néanmoins qu'elle requiert des changements politiques et sociaux préalables.

Les livres qui regroupent des communications présentées dans le cadre de conférences manquent généralement d'une certaine unité puisque le fil conducteur entre les divers chapitres est souvent très ténu. Ce livre n'échappe pas à cette règle. Le lecteur se retrouve devant une mosaïque de textes dont le seul lien se rapporte à quelques thèmes tels que la transculturalité, l'identité et l'américanité. Alors que certains textes sont de nature analytique, d'autres, comme ceux de Côté et de Bouchard, ont aussi une dimension normative. D'ailleurs, le choix des sections du livre se révèle plutôt arbitraire et superficiel. On se demande pourquoi tel texte se retrouve dans telle section plutôt que telle autre. L'absence d'une véritable introduction où l'on aurait développé une problématique pour l'ensemble des textes et non pas simplement soulevé des questions de recherche liées à la continentalisation aurait certai-

nement accru la cohérence du livre. Prenons l'exemple de la continentalisation qui semble pourtant être un thème central dans le livre. Alors que certains auteurs discutent de cette question à partir des enjeux politiques et économiques liés à l'intégration économique des Amériques, d'autres l'abordent en discutant des changements historiques et culturels dans la construction de l'identité américaine, sans faire référence à l'intégration économique que les accords de libre-échange ont précipitée.

Malgré ce caractère fragmenté et hétéroclite, ce livre est loin d'être inintéressant. Au contraire, plusieurs contributions sont très pertinentes et invitent à la réflexion lorsqu'on les regarde séparément. Nous pensons ici aux analyses de Cuccioletta, de Morales et de Mato sur les changements politiques et économiques engendrés par l'intégration économique et, de façon plus générale, par la mondialisation. D'autres contributions s'avèrent tout aussi pertinentes pour quiconque s'intéresse à l'identité américaine et à l'américanité. L'approche adoptée par plusieurs auteurs, qui vise à mettre en lumière leur caractère hybride et transnational, apporte un nouveau souffle et contribue ainsi à poser sur de nouvelles bases la question de la politique identitaire. Toutefois, est-ce que le fait de rassembler plusieurs textes pertinents et intéressants constitue en soi un livre? J'aurais tendance à répondre par la négative.

JEAN ROUSSEAU *Université de Montréal*

Pepper in our Eyes: The APEC Affair

W. Wesley Pue, ed.

Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2000, pp. xxii, 242

Due to its publication prior to the release of the Hughes Commission Report (August 6, 2001), the essays in *Pepper in Our Eyes* are filled with conditional statements about the events surrounding the meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC 97) in Vancouver. Yet much of the criticism and condemnation offered within the text is reflected in the Hughes Report, which blamed the RCMP for a lack of planning and also noted that the Prime Minister's Office tried to interfere with police activities in order to expedite the protection and dignity of APEC officials. What the report does not discuss are later events that are chronicled in this book—namely, the treatment of Terry Milewski, a reporter for the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, and the problems with the failed, first inquiry into the APEC affair, the Morin Commission.

In the introduction and leading essay, Wesley Pue states that the purpose of the book is to discuss “civics” (3), and to address questions “relating to constitutional principle, the role of police in democratic society, and the effects of ‘globalization’ on rights and politics in Canada” (x). Also included is a timeline of events before, during and after what have come to be seen as a few dark days in recent Canadian political history. Pue's essay in part 1 presents the myriad problems with what at first seemed a minor scuffle between police and protestors: the corrupting influence of power in general; political influence over police; free press versus undue government influence over the CBC; the increase of the prime minister's control over virtually the entire government landscape; and the problems with political linkages between commissions investigating government actions and the government itself. Most importantly, Pue's essay demonstrates just why this event, and the issues it raises, is important, a claim made all that much harder due to government attempts at obfuscation and the dwarfing of the event by the Clinton-Lewinsky scandal in the United States.

In part 2, “Constitutional Fundamentals,” the authors detail many of the legal issues at stake in the APEC affair. Andrew Irvine compares the voiding of free speech during the APEC summit to the increasingly ridiculous restrictions on speech and press in South Africa in the 1980s. While extreme, this comparison gives us an idea of the slippery slope upon which the APEC restrictions stood. Margot Young, on the other hand, addresses the base constitutional values governing Canadian government, and serves as a “primer” for people who she believes are too “relaxed” about “abuses of state power” (56). Similarly, Donald Sorochan writes of the rule of law and the need for public oversight of the police. Joel Bakan, in contrast to the other authors, looks at the protest issues themselves, and wonders if they are really the point—is acceptance of neoliberalism to blame for the “low weight” assigned to rights in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in balancing those rights against the need to protect APEC officials?

Part 3, “Policing and Accountability,” contains three essays. Philip Stenning’s essay depicts the long-lived problems of political control and police accountability. He demonstrates that even given statutory allowances for policing decisions ultimately to be made by the solicitor general, nowhere does it literally allow for the PMO to have control of policing decisions. The reader is presented with a long history of events—from the Nicholson affair of 1959 to the McDonald Inquiry and through recent events—to demonstrate the difficulties different parties have had in determining where control and accountability lie, and in many cases, what those words actually mean. It is a fine line, and the definition of control and accountability differ from case to case. Stenning ends this piece with several recommendations for making these important distinctions. Nelson Wiseman’s essay presents two “story lines” to try to explain what could have allowed the APEC mess to happen in the first place. Is it a change in political culture (the “decline of deference”) or has there really been no change other than increased media scrutiny and rights consciousness? Story line 2 supposes that Canadians still have great respect for police and the law, but that the public is more upset by government influence in affairs than in the actual excesses committed by the RCMP. Gil Puder’s essay appears at first to be an apologia for the RCMP, but instead provides a voice for the RCMP—how and why the police must respond, and why force is sometimes used. Unfortunately, no questions are really answered in his essay.

Part 4, “Public Accountability in a Free and Democratic Society,” should be further subtitled: “Personal Reflections by Involved Parties.” Of the three essays, we find two accounts of difficulties surrounding the aftermath of APEC 97—Terry Milewski’s treatment by the government and the RCMP, and Gerald Morin’s disgust with “improper” meddling from the RCMP’s commissioner. I wonder if someone else could have written about Milewski’s ordeal. At least, however, he did not refer to himself as “award-winning CBC journalist Terry Milewski” as appears several tedious times throughout the book. We get the point—he’s a good journalist done wrong. As far as Morin’s account goes, it is thorough but makes me uncomfortable, as there is no response or counter argument from Shirley Heafey, the RCMP’s public complaints commissioner, who is lambasted in his essay. The last essay in part 4 saves the section. Karen Busby’s piece systematically explores the issue of complainant funding in inquiries and similar adjudicative proceedings. When opposed by the government in inquiries such as the Hughes (and before it, the Morin) Commission, complainants are at a decided disadvantage in resources. And in extraordinary cases like the APEC affair, a leveling of the legal playing field is essential not only for fairness’ sake, but to rebuff public perception of bias.

Part 5, "Globalization and Canadian Rights," includes three essays, the best being Obiora Chinedu Okafor's discussion of IPP's (internationally protected persons), and the limits of the Canadian government's authority and obligation to protect them. Legally, the RCMP was obliged to protect IPP's such as Indonesia's President Suharto from potential criminal activities, but not potential attacks on dignity, or insults. Peaceable protest resulting in insult to an IPP is not a threat to Canadian national security, and while "special" or enhanced protection of IPP's is acceptable, "the human rights of Canadians or any other people are not required to leave town when IPP's ride in" (192).

Arnab Guha gives us a personal view of APEC in general, and the 97 meeting. He is pro-APEC, but against the excesses shown by the RCMP, and aghast at the lack of communication and openness by APEC toward the community of the University of British Columbia. By contrast, Jane Kelsey's piece, "Whither APEC" seeks to demonstrate the inherent problems with APEC—business for business' sake, theoretically occurring in a vacuum without regard for human rights, environmental impact, or domestic economic issues.

The best contributions to *Pepper in Our Eyes* are those that are systematic, analytical and more objective than the personal pieces. Okafor, Busby and Stenning's essays stand out, due to the fact that they are, to quote Okafor, "brief and focused" (192). These essays place the events of APEC 97 in a framework of history and law—whether constitutional, international or administrative. The text would have been complete without the essays of Morin, Milewski and Guha. Elements of their essays were to be found throughout the text, especially in the timeline and in Pue's leading chapter. At the very least they belong grouped together in one subsection.

Despite the limitations discussed above, Pue certainly succeeds in the general purpose of having a text about civics. This is a worthy supplementary text for undergraduate courses in introductory Canadian politics as well as constitutional law.

SHARON A. MANNA *State University of New York*

Nationalismes en perspective

Gil Delannoi et Pierre-André Taguieff, sous la direction de
Paris: Berg International Éditeurs, 2001, 412 p.

Les directeurs de ce collectif affirment d'entrée de jeu que le « XXI^e siècle pourrait bien être le siècle du conflit interminable entre les ethnonationalismes sécessionnistes et les nationalismes des grands États constitués, à visée impériale ou non » (7). Dans cette perspective, ils ont réuni des spécialistes reconnus du nationalisme et de jeunes chercheurs pour examiner et expliquer certains phénomènes nationaux d'aujourd'hui, tout en leur apportant un éclairage historique.

Selon Gil Delannoi, si le nationalisme possède un « visage sombre », il faut lui reconnaître aussi une « face claire » puisqu'il a participé à la création d'espaces démocratiques. Des penseurs comme Isaiah Berlin ont d'ailleurs refusé, rappelle-t-il, la condamnation sans nuance du phénomène national. Rejetant la dichotomie classique entre nationalisme ethno-culturel et nationalisme civique, Delannoi distingue trois types de nationalisme (culturel, politique et ethnique). Chaque forme aurait sa pathologie propre : le premier peut mener à l'ethnocentrisme et au folklorisme, le second à une politique de puissance et le troisième au racisme et aux persécutions (23).

Dans le cas d'Israël, avance le politologue Alain Dieckhoff, nationalisme politique et nationalisme culturel se confondent puisque, dès 1948, c'est l'État qui porte le projet sioniste. Mais, après la guerre du Kippour, le nationalisme devient une «force d'opposition» entre les mains du Likoud. Celui-ci accuse le Parti travailliste de trahir la cause sioniste parce qu'il se montre favorable au compromis territorial. Unis par un profond sentiment de défiance envers les Arabes, les «exclus» du système, comme les Sépharades, se regroupent autour d'une définition de plus en plus religieuse du nationalisme. Aux yeux de l'auteur, la victoire de Benyamin Nétanyahou, en 1996, confirme la convergence de la droite et des milieux religieux vers une conception «identitariste» qui refuse la «normalisation» d'Israël.

Alexandra Goujon croit aussi que la distinction entre nationalisme ethno-culturel et nationalisme civique ne permet pas de bien comprendre les nationalismes biélorusse et ukrainien. En effet, la libéralisation politique ukrainienne est allée de pair avec l'affirmation d'une singularité nationale qui en était la condition. En revanche, le président biélorusse Loukachenka s'est fait le chantre d'un ethno-nationalisme xénophobe prônant une identité slave. Formés dans un même mouvement de contestation de l'identité russe, les deux nationalismes ont pourtant connu une évolution différenciée.

C'est que le nationalisme est une «fausse idée claire», pour reprendre l'expression d'Isabelle Grimberg dans son texte consacré au nationalisme russe. Trop d'auteurs, avance-t-elle, se contentent de récupérer les poncifs véhiculés par les nationalistes, certains reprenant le cliché selon lequel les Russes ont souffert aux mains des Juifs (94-95)! Selon Grimberg, il vaut mieux, pour analyser le nationalisme russe, partir de l'idée qu'il s'est développé en opposition au pouvoir tsariste et par la suite soviétique, mais que ceux-ci ont aussi tenté de s'en servir pour conforter leur légitimité. Voilà pourquoi, nous dit l'auteur, le nationalisme russe oscille sans arrêt entre la tentation de se fixer dans un État national et celle de l'impérialisme (111).

Le nationalisme a par ailleurs été une ressource politique pour d'autres dirigeants communistes. Joseph Krulic montre comment Slobodan Milosevic et son épouse sont parvenus, dans le contexte de l'effondrement de la Yougoslavie, à manipuler les passions nationales, notamment en initiant une véritable «révolution culturelle» entre 1987 et 1989. Réactivant de vieilles querelles, Milosevic promet aux Serbes du Kosovo qu'ils ne seront pas vaincus. Le dirigeant serbe parvient ainsi à sauvegarder son pouvoir communiste en misant sur le repli identitaire et le nationalisme agressif. Le gouvernement chinois, explique Chen Yan, a, lui aussi, essayé d'utiliser les passions nationales à son profit, notamment dans la dernière décennie du vingtième siècle. Mais c'est là jouer avec une arme à double tranchant. D'une part, le nationalisme et la valorisation du confucianisme qui l'accompagne contredisent l'idéologie communiste; d'autre part, le sentiment national amène du ressentiment contre «l'Autre», surtout les États-Unis. Or, cette tendance, croit l'auteur, va à l'encontre des efforts d'ouverture démontrés par le gouvernement chinois.

Dans son examen du cas de l'Inde, Christophe Jaffrelot explique que le nationalisme hindou active également le sentiment qu'une menace pèse sur la nation. Dès 1925, le RSS (Association des volontaires nationaux) est créé en réaction contre ce qui était perçu comme une agression de la minorité musulmane (le panislamisme). À la fin des années 1990, les militants du RSS se tournent aussi contre les chrétiens. Le nationalisme hindou utilise ce que Jaffrelot appelle le «ritualisme de la religion commune» (198) pour se légitimer auprès de la population, c'est-à-dire qu'il se sert de symboles religieux comme l'idole de Ram. Mais l'utilisation d'une logique religieuse peut aussi

causer des problèmes d'allégeances. Ainsi, comme l'explique Tewfick Aclimandos dans son texte sur les nationalismes machréquins, trois allégeances possibles peuvent se heurter : allégeance à l'État-nation, à la nation arabe et à l'Islam. L'auteur s'intéresse plus particulièrement à Nasser qui, pour dénouer le conflit, proposait de situer l'action de l'Égypte au sein des « trois cercles » (arabe, islamique et africain), le cercle arabe étant toutefois privilégié. Or, selon l'auteur, le nationalisme arabe n'arrive pas à créer l'unité qu'il préconise.

Dans d'autres contextes toutefois, le nationalisme demeure un outil politique moins utilisé. C'est le cas, croit Uwe Backes, de l'Allemagne où le nationalisme est discrédité après 1945. Jusqu'au début des années 90, les scores électoraux des partis nationalistes « restent globalement médiocres » (126). Certes, la Nouvelle droite tente de moderniser le nationalisme en remplaçant certains concepts par d'autres, comme celui de race par celui d'ethnie. Mais l'auteur juge que les tendances nationales-conservatrices ne sont pas aussi fortes que certaines déclarations le laissent croire.

Les deux derniers textes abordent le phénomène national sous un angle plus théorique. Suivant les traces de Raymond Aron, Paul Zawadzki propose une analyse du nationalisme à la lumière du concept de religion séculière. Les religions séculières, explique-t-il, proposent « des *recompositions de sens* » (282) qui impliquent la sacralisation d'entités holistes comme la « race » ou la « nation ». C'est ce que l'auteur, à la suite de Hugh Seton-Watson, appelle « l'ethnolâtrie ». Or, la sacralisation de la nation conduit à l'exclusion de tous ceux qui ne correspondent pas à la définition que l'on donne de la nation.

La référence à la nation est commune à tous les mouvements populistes, ce qui lui donne mauvaise presse. En effet, le populisme est aujourd'hui considéré, explique Pierre-André Taguieff, comme étant un « mal politique ». Mais le populisme présente un « double visage », c'est-à-dire qu'il peut être à la fois démagogique et protestation légitime. Jouant sur le sens du mot peuple, les populistes peuvent s'adresser au « peuple des petits », c'est-à-dire à celui « d'en bas », que l'on dit menacé par les « élites d'en haut ». Ils peuvent aussi mobiliser le peuple « d'ici », défini de manière ethno-culturelle, qui serait menacé par des « étrangers ». On assisterait enfin à l'émergence d'une nouvelle forme de populisme, le « télé-populisme » des Silvio Berlusconi et Carl Menem qui parlent directement au peuple par l'entremise de la télévision.

Comme c'est souvent le cas dans les collectifs, les textes sont d'inégale valeur. L'ouvrage parvient cependant à offrir un bon panorama du nationalisme d'aujourd'hui, encore que le nationalisme des Amériques ne soit pas examiné. On notera tout particulièrement que les auteurs s'efforcent de ne pas reprendre les schémas de pensée des nationalistes, une démarche qui leur permet de montrer que le nationalisme est un instrument de légitimation politique puissant et protéiforme. Car il peut aussi bien servir à l'État qu'à ceux qui luttent contre lui. Les textes confirment également l'idée que l'affirmation du nationalisme passe par la lutte contre « l'Autre ». Au registre des défauts, déplorons les trop nombreuses coquilles et fautes qui parsèment l'ouvrage (pour illustration, voir les pages 30 et 36, la phrase qui est répétée à la page 292 et la confusion entre Herder et Haider à la page 11). Et certains textes sont, à mon avis, trop longs (surtout celui qui compte plus de 100 pages). Voilà qui, malheureusement, vient gâcher la lecture d'un ouvrage qui mérite pourtant d'être lu.

Community Besieged: The Anglophone Minority and the Politics of Quebec

Garth Stevenson

Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1999, pp. x, 363

Outside of successive commissioners of official languages and themselves, anglophone Quebecers find few who are strongly sympathetic to the plight of their community. This is, after all, a community that was characterized by relative privilege for most of its history. It dominated the provincial economy until a generation ago. Its influence in both Quebec and federal politics was far out of proportion to the size of this community. It controlled its own social and cultural institutions, including hospitals, schools and universities. The decisive proof of its status was the fact that thousands of non-francophone and non-anglophone immigrants to Quebec chose to assimilate into the English-language community, sending their children to its schools and acquiring its language instead of that of the province's francophone majority.

Every student of Quebec politics knows that this world began to unravel during the 1960s. The transformation in Quebec nationalism that has taken place since the Quiet Revolution has washed away the supports on which the old consociational arrangements between the English and French community of Quebec rested. From privilege and a secure status perched atop the heights of the Quebec economy anglophones have indeed become, in Garth Stevenson's words, a community besieged.

Stevenson's erudite account of relations between the anglophone and francophone communities omits nothing. He begins with the pre-Confederation emergence of consociational arrangements in the legislature of the United Province of Canada and meticulously describes the rise, consolidation and fall of these arrangements in the political life of Quebec. It is appropriate in more ways than one that Stevenson begins his first chapter with a reference to the writings of Kenneth D. McRae, a foremost student of intercommunal relations. In the style of McRae he has produced a gem of careful and thorough scholarship that weaves together newspaper accounts, government documents, secondary literature and material gathered from dozens of personal interviews into a nearly flawless narrative. And, as in the case of McRae, one detects in Stevenson's analysis a wistful regret that consociationalism could not be made to work.

There is not much doubt that this book will long be considered the definitive historical account of the English community's status in Quebec. But although Stevenson's scholarship and even-handed treatment of his subject are beyond reproach, some may dissent from what I perceive to be the normative premise of his book, namely, that treatment of the English-speaking minority of Quebec and erosion of its rights and political status as a communal partner in Quebec are matters to be regretted.

This strikes me as, inevitably, a rather sentimental regret. I certainly do not mean to accuse Stevenson's analysis of sentimentality or anger at the decline of a once robust and influential community. Unlike Mordecai Richler's *Oh Canada! Oh Quebec!* (Toronto: Penguin, 1992), there is no vituperative or sense of betrayal in the story that Stevenson tells. But there is a quality of lament in *Community Besieged* that can only be shared by those who believe, as Stevenson does, that consociational political arrangements and the recognition of group rights are normatively superior to majoritarian politics. This is a sentiment which is very much in the Canadian tradition, or at least in the tradition of a Canada whose story is told from the stand-

point of central Canada and its historical preoccupations with French-English relations and the stresses on national unity that these relations have often engendered.

STEPHEN BROOKS *University of Windsor*

Democracies and the Populist Challenge

Yves Mény and Yves Surel, eds.

New York: Palgrave, 2002, pp. pp. 258

Populism

Paul Taggart

Buckingham: Open University Press, 2000, pp. 128

The appearance of diverse charismatic, populist leaders such as Ross Perot, Preston Manning, Silvio Berlusconi, Bill Clinton and Jean-Marie Le Pen has generated a new interest in populism. As most commentators on the subject point out, populism has proven to be particularly evasive and difficult to define. Is populism an ideology? Are there left and right forms of populism? Is populism democratic? Yves Mény and Yves Surel's edited collection of essays, *Democracy and the Populist Challenge*, and Paul Taggart's *Populism* are two timely attempts to confront this problem.

Both books present us with stimulating discussions concerning the link between democracy and populism. As Mény and Surel point out in their introduction, the purpose of their collected edition is to examine "precisely how populism amplified the inherent tension between the democratic and 'non-democratic' components of democratic systems" (18). A common theme running throughout both books is the fact that populists, exploiting the notion of popular sovereignty, emphasize the need for democracy to be grounded in the notion of the "people." This notion of the people is juxtaposed to economic and political elites and to an enemy, foe or an outsider. Populists thus claim that they represent the true democrats since they are bringing democracy back to the people; in the process they claim to protect the "heartland" and the "silent majority" from the outsider and the Other. (See especially Taggart's chapter in Mény and Surel and part two of his book.)

This focus on democracy and populism leads to an interesting discussion concerning the links between popular sovereignty and liberal, constitutional notions of democracy and the role of elites, bureaucracies and policy formation. Margaret Canovan, in a theoretically very provocative chapter ("Taking Politics to the People: Populism as an Ideology of Democracy"), argues that populism attacks the very ideology of democracy, that is, the notion that democracy lies in the power of the people. Populists exploit this theme during times of political and economic crisis by claiming that political elites have stolen democracy from the "people." Similarly, Yannis Papadopoulos ("Populism, the Democratic Question, and Contemporary Governance") emphasizes the tension between popular sovereignty and the increasingly omnipotent role that bureaucracies and political elites play in policy decisions. Taggart also views the rise of populism as a pathology of representation. He argues that once people no longer feel that politicians represent their interests, populist leaders are able to exploit the notion that democracy must be based upon the voice of the people (Taggart in Mény and Surel, 71-75; and *Populism*, 108-15). The link between democracy and populism becomes particularly clear in Cas Mudde's discussion of populism in eastern Europe. He points out that many dissidents-cum-politicians were initially intoxicated by

populism since they viewed it as the democratic expression of the people against the former communist regime (“In the Name of the Peasantry, the Proletariat, and the People: Populisms in Eastern Europe,” 225-27).

Mény, Surel, Canovan, Papadopoulos, Taggart, Mair and Mudde all point to the degree to which populism highlights the contradictions inherent in the ideology of democracy. However, even though the key objective of both books is not to demonize populism, there is a general consensus that populism itself does not contribute any concrete solutions to what increasing numbers of voters feel is a crisis of democracy. From a normative perspective, Canovan and Papadopoulos point out that the exclusionary politics inherent in populism negates the need for diversity, multiple channels of participation and reconciliation. However, it is only Peter Mair who presents us with more than a normative solution to the contradictions inherent in the ideology of democracy and the current surge of populism (“Populism Democracy vs. Party Democracy”). He argues that the key equilibrium between popular and constitutional democracy is the political party. Currently the decline of ideologies and partisan politics, the importance of media in politics and the increasing emphasis on governance all overshadow the crucial link between political parties, representation and political mobilization. The negative effects of populism can only be curtailed by rejuvenating the link between the political party and representation.

The real contribution of this discussion is that the reader is given a clear and convincing interpretation of populism, one that compares cases in different historical periods and in various geographical locations. This is nowhere more obvious than in Taggart’s attempt, both in his article and in his book, to create an ideal type of populism. In the book, he examines various forms of populism in the United States, Russia, Latin America, and more recently the rise of new populism in western Europe, before creating an ideal type of populism that cuts across history and cases. He claims that populism is best understood as a movement that is hostile to representative government; it creates an idealized notion of the heartland; it lacks ideological content; it appears in periods of crisis; its own contradictions make it self-limiting and fleeting, and it is chameleon-like (*Populism*, 2; “Populism and the Pathology of Representative Politics,” 66-71). This ideal type implies that populism must be understood more as a form of political action than as an ideology. Taggart in fact explicitly states this: he claims that the “empty heart of populism is invariably remedied with values of other ideologies” (*Populism*, 115). Similar sentiments drive much of the analysis in Mény and Surel. They claim that “our concern has not been so much the specific content of the populist party programs as their positions vis-à-vis the organizational creeds of the democratic systems (17).

Looking at the organizational structure of populism in this manner underscores the strength of both books. They present a broad discussion of rather diverse forms of populism, with a clear and concise definition that points to the causes of its rise and its relation to modernity and democracy. However, omitting ideology and political platforms from the discussion also points to the shortcomings of this overly structural approach. In the process not enough differentiation is made between the various types of populism. One of the few exceptions is Mény’s chapter “Populism in the French System.” Mény touches on the anti-system populism of Le Pen and the populism of a career politician like Jacques Chirac. He points out that the former works from outside the system in order to attack the elite and the undemocratic nature of politics, while the latter, still appealing to the sovereign notion of the people, attempts to reform the system from within (151-52). I would

argue, however, that an approach that includes the important structural and organization features of populism and its methods of political mobilization, highlighted in these two books on populism, with an examination of the political ideology and the political platforms of the political parties themselves, would in fact create a more nuanced discussion and a better understanding of the differences between, for example, Chirac and Le Pen.

Even though the authors of both books claim that their intent is to address the general phenomenon of populism and not only its most recent reincarnation in the form of the radical right in western Europe, there is no doubt that it is the very success of parties such as the National Front, the Austrian Freedom party and the Lega Nord that lurks behind the urgency of the analysis. This is nowhere more clear than in the case studies and the comparative studies in *Democracies* and *the Populist Challenge*.

One of the more noble attempts to present a more differentiated distinction among forms of populism in the current west European context is Herbert Kitschelt's chapter "Popular Dissatisfaction with Democracy: Populism and Party Systems." Kitschelt makes the distinction between anti-statist populist parties and new radical-right parties. The former mobilize voters primarily against a mistrust of political parties and against corporatist and clientelist politics. Even though Kitschelt argues that the anti-statist populist parties are also xenophobic, he claims that they must be differentiated from the new radical right. In terms of voter support, the new radical right is overrepresented by blue- and white-collar working-class voters. Politically, more emphasis is placed on issues of immigration and support for a free-market economy, while less emphasis is placed on an anti-state rhetoric. In other words, the latter is less populist than the former (179-81).

Kitschelt's overly structurally deterministic taxonomy of the radical right populist parties is misguided on two counts. Unlike Mény, Surel, Taggart and Betz who point out that the Lega, the Austrian Freedom Party, the Scandinavian radical-right parties and the French National Front should all be understood as populist, Kitschelt attempts to make an overly deterministic and structural distinction between populists and the new radical right. Omitting the populist nature of the current rise of all radical-right parties means that Kitschelt cannot account for the evolution of the Danish and Norwegian Progress parties from anti-tax parties to radical-right parties, and his analysis does not explain the evolution of the Lega or the Austrian Freedom Party's political support and policy decisions. As Hans-Georg Betz mentions, the initial success of most radical-right parties depends on the ability of new populist parties to mobilize voters who feel resentment towards the existing political and economic systems. Only subsequently do economic and immigration issues become central to political success ("Conditions Favoring the Success and the Failure of Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties in Contemporary Democracies," 205).

If Taggart's and Mény's lack of emphasis on ideology errs insofar as it does not explain the difference between a Le Pen and a Berlusconi, Kitschelt's lack of emphasis on ideology means that the commonalities that link the Lega Nord, the Austrian Freedom Party and the National Front are overlooked. In contrast to Kitschelt, Marco Tarchi correctly emphasizes the ideology and the political platform of the Lega Nord, while not omitting the importance of populist mobilization. Tarchi points to the importance that ideas such as support for a free-market economy, protection of the local, exclusion of the Other (either southerner or immigrant), anti-globalization, anti-Islam and support for "Christian" values play in the success of the Lega Nord. Tarchi comes the closest to identifying the key components of the new

radical right, as manifested not only in the Lega but across Europe (“Populism Italian Style,” 126-31). In the process, he differentiates between the recent rise of radical-right populism and fascism or neo-fascism (121-22). Moreover, Tachi is also able to emphasize the difference, in the Italian case, between the populism of Forza Italia, the Lega Nord, Alleanza Nazionale and of Antonio di Pietro, the anti-corruption crusader who was so important during the *Tangentopoli* scandals in the early 1990s. The true explanatory value of *Democracies and the Populist Challenge* and *Populism* can only be exploited if the insights of populist mobilization, agency and discourse are fused with a more nuanced analysis of the ideas and the platforms of populist parties. This will not only present a clearer picture of the various manifestations of populism on the left, centre and right, but it will also explain more clearly and substantially the current rise of radical-right populism, the reasons for its current success and its influence on national and European Union policy decisions.

ANDREJ ZASLOVE *York University*

Fenced Off: The Suburbanization of American Politics

Juliet F. Gainsborough

Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2001, pp. viii, 191

In this important book, Juliet Gainsborough makes at least three important points: (1) living in a suburban municipality in the United States has an independent effect on a person's political behaviour; (2) both Republicans and Democrats have worked exceptionally hard to attract the support of a growing number of suburban residents; and (3) residents of suburban and central-city municipalities share much in common and more effort should be made by political actors to make everyone aware of these common interests. The first point is proven by the use of sophisticated statistical analysis of data from National Election Studies from 1952 to 1992 and the second by careful study of party platforms. The third point reflects the author's considered judgment in light of her study of American suburban politics. Students of American government will find much of value in this book, although such value probably relates more to providing evidence for what is now conventional wisdom rather than in advancing new theories or lines of argument.

This is not a book about local government; it is about politics at all levels within American suburbs. It contains more information on presidential and congressional voting behaviour than on local. However, this review addresses the book's potential relevance for Canadian politics. In order to do so, we must first be clear about Gainsborough's definition of a suburb. It relates to governmental structures rather than to urban form. For Gainsborough, suburban residents are people who live within census-defined metropolitan areas but not within the boundaries of the central-city municipality. In the United States, the boundaries of such central cities (except for some cities in the southwest) have been static since early in the twentieth century. The impact of changes in boundaries of central-city municipalities on residents within previously unincorporated areas is not an issue she addresses. The fact that she omits this topic, even for the southwest, is my one main criticism of an otherwise outstanding book.

A scholar seeking to replicate Gainsborough's work within Canada could not possibly avoid the impact of such boundary changes. Since the early 1990s, hundreds of thousands of residents of eastern Canada have had their status changed (according to Gainsborough's definition) from suburban-

ites to central-city residents. Listed in rough order of the approximate number of residents affected, the relevant Canadian metropolitan areas are: Toronto, Montreal, Ottawa, Quebec City, Hamilton, Halifax, Hull (now Gatineau), Sudbury and Sherbrooke.

Recent municipal amalgamations in Canada have been of obvious interest to students of local government. Gainsborough's work suggests that these amalgamations should likewise be of interest to all students of Canadian political behaviour. Examples of the essential questions are: Will the political behaviour of residents of the former City of Scarborough grow more similar to that of residents of the "old" City of Toronto now that both areas are part of the "new" City of Toronto? Will it differ significantly from residents of the Town of Markham, which is immediately north of Scarborough and outside the boundaries of the City of Toronto? What about residents of formerly outer suburban municipalities who now find themselves within central-city municipalities, for example, Bedford (Halifax Regional Municipality) and Kanata (the new City of Ottawa)? Controlling for other variables, will residents of Bedford and Kanata eventually behave differently from residents of the Town of Markham or the District of Surrey (a suburban municipality near the City of Vancouver). Or is it conceivable that residents of the old central-city municipalities in eastern Canada will absorb the suburban attitudes (whatever they might be in the Canadian context) of those who have now joined them as central-city residents?

There are now many important Canadian metropolitan areas in which there are very few suburbanites as Gainsborough defines them. The most important examples are Calgary, Winnipeg, Ottawa, London, Halifax, Regina, Saskatoon, Sudbury and Thunder Bay. In these metropolitan areas, almost everyone lives in the central-city municipality. But, just as Gainsborough argues that suburbanites and central-city residents share unrecognized common interests in US metropolitan areas, surely we can make a similar case for the diverse residents who live within those Canadian central-city municipalities that encompass entire metropolitan areas. Is there more solidarity between low-income inner-city residents of these municipalities and their better-off fellow municipal citizens than there is between low-income inner-city residents and suburban residents in municipally fragmented metropolitan areas. Extrapolating from Gainsborough's evidence in the United States, the likely answer to this question is "Yes." What we cannot know from Gainsborough's book is whether legislated amalgamations of the type we have experienced in Canada can themselves have the effect—over time at least—of fostering such solidarity.

ANDREW SANCTON *University of Western Ontario*

Profession : femme politique. Sexe et pouvoir sous la Cinquième république

Mariette Sineau

Paris : Presses de sciences Po, 2001, 306 p.

Les ouvrages de la politologue Mariette Sineau sur le thème des femmes et de la politique sont toujours attendus avec impatience, car ils sont porteurs d'idées et d'hypothèses nouvelles dans ce champ d'analyse. Dans *Profession : femme politique*, Sineau présente une étude de la dynamique d'inclusion des femmes dans la cinquième République en France, à compter de 1958. Si l'identification du politique à l'homme – c'est-à-dire à l'acteur masculin – a été une norme constante durant la cinquième République, les rap-

ports entre femmes et pouvoir ont néanmoins évolué dans le temps, en fonction du contexte social et politique des rapports de sexe, écrit Sineau. Les locataires de l'Élysée ont pesé chacun à leur façon sur la redistribution des pouvoirs entre les sexes. Selon leurs référents culturels et idéologiques, mais aussi selon la stratégie électorale de conquête ou de reconquête de l'électorat féminin, ils ont porté une attention plus ou moins grande aux aspirations des Françaises à jouer un rôle politique (151).

La première partie du livre décrit l'ascension des femmes dans les lieux de pouvoir sous les différents présidents, l'auteure suggérant un lien entre la personnalité des présidents de la République et la place occupée par les femmes dans l'arène politique. La seconde partie de l'ouvrage se concentre sur les années 1997-2001, soit depuis l'avènement au pouvoir de la gauche plurielle, qui va, selon Sineau, précipiter les changements importants dans l'ordre politique républicain traditionnel de la France. C'est en effet sous ce gouvernement que sera adoptée la loi sur la parité, qui fait l'objet d'une longue analyse. L'ouvrage présente également les résultats d'une enquête originale menée auprès des députés français des deux sexes, dans laquelle sont explorés les parcours et profils de ces hommes et de ces femmes, de même que leurs opinions sur le féminisme et les femmes politiques.

La structure de l'ouvrage repose sur une analyse chronologique qui tient souvent du récit ; on en retient qu'il y a eu des points tournants, des facteurs précipitants et des dynamiques spécifiques, résultat de l'entrée en scène de certaines personnalités, hommes ou femmes, sur la scène politique. Cet enchevêtrement de situations et de personnalités produit un effet cumulatif et évolutif : nous allons vers un avenir meilleur en ce qui a trait à la place des femmes en politique ; c'est à travers ce prisme évolutif que sont examinés les faits et actes de la cinquième République. Sineau remonte jusqu'aux débuts de la cinquième République, période où se cristallise la mise à l'écart politique des femmes, fruit de certaines actions délibérées de la part de de Gaulle. Dans ce contexte, écrit l'auteure, être femme politique était un destin d'exception. Durant les quinze années de ces trois mandats présidentiels, les femmes ne seront qu'une poignée à se maintenir sur la scène politique (43). Leur infériorité numérique est telle que ces femmes élues n'ont aucune expression propre. Au cours des années 1960 et 1970, les féministes françaises se sont d'ailleurs peu intéressées à la place des femmes en politique, choisissant l'isolationnisme vis-à-vis des institutions et préférant investir le politique en dehors des organisations traditionnelles (149).

L'élection de Valéry Giscard d'Estaing à la présidence en 1974 met la question de la place des femmes à l'agenda politique. Une fois élu, Giscard d'Estaing exprime le souhait que son mandat soit marqué par la reconnaissance complète des droits et responsabilités des femmes dans la société française et affirme vouloir féminiser la politique française. Les nominations de Françoise Giroud, qui se voit confier le premier ministère des femmes, et de Simone Veil, qui aura la responsabilité de dossiers importants, confirme cette résolution élyséenne d'ouvrir la politique aux femmes. Néanmoins, écrit Sineau, si la féminisation de la scène gouvernementale est indéniable, le blocage à l'entrée des assemblées élues n'en est que plus manifeste, avec 3,2 pour cent de femmes élues au parlement. La fin des années 1970 marque l'ouverture de la voie européenne pour les Françaises : celles-ci acquièrent légitimité et notoriété via le parlement européen où elles se font élire en grand nombre. Parmi les femmes qui œuvrent au sein des institutions françaises, certaines ont su jouer leur rôle avec une crédibilité telle qu'elle a donné au genre féminin tout entier un début de crédibilité politique que rien désormais ne pourra entamer (105).

Les deux septennats de Mitterrand marquent un tournant. C'est sous son impulsion que le Parti socialiste va teinter son programme de principes féministes, le grand virage théorique étant opéré en 1978, lorsque le manifeste du PS sur le droit des femmes reconnaît la double exploitation, capitaliste et patriarcale, que subissent les femmes (110). Mitterrand utilise son pouvoir de chef d'État pour désigner des femmes dans des bastions masculins. Mais les femmes élues continuent d'être peu nombreuses (moins de 5% aux législatives de 1993), et celles qui sont recrutées imitent le modèle masculin d'accès au pouvoir de par leurs caractéristiques, sauf qu'elles sont plus jeunes et souvent mères de jeunes enfants.

La deuxième partie de l'ouvrage porte sur le mandat de Jacques Chirac et sur le cheminement de la revendication pour la parité femmes/hommes dans les instances décisionnelles. C'est sous le septennat de Chirac que vont se produire les avancées les plus radicales en matière de représentation des femmes, note Sineau (164). La gauche plurielle sera à l'origine de réformes constitutionnelles et législatives importantes, qui vont marquer un tournant. Ces réformes, voulues par la gauche, n'auraient pu, toutefois, être menées à bien sans Chirac et Jospin, ce dernier ayant été l'acteur déterminant dans l'adoption par le PS d'une revendication paritaire (178). L'ouvrage présente par la suite une chronologie des moments qui ont conduit à l'adoption de la loi sur la parité en juin 2000, loi qui oblige les partis politiques à présenter 50 pour cent de candidats de chacun des deux sexes pour toutes les élections au scrutin de liste. Pour Sineau, ce mouvement vers la mixité des instances politiques est à porter au crédit de la gauche (196). Mais si la revendication paritaire s'est imposée aussi rapidement, c'est également à cause de l'existence d'un malaise dans la démocratie, à savoir une crise de la représentation doublée de l'impuissance des acteurs politiques à résoudre les problèmes des citoyens. On trouvera en épilogue l'analyse des résultats des élections municipales de mars 2001, qui ont servi de banc d'essai aux mesures paritaristes. Quelques chiffres : au soir du 18 mars 2001, plus de 39 000 femmes, portées par la loi sur la parité, entrent dans les conseils des villes de plus de 3500 habitants de la France métropolitaine, soit 47,5 pour cent (267).

Les deux derniers chapitres de l'ouvrage présentent les résultats d'une enquête sur les députés des deux sexes élus en juin 1997. Les caractéristiques personnelles de ces élus, hommes et femmes, demeurent relativement semblables, bien que Sineau réussisse à déceler certaines dissemblances. Pas assez, néanmoins, pour que ces nouvelles venues représentent un renouvellement de la classe politique française, hautement élitiste et empêtrée dans ses propres codes ; par leur profil scolaire, les femmes consacrent plus qu'elles ne contrarient l'élitisme social du gouvernement (183). Pour ce qui est de l'appui au féminisme, il est lié à l'idéologie de gauche tout en étant l'expression privilégiée des femmes, quel que soit leur camp (232). Néanmoins, à gauche, le féminisme implique les hommes, écrit Sineau. À droite, au contraire, le féminisme est largement refusé par les hommes, à l'exception de quelques-uns.

Dans sa conclusion, l'auteure se demande si cette nouvelle place faite aux femmes dans la politique française ne serait pas tout simplement le signe d'une migration du véritable pouvoir vers l'économie. Plutôt que d'adhérer à cette vision morose, Sineau préfère penser qu'en endossant les habits usés de la politique, délaissés par certains hommes, les femmes pourront leur redonner un certain lustre, misant sur une différence-femme en politique qui serait appuyée par les données de son enquête.

On termine la lecture de ce livre avec le sentiment d'avoir partagé l'intimité du pouvoir politique français. Au-delà d'une analyse qui s'appuie un peu

trop sur des chiffres et des pourcentages pour rendre compte d'une réalité difficilement quantifiable, soit les rapports complexes que les femmes entretiennent avec la politique, on trouve un texte érudit, écrit sur le mode de la passion. Sineau n'hésite pas à laisser transparaître dans son analyse son parti-pris pour la gauche française, plutôt que de se cantonner dans la position distante de l'experte. Souhaitons que la critique de la démocratie qui a conduit à la formulation de la revendication de parité ouvre la voie à une analyse de l'ensemble des dynamiques d'exclusion qui opèrent au sein des institutions politiques françaises.

CHANTAL MAILLÉ *Université Concordia*

Which Direction for Organized Labor? Essays on Organizing, Outreach, and Internal Transformations

Bruce Nissen, ed.

Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1999, pp. 260

An understanding of contemporary democracy in the United States must take as a critical dimension the disorganization and decline in political involvement of American workers. Nowhere else in the advanced capitalist countries are workers more alienated from the political system, less likely to participate in elections even to the limited extent of voting, and less organized into unions. And only in the US have workers failed to develop an electorally significant socialist party.

Set against the hubris of the "new economy" discussion in the US, the economic and organizational trends affecting American workers make for sober reading. The real wage growth that has occurred since 1995 only partly reverses the decline in living standards that American workers have faced since 1973, and pale in comparison to the real annual wage gains across the postwar period. The drop in unemployment through the 1990s to the 4-5 per cent range remains above postwar unemployment levels. In any case, unemployment is only one dimension of the rise in labour reserves in the US. The growth of involuntary part-time work, underemployment and contingent work all have increased labour market pressures impacting on American workers. The "new economy" has spelled the end of the 40-hour week: for their faltering wages American workers work longer hours daily, weekly and yearly, with the most miserly paid vacations, than workers in the other advanced capitalist countries. Inequality is a growing blight of American society: the average incomes of the poorest quintile of Americans have dropped below levels of the 1970s, while the richest 1 per cent of Americans have after-tax incomes roughly equal to the bottom 100 million together; and with only 5 per cent of the world's population, the US has 25 per cent of its prison population. Black and Latino workers continue to fare even worse given their predominant location at the bottom of the American class structure. These depressing labour market trends, which reflect the increase in exploitation that has been central to boosting corporate profits in the US and sparking the 1990s recovery, have been paralleled by a stark decline in union density levels. From a 1950s level of about 35 per cent of workers being represented in unions, more than 4 million members have been lost since 1975, leaving in 2002 less than 14 per cent of the American workforce in unions.

The collection of essays gathered in Bruce Nissen's *Which Direction for Organized Labor?* attempts to assess and respond to the organizational crisis of US unions. The book is written within the context of the important shift that occurred in the leadership of the AFL-CIO, the American trade union

central, in 1995. The election of John Sweeney as head, along with Richard Trumka and Linda Chavez-Thompson (amazingly both the first woman and person of colour elected to the executive leadership), under the “New Voice” banner fostered great hopes for the US union movement after the long years of the stale, and often reactionary, business unionism of leaders like George Meany and then Lane Kirkland. While the renewal project has obviously faced enormous hurdles, and been plagued by tentativeness and strategic setbacks, it has also spelled, in some measure, a realigning of progressive forces in the US.

The contributors to this volume, about one half emerging from the labour movement itself, are clearly on the side of “new voice” leadership, albeit not without disagreements. Some contributors are demanding an even further break from the past practice of the AFL-CIO than the Sweeney leadership has undertaken or even proposed. The essays provide, then, an assessment from the “grass-roots leadership” of American unions, with reference to numerous concrete cases, of new departures in American union organizing and community struggles.

Three of the essays address the general state of the American labour movement and the challenges that have faced the Sweeney leadership. The theme is well put by David Moberg: “Re-creation of a social movement on behalf of workers would necessarily challenge the abuse of power by corporations . . . [and] would also have to demand greater democracy at work (including inside workers’ own organizations, like unions) as well as in society” (22). The organizing impasse of the American labour movement is squarely situated in the predominance of business unionism’s “service model” with its focus on the bureaucratic delivery of benefits to existing union members in traditional industries. In contrast, union democracy and future organizing will depend upon the development of an “organizing model” whereby rank and file activism is coupled with continual efforts to extend unions into new sectors and unorganized workers.

The other nine essays comprise studies of attempts to address union organizing in the US along these lines. The cases range widely covering specific organizing efforts of the Communication Workers, Service Employees, and Building Trades, new initiatives of Central Labour Councils in Atlanta and elsewhere, and various efforts at community-labour coalitions.

Several provocative suggestions are forwarded out of these concrete experiences. Wade Rathke’s study of the Service Employees International Union (SEIU), for example, argues for re-consideration of “members-only” organizing, even where union certification by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) is absent. He shows how direct action by members can still put pressure on employers and aid organizing. Larry Cohen and Steve Early’s study of the Communication Workers of America’s (CWA) efforts to develop cross-border campaigns in support of strikes and organizing drives suggests the need to combine central multinational co-ordination with extensive local union involvement. The anti-union and often illegal practices of Nortel in the US, for instance, required joint efforts by Canadian unions such as Canadian Auto Workers and CEP and CWA to challenge these practices and to assist organizing efforts. Stewart Acuff’s analysis of the Atlantic Olympics campaign for union work suggests the need for community-labour coalitions to expand membership. Social justice and class solidarity can be as important as legalistic certification drives. Studies of UNITE and the Building Trades suggest the need both to train staff and members intensively in organizing, but also to engage members directly in multitrade workforce organizing across several jurisdictions where local markets have become intertwined. Bill

Fletcher and Richard Hurd's interesting analysis of the internal organizational challenges of SEIU's organizing drive suggests the need to alter representational roles, particularly by involving members more fully in contract and grievance issues, to increase the space for the politics of organizing.

The discussion of numerous new organizing initiatives is one of the important contributions of this collection. There are, however, several gaps where further assessment of organizing is required: the AFL-CIO efforts to reach out to youth through the "union summer" initiative; the advances of people of colour into central organizational roles; the capacity of retirees to aid organizing drives; assessments of the "union city" project; and the successes and limits of central organizing drives versus affiliate-led ones. These issues all relate to the main thesis of the essays, and the common view on both sides of the border amongst labour activists, that rank and file activism around the "organizing model" is central to union renewal. But as crucial as rank and file activism may be to restoring workers' capacities to intervene in their union locals and communities, this activism cannot avoid reconnecting local campaigns to central political issues even in terms of just organizing efforts. Any long-term organizing success will depend upon remaking the AFL-CIO itself from its bureaucratic structures into a campaigning organization as the "old voices" will hold back, as they have done, new leadership departures. An independent class capacity of American workers to struggle nationally is also what will be required to break the legalism of the NLRB and the restrictions of "right-to-work" states. Only then will union density levels in the US rise and American workers gain voice over the conditions in which they sell their labour-power.

These gaps in the collection point to the silence about the political context in which mass union organizing takes place. Can union democracy and organization be extended in the absence of an egalitarian movement addressing the societal inequalities produced by capitalism? Campaigns such as Justice for Janitors, the L.A. Bus Riders Union, Students against Sweatshops, and the "Teamster and Turtles" Alliance of Seattle, all have illustrated the linkage between union revitalization and wider political struggles to reforming a viable American left. But it is also at this political level that the US left has faltered, and the limits of the "new voice" leadership have been exposed. The AFL-CIO leadership again fell into its Cold War past by uncritically endorsing Bush's "War Against Terrorism," in the process fracturing a nascent alliance with anti-globalization activists and solidarity with unions around the world against war mobilization; as much union money as ever pours into the Democratic party with little to show for the effort in terms of legislation empowering workers; and only a minority of AFL-CIO affiliates have heeded the call for increased funds and energies into organizing. Researchers interested in these crucial issues and the state of grass-roots union organizing in the US will gain a great deal from this insightful set of essays.

GREG ALBO *York University*

Zimbabwe: The Political Economy of Transformation

Hevina S. Dashwood

Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000, pp. xii, 252

In 1994, Oxfam was threatened with expulsion from Zimbabwe, where it had worked in apparent harmony with the government since Zimbabwe's independence in 1980. Its crime? To have criticized the government's implemen-

tation of a structural adjustment policy, rather than the international financial institutions that had “imposed” it. This criticism was profoundly embarrassing to Robert Mugabe’s regime, then known in donor circles for its commitment to equitable socio-economic development.

However, in the 1990s, this was changing. Socialist rhetoric was exchanged for liberalization, privatization and the imposition of health and education user-fees. Hevina Dashwood’s book is an attempt to explain this policy shift. It is a detailed and useful contribution to the already substantial literature on Zimbabwe’s economic policies. Dashwood’s argument is that the changing nature and interests of the ruling elite resulted in their neglect of social welfare. They became more interested in improved investment opportunities than in increased social equity.

International pressure “does not provide a sufficient explanation for the government’s failure to introduce poverty-related policies alongside the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) introduced in January 1991” (ix). Dashwood argues that economically and politically Zimbabwe was in a relatively strong bargaining position vis-à-vis the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund during the “policy-formulation” stage of 1987-1991 (71). At the same time, elite interests shifted, as politicians formed a new “national bourgeoisie” which supported reform (97). As the ruling elite’s interests cohered with those of the economic elite, the new development strategy de-emphasized welfarist concerns.

Dashwood’s well-told story contradicts current assumptions about ESAP in Zimbabwe. At the same time, its largely national-level analysis needs to be further disaggregated. Despite a useful chapter examining cabinet-level debates over economic policy, we have little sense of who is the “ruling clique.” It cannot mean simply “the ruling party” because many members of parliament were frustrated by their exclusion from economic policy making and implementation. Does the elite consist only of cabinet ministers (some of whom also rejected ESAP)? What are the dynamics of the relationship between political elites and business elites? Are linkages derived from kinship, party membership, old-school ties?

This account of Zimbabwe’s liberalization also contributes to the existing literature on agrarian policy and economic reform in Africa. Independent Zimbabwe did not fall into the so-called “urban bias” trap of benefiting urban consumers at the expense of rural producers. Powerful interest groups of white farmers ensured that prices paid to producers more than rewarded their continued commitment to the domestic economy. Small-scale producers benefited collaterally from this pro-farmer policy. Zimbabwe’s structural adjustment and liberalization could not follow the approved “easy-win” scenario of stimulating production through increased prices and creating a rural base of support for new policies. Some export-oriented sectors did expand massively in the 1990s—exotic flowers, green beans, paprika and minerals. Zimbabwe’s already diversified markets benefited those already equipped to invest and ship directly to Europe, rather than medium- and small-scale producers. Local manufacturing, particularly hard-hit by imports, declined dramatically. “Gainers” came instead from groups such as importers, petty capitalists in growth sectors such as transport and banking.

Urban consumers found that the cost of living increased, even as jobs dried up. AIDs and drought further exacerbated hardship. Like other adjusters in the 1980s, the Zimbabwean government did bring in a “social safety net” to protect the poorest from the impact of adjustment (77). But the limited funds did not reach intended beneficiaries and were depleted through maladministration (172-74; 178-79). It was this failure that Oxfam, and others, crit-

icized. Why was the government not willing or able to administer this fund more efficiently in the interests of its own popularity? The ruling party's rhetoric and *raison d'être* was premised on development. Instead, the social contract was comprehensively breached.

While Dashwood makes sense of the shift in politicians' economic interests, it is harder to understand their political failure to appease the masses. Dashwood's account works best between 1990 and 1995, a period relatively free of social discontent and with little domestic criticism of social policy. After 1995, the government's policies gradually lost focus, as it failed to introduce a second period of reform. Rash political decisions in 1997 spurred the drastic devaluation of the Zimbabwe dollar, leading to the current economic meltdown. The elites' potential to capitalize on liberalization is itself limited by the economic crisis (with the important exception of those profiteering in the Congo).

Mugabe's main justification for economic hardship has been to blame international donors and bankers. But blaming international pressure works only if those same international forces do not then become your harshest critics. It was unwise to neglect the urban workers—as had been seen in the massive urban votes against the ZANU(PF) party since February 2000. Dashwood's account helps make sense of the particular vulnerability of the Mugabe government to a well-constructed critique, if not from the left, then from the perspective of the working poor, as currently articulated by the trades union-backed Movement for Democratic Change.

SARA RICH DORMAN *Oxford University*

Mondialisation : perspectives philosophiques

Pierre-Yves Bonin, sous la direction de

Paris / Sainte-Foy : L'Harmattan/Presses de l'Université Laval, 2001, 372 p.

Ce collectif est tiré d'un colloque qui s'est tenu à l'Université du Québec à Trois-Rivières, en février 2001, dans le cadre du congrès annuel de la Société de Philosophie du Québec. L'ouvrage est organisé autour de trois thèmes centraux : démocratie et société, citoyenneté et nationalisme, enfin arts, culture et communication. Les 17 contributions couvrent à peu près également les trois thèmes et sont remarquablement cohérentes par rapport au questionnement central.

Que pense la philosophie de la mondialisation? Les avis sont partagés. Pour certains, la mondialisation représente un moment privilégié pour revoir et abattre les pratiques exclusives et autoritaires de l'État et du nationalisme, alors que, pour d'autres, elle constitue une menace à la démocratie, et l'État représente un lieu de délibération nécessaire à la démocratie. Plusieurs des contributions à cet ouvrage dépassent un traitement purement politique de la question.

L'idée de fournir des perspectives philosophiques sur la mondialisation est séduisante et ambitieuse à la fois. Sur un thème qui a déjà engendré de nombreuses analyses, on s'attend d'un ouvrage comme celui-ci à des contributions allant au-delà des analyses politiques, sociologiques et économiques. On s'attend à un questionnement profond sur le sens à donner à la mondialisation, à un niveau de généralité sur les fondements des valeurs humaines, que la rhétorique pro ou anti-mondialisation n'a pas atteint. Quelques contributions du collectif ont réussi à relever le défi et enrichissent la réflexion déjà bien avancée sur la mondialisation.

Ainsi, dans la première partie, la contribution de Philippe Constantineau

est intéressante parce qu'elle propose de redonner à la société civile une place plus importante dans la sphère publique, par rapport à la société économique, à travers des réformes du système juridique. Dans la deuxième section intitulée «Citoyenneté et Nationalisme», trois contributions sont particulièrement intéressantes. Celle de Daniel Weinstock consiste à réfléchir sur le développement d'une citoyenneté et d'une démocratie significatives. Cela l'amène à avancer que les sentiments de solidarité et de communauté pourraient exister au niveau transnational, avec la présence de structures et d'un contexte permissif. Le chapitre de Geneviève Nootens est également intéressant parce qu'il propose une analyse du pouvoir territorialisé, en suggérant que le territoire est le trait structurant et limitatif des autres catégories modernes de la vie politique (232). Enfin la contribution de Koula Mellos est aussi fort intéressante. Mellos cherche à expliquer la difficulté qu'éprouvent les mouvements identitaires à monter une opposition fondamentale à la mondialisation, par le biais des concepts développés par C. B. Macpherson au sujet de l'individualisme possessif. La réification de l'économie de marché et son corollaire, la séparation entre le principe de libre arbitre et celui de propriété privée, se retrouvent ainsi au sein des mouvements identitaires qui ont tendance à revendiquer le premier mais ne s'interrogent pas sur le second, recréant alors la séparation et l'indépendance de ces deux principes. Enfin, la contribution de Paul Dumouchel, qui sert de conclusion, mérite également d'être soulignée. Elle porte sur la pertinence de la philosophie de l'histoire pour discuter de la mondialisation dans un contexte où le postmodernisme et l'ethnocide occupent une place de choix, parce qu'elle met l'accent sur les diverses formes d'historicité qui sont très mobilisatrices.

Le collectif n'échappe pas aux faiblesses typiques des ouvrages de cette nature, notamment la qualité inégale des contributions, les différences de style et de langage, voire les différences de perspectives. Par ailleurs, certaines contributions sont des analyses politiques ou d'économie politique qui font peu de place à une perspective philosophique autrement que par leur positionnement normatif. Ces contributions, telles celles de Piotte, de Chosudovsky ou de Robillard, auraient été plus appropriées pour un ouvrage d'économie politique ou de sociologie de la mondialisation.

Dans la préface, Pierre-Yves Bonin souligne que le thème de la mondialisation était particulièrement approprié pour ce colloque, puisque celui-ci précédait de deux mois seulement la tenue du Sommet des Amériques à Québec. Plusieurs analyses ont été publiées depuis, mais l'ouvrage dirigé par P.-Y. Bonin garde son intérêt en raison du type différent de questionnements qu'il provoque et aussi parce qu'il constitue un ajout important aux ouvrages en français sur la question.

HÉLÈNE PELLERIN *Université d'Ottawa*

Elections and Democracy in Greater China

Larry Diamond and Ramon H. Myers, eds.

Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. vii, 200

This volume brings together a number of previously published articles from the pages of the *China Quarterly* (the premier journal in contemporary China studies) with an introductory chapter by Larry Diamond and Ramon Myers. The "Greater China" in the title refers to the territory of Taiwan, Hong Kong and the People's Republic of China. Within this geographical space, democratic progress is uneven and to a great extent incommensurable. In Taiwan, direct elections now fill practically all public offices, from the president down

to the locality. At the “national” (bearing in mind Beijing’s sensitivities to the political identity question of Taiwan) level, not only have direct and competitive elections to the legislature taken place since the early 1990s, but in 1996 and 2000 direct competitive elections filled the office of chief executive, and in 2000 elections resulted in party alternation for the first time. This result was in large measure paralleled by the plurality achieved by the Democratic Progressive Party in the 2001 legislative elections. By contrast, the Chief Executive in Hong Kong is filled by a limited selectorate subject to the discretion of the authorities in Beijing, while the legislature is only partially elected. Within the borders of the mainland People’s Republic of China, direct elections are confined to the lowest rung of politics at the village level. The meaning and significance of the movement to grass-roots democracy in China is the subject of three articles in the volume.

The introduction by Larry Diamond and Ramon Myers places the question of elections in comparative perspective, drawing on Diamond’s own comparative work on democratization. Unfortunately the framework laid out by Diamond and Myers is only partially followed by the rest of the essayists. Ramon Myers’ essay on democratization in Taiwan co-authored with Linda Chao comes closest. Chao and Myers outline how the KMT regime in Taiwan gradually broadened and evened the field of electoral politics under martial law. Chao and Myers tend to downplay sub-ethnic tensions between Mainlanders and native Taiwanese in creating the legitimacy deficit which was finally filled through the lifting of martial law and the legitimization of an opposition party. Still, the piece gives a good overview of the political, institutional and economic conditions which underpinned the growth of electoral competition and electoral participation from 1950 to 1986. Suzanne Pepper’s excellent review of the thwarted progress towards electoral democracy in Hong Kong, explains the causes and consequences of the exceptional history of Hong Kong as the sole Crown Colony where self-government (responsible or not) was neither implemented nor contemplated until after the Crown had agreed to relinquish sovereignty. Colonialist hesitations and elite fears of mass democracy conspired to hold back democratic aspiration in Hong Kong. So long as the order and freedom in Hong Kong contrasted with the excesses of politics next door in the Chinese Mainland these pressures never threatened to overwhelm the colonial idyll in which the British administration was ensconced. However, the prospect of a handover, and particularly the alarming impact of the a democracy movement crushed under tank-treads at Tiananmen galvanized a belated response. Until that point, Beijing was content in the assurance that whatever degree of self-government it established in Hong Kong under the Basic Law for the Special Administrative Region (SAR) it would exceed anything put in place by the British colonial authority. As is well-known, the substantive reworking of Britain’s belated electoral reform process by Hong Kong’s last governor, the Conservative politician Chris Patten, ran afoul of the assurances Whitehall had previously given to Beijing that all reform proposals would be harmonized with Beijing’s own blueprint for SAR governance. As a result, the LegCo (Legislative Council) elected in 1995 by majority direct suffrage was not recognized by Beijing, and was prorogued, to be replaced by a new LegCo, under electoral rules designed to ensure that pro-democracy candidates would not be able to dominate even the elected constituencies. Given that elected seats constitute only a minority of the LegCo (with the remainder appointed or selected by “functional constituency” slates) and the fact that the Chief Executive and ExCo (Executive Committee—the equivalent of Cabinet) are not responsible to the legislature—even for legislative proposals, the meaning of electoral democ-

racy is open to serious doubt. Elections are, at best, referendums on executive performance without legislative impact. Although the Basic Law mandates a fully elected LegCo after 2007 and contemplates the direct election of the Chief Executive, this is not guaranteed.

The electoral process under Chinese sovereignty is the subject of a separate article by Richard Baum. He finds what he calls "an effective institutional disconnect between political participation, political representation and political power" (99). Hong Kong is not a "pseudo-democracy" where electoral results are predetermined and controlled by the political centre. Elections are free, unfettered and fair, but do not translate into effective power for directly elected representatives. Baum forecasts that future electoral mobilization will be increasingly focused on economic and welfare issues cross-cutting cleavages according to support for further democratization. In the election/selection of the Chief Executive, incumbent Tung Chee-Hwa was endorsed by 700 of 800 members of the selectorate, despite his deep unpopularity with everyone except Beijing. He ran unopposed, save by a symbolic Yorkshire terrier put up by frustrated opponents. Given the ineffectiveness of public opinion, one wonders whether the Hong Kong electorate will maintain its growing enthusiasm for electoral participation in coming years.

Indeed, the fate of Hong Kong's democratization very much depends on what happens next door, the subject of the last three articles. These focus on township elections in China, the tender shoot of political reform which has survived, if not exactly flourished during the anti-liberal 1990s. Right from the beginning, the Party authorities in Beijing have been ambivalent about this process. Some see it as a bold experiment on the road to direct elections at all levels, such as was intimated by China's Premier Zhu Rongji upon his assumption of office. Others opposed the process since the 1980s seeing it as unwanted competition for the authority of the Chinese Communist Party at the grass-roots level. Over the past decade, pragmatists have been successful in arguing that this may be an important measure which can save the prestige and authority of the Party and state at the grass roots, by providing a check on corruption and an avenue for participation and a voice in selecting the leaders closest to the people. The evidence however is that these "selections" are only partly free and fair, and given that village government does not have an independent budget, only partially meaningful. Village elections pre-existed Central endorsement, but an Organic Law on village committees was passed in 1987. Initially election procedures were not clear, and even today, the method of selecting candidates is diverse. Some are by write-ins, some are nominated and winnowed down through primaries, and others are on tightly controlled slates that allow only nominal choice (say 8 candidates nominated for 7 positions). Of China's nearly one million villages, perhaps one half have village committees, and less than one half again give the villagers themselves full control over nominations. A revised Organic Law in 1998 specifies that nominations must be by the villagers themselves and that there be more candidates than the number of positions to be filled. On the other hand, the Law specifies that the party Branch is the village's "leadership core," and Kevin O'Brien and Lianjiang Li conclude that "self-government program is best seen as an effort to rejuvenate village leadership by cleaning out incompetent, corrupt and high-minded cadres, for the purpose of consolidating the current regime" (125).

By contrast, Robert Pastor and Qingshan Tan present a somewhat more complex and sanguine picture. While they find fault with the electoral process, they set a lower standard for success than whether the elections are "free" and "fair". Instead they try to place the electoral experience within

the context of the authoritarian traditions of China, evaluating the electoral process as a learning experience promoting higher political standards and a greater sense of citizenship. They find evidence of improvement, and see the potential both for the expansion of electoral competition to higher offices and refinement of electoral procedures.

Jean Oi and Scott Rozelle evaluate the meaning of village elections in the context of village decision making. To what extent does village government actually control resources that are meaningful for villagers' lives, and where they do, is this at all correlated with elected representation? Oi and Rozelle distinguished villages according to their economic base (agricultural versus industrial) and exposure to national markets as well as income level, and attempted to correlate this with electoral participation and competition. They found that electoral enthusiasm rose more slowly than income did, based largely on the hypothesis that land issues are the most contentious ones in a pure agricultural economy. By contrast, electoral competition dropped off significantly in industrial villages, where presumably the village leadership had access to considerable resources over which they had considerable incentives to retain veto power. Furthermore, electoral participation naturally waned in villages with substantial patterns of out-migration. Thus, the answer to the question of whether "economic development" encouraged electoral democracy was decidedly murky.

The final chapter reveals the results of Tianjian Shi's 1993 survey on political culture in China which sought to apply the pioneering work of Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba in *The Civic Culture* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963) to China. He asks whether participation in grass-roots elections has any bearing on individual value orientations and finds that they do not. Nonetheless, he does report that elections can elevate concern about politics and public affairs. The strongest relationship with a sense of personal effectiveness and a reciprocal (rather than hierarchic) relationship with power and authority came with education. Whether this is an effect of knowledge and awareness alone or whether it is associated with an improvement in social status is not fully explained.

On the whole scholars working in the area of comparative politics and especially in the field of transitions to democracy will rejoice in the appearance of this useful volume. The range of articles within it will satisfy both those of a neo-institutionalist bent as well as those who hold that democratic transitions require underlying shifts in social values. Moreover the contrasts among Mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan give nourishing food for thought with respect to the economic preconditions of democratic transitions. This book should make its way onto the syllabus in upper year and graduate seminars.

JEREMY PALTIEL *Carleton University*

La Nef marrane : essai sur le retour du judaïsme aux portes de l'Occident

Anne-Lise Polo

Sainte-Foy : Presses de l'Université du Québec, 2001, 258 p.

L'Expulsion de 1492 marque un tournant majeur à la fois dans l'histoire du peuple juif et dans celle de l'Espagne, car les conséquences à long terme furent nombreuses, et ce, à plusieurs niveaux. Innombrables sont les œuvres entourant, explorant, décortiquant le récit de l'Expulsion, cherchant à en comprendre les causes à la fois multiples et complexes.

L'ouvrage de Anne-Lise Polo, *La Nef marrane: essai sur le retour du judaïsme aux portes de l'Occident*, se taille une place particulière dans cette florissante littérature. L'approche qu'elle a choisie, pour le moins originale, nous interpelle d'emblée: suivre les pérégrinations juives, et l'implantation des nouvelles communautés en diaspora européenne après l'exil forcé au Portugal. L'auteure nous suggère une mosaïque spatio-temporelle par laquelle le lecteur peut s'initier aux enjeux d'un retour des Juifs en Occident. Polo propose un voyage de Grenade à Jérusalem, en passant par Venise, Amsterdam et Berlin; un voyage qui s'étend sur quatre siècles et où, à chaque escale, nous attend une nouvelle vision intellectuelle, tant juive qu'occidentale.

Retour double, à la fois géographique, mais aussi religieux et intellectuel. Car les Juifs n'ont pas simplement quitté le royaume d'Espagne, mais ont été, dans le contexte des persécutions précédant l'Expulsion, forcés d'abandonner la foi de leurs pères. Une question est posée: comment ces *marranos*, ces nouveaux convertis, et leurs descendants récupèrent-ils, au gré de leurs migrations, ce double espace perdu? Mieux encore, l'on constate que malgré l'exclusion subie, la pensée juive continue de se développer et de s'affirmer, même dans le contexte de l'implantation des ghettos. À un point tel, et c'est là l'une des articulations essentielles de cet ouvrage, que l'Occident développera un nouveau principe d'exclusion: à la mise à l'écart physique se greffe, ou parfois se substitue, une exclusion intellectuelle. L'Occident chrétien et impérialiste, c'est-à-dire l'Occident entendu comme suprématie par le glissement de sa pensée politique, tend à s'appropriier pour ses propres fins la pensée juive, l'héritage intellectuel (*Talmud*, *kabbale*, etc.) d'un peuple désormais exclu.

Dans ce contexte d'appropriation de l'autre, face à la modernité, les Juifs ne renoncent pas nécessairement à leur différence. Ainsi, malgré la mise en ghettos (tant physique qu'intellectuelle), les Juifs n'ont pas nécessairement vécu une forme de ségrégation mais un processus de consolidation de leur communauté et de leur pensée; le ghetto devient un lieu de production intellectuelle. L'on s'interrogera également sur la survivance de l'identité juive, avec la période de liberté religieuse dans laquelle vivait Spinoza ou à l'époque de sécularisation issue conjointement de l'*Aufklärung* et de la *Has-kalah*. Tout au long de l'histoire donc, l'Occident s'approprie l'héritage juif et, à cette réalité, s'attaquera Herzl: redonner aux Juifs ce qui leur a toujours appartenu (ou qui aurait dû ne jamais leur être pris). Une nuance de taille cependant: il inverse, en quelque sorte, le processus de substitution en faisant du peuple juif un peuple moderne et « occidentalisé ».

Un aspect qui nous a paru intéressant (bien entendu, venant d'une théologienne) est son analyse du « passage » du point de vue de l'espérance messianique. Dans le rapport entre l'histoire et la *geoula* (Rédemption), la trilogie messianique d'Abraham, écrite en réaction à l'Expulsion, s'inscrit comme un prélude à la lignée d'événements historiques ultérieurs qui s'apparentent aux « douleurs de l'enfantement du Messie ». En d'autres mots, elle intervient comme élément redondant dans la pensée juive qui existait avant l'Expulsion, mais reviendra avec le sionisme (il n'est donc pas étonnant de retrouver côte à côte Abraham et Herzl) et plus près de nous, avec la *Shoah*.

Bien entendu, dans le cadre d'un tel ouvrage, qui au départ constituait une thèse de doctorat, certains points ont dû être mis de côté, pour ne cibler que le discours essentiel. Cependant, pour le lecteur moins averti de l'histoire juive, certaines explications s'imposent. Il aurait été intéressant qu'Anne-Lise Polo consacre quelques pages supplémentaires à expliquer le contexte social des Juifs d'Espagne dont la situation, somme toute, était relativement confor-

table avant l'Expulsion et permit le développement de la culture et des sciences – ce que l'on a appelé l'« Âge d'or espagnol ». Il est certes fait mention de quelques écrivains, mais nous nous permettons d'ajouter à cette liste la célèbre école des traducteurs de Tolède (à laquelle appartient Samuel ha-Levy), et nous ne pouvons passer sous silence Abraham ben Samuel Zacuto, inventeur de l'astrolabe en cuivre et dont l'*Almanach Perpetuum* accompagna outre-mer, la même année que l'Expulsion, un certain Christophe Colomb. Néanmoins, l'auteure situe bien la cohabitation des trois religions monothéistes (fait exceptionnel en Europe à cette époque) alors que Ferdinand, roi de Castille, se targue d'être le roi de trois religions.

Aussi, l'accent sur la conversion aurait mérité d'être plus développé. Le cas des *marranos* ou *conversos* est extrêmement complexe. Cette conversion au christianisme entraîna l'apparition d'un contingent massif de nouveaux chrétiens mal assimilés à leur nouvelle religion à cause de leur conversion trop hâtive. Mais, paradoxalement, certains de ces *conversos* y voient des opportunités et s'assimilent trop bien : augmentation des alliances matrimoniales, entrée dans la vie ecclésiastique, etc. Leur présence parmi les chanoines a motivé l'élaboration de la *Santecia Estuato*, les *Statuts de la Pureté du Sang* . . . Les notes de bas de page 40 et 43 (auxquelles se seraient greffés certains ajouts) auraient pu se trouver dans le corpus du texte, sans alourdir ce dernier pour autant.

Dans le même ordre d'idées, il est également dommage qu'Anne-Lise Polo n'ait pas traité davantage de la situation des immigrants juifs. Partout en diaspora, ils menèrent une vie difficile, et furent parfois pratiquement réduits à l'esclavage. Dans leur exil vers d'autres contrées, beaucoup d'entre eux furent victimes d'actes de barbarie : nombreux furent ceux qu'on éventa ou qu'on purgea pour trouver l'or et l'argent que les autorités espagnoles et portugaises leur avaient défendu d'emporter mais qu'ils auraient (et certains le firent, en effet) avalés pour les garder. Ceux qui arrivèrent à destination, surtout au Portugal, durent payer des droits d'entrée exorbitants. Après les avoir ainsi ruinés, on s'empressait ensuite de les expulser.

Il n'en demeure pas moins, malgré les quelques remarques précédentes, que l'œuvre de Polo est très bien et clairement documentée. L'on y voit le fruit d'un long labeur. Le lecteur se sent à l'aise et en confiance tout au long du voyage proposé, parce que l'auteure maîtrise à merveille chacun des penseurs et des courants idéologiques qu'elle nous présente. Le traitement qu'elle fait de Spinoza, en particulier, nous paraît remarquable.

La *Nef marrane* ouvre une nouvelle perspective essentielle à la compréhension des relations intellectuelles entre juifs et chrétiens, une nouvelle fenêtre sur l'exploration du judaïsme européen. Enfin, au delà de cette perspective, Anne-Lise Polo nous amène à nous interroger, à notre tour, sur les modes d'appropriation de l'autre que, peut-être inconsciemment, la société actuelle ne cesse de développer . . .

SOPHIE RÉGNIÈRE *Université Laval*

The Jewish State: The Struggle for Israel's Soul

Yoram Hazony

New York: Basic Books, 2000, pp. 464

An important key to situating and appreciating this book lies in the credentials of its author. Yoram Hazony heads Jerusalem's Shalem Institute, a right-wing think-tank with close ties to former Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and American-Jewish philanthropist, Ronald Lauder. *The Jewish*

State offers a sweeping, but idiosyncratic, re-examination of the intellectual forces that created and shaped the modern state of Israel.

Hazon, himself a neoconservative American Israeli, provides some novel reappraisals of the thinking and accomplishments of Zionism's main thinkers and leaders. Many of his conclusions are based on his peculiar, selective reading of the life and works of the book's main protagonists, starting with Theodor Herzl, Zionism's founding father (and author of *Der Judenstaat*, the title emulated by Hazon's book). Hazon would have us believe that Herzl's true aim was to create a *religiously* Jewish state, when Herzl's biographers stress his liberal attitudes and the assimilationist forces that shaped his life. Clearly, Herzl's own utopian novel, *Altneuland*, envisioned a modern secular state.

Hazon credits David Ben-Gurion and early labour-Zionism (which he misleadingly conflates into a single unified whole) with having had another worthy vision of the Jewish State. But, in the author's view, this "true" labour-Zionism became subverted by anti-Zionists under the influence of German-Jewish philosopher, Martin Buber, and other intellectuals who emigrated to Palestine during the 1920s and 1930s. Most students of the history of Zionism will be shocked (or amused) to read Hazon's portrayal of this marginal little band of German Jewish academics, who founded the Brit Shalom ("Covenant of Peace"), as the font of anti-Zionist political thought that flourished nefariously in the very heart of Zion—the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

Hazon's sophistication and credibility is undermined by his blanket condemnation of yesterday's and today's Jewish liberals and those lacking faith in military might as traitors. *The Jewish State* begins with a xenophobic lament which discredits many of Israel's contemporary beacons of culture and scholarship, from Amos Oz, David Grossman and S. Yizhar to Meir Shalev and Aharon Appelfeld, accusing them of unzionistic self-scrutiny and defeatism. In the course of his diatribe, Hazon proves himself a master of misrepresentation, decontextualization, reductionism and selective quotation. His overall purpose is to explain how, where and why Zionism went wrong.

How did these intellectuals end up deforming Hazon's pristine Zionism? It is Hazon's belief that the universalism and humanism of the Enlightenment are inappropriate and dangerous transplants into Jewish thinking. Readers familiar with Quebec and Canadian history will be struck at the similarities to the worldview of Lionel Groulx, for whom such "foreign" elements as federalism and American secular culture threatened the ruination of an agrarian, Catholic Quebec. Pierre Trudeau's federalism was betrayal; Groulx's own clerical nationalism promised salvation and fulfilment. Likewise, Hazon seems to be saying that the abandonment of orthodox Zionism has corrupted the very soul of the Israeli state by abandoning its (to borrow a phrase) *pure laine* Jewishness.

The most threatening manifestations of this deviation from Zionism's true mission, in Hazon's view, were the misguided efforts to come to terms with the Arabs, culminating in the Oslo peace process of the 1990s. For Hazon, misgivings about the manner in which the State of Israel was born or recognition of Palestinian Arab nationalism are tantamount to self-hate or anti-Zionism. In his treatment of the great debates within Zionism, only those who want Zionism to fail acknowledge Palestinian rights or seek ways to harmonize rival claims to Palestine/*Eretz-Israel*.

Radical or counter-intuitive conclusions abound in this book. As one Israeli critic noted, Hazon's purpose seems to be to "demonstrate that everything we thought up to now to be Zionist, is actually anti-Zionist. In other

words, we are all ‘new historians,’ we are all ‘post-Zionist,’ we have all sinned in that we do not conform to the definition of Zionism according to Dr. Hazony” (Israel Bartal, Professor of History, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem).

Despite its scholarly footnoting, *The Jewish State* is a polemical work rather than an academic treatise on Zionism. It is undoubtedly a very readable and engaging work—one that has already seduced some North American Jews who find themselves in despair over the course of events in Israel and the Palestinian territories. Those who share the author’s predispositions and conspiratorial outlook will feel vindicated by Hazony’s eloquent and tightly argued apologetics. Many, however, will be unconvinced by his skewed presentation, including the conclusion that today’s Jewish settlers residing in the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza should be viewed as the true heirs to labour-Zionism’s original pioneering mission.

NEIL CAPLAN *Vanier College*
RUEVEN SHULTZ *Labour-Zionist Alliance of Canada*

Southeast Asia into the Twenty First Century: Crisis and Beyond

Abdul Rahman Embong and Jurgen Rudolph, eds.

Bangi, Selangor D.E. Malaysia: Penerbit Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 2000, pp. 231

Southeast Asia into the Twenty First Century: Crisis and Beyond is a collection of essays from a conference held in Pattani, Thailand, in 1999. The essays serve, as the editors note, as a record of “the thinking of the time.” While some of these essays are quite useful empirically, the book is unfortunately marred by unevenness in the quality of the writings. A few, like Linda Low’s piece on the “The Politics of Asian Corporate and Financial Restructuring” are insightful. Several others, on the other hand, are conceptually weak.

There are a few themes that the editors articulate in their introductory essay that are pursued by several of the contributors. The editors seek explicitly to advance a more *political* perspective on the crisis, rather than a purely economic analysis. Specifically, they focus on two related themes in their introductory essay: The cozy relationships between business and government, and the importance of democratization for economic progress. The editors assert that corruption, collusion and nepotism (referred to in Indonesia as KKN) are critical factors that led to the crisis (15). They also argue that the crisis has shown that economic and political development are closely related (16). In other words, democracy is not positively correlated with the economic downturn of these countries and it has furthermore helped most of them weather the worst of the crisis.

These assertions are highly debatable. While cronyism undoubtedly must figure in an understanding of the crisis, the editors and number of the authors accept too easily the claims made by the Washington Consensus that all is rotten in the Asian economies. One has to ask why the close links between business and government led to a major implosion of these economies at the specific time period. The answer that I would put forth, and that has been advocated by scholars such as Robert Wade and Linda Weiss, is that liberalization of the Asian economies, pushed stridently by the Washington Consensus, opened these countries to massive external shocks which they were unprepared to control. One important example of the process of liberalization is the dismantling of the Economic Planning Board in Korea that

occurred in the early 1990s. The EPB had long been a powerful steering force of Korea's economic development, but was eliminated as a condition for Korea's entry into the OECD. Here we see clearly the political effects of neoliberalism. Some might argue that this reflects "conspiracy thinking," but it is more correct to note that this is simply a case of *realpolitik* and of governments seeking market access for their own firms. This, I would argue, is what lies at the heart of the political basis of the crisis. Although I would not dispute that cronyism compounded the crisis, a better explanation must ask what force led to a radical shock, given that for decades cronyism propelled the dynamism of Asian economies. Our analytical lenses then might gain greater leverage by focusing on the politics of liberalization and of North-South relations.

The second theme that appears in a few essays, such as those of Linda Low, Ji Giles Ungpakorn, and Wilfrido Villacorta and Eric Batalla, is that democratization holds the key to steady economic growth. Low writes that "the ultimate political implication and lesson all round would be the need for democratization and more institutionalization of the form of political participation" (133), while Villacorta and Batalla write that "a welcome offshoot of the financial turmoil is the realization that democratization is the best political system for both economic and social development" (176). Again, there appears to be an unfortunate tendency to take for granted the values of the Washington Consensus that democracy is the panacea to the developing world's ills. Although democracy and political participation are clearly to be valued and encouraged, one must also confront squarely the empirical record in Southeast Asia. It was, after all, in democratic Thailand where the crisis erupted. It may be true that democracies have been better able to weather the social repercussions of the crisis (witness the paroxysms that have engulfed Indonesia), but I would caution nonetheless that one should not laud democracy more than is warranted, and definitely not without serious qualifications about the way that elites and personalistic parties can exploit democracy for their own non-democratic ends. Therefore, when analyzing the political causes of the crisis, it may be helpful to be more discerning about the specific ways in which democracy is or is not beneficial towards economic development.

Finally, while I have noted at the beginning the unevenness of the essays in the volume, I should highlight a few essays that are well written and empirically valuable. José Tongzon's essay on the socio-economic implications of the crisis for Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia gives a solid overview of these under-documented countries; Linda Low's essay on the pattern of corporate ownership and control in Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia and the need for restructuring is both empirically rich and conceptually incisive; Abdul Rahman Embong's piece on the politics of the crisis in Malaysia gives a clear and focused account of UMNO's persistence in power; Allan Smith's essay looks comprehensively at contemporary politics in Burma, while Alfred Oehlers provides an unusual contrast between Mahathir and Lee Juan Yew's type of Asian Values, raising in the process useful avenues for future research. From the above list of diverse essays, it is clear that the volume could have benefited from tighter organization. Nonetheless, when read selectively, the South-east Asia specialist can still gain some insights from several of these essays.

ERIK M. KUHONTA *Princeton University*

The Federal Future of Europe. From the European Community to the European Union

Dusan Sidjanski

Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000, pp. xxv, 462

It is not easy to translate and update a successful French book into English and have it be equally well-received in the Anglo-Saxon academic community. Dusan Sidjanski's book is one of those ambitious projects that tries to do just that. *The Federal Future of Europe* was first published in French in 1992, and is now translated into English and a couple of chapters have been added to the original book. The book comes highly recommended by two prestigious persons: former European Commission President Jacques Delors and Professor Harold K. Jacobson. Each of them gives it considerable praise in their respective forewords. However, the book is unable to meet the high expectations generated by them. Jacobson, for example, compares the book to Ernst Haas's *The Uniting of Europe* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968) and Andrew Moravcsik's *The Choice For Europe* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998) and suggests that *The Federal Future of Europe* will be equally important. To be fair to the author, the book is not nearly as ambitious, and frankly it is of a totally different nature.

This book aims at making a political statement that the future of Europe should be a federal one. At the outset (3) it makes a brief attempt to be analytically rigorous by pointing to four theoretical frameworks from which it has borrowed (federalism, neofunctionalism, systemic analysis and the communication approach), but it does not follow through on that route. In fact, apart from the introductory and concluding chapters, the book does not aim to be strongly analytical at all. In fact, the book follows more the French language tradition in that it provides the reader with background information about the developments that led to today's Europe, while at the same time giving a political message about the importance of federalism for Europe.

The Federal Future of Europe provides the reader with detailed insights into the history of the European Community and the European Union, the various attempts to create a more politically oriented EC/EU and offers reflections on the challenges ahead. The latter are inspired in particular by the problems of nationalism and the events in ex-Yugoslavia, especially the civil war in Kosovo. The section on the latter is very interesting and informative. However, the author does not clearly explain how his analysis of the war in Kosovo lead him to conclude that a federal constitution is needed in Europe to ensure the continuation of a peaceful and tolerant Europe Union. Again, perhaps it is unfair to expect that from a book of this nature. Again, the book's strongest assets are its narrative, its political message and historical account, not so much its analytical rigour or its contribution to the theorizing of the broader European integration process.

Being translated and updated, the book suffers from considerable smaller mistakes. The proof-readers did not catch all the small differences between the English and the French wording, and besides those problems there are a number of other typos and imperfections throughout the book. Also, when updating, the choice was made to add a few new chapters and make some revisions to the existing chapters. Unfortunately, however, some chapters were not updated adequately which has the effect that the reader at various points gets the impression that some were written considerably before the book's publication in 2000. For example, the book talks about the 12 currencies that make up the ecu since 1989 (231) without explaining that the ecu was eventually replaced by the euro, and that the euro has been introduced in

financial markets since 1999 and that euro banknotes and coins would be circulating from 2002. The book subsequently discusses the euro in a “new chapter” towards the end of the book, but that does not take away the feeling that the earlier part of the book seems to be outdated.

Apart from these imperfections the book is a delight to read. This is not surprising. The author is exceptionally well-placed to write a book of this nature. Born in Yugoslavia and having become a citizen of Switzerland, he clearly is a person who has reflected on his life’s experiences in addition to his scholarly reading of the European integration process. Formerly at the University of Geneva, Sidjanski is now professor emeritus at the European University Institute in Florence. This book reads like his life’s work and as such contains many invaluable insights.

All in all *The Federal Future of Europe* is a worthwhile contribution to the literature on European Federalism. It should be in scholarly libraries and read by anyone who has an interest in the European integration process.

AMY VERDUN *University of Victoria*

Australia and the Global Trade System: From Havana to Seattle

Ann Capling

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp. x, 260

This meticulously researched and densely descriptive book on Australia’s international behaviour in an area of world trading system-making is authored by a Canadian expatriate pursuing her academic career in Melbourne. It is no doubt useful to Canadian scholars whose major fields are international political economy and Canadian foreign economic policy because Australia and Canada share many common characteristics, be it physical or social. Most importantly, these countries are both conventionally placed somewhere in the middle of the hierarchy in the international system. In other words, they are neither great nor miniscule. Does this prescribe a specific behavioural pattern in international relations on the part of Australia and Canada? The author retorts that reality is much more complex than a rather simple picture painted by so-called “middle power” advocates. The study covers the entire postwar period from the genesis of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade to the present time, when the World Trade Organization frequently hits major international newspapers’ headlines.

The book purports not to make any theoretical contribution because Ann Capling believes that none of contemporary dominant International Relations paradigms such as hegemonic stability theory, neoliberal institutionalism, and constructivism can fully capture and explain many diverse factors coming into play. Thus, she adopts an historical approach. Her self-imposed act of story-telling is not pejoratively regarded, instead it comes up with successful results. It is so encompassing and engrossing that it touches on almost everything palpable. It is a treasure trove of materials. All of her three aims are well achieved. They are to analyze the role of the state in Australia’s national development, to understand the interplay between competing economic and political interests in policy making, and to provide a non-hegemonic perspective in which small nations can be aggressive agents as well as passive subjects (11). The third point is linked to her main thesis that “Australia has wielded far more influence in multilateral trade institutions than is warranted by its size and power in the international economy” (2).

Capling extensively incorporates those multifarious elements such as societal forces, bureaucratic politics, politicians, party competition and insti-

tutional arrangements. These are behind Australia's persistent endeavour in the international forum to set up the rule of law for trade, applied more universally to a plural number of actors, over the law of the jungle, in which the major powers bully the less powerful in their one-to-one relationships. Not only structural causes but also individual negotiators' idiosyncrasies are tackled as they have indeed affected Australia's diplomacy. Without John Crawford, an astute and skillful battler, Australia could not have scored as high as it did in the match-up between David and Goliath. It is noteworthy that Australia acted quite differently from Canada vis-à-vis third-world nations, all of which maintain a large primary sector. Australia was acknowledged to be the leader of the Cairns group, a heterogeneous team pushing the liberalization of agricultural trade, in which the United States, Western Europe, and Japan are interventionist and protectionist, in contrast to trade in high-value-added manufactured goods and services.

Multilateralism is antithetical to unilateralism and bilateralism, and even to regional free-trade blocs. However, they are not mutually exclusive in practices. Capling should clarify these elusive concepts in better terms by spending some more pages. More norm-based, multilateralism cannot be exempted from the existing balance of power because the system would fall apart without unilateral great-power co-operation. Thus, multilateral trade negotiations are dominated initially by bargains among major powers, and subsequently extended to minor powers. However, Australia assisted notably in transforming this vertical unilateralism into a more horizontal version, in which small powers are reckoned with as significant partners from the outset. The most important rules of non-discrimination are most-favoured-nation treatment and national treatment. The former holds that countries must apply tariffs and other trade barriers equally to imports from all other members, without favouring any particular ones. In the latter, imports must be treated equally to domestic goods once tariffs and other trade measures have been cleared.

Some constructive advice is offered to this otherwise splendid work. The book can be improved by presenting more precise and germane economic analysis. For instance, even though it is self-evident that Australian agriculture enjoys an immense comparative advantage over its Japanese counterpart, average readers cannot know offhand in what way and by how much Australian agriculture is more efficient than that of the United States. Along the same line, perhaps more neat and clear-cut tables should be utilized to sort out each party's demands and bottlenecks, the process and pattern of negotiations, their final outcomes, and the arenas of fray and so on. Lastly, after reading the book, the reviewer is left with the impression that Australian state governments play no role in the making of national commercial policies. I do not think that this is the case.

NOBUAKI SUYAMA *Belarusian State University*

Political Scandal: Power and Visibility in the Media Age

John B. Thompson

Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000, pp. xiii, 324

While scandal is a prominent part of our recent political landscape, John B. Thompson notes that scandal has always been a visible part of our cultural milieu. What is new, however, is the way in which modern-day scandals are "mediated" by a technologically advanced electronic media. As the author notes, the interaction of new communication technologies with a new set of

professional imperatives for journalists has transported scandal from the realm of localism and face-to-face contact into the realm of symbolic national politics. Thompson concludes that, as a result of this transformation, the consequences of scandal may undermine citizen trust of political leaders and national democratic institutions, thereby depriving leaders of the very power necessary for their political survival.

In this ambitious book, Thompson attempts a comprehensive treatment of the form, function and context of scandal as it has occurred over the past century. What is unique about this work is not just that the author focuses on the role of the media, as James Fallows has done in *Breaking the News: How the Media Undermine American Democracy* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1996), or on how key political figures use their institutional resources to respond to scandal, as John Anthony Maltese has done in *Spin Control* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994), but that the author brings many of these disparate elements together in what is perhaps the first systematic and comprehensive theory of scandal (its origins, sequencing, context and consequences) available to scholars.

For this reason alone, many will find this book to be an important contribution to our understanding of the dramatic impact that scandal has on our politics and society. The author's treatment of infamous scandals in the Anglo-American world—from Profumo to Clinton, Iran Contra to White-water, Watergate to *Spycatcher*, and many others—provides important empirical context for testing the applicability of the theory of scandal developed in the book, while also providing some historically fascinating reading. The resultant three-pronged typology of scandal, based on sex, finance and power helps us to understand better the dynamics of this increasingly complex and high profile phenomenon.

As is often true with works attempting a broad theoretical synthesis of ideas, however, the development of the theory is somewhat uneven. Thompson is on his strongest theoretical footing when discussing the rise of communications technologies and the growth of the modern media as the key components responsible both for the high salience accorded to political scandal and for the transformation in symbolic politics between political leaders and citizens. The author is on somewhat weaker theoretical ground when offering a definitional basis for scandal and for its temporal sequencing. His journey into the realm of “speech-acts” and “lived-experiences” is not as thoroughly grounded in the literature of sociology, psychology and communications as it should be. Throughout the book's theoretical development, the author is fortunate to provide an inherently plausible explanation of scandal, yet his brief references to Bourdieu, Weber, and Habermas, as well as to a few political scientists and sociologists, does not provide a sufficient intellectual and scholarly grounding for the work.

Thompson concludes that the impact of scandals on politics and society is primarily a symbolic one. He argues that “scandals are struggles over symbolic power in which reputation and trust are at stake” (245). They break the symbolic link between politician and citizen, thereby depriving leaders of the critical electoral basis of their power. While the author acknowledges that there are other possible non-symbolic explanations of scandal, his argument is in stark contrast, for example, to that put forth by Benjamin Ginsberg and Martin Shefter in *Politics by Other Means* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1999), who argue that the link between citizen and leader in the modern context is largely irrelevant, as national political parties, well-funded by interest groups, struggle for power irrespective of citizen concerns and often use the pursuit of scandal as an effective weapon in their political arsenals.

Ultimately, the author's symbolic interpretation leaves us not too far from Richard E. Neustadt's classic formulation in *Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership* (New York: Wiley, 1960) that power rests primarily on the cultivation of professional reputation and public prestige. While Thompson does not directly make the connection to Neustadt, he would likely add that scandal strikes directly at the heart of those twin pillars of political power by undercutting the symbolic nature of political power as viewed by citizens and other political actors, with deleterious effects on our liberal democratic institutions.

As a result, John B. Thompson's *Political Scandal* brings us much closer to an understanding of the role of political scandal in both the actual and symbolic politics of our society, as played out by political actors, mediated by professional journalism, and ultimately processed by citizens as a reflection of the state of our democratic institutions.

CONSTANTINE J. SPILIOES *Dartmouth College*

The Clinton Scandal and the Future of American Government

Mark J. Rozell and Clyde Wilcox, eds.

Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2000, pp. xxii, 269

In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2002, the institution of the United States presidency has, according to some pundits, acquired powers heretofore associated only with Franklin Roosevelt and times of extreme crisis. The Bill Clinton/Monica Lewinsky scandal stands in stark contrast to recent events—instead of crippling the presidency or distracting whomever occupies the Oval Office from the business of the state, the scandal seems a distant memory. But, even when viewing the scandal in these terms, this volume offers important perspectives on a most bewildering event in the history of the United States presidency.

Within the scandal, ironies did abound. How could a president who so severely abused executive privilege (94) and the White House press corps (204) enjoy unprecedented levels of public support during impeachment proceedings and his Senate trial? How could the House of Representatives (a body traditionally viewed as subject to the whims of public pressure) ignore prevailing public opinion and proceed on a Quixotic crusade to take down a president (150-51)? The contributors address these questions among others in a series of essays offering both institutional and political perspectives on the scandal and its broader implications for governance and political life.

The editors begin the volume by noting that “the Clinton scandal will have lasting implications for the political system” (xxi). But, it is clearly the contention of most contributors that the implications are far from those bandied about in the early stages of the scandal. Indeed, some of the consequences (especially those for political life) appear in a positive light. The institution of the presidency remained relatively strong. As one contributor notes, Thomas Cronin's comment that “[w]hat is being punished here is the individual, not the institution” (14) effectively summarizes the event. Further, the erosion of support for the independent counsel and the Congress in general signals broader consequences for political actions motivated by extreme partisanship. As several contributors note, the prediction by Clinton supporters that the proceedings would subject future presidents to the threat of impeachment does not ring true. This is so mainly because the political consequences were so much greater for Congress than for Clinton or the presidency. In the future, Congress will most likely take heed and “keep the impeachment blunderbuss in its cabinet” (9).

The volume reflects the diversity of opinion that characterized public and scholarly debate. This is the main strength of the work. Scholars critique the performance of the independent counsel, the independent counsel statute itself, the role of the judiciary, the interaction of partisanship and public opinion in explaining the proceedings, presidential character and the long-term ramifications for the institution of the presidency.

Louis Fisher considers the performance of the independent counsel and the independent counsel statute. The expansion of Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr's jurisdiction, his inexperience as a prosecutor, and his lack of objectivity all contributed to the sense that Starr conducted the investigation inappropriately. However, Fisher concludes that the Independent Counsel statute was the most efficacious means for investigating the president given a politically charged environment. In contrast, Michael Gerhardt (who testified before the House of Representatives judiciary committee during the impeachment hearings) concludes that the performance of Starr revealed flaws inherent to the use of independent counsel investigations. Specifically, the independent counsel was unable to maintain even the appearance of impartiality given the political attacks leveled against him by the White House.

Contributors express differences concerning the impact of court rulings on the presidency. Karen O'Connor and John Hermann note that the Supreme Court's decision in *Clinton v. Jones* (520 U.S. 681, 1997) "opened the floodgates" (51) to lawsuits against a sitting president. The Court's decision also raised the spectre of limitations on the capacity of the president, executive office officials and White House staff to invoke executive privilege. While future suits may relate to a president's unofficial actions while in office, the courts have facilitated the potential that a private suit may dilute his ability to conduct the business of the state. However, Robert J. Spitzer offers an alternative view of the courts' role. The various rulings reaffirm presidential prerogatives established in precedent while opening the presidency to public scrutiny only in matters unrelated to official functions. In particular, the courts restricted these to routine matters mostly unrelated to official functions, duties or responsibilities. Although Spitzer does not make the explicit point in responding to claims that the Court gutted presidential prerogatives, we might also consider that the Supreme Court in particular is well placed to mediate disputes between branches in exactly this fashion. Bringing conceptual and legal clarity to the concept of executive privilege may appear to undermine the power of the presidency in the short term. However, the Court has consistently defined the scope and limits of executive privilege in ways that affirm the democratic notion that public offices should be open to scrutiny by the electorate.

Perhaps the most interesting analysis comes in chapters on public opinion vis-à-vis the Congress and news media. The disconnect between the public's views and the actions of congressional leaders is an important theme in Thomas A. Kazee's analysis of the House and Senate. Kazee contends that the impeachment, while not disabling the presidency, offers a "cautionary note about Congress and . . . American politics today" (36). This position was best expressed by a member of the House judiciary committee: Rep. Lindsay Graham noted that "[w]ithout public outrage, impeachment is hard to do, and it should be hard to do" (20). For Congress as an institution, the consequences of ignoring Graham's caution were severe. Chapters by Molly W. Andolina and Clyde Wilcox, John Anthony Maltese, and Paul J. Quirk consider the implications of the news media's preoccupation with scandal, the public disaffection with the proceedings and the contrast of Clinton's popularity in light of his misdeeds. Quirk considers the implications of "the poli-

tics of scandal" (139) for good governance. He concludes that political processes support the public fascination with base events rather than public business. He calls for systemic revisions to avoid the feeding frenzy promoted by media elites.

In the end, the editors present us with a volume that acknowledges the complexities (and perplexities) of the event, the personal failings of various concerned parties, the failure of our public institutions to focus our interest on public life and the potential for a rejuvenated dialogue on issues of public importance. Comprehending the dualities of character that distinguish many who occupied the presidency offers an opportunity to consider the standards used to evaluate presidential performance. If there is a positive result to this scandal, it is that attention is turned toward debating the qualities necessary for crafting good public policy. This volume is part of that dialogue.

HANS HACKER *Wheeling Jesuit University*

Désinformations par l'image

Vladimir Volkoff

Monaco: Éditions du Rocher et Jean-Paul Bertrand, 2001, 127 p.

Le prolifique romancier Vladimir Volkoff a déjà consacré quatre livres (en deux décennies) à l'étude du phénomène de la désinformation, dont un roman remarqué traduit de l'anglais sous le titre *Le Montage* (Paris: Presse-Pocket, 1983). Le présent ouvrage, abondamment illustré, permet de comparer différents cas de désinformation dans plusieurs pays, surtout durant la première moitié du 20^e siècle. En ayant recours à la désinformation, on manipule une photographie pour l'utiliser dans un autre contexte, afin de lui donner un sens nouveau (et souvent contraire à sa véritable signification). L'exemple classique (reproduit en couverture du livre) de cette forme d'analyse employée par Volkoff serait de montrer deux versions d'une même photo officielle de politiciens sur laquelle on aurait, dans un premier cas, des dissidents et, dans l'autre, uniquement les personnes que l'on aurait voulu voir figurer, avec des espaces vides là où se trouvaient initialement ceux dont l'image a été retirée sans laisser de marques. Ces retouches et ces manipulations de photographies sont courantes non seulement dans les régimes totalitaires mais aussi dans les magazines et journaux occidentaux, dans des opérations de publicité ou de manipulation de l'opinion publique. Volkoff puise ses exemples dans des documents d'archives, mais aussi dans *Paris-Match*, *Le Point* et dans des affiches publicitaires françaises. Pour la définir brièvement, la désinformation est une tentative de récupération d'une image pour l'utiliser autrement, tout en dissimulant la manœuvre de travestissement de la vérité. Le but de la désinformation est idéologique et sert à nier certains faits pour en réaffirmer d'autres, souvent reconstruits ou fabriqués de toutes pièces.

Le livre *Désinformations par l'image* se subdivise en deux parties, l'une théorique et l'autre servant à illustrer différents procédés de travestissement de la vérité. Le premier chapitre portant sur « l'image » est assez général et risque de décevoir par son caractère un peu vague, car il fournit une sorte de méditation sur le caractère éphémère des images, en puisant des exemples autant dans la mythologie ancienne que dans la *Bible*. Le second chapitre cerne beaucoup mieux le concept de désinformation, en fournissant un petit historique du mot. Les cent pages qui suivent décrivent, par l'illustration, des cas de désinformation, pris au sens large du terme. L'auteur fait référence à la psychologie de la perception et donne même quelques exemples d'illusions d'optique afin de faire comprendre le caractère ambigu de certaines images.

On y retrouve aussi des reproductions en couleurs de toiles et d'œuvres d'art plus ou moins célèbres. Les exemples d'affiches et de pages de journaux occupent toutefois la part la plus importante de la démonstration. Les régimes totalitaires ont fourni plusieurs exemples de désinformation, de l'Allemagne hitlérienne à l'URSS de Lénine et Staline, sans oublier la Chine maoïste et l'ancienne Yougoslavie. L'auteur ajoute toutefois d'autres exemples moins connus et plus proches de nous : des images mises en scène lors de la Libération ou la fabrication d'une photo de la dépouille du Roi d'Angleterre faite à partir d'une photo plus ancienne où le monarque avait momentanément les yeux fermés.

Le point fort de l'ouvrage réside dans son iconographie de près d'une centaine d'images, pas toujours pertinentes ni du meilleur goût, mais servant presque chaque fois à illustrer une stratégie de persuasion efficace. La qualité du travail de documentation et d'édition est à souligner. Ce livre servira certainement d'initiation utile et claire au concept de désinformation et évitera de longues lectures à ceux qui en voudraient un aperçu succinct. Il ne prétend évidemment pas à l'exhaustivité. Le principal point faible de l'ouvrage réside dans sa difficulté à bien cerner le concept de désinformation, pris ici dans un sens trop large. De plus, le livre ne comporte pas de bibliographie ni de table des matières.

Le livre *Désinformations par l'image* pourrait être utile aux étudiants de premier cycle en communication politique, en histoire des relations internationales et en sémiotique visuelle. Loin d'être le meilleur de son auteur, il demeure toutefois son plus éloquent.

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Processing Politics: Learning from Television in the Internet Age

Doris A. Graber

Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001, pp. xiii, 231

Doris Graber presents three questions about the role of televised news in a democracy. Each question presents a problem impacted by key forces affecting democratic practice in the United States: 1: "Why does the public prefer television for gathering political information? And why do most political scientists, including many television scholars, claim that print media are far better sources?" (2); 2: why do "television reliant people claim to be well informed enough to carry out their civic functions, while political scientists claim that the public is woefully ignorant about matters that it ought to know?" (5). Finally, 3: "Why does television earn the plaudits of many observers as one of the most fruitful inventions of the twentieth century and the condemnation of others as a despoiler of democracy and a danger to the civic health of the nation, especially its children?" (7).

Graber's analysis reveals three forces related to television news consumption. First, scholars note that the public is too uninformed about relevant political issues to be meaningful political actors. Citizens pay too little attention to important issues and too much attention to unimportant issues. Second, politicians contribute to the public's inadequate knowledge base through television. Politicians see the public as having a declining attention span preventing it from comprehending complex political information particularly about those policy areas and regions perceived as disconnected from the public's immediate concerns. The public knows more about what is of immediate importance to it. Such circumstances make it difficult for politicians to engage the public in meaningful discourse. Finally, the journalism commu-

nity, including journalists and media owners, sees the public as wanting a colourful, fast-paced, and otherwise easy-to-digest product. Producing more in-depth news and approaches exploring alternative viewpoints is more expensive, time-consuming and difficult. Taken together, the public is seen as unable and unwilling to digest complex news and information. Changing formats to improve broadcast quality is feared because it would lower profits.

Graber thoroughly addresses these issues. First, she asks whether the public does, indeed, consume television news because it is easier to comprehend than print media. She shows that the human brain is more responsive to the stimuli provided by television, making television news easier to retain and more appealing for learning new information. The combination of broadcast stimuli, including pictures, sounds and text, stimulate the brain in ways that print media cannot. Is the public's information level too limited to engage critically in policy debate? No. It is the indicators that political scientists use to show that the public is uninformed. Many of the questions asked, such as who holds particular offices and term length, are not immediately relevant to most people. More people are well informed on those policy issues perceived as personally relevant. The public will come up short when political scientists impose their values on the public regarding what it should know. Finally, Graber notes that the journalism industry itself shares responsibility because of the way that it frames and presents issues. Issues presented in a way that is devoid of meaningful policy content will hinder the public from learning the policy consequences of those issues presented in news stories.

Taken together, can the news be presented so that the public will learn more about politics? Is it capable of learning more about complex policy matters in light of its television viewing habits and attention span? The answer to both is "yes." Graber argues that a fair representation of the public's knowledge base, portrayed through a reasonable, public-centred set of expectations, will garner respect from political elites. Further, journalists and media owners should undertake efforts that make news stories relevant to the public. Journalists and news organizations should draw stronger connections between national and international issues and personal, immediate public experiences. This will cultivate greater public interest and attention to political issues and eventually lead to a stronger civic society better prepared to undertake the demands of democracy. At the same time, Graber argues that the human brain's response to television stimuli cannot be otherwise changed or altered because of its biological basis. This means that political and journalistic elites are responsible for changing their approaches rather than the public altering its news consumption habits.

Graber's substantive approach is based on numerous research efforts conducted by herself and others. These research sources include public opinion surveys, focus groups, content analysis, in-depth interviews and aggregate data such as news ratings. This vast amount of research makes her argument that much more compelling. *Processing Politics* would be an excellent component of an advanced undergraduate or graduate level "Media and Politics" course whether it be offered through a communication or political science department. It would not be a suitable core text for such a course because of its narrow focus.

TERRI SUSAN FINE *University of Central Florida*

Le philosophe et le tyran

Christian Delacampagne

Coll. « Perspectives critiques »

Paris : Presses universitaires de France, 2000, 247 p.

À la frontière de l'analyse universitaire et de l'essai politique, l'ouvrage de Christian Delacampagne (à qui l'on doit, entre autres, *L'Invention du racisme* [1983], *Une histoire du racisme* [2000] et *La philosophie politique aujourd'hui* [2000]) tente de penser l'union délicate entre la philosophie et la politique, plus précisément entre le philosophe et le tyran. L'auteur trace une histoire de la philosophie politique orientée de façon telle que l'on y croise tous les auteurs qui ont réfléchi à cette union ou s'y sont essayés.

Cette réflexion commence par une histoire du concept de « tyran » qui remonte aux Grecs, pour qui le tyran n'est pas nécessairement un dirigeant « mauvais ». En fait, furent souvent nommés « tyran » des leaders populaires portés au pouvoir par un peuple – le *démos* – qui cherchait à se débarrasser d'une monarchie ou d'une aristocratie héréditaires. Mais, pour les philosophes de l'Antiquité, il importe avant tout que pouvoir et vérité aillent de pair. Ainsi, comme le rappelle Delacampagne, « Depuis Platon, la tradition occidentale, dans son ensemble, a eu tendance à considérer que le pouvoir devait revenir à ceux qui détenaient le savoir et, plus précisément, à ceux qui possédaient l'intuition de la 'vérité' » (8). Le peuple et ses champions ne peuvent avoir accès à cette vérité, et c'est ainsi que les philosophes vont rêver d'être eux-mêmes rois (voir *La République* de Platon) ou, à tout le moins, d'être conseillers des rois (voir la fameuse lettre VII de Platon). Généralement antidémocrates, les philosophes seront prêts à « faire systématiquement alliance, chaque fois que le problème se posera, avec les pouvoirs établis plutôt qu'avec les forces populaires » (35). L'auteur affirme ainsi que « la philosophie politique ne se proposerait donc rien d'autre que d'être une philosophie de pouvoir, une philosophie pour le pouvoir, conçue pour être utilisée par des tyrans réels, présents ou futurs » (67).

Aux Platon, Xénophon et Aristote s'ajoute dès lors toute une cohorte de philosophes prêts à conseiller le prince : Machiavel, bien sûr, mais aussi Voltaire (auprès de Frédéric II), Diderot (auprès de Catherine II) et, plus près de nous, Martin Heidegger et Carl Schmitt (auprès d'Adolf Hitler) et les divers penseurs communistes ayant frayed avec Joseph Staline. Que cherchent ces philosophes auprès des tyrans ? Du prestige, les douceurs d'une vie mondaine, l'argent, parfois la protection ! Mais il y a plus. Reprenant l'explication d'Alexandre Kojève, Delacampagne affirme que « le philosophe et le tyran recherchent, l'un et l'autre, le même genre de "reconnaissance". Leur vocation à tous deux est de convertir un maximum d'êtres humains à leurs idées (163) ». Du coup, on bascule dans un jeu de miroirs où philosophe et politicien ne sont plus que deux frères siamois. Delacampagne aurait pu faire sienne la phrase de Robert Musil selon laquelle « [l]es philosophes sont des êtres violents qui, faute d'avoir une armée à leur disposition, soumettent le monde en l'enfermant dans un système ». C'est d'ailleurs cette thèse que Delacampagne cherche à démontrer, vers la fin de son ouvrage. Mais avant de conclure, l'auteur aura traité du corpus qui porte sur le droit à la révolte (et au tyrannicide), trop souvent évacué en théorie politique contemporaine (mais au sujet duquel il faut lire le monumental *Tyrannie et tyrannicide de l'antiquité à nos jours*, de Mario Turchetti [Paris : PUF, 2001]). Il aura également rappelé que depuis Xénophon, Machiavel et de la Boétie, on s'entend entre philosophes pour dire qu'un tyran ne peut jamais régner sans l'appui d'au moins

un fragment de la population. Le tyran ne peut donc uniquement se fier à sa force pour se maintenir au pouvoir ; il doit aussi savoir manier la ruse et la séduction.

Si l'entreprise de Delacampagne est bien menée et souvent convaincante, elle souffre malheureusement d'une sorte de compromission embarrassante, qui ne mine toutefois pas l'entreprise dans son ensemble. On comprend que, pour le philosophe Delacampagne, tous les régimes sont tyranniques, sauf un : la démocratie libérale. Il dira ainsi que « la démocratie représentative est, à l'époque des sociétés de masse, le 'meilleur' (ou le moins mauvais) des régimes, dans la mesure où elle est, pour cette époque, le régime qui produit le moins de cruauté ou de souffrances inutiles » (9). Delacampagne ne revient pas sur la naissance de ce régime représentatif moderne qui fut précisément fondé par des penseurs politiques aux prétentions philosophiques. John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison et Thomas Paine en Amérique, Octave Mirabeau, Maximilien Robespierre et Emmanuel Sieyès en France n'incarneraient-ils pas cet idéal d'un individu à la fois acteur et penseur politique ? Si Delacampagne n'en traite pas, c'est qu'il considère apparemment que les républiques instaurées par ces philosophes patriotes n'étaient pas des tyrannies. Et pourtant, comment penser la Terreur sans référence à la tyrannie, fût-elle au nom des intérêts du peuple ? Même sans Terreur, le système électoral est problématique, car il réserve l'exercice du pouvoir à une poignée de citoyens qui disent se mettre au service du peuple mais qui, dans les faits, empêchent le « peuple » d'exercer son pouvoir que l'on dit pourtant souverain. Ce type de régime, les démocrates d'Athènes l'auraient certainement condamné en raison de son essence oligarchique.

Certes, en « démocraties libérales » les citoyens jouissent de droits fondamentaux. Mais le pouvoir, qui réside en principe dans le peuple, est dans les faits concentré entre les mains de quelques citoyens élus. Par son silence, Delacampagne le philosophe se place *de facto* au service de la démocratie représentative, qu'il légitimise en la présentant comme la seule forme politique non-tyrannique. Un philosophe anarchiste ou démocrate (au sens classique du terme) ne manquerait pas de questionner l'objectif politique de la philosophie delacampagnienne. Il y a fort à parier qu'il l'accuserait de copinage avec le tyran élu.

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Francis Bacon and the Transformation of Early-Modern Philosophy

Stephen Gaukroger

Cambridge: Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 2001, pp. xii, 249

At the end of this engaging and well-documented contribution to the history of philosophy, Stephen Gaukroger refers to Francis Bacon as the “first engineer” of modern “scientific culture.” There is much to say in favour of this characterization. Calling him an engineer in part reflects Bacon's untiring emphasis on the practical application of science for the use and benefit of humanity. He advanced the now familiar position that usefulness measures value and demonstrates truth. The reference to engineering also suggests that modern culture was designed and constructed according to a plan (but neither an algorithm nor a heavenly pattern), the execution of which involved some simplification, guesswork, patchwork, tinkering and risk. Even the commonplace stereotype of the engineer befits the image of the new type of natural philosopher that Gaukroger identifies as one of Bacon's chief innovations—a

methodical, formulistic and unemotional solver of often mundane or unpleasant problems under the direction of others.

To call Bacon an engineer, a “first engineer” no less, is to deny him other, more elevated titles such as founder, legislator or prophet. Whether or not Gaukroger so intended, it also withdraws from him the title of philosopher. Indeed, precisely because he condemns every previous philosophy for producing words not works, Bacon does not engage his predecessors in extensive and detailed disputation. He prefers to conquer his rivals by slandering and bullying them. His philosophy is, in this way, fundamentally political. Modern scientific culture was in part born of propaganda rather than rational investigation. Because it gave hope and relief to those who believed in it, that propaganda worked like none before it. And when one asks Bacon what is truth, his answer, in effect, is that it is what works.

As Gaukroger observes, Bacon recognizes the need to “colour” even perfectly good arguments with rhetoric in order to persuade people to change their thinking, their behaviour and furthermore the world (102). Gaukroger focuses on three “irreversible” (221) changes Bacon put into motion: transforming philosophy into science, transforming philosophers into scientists, and establishing the interdependence of science and government. As an intellectual historian, Gaukroger primarily renders an account of Bacon’s ideas in the context of the philosophical, religious and political environment of his time. Scholars interested in early modern philosophy will find this book a welcome resource. Gaukroger is pleased to announce that his research was not constrained by a concern for “present problems” (ix). In general he refrains from criticizing Bacon’s arguments or washing out their vivid colours.

Gaukroger’s best argument determines that the Baconian method of “eliminative induction” is unlikely to furnish the kind of discoveries that Bacon envisions (148-53). He then proceeds, in effect, to dismiss Bacon as a political thinker. Recounting Bacon’s inability to secure the necessary patronage from the authorities of his time, Gaukroger faults him for being too utopian. Bacon neglects practical considerations such as how to organize, finance and conduct the monumental scientific community he proposes, or how to distribute its fruits (160-65). While Bacon’s claim that power and knowledge coincide and his preference for the active life over the contemplative demonstrate Machiavelli’s influence (17, 46-47), Gaukroger considers Bacon a poor Machiavellian. His criticism amounts to the charge that Bacon’s political thought constitutes but an imagined principality of the kind Machiavelli rejected.

“The natural-philosophical pursuit of life-prolonging remedies is not merely an application of fundamental principles to the biological realm,” discerns Gaukroger, “but is in some ways constitutive of the natural-philosophical programme” (100). To illustrate the centrality of medicine to the Baconian project, Gaukroger summarizes Bacon’s peculiar physiological speculations regarding longevity (95-100, 212-20). Once knowledge yielding successful techniques for achieving his furthestmost goals superseded his conjectures, however, I expect that Bacon would have cheerfully relinquished them. In one footnote Gaukroger attempts to draw a distinction between “the search for longevity” and “the search for the ‘philosopher’s stone,’ which is supposed to secure immortality” (100). Admittedly Bacon spurns the alchemists’ quest for the philosopher’s stone, but he takes the project of securing indefinitely long life quite seriously. Gaukroger even quotes the one passage, discovered in the fragmentary *Valerius Terminus*, unpublished by Bacon, wherein he “speak[s] plainly and clearly” that only the inquiry into

nature may discover the means to “immortality” (78). This quotation is offered without comment in the middle of Gaukroger’s section on Bacon’s “religious vindication of natural philosophy.” Later, during his discussion of medicine, the “utilitarian vindication” of the project, he omits it. The reader may well wonder exactly how the pursuit of indefinitely long life is consonant with Christianity, or why a faithful Christian should be so terribly anxious about death.

Of special interest is Gaukroger’s depiction of the transformation of moral philosophers into, or rather their replacement by, natural scientists. Comprising an “élite group” that is subject “to a rigorous intellectual discipline and to the complete direction of a single sovereign,” Gaukroger draws a fascinating comparison between Baconian natural philosophers and the Jesuits (128-30). The scientist must develop a certain “persona,” characterized by the “mastery of the passions” (52, 118). Together they will orient themselves toward the whole community as its benefactors and as those whose knowledge is authoritative. Scientists must be released from “the psychological features of the mind which hinder the progress and fostering of knowledge” (115) and disciplined to conduct themselves “in many respects, quite contrary to their natural inclinations” (127). Gaukroger does not extend his striking portrayal of the behaviour becoming the modern scientist into a study of ethics and the professions. Based on his description it is not clear how far the scientist’s unflinching “mentality” (131) is from one that proceeds as though every experiment or procedure is permitted so long as performing it may be construed somehow as potentially beneficial. Furthermore, the connection between the scientist’s mentality and the benevolence attributed to the scientific project needs explaining. Are Bacon’s arguments predicated upon his recurring appeal to charity or only coloured by it?

Gaukroger discovers that according to Bacon’s design, “the sovereign” should be “the natural philosopher par excellence” (131). This pregnant remark reveals that this book points toward political questions relevant to those “present problems” from which Gaukroger distances himself. Above all, does modern science possess a legitimate claim to rule? How should scientists influence government? Should politics be scientific? Moreover, what happens if the general population adopts the scientific “mentality”? Gaukroger calls Bacon an “engineer.” At the end of his *Sylva Sylvarum*, however, Bacon confers upon the person who introduces “new doctrines” governing “the understandings and beliefs of men” the title of “arch-heretic.”

TRAVIS D. SMITH *Harvard University*

Toleration in Enlightened Europe

Ole Peter Grell and Roy Porter, eds.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. v, 270

This work is the third volume of a series on toleration (*From Persecution to Toleration: The Glorious Revolution and Religion in England* [1991] and *Toleration and Intolerance in the European Reformation* [1996]). A student of toleration could hardly do better than to consult these three volumes. As with the other two books, the essays in this volume were first given at an academic symposium and were written by scholars from history, political philosophy, and theology. It quickly becomes clear to the reader of these volumes that the history of toleration is not one of triumphal progress toward a separation of church and state, the creation of equal citizenship and the abolition of censor-

ship and that, in general, toleration has had a fragile existence. This volume has 14 authors and 13 essays. The topics covered include such issues as multiculturalisms and ethnic cleansing, thinkers such as Locke and Spinoza, and the development of the Enlightenment and toleration in such states as France, Poland, Italy and Spain. The advantage of a book with such a wide scope of essays is that the multidimensional nature of the Enlightenment and toleration can be demonstrated, and the reader is cured of any penchant toward simple generalizations. As Ole Peter Grell and Roy Porter make clear in an introductory essay that provides a magisterial and judicious synopsis of toleration in Enlightenment Europe, there is no simple explanatory narrative. There was no single foundational text or set of arguments accepted by advocates of toleration, there was no clear evolution of toleration, and there were even reversals. The essays in this book, in short, demonstrate the “ambiguities, limits and fluctuations no less than the extension of toleration in the Enlightenment” (1).

There was a mix of religious, political-historical and philosophical developments providing the fertile ground for the growth of toleration in certain areas. John Donne, John Milton and Peter Bayle famously provided religious arguments for toleration. The historical reality, or perhaps failure, of the Thirty Years War led many to recognize that the zeal of the religious dogmatist too often caused a disastrous civil disorder. The rational and empirical philosophies of Locke, Toland and Spinoza added further momentum to toleration.

Just as the theoretical and intellectual origins of toleration were many and complex, so too were the practices of states in addressing toleration. The Netherlands and Britain were clearly at the forefront in granting toleration. Even here the fragile nature of the practice of toleration can be clearly seen. Ernest van der Wall, in “Toleration and Enlightenment in the Dutch Republic,” recounts the bitter controversies that plagued the United Provinces in the 1740s. By the end of the century, the Reformed Church had lost its privileged position. There was a separation of Church and State; toleration as a concept had shifted from simply religious toleration to toleration as equality, and it now applied to all citizens, including Deists and Jews. In the essay “Toleration and Citizenship in Enlightenment England,” Justin Champion describes the tortured arguments on toleration and Judaism, Quakers and Baptists. John Toland was instrumental in this controversy in arguing that true toleration depended upon non-religious premises. However, the actual practice of toleration as defined by law was to take away the penalties from belonging, for example, to a dissenting sect or to Roman Catholicism while keeping such believers from holding civic or national offices. Neither the arguments of Locke nor those of the more radical Toland were fully accepted.

As other essays show, the limitations in Britain and the Dutch Republic were quite minor compared with the equivocations and limitations found elsewhere in Europe. Each state had its own complex interplay between ideals and political necessities. The essays on Italy, Spain, the Holy Roman Empire, France and Eastern Europe carefully show the periods—often brief—where toleration became persuasive, although the political and intellectual context of these states clearly constrained toleration far more in England and the Dutch Republic. Although citizenship was increasingly recognized as entailing religious toleration in various pockets throughout Europe, the Enlightenment was “short lived and of little consequence” in several areas, particularly in northern Europe.

A spirited defence of the Enlightenment and its concern for toleration is provided by Robert Wokler. He finds the charge that the ills of modernity,

including the Holocaust and ethnic cleansing, can be somehow traced back to the “Enlightenment Project,” to use Alasdair MacIntyre’s phrase, insupportable. Wokler argues that the rationalism of the *philosophes* was not a matter of dogmatic rationalism replacing dogmatic religion. The *philosophes* advocated a scientific rationalism and a skepticism against dogmatic claims, and they also appreciated “human variety and difference” (71). Actually, the French Enlightenment, he contends, received its major impetus from the ethnic cleansing after 1685. “As much as from any other philosophical, political, or economic source, it was from the precipitation of that brain drain,” according to Wokler, that the French Enlightenment received its fresh vitality (74). The holocaust or the ethnic cleansing of Bosnia is simply incompatible with the very nature of the Enlightenment project. The antidote to Carl Becker’s *The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth Century Philosophes* and its “sinister” charge of rational dogmatism is Ernst Cassirer’s *The Philosophy of the Enlightenment*, written in 1932 as he faced the rise of Nazism and the perils of a refugee. Such a testament represents the best of Enlightenment toleration, Wokler concludes.

It no doubt is too simple to blame the holocaust on the Enlightenment, and it is likewise too simple, as these essays in the main ably demonstrate, to read into the Enlightenment modern liberalism. There are, after all, more than one set of themes in the Enlightenment. Too much is lost, as an illustration, in linking Herder and Condorcet. In short, for many readers, one can find within the Enlightenment’s many messages an extraordinary and excessive faith in human power and reason.

JENE M. PORTER *University of Saskatchewan*

Conscience and Community: Revisiting Toleration and Religious Dissent in Early Modern England and America

Andrew R. Murphy

University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001, pp. xxii, 337

This book is, in effect, an extended brief against the view held by many contemporary theorists that political liberalism is the “culmination of three hundred years of theorizing about the good society, with its roots in the seventeenth-century struggle for religious toleration” (21). According to Andrew Murphy, this claim is historically inaccurate and it encourages fundamentally intolerant views. By carefully examining the context in which seventeenth-century toleration debates occurred, he believes we can better understand the debates themselves and gain insights relevant to contemporary arguments about liberalism.

The core of Murphy’s book is an extensive examination of debates about religious toleration among Puritans in Massachusetts Bay, English Protestants (and a few Catholics) from the Civil War to the Glorious Revolution and Quakers in Pennsylvania. In the course of his study, he attempts to deflate three common myths about religious toleration. Briefly, these are (1) that religious toleration is a self-evident and unqualified good opposed only by ignorant, narrow-minded people, (2) that religious toleration was a result of the efforts of skeptical Enlightenment rationalists such as Locke, Voltaire and Jefferson, and, (3) that religious toleration generalizes fairly easily and unproblematically to diverse contemporary social and political issues such as race, gender and sexuality (11-15).

Overall, Murphy’s well-documented arguments are persuasive. He shows that opponents of toleration had serious concerns about the disorder

that religious toleration could (and in some cases did) cause. As well, he demonstrates that most advocates of religious toleration grounded their arguments firmly in Christianity, not radical skepticism. Finally, he argues persuasively that advocates of toleration were deeply concerned with the political goal of creating “a way of living together in peace: a *modus vivendi*,” and that they did not make abstract arguments for the virtues of tolerance that are easily applied to other social and political issues (15). In doing so, he makes a convincing case that in order to understand the debates we must study their historical context—a point that might strike many historians as self-evident, but which serves as an important reminder to some intellectual historians and political theorists who neglect context in their desire to trace the influence of ideas.

In the second part of the book, Murphy moves from historical analysis to contemporary theoretical debates. He begins by arguing that John Rawls’s version of political liberalism, far from being a logical “completion and extension” of debates over religious toleration (as Rawls claims), represents instead “a retreat from the philosophical and political foundations of that movement” (248). Rawls’s insistence that citizens in a liberal democracy use “public reason” for political debates requires “at best, a split between belief and action that has historically worked against liberty of conscience; and at worst, a scheme of repression and self-censorship which renders comprehensive doctrines meaningless” (249). Other scholars have made similar criticisms of Rawls’s view of public reason, but none show so well its discontinuity with seventeenth-century tolerationist arguments.

Similarly, in the book’s final chapter, Murphy argues that identity theorists who insist that toleration means, in effect, acceptance, violate the spirit of seventeenth-century arguments for tolerance. Rather than insisting that everyone argue in a certain way or change their beliefs, these arguments suggest that we support a political system where individuals with different beliefs can live together in peace, without the fear of persecution, prosecution, or exclusion from public life for holding certain comprehensive world views.

The modern academy pushes its members to specialize in narrow fields. Murphy should be commended for resisting this tendency by writing a book that spans three major disciplines: American history, English history and political theory. In doing so, he has addressed some of the most vexing theoretical debates of our day. His book should be read by anyone interested in the history or future of religious toleration and/or political liberalism.

MARK DAVID HALL *George Fox University*

Frail Happiness: An Essay on Rousseau

Tzvetan Todorov

Translated by John T. Scott and Robert D. Zaretsky

University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001, pp. xxxii, 70

The legacy of Jean-Jacques Rousseau remains the subject of considerable controversy. At one extreme, Rousseau has been interpreted as a precursor to totalitarianism, an apologist for unprecedented state authority, power and surveillance (or in more generous and affirmative readings, as the first communitarian). At the other extreme, Rousseau has been read as a champion of individual rights and freedom against the power of state authority. And for others still, Rousseau is simply hopelessly contradictory, oscillating confusedly between the two positions—at times privileging the state and citizen at

the expense of the individual and at others, the individual at the expense of the political—failing to offer a coherent theoretical stance.

Tzvetan Todorov in his newly translated book, *Frail Happiness: An Essay on Rousseau* (first published in French in 1985) thankfully argues against this either/or interpretive framework (that Rousseau is either for the individual or for the state/citizen). To read Rousseau as accepting either position (or of just being confused), Todorov insists, is to fail to take into consideration the “overall system” of Rousseau’s thought—a failure that Todorov admits he himself was initially guilty of in first reading Rousseau as inclined towards “philosophical extremism” or totalitarianism. Instead Todorov, in this remarkably concise survey of most of Rousseau’s major and minor writings (a mere 70 pages), understands Rousseau as assuming different perspectives in order to reveal the logic and implications of each position.

This approach allows Todorov to understand Rousseau as neither endorsing state authority nor as a champion of individualism, but rather as implicitly criticizing both positions—implicitly, since Rousseau does so through a relentless and thorough exposition of each perspective and its attendant limitations, tragic implications and sacrificial economy rather than through explicit argumentation.

Todorov thus reads Rousseau’s “political” texts (*Social Contract*, *Political Economy*, *The Government of Poland*, *Constitutional Project for Corsica*) as critiques of state power (and consequently totalitarianism) rather than as prescriptive. Similarly, Todorov insists that Rousseau’s autobiographical works reveal (unwittingly perhaps) the limits and paradoxes of attempting to live an absolutely solitary existence rather than an endorsement of such a life. In the end, Todorov argues, Rousseau rejects both of these perspectives as undesirable and ultimately uninhabitable.

In the last chapter of *Frail Happiness*, though, Todorov less persuasively argues that Rousseau resolves this paradox, by offering a “third way,” a compromise between extreme individualism and excessive state power. This “third way,” Todorov terms that of “moral individualism.” The moral individual is one who is cosmopolitan yet has particular communal ties, autonomous yet social, critical of society and political institutions, yet non-idealistic. In short, moral individualism (a perspective that Todorov exalts) is one which respects the autonomy of the individual, yet is critical of its possible excesses and perversions (narcissistic solipsism or an entirely idiosyncratic, non-political existence).

Regardless of whether one agrees with Todorov’s politics (qualified autonomy) it is surprising that Todorov turns to *Emile* as the articulation and justification for this position. Todorov finds the “domestic education” of *Emile* to be one in which the values of autonomy, universal principles of right and wrong, critical, independent thought and strong ties to community are expounded. This interpretation of *Emile* is difficult to substantiate. As is well known, the pedagogical strategy in *Emile* is predicated on authoritarian manipulation and submission to paternal authority. *Emile*’s education produces not an autonomous subject but docile servitude. As is also well known, *Emile* represents Rousseau’s most hyperbolic justification for gender inequality and difference.

It seems strange then to suggest that *Emile* represents the best prescriptive statement that Rousseau has to offer—or if it is, is one we should embrace. Indeed, Rousseau himself calls such a reading into question. *Les Solitaires*, the sequel to *Emile* (a text that Todorov significantly fails to address), reveals the unhappy effects of this “ideal” project and serves as a welcome critical addendum. It is surprising that Todorov, in an otherwise

provocative exposition of the ambivalences and immanent critique in Rousseau's writing, in the end simply accepts *Emile* at face value. Todorov it seems succumbs to the temptation to "make sense" of Rousseau by finding some sort of definitive political prescription.

What Todorov's essay indicates though (at least in the first two chapters) is the possibility of another reading of Rousseau. Perhaps the "unity" of Rousseau's thought lies not in any of the prescriptive norms, ideals, or even "pathways" that he puts forward, but rather in the wariness and suspicion he held towards such solutions. That is, perhaps what is most productive *and* democratic in Rousseau's writings (and herein lies his "unity") is the failure to offer any definitive prescriptions or solace. Instead his writings are a testimony to the unresolvable contradictions and competing desires of human existence and the need for an interminable and incessant critique of any "ideal" solution. To cite Todorov: "it is not much, perhaps, but it is all that is open to us" (65).

ROSANNE KENNEDY *New York University*

Natural Law Modernized

David Braybrooke

Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001, pp. xiii, 351

It is likely that most political theorists would regard David Braybrooke's defence of natural law as anachronistic, equivalent to a defence of angels dancing on pinheads, or as an *apologia* of Roman Catholic orthodoxy and Western modes of domination. At least that is how natural law theorists are commonly held in the modern/postmodern secular world where the category of nature is usually dismissed either as empirical nonsense or as form of domination by elites who wear the mask of reason and authority. However, Braybrooke attempts to answer these charges by defending natural law in secular terms and ones that cross cultural boundaries, by showing how the "core" of the natural law teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas stands on its own as a secular teaching of enlightened self-interest that informs the methodology and property teachings of Locke and Hume, the legal content of Hobbes, and Rousseau's general will. His book also includes appendices by junior colleagues that discuss natural law teachings in Ibn Khaldun and in classical Chinese philosophy. With another chapter on jurisprudence, Braybrooke's defence should prove useful to practitioners of the law, such as Canadian Supreme Court Justice Louis LeBel, who recently observed that the increasing congruence of international legal norms suggests the workings of natural law. Instead of being an anachronism, Braybrooke's study is ahead of the curve.

The chapters consist largely of discussions of various authors whom Braybrooke wishes to include in the modernized natural law theory, although the chapters really serve as topical discussions on various components of the theory. The first chapter defines the "core" of the natural law theory of St. Thomas Aquinas and that of later thinkers. The "core" contains three claims: (a) there is a set of universally applicable moral rules (with allowances for variations); (b) people will thrive only when those rules prevail; and (c) human beings are inclined to follow those rules (3). The "core" is empirically verifiable and, being secular, it is based on the nature of human inclinations and not on God.

The author provides a rigorous and timely defence of his theory against contemporary critics of natural law theory. Yet, one wonders if, by modernizing natural law theory, or at least on the terms as he defines them, the author

has provided us with a diminished theory that may not quite stand up, not simply to modern criticisms, but to the demands of politics that Thomas, and Aristotle behind him, recognized.

His understanding of secularization, and the relationship between law and virtue, point to difficulties in modernizing natural law. His theory requires retiring “God to at most a role speaking offstage” (221). While Thomas would, with nuance and qualification, agree somewhat with this statement, Braybrooke distorts Thomas’ way of dealing with God and religion in his theory. For instance, in order to make Thomas’ and Hobbes’s lists of virtues complementary, the author must face the fact that Hobbes does not include religion as a virtue, while Thomas includes it as part of justice, and not as part of the theological virtues (109). Yet, the author forces religion together with the theological virtue of *caritas*, even though Thomas himself derives his understanding of religion as justice from Cicero, one of the ancient, and presumably secular, writers who plays next to no role in the discussion.

The difficulty with secularity points to the nature of law itself. The author rejects religion as part of justice because religion cannot be part of a system of ethics whose first principle derives from self-preservation (109). By treating Thomas’ theory of natural law as a set of axioms, indeed, as a legal theory and not as a theory of virtue, the bulk of the author’s argument treats Thomas’ theory as if the complexities and contradictions contained within the first premises of the natural law (also of practical reason) did not exist, even though Braybrooke’s direct treatment of those first principles acknowledges the difficulties of treating them as axioms (40-47). For Thomas, virtue is simply not reducible to axioms based on the need for self-preservation, even if such a moral calculus operates in the majority of cases.

The legalistic treatment of Thomas leads to problems in handling the virtue of *epieikeia* (“equity”) as simply the administration of the natural law, which comes in handy in hard cases when applying the law in its letter would cause harm. However, it is not at all clear that Thomas himself regarded *epieikeia* as a matter of *applying* the law, considering that, as a virtue related to *prudentia*, the judgment of the prudent human being constitutes *ius* in that particular circumstance. Besides, as writers like Alasdair MacIntyre have noticed, virtues may be associated with rules but there are no rules to govern the application of those rules. The author regards Thomas as one who, like Hobbes and others, regards justice exclusively in terms of obeying rules. He pays some attention to extreme circumstances and provides a fruitful analysis of how the habits of abiding by the laws can actually make it more difficult to act virtuously in extreme circumstances. His examples include Elie Wiesel’s and Bruno Bettelheim’s discussions of liberal intellectual and middle-class Nazi concentration camp prisoners being least able to withstand the shock of their situation, which made them most likely to commit injustices against fellow prisoners (330, nn.45-46). Braybrooke’s comments focus on how “normalcy” among decent, law-abiding people can prevent habits of virtue from arising, but he does not consider whether natural law theory itself, where justice is defined as abiding by laws rather than as virtue, might create the same situation, and, whether natural law theory can fully grasp the ethical demands that political life places upon it.

Thus, one wishes the author, in his discussion of moral education, would have spent more time on the difficulties of “hard cases” and on clarifying the difference between the letter and spirit of the law, than on the tendency of people to abide by rules and live under the common good. More attention could have been paid to how Thomas’ theory of virtue and even law focuses

on the exemplariness of virtuous conduct, and less so on the necessity of the regularity of patterns that is essential to the view of law of Hobbes and Locke (209). Virtue, unlike law, is not at all regular because it is so rare. Yet, it is perhaps an account of virtue, more so than the universality or regularity of natural law, of which we are most in need.

JOHN VON HEYKING *University of Lethbridge*

New Essays in the Legal and Political Theory of Property

Stephen R. Munzer, ed.

Coll. Cambridge Studies in Philosophy and Law

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp. xi, 211

This is an outstanding collection of six previously unpublished essays on property rights. Each essay is admirably ambitious and clearly argued. The subjects tackled range from broad structural features of the philosophy of property (as identified by Jeremy Waldron's concept of "normative resilience") to prescriptions for particular policies on specific issues (such as Edward J. McCaffery's argument for a progressive consumption tax). Rather than impose a common theme, Stephen R. Munzer invited each contributor to write on any topic in the theory of property; this approach is attractive for its commitment to quality of writing and to fostering diversity.

However, each essay prompts many questions that the others inform. Waldron's essay focuses on the fact that the normative force of judgments that we make from "within" a property system (for example, "that's my car," "she stole it") appears to be independent, to some degree, of the extent to which the property system itself is justified. For instance, our condemnation of a thief as dishonest is not wholly undermined if we discover that the property system whose rules the thief violated was an unjustified property system. Waldron calls this phenomenon the "normative resilience" of property. Waldron offers some explanations for why property is normatively resilient: he cites Bentham's concern for the security conferred by the existence of a widely accepted property system, and Margaret Radin's concern that respecting an individual's property can become bound up with respecting that individual's personhood. For these reasons, we attach normative importance to respecting the property rights that people hold under actual legal systems, independently of whether actual property systems are fully justified (for example, as utilitarianly optimal or distributively fair). Given that property is normatively resilient, Waldron concludes as follows: "[I]f we are poised . . . to introduce a new system of property, . . . then we should think very carefully about what we do, because the likely resilience of what we are instituting means that it is liable to . . . be much harder to eradicate if we make wrong choices at this stage than would be the case with our setting up a non-resilient institution" (34). Waldron's conclusion is compelling. His essay prompts many further questions. For example, where else is normative resilience evident? Would a proponent of "two-level consequentialism" hold that *all* rights and duties, except the basic duty to maximize the good, are normatively resilient? Related to these questions is the issue of how far the *explanation* of normative resilience (drawing on Bentham and Radin) also serves to *justify* the phenomenon. Social-relations theory (as explored in Munzer's essay) promises to cast some light on this question. For instance, social-relations theorists might argue that our conviction that respecting a person involves respecting their actual property rights is a conviction foisted on us by our social relations, a conviction that we do not hold autonomously. If

this is the case, then it appears that Radin-style explanations of the normative resilience of property do not justify that resilience.

While Waldron and Munzer explore general features of property rights, the remaining essays focus on specific aspects—waste, inheritance and intellectual property. One of the most exciting features of the collection is the extent to which the practical policy implications of philosophical and theoretical premises are explored. For example, McCaffery offers an arresting argument against what he calls “nonurgent waste” (“nonurgent, frivolous, or excessive consumption . . . think of selling the farm for a sack of beans” [86]). McCaffery argues that we have reason to limit the right to engage in nonurgent waste, by introducing a progressive consumption tax. In similar practical vein, J. W. Harris uses a witty fictional “Justice Tribunal” to reveal how differing theoretical approaches to inheritance justify differing practical conclusions, and Seana Valentine Shiffrin offers a persuasive argument that a non-traditional Lockeanism (de-emphasising the role of labour and self-ownership, and focusing on original common ownership and the divine injunction to use the world in the service of humankind) would undermine the case for private intellectual property. In the final essay, William Fisher explores and clarifies the limitations of four rival theoretical approaches to intellectual property.

Several theorists (including Munzer, Harris and Fisher) conclude in support of a pluralist approach to property rights. For Fisher, this pluralism is accompanied by a downgrading of the role of theory in arguments about property. These conclusions should be handled with care. It would be mistaken to hold that when considering the justification of a particular issue of property policy, we must draw on an unordered mix of incompatible theories. To obtain *justification* for pursuing the practical implications of one theory rather than another under particular circumstances, it is necessary for there to be *reason* for that theory to take priority in those circumstances. This requires the existence of justified priority rules determining the relative importance of different theories (see Stephen Munzer, *A Theory of Property* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1990], chap. 11). I suggest that the justificatory grounding for the priority rules, and the implications thereby justified, will themselves constitute a single complex theory of property. A more radical pluralism that allowed widespread indeterminacy in the justification of different property policies would leave us with no guide on what policy to pursue. And a move away from reasoned argument, towards merely attempting to “strike a chord of sympathy” with others (as Fisher suggests [199]) would not be an acceptable alternative. Property is an important issue, which—as its normative resilience implies, and as the social-relations theorists tell us—radically shapes the type and quality of our lives. Policy decisions concerning an issue of such importance require reasoned justification. By offering a range of enticing but incompatible theoretical perspectives that justify widely differing practical conclusions, this collection of essays reveals the extreme difficulty of the task of justifying specific policies about property rights. That is no reason to abandon the task—rather, this book should inspire us to renewed theoretical vigour.

ROWAN CRUFT *University of Stirling*

Beyond Nationalism? Sovereignty and Citizenship

Fred Dallmayr and José M. Rosales, eds.

Lanham: Lexington Books, 2001, pp. xxvii, 302

The book collects a selection of papers delivered at a conference held in Malaga, Spain, in 1999 under the title “Beyond Nationalism? Sovereignty, Governance and Compliance.” It gathers as many as 16 different papers mainly by political philosophers (the conference was sponsored by the IPSA Research Committee on Political Philosophy), dealing with a variety of topics loosely related to some form of nationalism or other.

While the number of fundamentally new arguments or perspectives which can be found in the book are limited, it may be of interest to those seeking a general picture of the “civic and political challenges raised by a postnational and cosmopolitan reconfiguration of the world order”—as indicted in the book outline. The starting point is, indeed, promising. In the introduction, the editors provide a set of theoretically coherent concepts and well-formulated research questions. However, readers go on, they will likely feel disappointed.

As it often happens with edited books that emerge from conferences, the papers are different in quality and approaches, and the collection as a whole lacks a shared conceptual framework, or a uniform level of analysis. A noteworthy weakness is that some of the relevant questions raised by the editors—who do not have papers of their own—will remain largely unanswered and sometimes not even addressed. This happens, for instance, when the editors ask whether it is possible to “safely abandon nationalism and the nation-state—especially if the latter is the haven of the rule of law and a firm statute of citizenship.” This is, of course, one of the main claims of liberal defenders of nationalism that is notoriously absent from the core discussions of the book. Indeed, a large number of recent works on nationalism are not cited as often as one would expect in a book on this issue.

The book is divided into three parts. In the first one, papers focus on mainly conceptual and purely theoretical matters—as opposed to institutional. To my mind, the most engaging paper of this section is the one by Manuel Toscano-Méndez, who analyzes what he calls the “social ontology of nationalism.” Toscano uses a distinction introduced by evolutionary biologists in order to challenge what he considers to be a core assumption of nationalist discourse. Unfortunately, he does not take into account that such ontology—that is, the belief that nations actually exist as distinct entities beyond their individual members—is not endorsed by the most prominent nationalist thinkers, which severely weakens his claim that a postnationalist scenario would be dependent on those assumptions being abandoned. Indeed, he neglects that the most plausible arguments in favour of nationalism are actually made by liberal individualists.

In part 2, the contributions look at the international arena, and explore how some changes caused by the so-called globalization process affect the normative assumptions and the model of national sovereignty. The most stimulating paper in this section is the one by Pedro Francés-Gómez, which deals with “the subject of sovereignty.” His discussion starts from the hypothesis that sovereignty is not a concept in crisis, and that the issue is just a “dispute about the same old scarce, valuable, and useful resource (the supreme social power)” (100). However, he challenges the “prejudice” that nationhood is the only candidate to be the subject of sovereignty, and ultimately refuses to endorse that view. Instead, inspired by Habermas, he appeals to the “enfranchised individual who (. . .) Aspires to be a full citizen

in a democratic community” (111) and claims that sovereignty has effectively “withdrawn to democratic procedures” and therefore “ceased to have its classical meaning” (112). This is, indeed, a rather attractive perspective, although Francés fails to demonstrate that there is a *necessary* connection between this normative view and the impact of globalization on actual institutions.

While the previous part is organized around the idea of sovereignty, the key concept of the third one is citizenship. Matteo Gianni’s contribution clearly stands out. First, his is a piece of high quality, which provides the only in-depth assessment of popular liberal nationalist theories in this book. More importantly, the paper deals with the challenges to the nation-state model posed by (internal) national and cultural pluralism, and the ways in which successful accommodation may be achieved. Arguably, this is one of the main (if not *the* main) sources of nationalist mobilization for both majorities and minorities within states. In a way, it is surprising that so little attention is devoted to the issue in a book entitled *Beyond Nationalism?* To be sure, this is not in any way different in that respect from other works on nationalism inspired by so-called postnationalist or cosmopolitan thinking, but it is nevertheless quite remarkable.

On the whole, those who support (liberal) nationalism, as well as those who do not support it but nonetheless think that nationalism is here to stay, may not feel challenged by the arguments provided by this book. Those who think otherwise, and seek to find completely new and original arguments in support of their views, may have to look elsewhere.

JOSEP COSTA *Stanford University*

La guerre et la paix : Approches contemporaines de la sécurité et la stratégie

Charles-Philippe David

Paris : Presses de sciences Po, 2000, 525 p.

Les étudiants et les professeurs de relations internationales qui se spécialisent dans l’analyse des conflits et de la sécurité dans des universités francophones sont habitués à ce que les séminaires soient menés en français, et les lectures théoriques – et surtout empiriques – discutées en classe dans la langue de Shakespeare. Il est dorénavant possible de remédier à cette situation grâce à cet ouvrage de Charles-Philippe David. Fruit de plus de quinze ans d’enseignement, dont les sept derniers à l’Université du Québec à Montréal et de 1985 à 1995 au défunt Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean, ce livre a été conçu pour servir de « manuel d’instruction au champ des études stratégiques en douze leçons » (15-16). Comme l’indique implicitement le titre de l’ouvrage, ce livre est une revue de littérature visant à faire le bilan des connaissances dans le champ des études stratégiques à l’aube du 21^e siècle. On n’y trouve donc pas d’hypothèse à étayer ni d’analyses empiriques. Néanmoins, cet ouvrage s’avère très utile et vient combler une carence dans le champ des relations internationales en français. Sa plus grande qualité est que le professeur David réussit à faire un état des connaissances dans le domaine des études stratégiques – au sens très large – dans la littérature théorique autant anglophone que francophone. En outre, il rassemble une liste d’auteurs réellement internationale, chose que trop peu d’auteurs anglo-saxons de ce genre de bilan théorique ont su faire.

Le livre est donc divisé en « douze leçons », c’est-à-dire quatre parties de trois chapitres. L’organisation demeure clairement définie, avec une introduc-

tion et un récapitulatif avant et après chaque section et chapitre. La première partie, intitulée « L'ordre sécuritaire, » traite principalement des trois aspects fondamentaux du champ des études stratégiques qui ont profondément changé depuis la fin de la guerre froide : les théories des conflits, les acteurs et « la finalité des rapports stratégiques entre les acteurs » (19). La seconde partie, « L'ordre militaire », fait état des connaissances théoriques sur l'escalade des conflits et des guerres. La troisième partie, intitulée « les stratégies de sujétion », traite des aspects diplomatiques et coercitifs en deçà de l'usage de la force militaire. Finalement la dernière partie, « Les stratégies de paix », fait un tour d'horizon des débats théoriques et des connaissances empiriques en matière de prévention et de résolution des conflits, ainsi que de gouvernance sécuritaire. Dans les paragraphes qui suivent, je résumerai les grandes lignes de l'ouvrage, pour ensuite terminer avec une appréciation et quelques critiques plus générales.

La première partie du livre fait état du corpus théorique et des débats qui émergent depuis la fin de la guerre froide. Dans les trois premiers chapitres, David examine trois évolutions théoriques dans les études stratégiques : l'ontologie et les concepts de « sécurité » et de « stratégie » qui sont en évolution depuis une quinzaine d'années; les concepts et théories de l'État comme acteur privilégié en études stratégiques depuis 1648; et les nouveaux concepts et formes de sécurité qui naissent depuis la fin de la guerre froide. La thèse, si l'on veut, de ce chapitre est que les nouvelles formes de menaces, les nouvelles organisations politiques ainsi que les nouvelles configurations de relations entre acteurs nationaux et internationaux ont bouleversé les concepts traditionnels de la sécurité. En outre, les concepts et réalités définissant les « sujets » et les « objets de la menace » sont en transition: les États n'ont plus le monopole de l'utilisation des armes et de la violence, et l'intégrité étatique n'a plus l'exclusivité conceptuelle de la sécurité. De plus en plus, les menaces proviennent d'acteurs non étatiques (le livre a été écrit avant le 11 septembre 2001 et cette observation est donc très pertinente) et l'objet de la menace est de moins en moins la sécurité frontalière, mais comprend maintenant la sécurité économique, écologique et « humaine ». En d'autres mots, on conçoit la sécurité beaucoup plus largement depuis quelques années.

La seconde partie est axée sur les questions plutôt militaires que conceptuelles et comprend trois chapitres faisant état, respectivement, des théories qui expliquent l'escalade des conflits et des crises vers la guerre (chapitre 4); du problème du dilemme de sécurité (chapitre 5); et, dans le chapitre 6, de la « révolution dans les affaires militaires » (RAM) et de sa signification pour le champ des études stratégiques. L'approche du quatrième chapitre est intéressante: elle s'appuie sur la thèse que le changement le plus important dans le domaine de l'analyse des conflits est le déclin du nombre de conflits interétatiques depuis la fin de la guerre froide et la recrudescence parallèle des conflits de type « pré modernes » (126) compris comme étant des conflits où les enjeux sont « la fragmentation et . . . la reconstruction des espaces politiques » (126). Le reste du chapitre nous initie aux concepts et aux opérationnalisations de « conflits armés », « crises » et « guerres » et aux travaux de plusieurs chercheurs dans le domaine. (À mon avis, trop d'auteurs sont absents de ce panorama mais j'y reviendrai plus tard.) Le chapitre cinq traite adéquatement du problème du dilemme de sécurité et des externalités qu'il peut occasionner (course aux armements, jeux d'alliances). Le chapitre six discute de l'évolution de la pensée stratégique au fil des décennies et se termine par une revue des nouveaux débats occasionnés par la révolution dans les affaires militaires.

La troisième partie du livre traite de la gestion des relations internatio-

nales dans le cadre d'un ordre international anarchique et donc, pour faire suite aux discussions précédentes, dangereux. Ces trois chapitres font état de la recherche sur : la diplomatie coercitive et l'intervention coercitive; la prolifération et la dissuasion nucléaire; enfin, la sécurité collective et le contrôle des armements. C.-P. David débute bien la section en déclarant qu'on « peut s'attendre à une recrudescence d'intérêt pour les stratégies coercitives » (233) et je suis d'accord avec lui. Dans le contexte de la lutte internationale (mais surtout américaine) contre le terrorisme et les « États parias » ou « voyous » qui appuient les terroristes, ainsi que dans le contexte des nouvelles normes internationales favorisant l'ingérence humanitaire, on doit s'assurer de bien comprendre les avantages et les inconvénients des stratégies coercitives. Ceci s'enchaîne bien avec le chapitre huit sur la dissuasion nucléaire – une autre forme de diplomatie musclée mais non militaire – qui se termine avec une section sur la prolifération et le contrôle nucléaire. Arrive ensuite le chapitre neuf sur la coopération en matière de sécurité – désarmement, contrôle des armements et droit international pour la sécurité des personnes. Somme toute, une section qui se tient bien et qui est une des plus logiquement articulées.

Les sujets reliés à la compétition internationale susceptibles d'engendrer des conflits ayant à peu près tous été abordés, la quatrième et dernière partie du livre porte plutôt sur les questions de paix et de sécurité « positives » (331). C'est ainsi que les trois derniers chapitres examinent les questions de résolution et de prévention de conflits, le rôle de l'ONU et des opérations de maintien de la paix et, finalement, les questions de gouvernance et de droit international. La problématique ici est de savoir si nous pouvons déceler les conditions favorables à une paix positive plutôt que la vieille approche qui prône une simple gestion des conflits. Ces questionnements sont vastes, et au chapitre 10 David nous amène à explorer les questions de négociation, de prévention et de résolution des conflits. J'ai particulièrement apprécié les paragraphes décrivant « Les recherches sur la paix et sur la résolution des conflits » (340-46), où l'auteur décrit les « quatre phases principales » de la recherche dans ce domaine; une description très rapide, mais que l'on peut bonifier en classe. Le chapitre 11, sur l'évolution du rôle de l'ONU dans la résolution des conflits, est bien présenté et la section se termine avec une présentation de la littérature portant sur les nouvelles formes de gouvernance internationale.

La conclusion, intitulée « Des anciennes aux nouvelles études stratégiques » (447), reprend douze des idées importantes qui ont été présentées dans chaque chapitre. Il n'y a donc rien de tranchant, aucune théorie ou approche qui soit prônée, mais plutôt un appel à « [l]a floraison d'écoles de pensée [qui] devra permettre l'énoncé de théories, des visions et des stratégies en faveur d'une paix durable » (453). Un appel, donc, à la recherche qui serait au profit de l'humanité.

La plus grande richesse de ce volume est le traitement plus qu'adéquat de la vaste littérature du champ des études stratégiques, au sens large, tant du milieu anglophone que du milieu francophone. On y retrouve, en effet, plusieurs des ouvrages classiques des dernières décennies, allant du milieu positiviste anglo-saxon et des analyses historiques françaises aux mouvements critiques et concepts issus de « l'école de Copenhague ».

Inexorablement, le traitement d'une littérature aussi vaste contribue à créer deux faiblesses. Premièrement, les sujets ne sont traités que d'une manière superficielle. Par exemple, au chapitre 4 sur les théories expliquant l'escalade des conflits et des crises vers la guerre, j'avoue avoir été déçu par le manque de références à certaines notions importantes. Dans les concepts de « crise », je m'attendais à voir des citations des travaux de Michael Bre-

cher et al. de l'International Crisis Behaviour Project, un collègue montréalais de David (Brecher est professeur à l'Université McGill) et directeur du projet scientifique le plus important sur l'analyse des crises internationales, et ce, depuis 1975. Dans la section sur la « guerre », je n'ai trouvé aucune référence au projet international *Correlates of War* qui, basé à l'Université du Michigan depuis 1965, œuvre sous la direction de J. David Singer (qui ne figure pas dans la bibliographie non plus). Ce dernier a développé des connaissances empiriques sur les guerres de 1816 à nos jours, et est responsable du plus important effort mondial de collecte et d'analyse de données sur les guerres. À mon avis, on a beau exercer de la préemption dans l'introduction en disant que « ce manuel est conçu pour *introduire* et ne peut donc que "laisser sur leur faim" la majorité des spécialistes qui auraient, assurément, souhaité que chaque question, controverse, approche ou perspective soit davantage approfondie » (16), il y a certains ouvrages classiques ou champs d'investigation incontournables qu'il aurait fallu mentionner.

Deuxièmement, l'ambitieuse revue de littérature de ce volume entraîne un style d'écriture plutôt régimentaire et didactique; l'auteur est très doué pour présenter les « quatre enjeux de » ou les « trois périodes dans l'évolution de » et les listes et bilans foisonnent dans le texte. Ceci étant dit, l'auteur nous met en garde, dans l'introduction, et il est très clair que ce livre se veut une introduction à ce vaste champ d'études. D'ailleurs, c'est l'utilisation que j'en fais dans mes propres cours – j'ai assigné ce volume deux fois jusqu'à présent, une fois au niveau du baccalauréat et à une autre occasion pour un cours de 2^e et de 3^e cycles sur « l'analyse comparative des conflits ». Ce volume sert de référence de base pour les étudiant(e)s et il est complété par une sélection de textes spécialisés selon le sujet du séminaire. Espérons que Charles-Philippe David puisse, dans quelques années, nous doter d'une deuxième édition améliorée et mise à jour. En définitive, je continuerai à l'utiliser dans mes cours, puisque je le considère comme étant un très bon ouvrage de base et, de surcroît, en français.

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Cultural Pluralism and Dilemmas of Justice

Monique Deveaux

Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000, pp. vii, 205

Monique Deveaux's *Cultural Pluralism and Dilemmas of Justice* represents a recent addition to a burgeoning literature on the rights of minority cultures in liberal democratic states. Like many others, she believes that conventional liberal theory is unable to provide a coherent or fair response to claims made by cultural minorities as a result of its normative commitment to *individual* rights over *group* attachments. The claim is all too familiar. In its quest to secure the freedom and equality of all individuals, regardless of their particular religious beliefs or cultural background, we are often told that liberalism ignores the important effects that group attachments have upon each individual's sense of self, their ends, and their understanding of the world. The result, we are told, is that liberalism presents an impoverished conception of the agent as shorn of those attachments that confer its identity and of those affiliations that render it able to deliberate upon its ends and to act freely and purposively in the world. Liberalism, it seems, requires persons to "bracket" their ideas about the good when resolving questions of justice. Consequently, it is premised upon an account of reasoning in which we can somehow engage as dislocated, abstract individuals, devoid of all those things that

make us reasoning beings in the first place. What we need in place of liberalism, therefore, is—according to many critics—a conception of politics that acknowledges the importance of cultural membership and that “recognizes” or “affirms” the particular memberships of those in society. The liberal strategy of establishing a thin, second-order framework of basic principles that define rights for all (rather than a set of principles rooted in the active recognition of particular first-order commitments in and of themselves) is, it seems, necessarily “culturally-imperialistic” and rooted in a controversial liberal account of individuality, reason and politics that may or may not be compatible with the understandings some members of the polity have of themselves and of the way in which politics should be conducted.

These are claims for which Deveaux has some sympathy. Liberalism as it is conventionally expressed, she argues, encourages citizens and institutions to “tolerate” rather than “respect” the various different ways of life they encounter. As such, she believes, liberalism fails to appreciate those who hold these views and fails to “accord them or their communities adequate respect and recognition” (63). In actively *respecting* those particular ways of life that exist in society, she says, institutions and citizens acknowledge that they are “valuable and [that] many give rise to legitimate social and political needs” (62).

So much is, again, all too familiar in the literature. Far less familiar—at least, among writers who seek to distance themselves from the liberal tradition—and all but absent in Deveaux’s book, is any instructive debate about what *makes* a particular way of life valuable. Is a way of life or a set of attachments valuable simply in virtue of the fact that someone holds it? Should I, as a citizen of a diverse society, respect a particular way of life or set of practices merely because it *exists*? Or are the criteria by which we might determine the “value” of a particular set of cultural norms more specific than that?

Deveaux is somewhat reluctant to tell us. Instead, she places her confidence in the power of public deliberation and dialogue to resolve questions such as these. What we need, she says, are political forums in which each and every individual can come together and debate the relative worth of their beliefs and ideals. This, for her, is what “respect” is all about: the willingness and ability among all persons to come together to debate political questions meaningfully such that outcomes will be fair, inclusive, and sensitive to the cultural and religious commitments of all those affected by them.

The problem with this, of course, is that it places significant constraints upon which ways of life and which traditions can be respected and which cannot. It suggests, for example, that the norm of discourse—the requirement that all persons should be able to contribute to public debates about justice and politics—*trumps* those cultural norms that would deny this ability to any or all of its members. Consequently, groups that deny that certain of their members should access political debates will get a rough ride in Deveaux’s polity. This is, of course, as it should be. What is interesting, though, is that they get a rough ride for precisely the same reasons that they would in a conventional liberal polity, circumscribed by individual rights.

Liberals, however, come in for a good deal of criticism from Deveaux. The problem, she thinks, is that liberals are too interested in protecting the principle of autonomy at the expense of other “cultural” values. Liberals who appear sensitive to cultural demands (like Kymlicka and Raz, for example) are criticized for only being interested in recognizing cultures that protect and support individual autonomy and that therefore fit neatly within the “limiting liberal model.” But if we take seriously Deveaux’s claims about the impor-

tance of inclusive public debate and the ability of all individuals to question those forms of authority under which they find themselves, then it becomes unclear as to how her alternative to liberalism avoids the liberal tendency to support groups that encourage this idea, and to condemn those that do not. In positing open and public deliberation among different cultural groups as the mechanism by which we should resolve questions of justice, Deveaux is required to outlaw practices that deny that all persons have an equal right to enter into public deliberation concerning those policies and principles that govern them for precisely the same reasons as liberals.

It would seem, then, that Deveaux's position fits *too* neatly into the recent multiculturalist or difference-based critique of liberalism in that, like the "alternatives" to liberalism advanced by Iris Marion Young among others, it fails to mount any critique to which it is not itself vulnerable. Hence, what we get from Deveaux is an argument that presents itself as an alternative to the dominant liberal paradigm but that is actually merely another form of that same paradigm that purports to be more sensitive to minority cultural norms but that is, in the end, rooted in a commitment to the liberal principles of individual equality and freedom. Liberalism is not inhospitable toward groups, and it is not insensitive to group norms and ways of life. It is, however, sceptical of claims that seek to afford power to groups so that they might use it to oppress and dominate their members. In positing a form of deliberative democracy as the means by which a polity might resolve political questions and conflicts, Deveaux is necessarily *joining* with liberals and many pluralists and difference-theorists in invoking those virtues, freedoms, and attitudes that make public deliberation fair and possible. While her understanding of conventional liberal theory is therefore solid, and her normative prescriptions largely persuasive and insightful, it is questionable exactly how far her argument escapes the constraints of the position she is attacking.

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Culture and Equality

Brian Barry

Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000, pp. 399

The length of Brian Barry's *Culture and Equality* makes it certain that a short review cannot do justice (egalitarian or otherwise) to either its strengths or its weaknesses. Over eight chapters, Barry attacks the main proponents of multiculturalism, criticizing both the theoretical underpinnings of their work and specific policy proposals they envisage as solutions to the problems they identify. His specific complaint is that, although many "multiculturalists" claim to be liberal, their proposals fail to uphold basic liberal norms (326). The multiculturalist position—which, for Barry ranges from the politics of difference advocated by Iris Marion Young to Will Kymlicka's liberal defence of minority rights to Chandran Kukathas' denial of the existence of cultural rights—is problematic because it "insist[s] that liberal protections for individuals should be withdrawn whenever they interfere with a minority's ability to live according to its culture" (327).

In this context, Barry's objective is to force advocates of multicultural policies to deal with a theoretically rigorous version of egalitarian liberalism. In this sense, it is an interesting and useful project, since a great deal of liberal thought is indeed currently concentrated on multicultural questions and the importance and relevance of liberal principles is often forgotten. Barry claims that it is the fact that "nobody seems to care much about the increas-

ing inequality of opportunity" (64) which worries him so much (although to claim that "nobody" is doing this work seems an exaggeration). On the other hand, as I will claim below, the strength of this book turns out not to lie in its not-so-strong defence of egalitarian liberalism, but (ironically) in Barry's contribution to the multiculturalist debate in the form of an emphasis on exit options.

Throughout *Culture and Equality*, Barry takes for granted—and so fails to demonstrate—the superiority of egalitarian liberalism, and this gives rise to a range of difficulties in the book. Each of the book's eight chapters deals with a particular issue or issue-set associated with the "multiculturalist" position, and so he deals separately with group rights, with the liberal approach to illiberal religions, and with the abuse of culturally based argumentation, among others. In each chapter, egalitarian liberalism is posited as the only simultaneously theoretical *and* practical position that does not fall victim to logical inconsistencies and, so, to the "hideous" consequences he claims rise from the multiculturalist position in its extreme. His most repeated claim against Kukathas, for example, takes the form of the following: "And if we are prepared to allow parents to deny life-saving medical treatment to their children, why should they not be able to kill them?" (145); this reference is part way through a section devoted to criticizing Kukathas which is filled with similar comments. Yet, even in the section in which Barry claims that he will "explicitly put the case of the liberal universalism whose validity I have so far assumed" to the test, he fails to live up to the promise. Instead, through this section, he takes an almost dogmatic approach, making generalized statements about what is and is not consistent with liberalism, claiming, for example, that "compromise over liberal principles is not, and cannot be, a liberal value" (283).

The consequence of failing to offer even an outline of the egalitarian liberal solution to the problem is two-fold. First, the theorists he considers most—Young, Kymlicka, Charles Taylor, Michael Walzer and Kukathas—are presented piecemeal, so that it is difficult to get a full sense of Barry's position on them. This difficulty is compounded by Barry's unfair rendering of the "multiculturalist" arguments, in particular in the sense that he tends to paint them all with the same brush. He pays no attention, for example, to the fact that Kukathas, subjected to some of Barry's most brutal tongue-lashing (as it were), also argues rigorously against Young's theoretical and practical suggestions. Moreover, Barry tends to use the term "culture" as a catch-all term, to include a range of identities (religious, ethnic, sexual) which are deliberately treated differently by the theorists he critiques. It is only rhetorically, then, that readers can be clear on Barry's reaction to the "multiculturalist" position. Although he notes surprise that the theoretical work on multiculturalism has not yet sunk "under the weight of its intellectual weaknesses" (6)—in particular, he writes, since in the main the problems identified by multiculturalists are "invented out of nothing" (317)—he remains highly selective around the weaknesses he himself targets for critique.

At the end of the book, Barry finally admits an understanding of the context in which "multiculturalist" demands have emerged: "Undoubtedly, a significant source of support for the multiculturalist cause has been despair at the prospects of getting broad-based egalitarian policies adopted" (326). The late-date admission, however, does little to assuage the frustration a reader might experience with Barry's mistreatment of focused, well-articulated political theory that attempts to grapple with the failures of liberal institutions in granting both respect and opportunities for political participation to those marginalized by the majority. Barry offers no institutional solutions (other

than the removal of all policies implemented on “multiculturalist” grounds) designed to deal with as of yet unresolved and often justified claims of injustice made by advocates of various multicultural policies. In the end, then, readers are left without a sense of the liberal egalitarian solution at all.

Unfortunately, Barry’s concept of “civic nationality” suffers a similar fate (80). He introduces the concept as an alternative to the thick conceptions of culture and nationality he claims pervade the “multiculturalist” literature. His conception, it would seem, is meant to concede that certain cultural traits must be shared in a given political association, so that an immigrant (say) would have to adopt these in order to “belong.” Identity, for Barry, is chosen (though he admits the choice is “not necessarily one consciously taken”), and this reflects Barry’s general position that identity, whether culturally or religiously based, must be conceived, analytically if not actually, as a voluntary association (147-54). Not only, however, is the discussion of the contents of civic nationality thin and unsatisfactory; it ignores the complexities of what may sometimes be a choice, but is certainly a difficult one fraught with moral ambiguity (and so gives rise to the literature that Barry critiques). Thus, although Barry is convinced that Kymlicka’s conception of “societal culture” is riddled with difficulties, it remains the case that Barry fails to offer a convincing case for rejecting Kymlicka’s eminently plausible claim that access to one’s own flourishing culture is important to most people, since it provides the context in which most people exercise their autonomy.

The emphasis on the voluntary nature of identity, even though in Barry’s formulation it tends to underplay the (felt) strength of cultural ties in many people’s lives, gives rise to what I think is Barry’s substantial contribution to debates about multiculturalism: his emphasis on exit options. In a very real sense, he builds on Kukathas’ preliminary theorizing on exit options, and argues convincingly that ensuring a genuine exit option for members of a cultural group requires emphasizing certain background conditions in the society in which cultures operate. While Kukathas argues that an exit option is the only right to which members of cultural groups may be entitled, Barry adds the plausible claim that ensuring real exit options requires ensuring a set of background conditions, including, for example, the requirement of minimal educational attainment for children being raised in orthodox religions.

Thus, while it may not be true to most people’s experiences of, in particular, illiberal cultures and religions, to suggest that they may voluntarily leave, Barry offers an answer to a question that liberals who defend tolerant attitudes towards illiberal cultures (both within and external to the state) have difficulty with; that is, the question of whether or not it is consistent with liberal principles to intervene when cultures deprive their members of options that are meant to be available to all citizens of liberal regimes. To accommodate diversity in a liberal regime, we must “eliminate gratuitous barriers to exit from groups,” and to do so, public policy may be directed towards ensuring, “as far as possible that members of associations have real exit options available to them” (148, 149). As with most discussions in his book, however, Barry’s comments on exit options are scattered throughout the chapters, so a full understanding of his position must be reconstructed by the reader (see, for example, his discussions at 128, 157-59, 165, 189-90 and 239-45). The consequence of these discussions, nevertheless, is a fairly complete picture, both theoretically and practically, of the importance of exit options in a liberal society concerned with accommodating diversity.

Culture and Equality is nothing if not provocative and contains many sensible criticisms of multiculturalist theorizing of late. Barry offers a genuinely challenging liberal egalitarian response to a range of theoretical and

practical suggestions—some good and some bad—which have emerged in recent years to deal with complaints of cultural marginalization from minority groups. In the end, however, in his attempts to counter virtually all attempts at accommodating diversity, Barry fails to discredit most of them.

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Justice is Conflict

Stuart Hampshire

Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000, pp. xiii, 98

Stuart Hampshire's *Justice is Conflict* is a short, insightful and timely book. Hampshire makes it clear in the beginning of the book that his main concern is conflict and the regulation of it. He contrasts his approach to the issue of justice with Plato's account. In *The Republic*, Plato draws an analogy between conflict and justice in the divided minds of individuals and in the class-divided city. In both of these cases Plato believes that justice consists in reason imposing a harmony of the parts. Hampshire argues that Plato is right to make the analogy between the soul and city and that this analogy best explains the concept of justice. What Hampshire rejects is the claim that justice consists in any kind of harmony and consensus. Such a harmony will never exist, argues Hampshire, either in the soul or in the city. Hampshire also rejects the approach advocated by many contemporary liberals, especially John Rawls, of appealing to some sort of "overlapping consensus" on the principles of substantive justice. Such an approach bypasses what Hampshire takes to be the important political problem of our time—the relation between two kinds of society: "On the one hand, self-consciously traditional societies and governments, where priests of the church or rabbis or imams or mullahs, and other experts in the will of God, maintain a single conception of the good that determines the way of life of the society as a whole; and on the other hand, the liberal democratic societies and governments that permit, or encourage, a plurality of conceptions of the good" (23–24).

One only has to reflect briefly on the main events of the past few months to see that Hampshire's diagnosis of the importance of this dilemma is perceptive. How are we to resolve the fundamental disagreements that arise, not only between citizens of a liberal society, but between liberal and non-liberal societies? Hampshire argues that the solution to these moral conflicts lies not in an appeal to justice and fairness in matters of substance, but an appeal to justice and fairness in matters of procedure. Hampshire's rejection of the former is partly inspired by David Hume's belief "that opinions about substantive justice and the other virtues arise from, and are explained by, natural and widespread human sentiments greatly modified by very variable customs and social histories" (37). Those who appeal to some form of moral universalism fail to recognize that the diversity and divisiveness of languages and of cultures and of local loyalties is an essential and deep part of human nature. International conflicts will not be resolved by declarations of universal principles. What is needed, argues Hampshire, are institutions and recognized procedures. "Fairness and justice in procedures are the only virtues that can reasonably be considered as setting norms to be universally respected" (53).

Moral universalism, such as utilitarianism, is, like monotheism, rejected by Hampshire because "rationality in politics, and hence procedural justice, requires, as a condition of its existence, the convergence of several minds working together in shared practices" (71). Institutions play a crucial role in bringing about this convergence of minds and Hampshire argues that "human

beings are habituated to recognize the rules and conventions of the institutions within which they have been brought up, including the conventions of their family life" (54). But it is exactly this fact that raises doubts about the viability of the procedural account of justice Hampshire defends. If, as Hampshire argues throughout *Justice is Conflict*, justice requires that we "hear the other side," the prospect of resolution looks dim when the institutional arrangements of many cultures are antithetical to the norm of rationality in argument that Hampshire appeals to. The two elements of procedural justice Hampshire notes—a universal requirement of two-sidedness and respect for locally established and familiar rules of procedure—appear complementary when one considers democratic cultures that have political arrangements that internalize the norm "hear the other side." But what about those societies that internalize the norm—"infidels must be punished"? This takes us back to the problem of the relation between liberal and non-liberal societies. Hampshire believes that an appeal to justice in procedure offers the best hope of resolving conflict. But what a society regards as a fair and just procedure will be shaped largely by the moral ideals embedded in its main institutions. If, as Hampshire maintains, the particular procedure employed to resolve a dispute must be "chosen to be, or to become, the regular one" (53), then it is difficult to see how Hampshire's approach could be applied to resolve the intractable conflicts that currently dominate international affairs. Hampshire might reply to this concern by arguing, as he does in *Justice is Conflict*, that "a feeling for procedural justice and fairness for rationality is grounded in human nature" (72). He adopts a pragmatic attitude and claims that "everyone uses the balancing of pros and cons in his own mind in the pursuit of his own conception of the good, as well as in common prudence, in pursuit of his own interests" (42). But the atrocities that many societies commit against even their own citizens makes me sceptical about the viability of Hampshire's approach. Those who reject the democratic values of toleration and equal respect will have drastically different conceptions of what constitutes a fair and just procedure that they are willing to be bound by. I doubt that much can be achieved through procedural justice if there is little consensus on the principles of substantive justice to begin with.

COLIN FARRELLY *University of Birmingham*

Boundaries and Justice: Diverse Ethical Perspectives

David Miller and Sohail H. Hashmi, eds.

Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001, pp. xi, 367

The objective of this commendable collection of essays is nothing short of extraordinary: it presents eight ethical perspectives, with eight concomitant reviews, each of which tackles the ticklish problem of boundary definition in matters of property ownership and political ordering. As if it were not sufficient to undertake this ambitious project in one book, notions of autonomy and diversity (or the lack thereof) in various traditions are also considered, however cursorily. The traditions represented are described, both in the introductory and concluding chapters, as falling into two categories. On the one hand, there are secular liberal perspectives, falling under the rubric of classical liberalism, international law and liberal egalitarianism. On the other hand, certain perspectives rooted in religious traditions or communal understandings are also depicted. These include Christianity, Confucianism, Islam, Judaism and natural law.

The essays are at their best when the author conveys a thorough under-

standing of an assigned tradition, and from this firm grounding, puts forth a thesis about how that tradition might evolve. In this respect, the essays by Lomasky, Novak, Kymlicka, and Boyle are among the finest in the collection. Writing of classical liberalism, Loren Lomasky's essay summarizes the respects in which boundaries offend individual freedom, while he also enumerates circumstances in which boundaries are defensible. He concludes by endorsing "soft boundaries" among nation-states as a means of reconciling the benefits of political boundaries with the burdens these impose on individual choice. David Novak, in depicting the Judaic tradition, demonstrates an impressive knowledge of biblical and historical influences as he outlines Judaic conceptions of ownership and boundaries. In concluding, he considers the political challenges currently facing the state of Israel, given non-Jewish residents within its borders, and proposes that juridical control could justifiably be given to such residents. Will Kymlicka tackles the difficult project of justifying boundaries among cultural or linguistic groups with principles of liberal egalitarianism. His intriguing solution is to allow for national distinctiveness, with caveats, and to promote a redistributive tax from wealthy to poor nations. Joseph Boyle advances the Thomist natural law tradition by defending territorial boundaries as necessary for the common good, and the intrinsic good of individuals. At the same time, he contends that wealth redistribution is justifiable where individuals cannot adequately address the needs of others.

The excellence of these works is separable from the issue of whether one agrees with the aspects of these traditions emphasized or with the proposals put forth. In many respects, I disagree with them. So too, in reviewing Novak's essay, Noam J. Zohar disagrees with the extent to which Novak emphasizes boundaries between Jews and non-Jews. Russell Hardin challenges the coherence and moral defensibility of Will Kymlicka's vision of liberal egalitarianism. Jeremy Rabkin fleshes out some of the less palatable implications of Joseph Boyle's endorsement of wealth redistribution. The point remains that these essays, and those of their critics, are fine depictions of their respective genres. These disagreements enhance one's overall appreciation of the complexities of each tradition.

Not all of the essays in this collection fully live up to this standard. There are a small number of instances in which the author assigned to represent a tradition does not adequately convey the normative impulses that underlie it, or interprets the tradition idiosyncratically. Robert McCorquodale, for instance, does not attempt seriously to put forward a case for sovereign states in international law. Without carefully articulating the pros, as well as the cons, of state sovereignty, the conclusion he draws is somewhat hackneyed: "The language of international law in relation to territorial boundaries must be in terms of an international society that is inclusive of all, allows all to find and use their voices, is creative of identity opportunities, and recognizes diversity within the universality of international society" (155-56). So too, Hillel Steiner, in commenting on Loren Lomasky's essay on classical liberalism, is idiosyncratic in suggesting that Kant and Locke could be construed to support the creation of a global fund, in which everyone in the world would be entitled to an unconditional basic income (84-85).

The book concludes on a high note as Daniel Philpott imposes order on the essays, while respecting the tensions within each tradition. He finds a pattern in the collage by deploying the political theorist's distinction of thin and thick conceptions of the good, and aligning secular liberal perspectives on the former side of the divide and religious (or communal) conceptions on the latter. From this, he draws the plausible conclusion that secular liberal concep-

tions tend to find boundaries troublesome because of their universal concern for all humanity, and can justify them, if at all, only on instrumental grounds. Religious or communal perspectives are, in his view, more capable of defending boundaries associated with political order (358).

Although this is a satisfactory account, it might equally be worthwhile to consider how the very questions raised by this book presuppose its answers, and foreshadow the tensions it finds. By focusing on the problem of boundaries, and examining this issue from diverse perspectives, the book premises equality as its guiding norm. Without it, boundaries would pose few problems, and diverse perspectives would not necessarily be regarded as desirable. This suggests, then, another plausible conclusion: those traditions that prize equality very highly will likely find boundaries to be problematic; they may also, and somewhat paradoxically, find it difficult to draw conclusions as to the permissibility of boundaries in light of diverse perspectives on the matter. Those traditions for which equality is not a value that trumps all others are less apt to encounter this dilemma.

SEANA SUGRUE *James Madison Program, Princeton University*

Intervening in Africa: Superpower Peacemaking in a Troubled Continent.

Herman J. Cohen

New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000, pp. vii, 268

The end of the Cold War was accompanied by significant turbulence that extended well beyond the former Soviet states. It also posed serious challenges to decision-makers forced to respond to a multitude of civil wars and other armed conflicts, nowhere more so than in sub-Saharan Africa. For the United States, the period 1989-1993 presented a particular set of dilemmas. On the one hand, its new status as "sole superpower" freed up sizable resources to focus on constructive conflict management and economic development, even when core national interests were not obviously threatened. On the other hand, it also left the US with a special responsibility and weight to enhance peace and stability in Africa that it assumed with significant ambivalence and haphazardness.

Herman Cohen's self-described practitioner's memoir (xii) provides the reader with a detailed analysis of the working level of US leadership (or lack thereof) in seven African civil wars during his tenure as assistant secretary of state for Africa under President George Bush. In the course of detailed case studies of US responses to armed conflicts in Ethiopia, Sudan, Angola, Liberia, Rwanda, Mozambique and Somalia, Cohen paints a vivid picture of the consequences of a superpower's decision to "make conflict resolution and democratization the centerpieces of [our] African policy" (3). Cohen shows how the Bush administration was motivated in part by the need to develop a new working relationship with the former Soviet Union (5), as expressed by its interventions in Ethiopia and Angola in particular. Domestic interest groups were exerting pressure on the administration to act either for strategic or humanitarian reasons (as in Sudan and Somalia, for example) or because of close historic ties (Liberia). Budgetary constraints and a certain amount of "disaster fatigue" (206) further shaped US responses, for example in Mozambique where the US had already invested millions in humanitarian assistance or in Somalia. US interventions in these conflicts produced very mixed results. Cohen distinguishes between "mature" wars (Angola, Ethiopia, Sudan and Mozambique) and "new" wars (Liberia, Rwanda and

Somalia) in explaining some of the variation—suggesting that US interventions in the former were more “productive” (10). And yet, even among the mature cases, only one—Mozambique—has maintained a trajectory of stable peace and development.

What emerges from Cohen’s memoirs is an anatomy of rather messy bureaucratic politics in action, but one that laid the foundation for subsequent initiatives both by the Clinton administration and international organizations. US policy toward Africa was not formalized until late 1992 and signed by President Bush as National Security Decision Directive on January 15, 1993 (15). Cohen early on justifies this ad hoc approach to policy making on the premise of the uniqueness of each conflict and the need for flexible, sometimes risky responses that would have been difficult to mount in the face of rigorous interagency scrutiny and authorization procedures. Cynics of course might take that to mean that it also provided this administration with a high degree of autonomy and greater freedom from standards of accountability in formulating its intervention (or non-intervention) strategies. For example, as we have only recently learned through the release of declassified documents, the US had much better intelligence and sufficient knowledge to prevent the Rwandan genocide. Cohen admits as much himself but downplays the degree of US culpability (180). Similarly, in the case of Angola the US role is one that perhaps deserves more critical scrutiny both in terms of armed support for UNITA and by extension the relationship with Zairian dictator and regional strongman Mobutu Sese Seko.

Cohen concludes his survey of US involvement in the seven African civil wars with a set of lessons learned. In keeping with the US policy practitioner’s lens applied by Cohen, these lessons focus mostly on the internal machinations of policy making, including such factors as decision making and willpower at the working level, the role of the network of US embassies and the involvement of the US national security community (220ff). Beyond the interagency dimensions, Cohen does address the importance of timing (early better than late) interventions, inclusiveness of all parties to a conflict, and the involvement of multilateral organizations (222). He attributes central importance to US moral influence as well as the injection of US expertise and material resources at critical stages of negotiation processes (219).

This book contributes to our understanding of African conflicts and US interventionism most notably through its detailed portrayal of US foreign policy making and bureaucratic processes. Beyond that it reminds us of the pitfalls of US involvement in these very complex situations under conditions of uncertainty and transition (the post-Cold War era). Two stand out in particular: the often one-dimensional approach to multidimensional conflicts (for example, signature obsession at the expense of workable substance in peace negotiations) and the ambivalence in US policy stances toward aspects of African armed conflicts, such as cross-border assistance to rebels or refugees. This ambivalence, combined with the weight of US influence, not only has led to unintended consequences of superpower peacemaking such as the collapse of the Ethiopian army but also to a very high cost of African and other lives. Cohen rightly cites the African saying: “When the elephant walks by the village, the grass gets crushed” (59).

CAROLA WEIL *University of Maryland*

Governance in a Globalizing World

Joseph S. Nye and John D. Donahue, eds.

Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2000, pp. xiii, 386

This book is a compilation of essays from the Visions of Governance for the 21st Century project at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. The authors are drawn from several disciplines—Economics, Political Science, Public Policy, Philosophy—and all save Robert Keohane are associated with the Kennedy School. Joseph Nye and Keohane, the authors of the introductory chapter, pose three questions as the focus of the volume. How are patterns of governance in the first half of the twenty-first century likely to evolve? How do changes in these patterns affect governance previously associated with the nation-state? How might “globalism” itself be governed?

After the introductory chapter, the sectioning of the book follows these questions. The first section on “Trends in Globalization” contains studies of the economy (Jeffrey Frankel), national and international security (Graham Allison), the environment (William C. Clark), culture and society (Neal M. Rosendorf) and communication (Viktor Mayer-Schönberger and Deborah Hurley). The second section examines “The Impact on Domestic Governance” with chapters on cosmopolitan citizens (Pippa Norris), the developing world (Merilee Grindle), China (Tony Saich), public administration reform (Elaine Ciulla Kamarck), and legal transplantation (Frederick Schauer). The final section turns to the “Governance of Globalism” and includes chapters on NGOs (L. David Brown and three others), the design of international institutions (Cary Coglianese), culture, identity and legitimacy (Arthur I. Applbaum), information policy (Hurley and Schönberger), and economic globalization (Rodrik).

The introductory chapter by Keohane and Nye proposes a framework for these questions and thus the three sections. First, they distinguish between globalism (“a state of the world involving networks of interdependence at multicontinental distances” (2) and “globalization and deglobalization;” the “increase or decline of globalism” (2). They then proceed to distinguish four broad dimensions of globalism—economic, military, environmental, and social and cultural—dimensions analyzed in section one of the book. Recognizing that globalism has been occurring for centuries, they pose the question: what is novel about the contemporary form? Drawing on the work of British scholars, they argue that globalism is becoming increasingly “thick”: relations are more extensive, intensive and developing at ever increasing rates of speed (David Held et al., *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture* [Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999]). Somewhat controversially perhaps, they add that globalism is “America-centric” in the sense that most of its impetus comes from the United States. They conclude their chapter by arguing that the most effective form of governance is likely to be one of “networked minimalism”: “networked” because globalism itself is networked rather than hierarchical, and “minimal” because governance at the global level will only be acceptable if it does not supersede national governance. They then proceed to discuss issues of legitimacy and democracy in relationship to networked minimalism.

The book as a whole does not address systematically the three general questions posed by Keohane and Nye. The chapters in section one do not address systematically the ambitious question posed the evolution of globalism over the next half century. The chapters in section two do focus better on the question posed, but the topics selected seem to represent the interests of the authors available, rather than providing a systematic overview of domestic

governance. The chapters in section three do a better job of focusing on the core question posed. Surprisingly, relatively few chapters use Keohane's and Nye's conceptual framework, with the result that the meaning of globalization varies from one chapter to another. Accordingly, there is an unevenness to the chapters and, without a conclusion, there is not a concerted attempt to reflect on the core questions in the light of each author's work. Some chapters are far too America-centric. For example, that by Rosendorf on cultural globalization focuses exclusively on "the global cultural power of the United States" (110), with the argument that "free speech, entertainment and entrepreneurship have been the engine of American global dominance in mass media" (124). This perspective is a rather narrow one on the globalization of cultures, a more apt term than cultural globalization. If readers are interested in particular subject areas, the chapters by Frankel, Schönberger and Hurley, Norris, Grindle, Saich, Brown et al. and Rodrik are provocative and well-argued. The others vary in quality and make smaller contributions to the growing globalization literature.

WILLIAM D. COLEMAN *McMaster University*

Ideologies of Globalization: Contending Visions of a New World Order

Mark Rupert

New York: Routledge, 2000, pp. xvi, 187

Written from a Gramscian perspective, *Ideologies of Globalization* provides a detailed analysis of United States discourse surrounding globalization. At stake is the definition of an American "common sense" about this subject. Canadian readers should find the book's focus on the United States useful. Long accustomed to the imagery of being "in bed with an elephant," Mark Rupert provides us an opportunity to assess that beast's frame(s) of mind on an important issue.

In Rupert's view, there are three contenders in the battle of ideas within the US. First, there is the transnational historic bloc that promotes globalization—multinational corporations, their political allies, and the mainstream economics profession which provides the theoretical underpinning for the globalization project. Second, labour and other progressive social movements challenge many of the project's key assumptions. Finally, right-wing populists are frequently hostile to globalization, for different reasons than those that motivate the labour/social movement coalition. One of the strengths of Rupert's study is that, while highly critical of the last group, he does take them seriously. Their "distorted populism" (120) is the product of real social conditions which produce their perception that their interests are being sacrificed to those of a remote, increasingly international power elite. Thus they are part of the discourse. Rupert's investigation reveals little common ground between the opponents, a factor that assists proponents of globalization.

Neoliberal globalism is presented as the hegemonic project of a transnational historic bloc in which US industrial and, especially, finance capital plays the dominant role. The hegemony of this bloc is seen as continuous over the postwar period but, unlike its earlier "Fordist" manifestation, the current globalization rendition is depicted as fragile and contested. This is because the long association between liberal capitalism, "Americanism" and democracy, on the one hand, and the general good and prosperity, on the other, is becoming more difficult to sustain.

On the latter point, liberal internationalism's globalization project, in the minds of its supporters, is similar to the postwar Marshall Plan in that there is

a linkage between “renewed capital accumulation, more widespread prosperity, and a reconstructed world order hospitable to American values and forms of social organization” (27). Underpinning this view is the economic theory of comparative advantage which holds that liberalization of trade and investment is a positive sum game which encourages economic specialization. The result is that all gain, even if not always equally. Opposition to this “law” of economics is dismissed either as self-interested rent-seeking behaviour or as the ranting of economic illiterates.

Why then, given the political predominance and ideological assurance of this bloc, is the neoliberal globalization hegemonic project proving more vulnerable than its Fordist predecessor? Rupert’s answer is that significant sectors of society whose interests were addressed in the Fordist period, now see themselves as harmed or abandoned. Equally importantly, the ideological foundation of cross-class integration that the Cold War had provided is no longer operative. Thus labour, integrated as a junior partner in the postwar project, is now under assault. Working-class living standards and economic security, despite relatively full employment in the US, seem less assured than formerly. The impact of stagnant real earnings, when combined with the burden imposed by cutting and privatizing public services, fall disproportionately on women. This increases the prospect of class and gender divisions playing mutually reinforcing roles in the development of a counter-hegemonic coalition. The Cold War’s easy black and white imagery of the world had consolidated internal solidarity. But it has ceased to have resonance. Rupert believes that in the late 1990s, the social forces promoting globalization became sufficiently concerned about the eroding bases of hegemony, especially when reinforced by the turbulence associated with the Mexican and East Asian crises of the 1990s, that they initiated a strategy of “passive revolution,” or social reform from above. This was designed to promote globalization “with a human face,” and involved greater consultation with selected NGOs. The book was published between the World Trade Organization meetings in Seattle and the events of September 11, 2001. It would have been interesting to have had the author’s assessment of the latter’s impact, for example, on the extent that the war on terror is capable of serving as a functional equivalent of the Cold War in promoting national solidarity. As it is, it remains to be seen whether the volume will stand as an historical study of a process irretrievably changed by public reactions to the events of September 11, 2001, or an analysis of a process interrupted by, but continuing beyond those events. Either way, it is a useful addition to the bookshelf on globalization.

STEPHEN MCBRIDE *Simon Fraser University*

The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise of Communism

Daniel C. Thomas

Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001, pp. 288

Several years ago, while visiting Berlin, I happened across one of the last remnants of the Berlin Wall. The standing slab of concrete was completely covered with graffiti, but one message struck me as remarkable: “Trophy of Human Rights.”

Now we have a splendid book that provides a detailed historical and theoretical analysis of the claim that the anonymous graffiti writer had only intuited, namely that “the Kremlin reforms that dismantled the coercive capacities of the Soviet party-state were driven in large part by domestic and

international demands for compliance with human rights norms, not by Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative or even by the declining productivity of central planning" (285-86).

Daniel Thomas' work is an important contribution to the growing literature on the role of norms and transnational social movements in international politics. It extends the work of authors such as Martha Finnemore, Jeffrey Checkel, Kathryn Sikkink, Audie Klotz, Anne Marie Clark, and others, by providing an account of how the 1975 Helsinki Final Act set in motion a political dynamic that de-legitimized political repression within the Eastern Bloc thus providing the political space for democratic opposition movements to emerge in the former Soviet domains that were able to challenge successfully Communist Party rule. This study also puts another chink in the armour of realist theory in international relations by demonstrating how norms matter in international politics. Thomas provides a compelling argument as to why constructivist theory provides a better explanation than either realism or liberalism of what is arguably the most important development in international affairs of the latter half of the twentieth century, the collapse of communism.

A central theoretical puzzle arises from the question: Why do states agree to place themselves under of norms that can be used by internal dissidents and geopolitical adversaries to criticize those same states? According to constructivist theories of international relations of the kind favoured by Thomas, "actors seek to behave in accordance with norms relevant to their identities" (13). The identities of states are constructed through interaction with domestic social movements as well as through pressures from other states and transnational social movements. State actors have multiple identities of varying degrees of salience, and many states will attempt to negotiate the gap between their domestic identities and their desired international identities by signing international human rights conventions as a means of gaining legitimacy while having no intention of fulfilling their terms in their domestic arenas. But by doing this they open themselves to the charge of hypocrisy.

In Thomas' view, the key driver of the Helsinki process was the emergence of a common European identity based upon respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. Unlike some other accounts of the Helsinki process that focus on the role of United States foreign policy, and domestic pressures in the US for more liberal Jewish emigration, Thomas takes great pains to show that both the US and the Soviet Union were reluctant to place the issue of human rights on the agenda of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), but the European Community insisted on it because they had come to see a commitment to human rights as central to a common European identity. The Copenhagen Declaration of European Identity (1973) explains the motivation of the Europeans, but not that of the Soviet Union and its satellites. For them it was mainly the desire to gain the economic benefits of closer integration with Western Europe in the hope of rescuing their failing economies. But while Washington refused to take Basket III issues seriously, the Europeans insisted that the Eastern states could not become part of Europe without accepting respect for human rights as part of the package.

Thomas' scholarship is impressive. His narrative draws on extensive interviews with key players in the United States, Western Europe, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and the Soviet Union. He tells the story of diplomatic negotiations that led up to the signing of Helsinki Final Act on August 1, 1975 in considerable detail, but the real heart of the book is the account he gives of the ways in which the meaning of the Helsinki Final Act was taken up by dissident groups within Eastern Europe who "resolved to reframe the

meaning of Helsinki by focusing on its human rights components in ‘upward’ appeals to the Communist authorities and ‘outward’ appeals to Western governments, media, and NGOs. In other words, whatever the Communist governments had intended by signing the Final Act, the dissident activists would invoke the formal commitment to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms *as if it had been sincere*” (99). The Helsinki Final Act served as a catalyst to the mobilization of grass-roots social movements in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union such as the Moscow Helsinki Group, the Workers’ Defence Committee (KOR), Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia, and the Solidarity movement in Poland. As these social movements became emboldened to express dissent openly, the state authorities found themselves faced by an uncomfortable dilemma: they could either enact political reforms of the kind the dissidents were demanding, and thus loosen their grip on power, or they could engage in direct repression, thus opening themselves to greater domestic and international criticism further de-legitimizing their rule.

Eventually the unexpected power of human rights norms to reshape national identities and their quest for legitimation within “a common European home” forced the Communist Party elites in the Eastern Bloc to change their outlooks and policies, and contributed to Mikhail Gorbachev’s reforms, which led to the unravelling of the Soviet empire. While realists see national interests as permanent, constructivists see them as politically contested expressions of national identities that can change over time due to both internal and external pressures. The value that states place on recognition and legitimation “produces preferences that cannot be reduced to instrumental calculations of material gain or political power, and negotiating behavior cannot be explained by traditional cost-benefit analysis” (267). Ethical norms, identity and ideas do matter in politics. In the words of US Ambassador Leonard Garment, “Perhaps we in the West, who pay such frequent tribute to the worth of ideas, should be a little embarrassed that at the time of Helsinki we entertained such a low opinion of their power” (257). It is unlikely that many will continue to hold a low opinion of the power of norms after reading this book.

MORTON WINSTON *The College of New Jersey*

The International Political Economy of the Environment

Dimitris Stevis and Valerie J. Assetto, eds.

Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2001, pp. viii, 309

This book is an excellent collection of chapters in its area. It is stimulating, timely and will be a valuable resource for those interested in its important issues. The editors have aimed to promote “cohesion and synergies” in the book among the contributor chapters. (viii). The editors provide an introduction about their “critical perspective” on the international political economy of the environment. They write that much of the literature “does not address questions of social purpose—that is, the ways in which the framing of environmental problems and solutions reflects particular standpoints, values, and preferences” (2). The editors also write that “The measure of success of critical analysis is the degree to which it can provide more inclusive accounts of how the world is organized, what its dynamics are, and how it can be changed toward more democracy and equity” (2). We should be grateful for the efforts of the authors, both editors and contributors, while also noting that these efforts are perhaps more elaborated in their descriptive, interpretive and explanatory aspects than in their normative aspects. The issues are (as the

authors appearing in the volume probably all know but emphasize in varying degrees) centrally both about what is and about what ought to be. This book deals with topics that should be addressed in an account of normatively adequate democratic legitimacy. Some authors here do indicate possibilities for generating what they take to be improved solutions to basic political and economic problems (while also, as indicated above, encouraging more awareness of the ways in which problems are framed). Examining development and environment together, as this book does, situating these in a framework showing cognizance of increasing globalization and its ever-changing organizational structures, is enormously valuable.

Among contributors, Rosalind Irwin's historical account of changing paradigms in environmental politics is very useful. Marc Williams insightfully writes about trade liberalization and the environment. Daniel Egan and David Levy, drawing on work by Antonio Gramsci and Robert Cox (among others) informatively discuss climate change, and offer a perspective that interestingly allows for options in critique and effective resistance to problematic trends in climate change and policy about climate change. (Robert Cox is an influential presence in work by several contributors here.) Peter Newell discusses in a very valuable way both broadly theoretical questions and possible practical strategies for implementing critical perspectives on the environment. Like other authors, he raises questions about legitimacy in governance. He writes in his conclusion: "The theoretical implications of the relationships described here . . . contribute to a more comprehensive global political economy of the environment. They offer a less state-centered reading of the important dynamics in global environmental politics by focusing on the interaction of economic agents with nonstate environmental actors. They highlight the need to transcend narrow and restrictive definitions of international environmental politics that reify interstate accords as the only appropriate and legitimate mechanism for addressing environmental problems" (104). Newell's and other investigations in the book invite supplementation by further elaboration of the theory and practice of normative legitimacy in environmental policy making. Marian Miller, interpreting British domestic (English) enclosure and British colonialism in Kenya, as well as issues about global commodification of local knowledge of the neem tree in India, presents some very suggestive comparisons. Valerie de Campos Mello offers a very useful analysis and critique of liberal globalization and environmental policy in Brazil. Barbara Lynch's comparison of environmental and developmental watershed issues in the Dominican Republic and in Cuba is fruitful. Gabriela Kutting interestingly discusses transboundary air pollution. Eric Laffiere proposes a radical ecological perspective. Commentaries by Frederick Buttel and Timothy Luke, and a conclusion by the editors Dimitris Stevis and Valerie Assetto span in valuable ways concerns in various chapters.

In sum, this volume has serious and engaged scholarship on some of the most urgent and deepest political and economic problems facing the world today. The viewpoints expressed in the book contribute to a broad and pragmatically directed conversation about the international political economy of the environment. The richness of empirical detail in the book about history, agreements, and organizations, and the willingness to connect these topics with broader normative issues, while these broader issues need further examination by us all, are admirable. Thus, this book deserves high praise.

EDWARD SANKOWSKI *University of Oklahoma*