

The Political Economy of Terrorism. By Walter Enders and Todd Sandler. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 292p. \$65.00 cloth, \$23.99 paper. DOI: 10.1017/S1537592707071332

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The study of terrorism has come a long way since the pioneering research in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The events of 9/11 have greatly accelerated the proliferation of books and articles on a topic that is now of major academic and policy concern. Throughout the development of research, there has been a growing attempt to apply empirical and methodological approaches to understanding the causes, dynamics, and outcomes of terrorism. Walter Enders and Todd Sandler have been at the forefront of this work, and their book, *The Political Economy of Terrorism*, is a fine illustration of their continuing research agenda.

At the outset, the authors note that they are utilizing an economic approach to the study of terrorism and emphasize that “in economics rationality is not judged by objectives and norms of acceptable behavior but by the manner in which an agent responds to environmental and other constraints. *By responding in a sensible and predictable fashion to changing risks, terrorists are judged to be rational*” (p. 11, italics in original). Based on this contention, the authors bring their expertise in political economy to provide a degree of analytical order to what the public often views to be mindless violence.

After providing a succinct history of terrorism, the authors address the fundamental dilemma liberal democracies face in dealing with terrorism: How does a democratic state reconcile the protection of civil liberties while at the same time provide the public with the necessary security in the face of terrorists’ threats and actions? It is instructive to note that the authors find that there are diminishing returns in regards to counterterrorism measures: “Each additional sacrifice of freedom gains less security from terrorist attacks” (p. 32). This conclusion serves to affirm that as security measures increase, there may be an intentional or unintentional incremental loss in individual freedom. Enders and Sandler also provide a good assessment of the impact and responsibility of the media in terrorism coverage. They aptly discuss both the positive and negative aspects created by the media and now the Internet. Their discussion of “Fundamentalist Terrorists—the Fourth Wave,” cogently discusses how and why these groups seek to impose maximum casualties on the widest possible targets. The authors also address the complex issues associated with suicide bombers. Citing Jean Paul Assam’s “Suicide Bombing as an Inter-generational Investment” (*Public Choice* 122 [nos. 1–2, 2005]: 49), the authors make the case for the proposition that “if terrorists are rational . . . there must be a rationally based explanation for their willingness to make the ultimate sacrifice for the cause” (p. 49). One can accept to some degree that such

“rationality” may somehow improve the conditions of those that survive them. Although it is also plausible that “rational” terrorism is caused by degrading social conditions—such as poverty or a failure in educational processes and opportunities—that can lead to frustration and violence; indeed, such terrorism may sometimes be motivated and justified by religious convictions.

In Chapter 3, “Statistical Studies and Terrorism,” Enders and Sandler demonstrate the promise of applying statistical methodologies to the study of terrorist behaviors. Their discussion of patterns related to such methodologies is especially useful for those who wish to effectively utilize existing databases, and their use of the pioneering and continually updated data in the International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events data set (starting in 1980) is quite impressive.

Chapter 4, “Counter Terrorism,” will be of particular interest to policymakers. The authors suggest that “a more fruitful approach is to make nonterrorist activities less expensive and therefore more attractive, rather than award terrorist campaigns through concessions” (p. 108). This view supports those who would stress the need to address the underlying causes of terrorism. However, it must be noted that terrorism takes on its own dynamic and the failure to engage in peaceful resolution of conflict in too many instances may have less to do with the motivations of those who resort to terrorism than it does with their public rationalizations. Such men and women of violence, in other words, may not be reasonable in the sense that they may believe in the need for permanent conflict and violence.

Chapter 6, “International Cooperation,” can be particularly useful for those who seek to address the challenges of acting in concert against terrorism. The authors argue: “Unfortunately terrorists are often motivated to address their collective actions problems while governments are not motivated to address their common concerns” (p. 135). Jealousies regarding national sovereignty, and the view that terrorism is not significant unless it constitutes a domestic threat, will continue to act as barriers toward meaningful cooperation between states. This impediment is particularly dangerous at a time when the line between domestic and international terrorism is becoming increasingly blurred.

Chapter 9, “The Economic Impact of Terrorism,” should also be required reading for policymakers, chief executives, and others concerned about the costs of terrorism. Enders and Sandler note that “contrary to the view often expressed in the media many economists and political scientists hold the view that the U.S. macroeconomy should experience only small effects on terrorism” (p. 208). This observation provides a sobering counterpoint to often exaggerated claims about the dangers of terrorism. How does one measure the long-term, often hidden, psychological and social costs resulting from a major attack?

Chapter 10, “Homeland Security,” concludes with the view that “DHS . . . in principle . . . was a move in the right direction to improve coordination among agencies involved in homeland security and to avoid duplication” (p. 243). However, a strong case can be made for the argument that this megaorganization has actually exacerbated divisions among those responsible for countering terrorism, has not effectively supported the state and local levels, and as a result of funding based on political pork barreling rather than meaningful threat assessments has led to a very wasteful duplication and failure to achieve unity of action.

In their concluding chapter, “The Future of Terrorism,” Enders and Sandler provide a fine assessment of the continuity and change in terrorism tactics and terrorist strategies. They note that religious terrorism will lead to new and more lethal attacks. While recognizing the danger of weapons of mass destruction, they note that “the bomb will remain the terrorists’ favorite mode of attack” (p. 257).

The *Political Economy of Terrorism* is a well-researched book that affirms the validity of new approaches to the study of terrorism. It will be of particular interest to academic scholars, but its findings should be read by policymakers and others who will have to address the present and enduring threat of terrorism.

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Why has anti-Americanism become a fact of life in Europe? How is this phenomenon related to the rise of neoconservatism in the United States? These are important questions, and this new volume, based on seminars held at the University of Trento in 2003 and 2004, provides—if not the definitive answer—certainly a richer understanding of transatlantic relations.

All of the contributors argue that European discontent is the product of the unilateral turn in American foreign policy since 2000. The rise since the 1970s of conservative nationalism (neoconservatism), and the victory of George W. Bush in 2000, represented a sharp break with the liberal multilateralism of the 1940s to 1970s. The result is an increasingly striking disparity between the neoconservative vision of a unilateral and hegemonic United States and the European vision of a post-Westphalian order. This argument veers close to Robert Kagan’s belief that Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus (so long as we define Venus generously as a Kantian paradise).

In an interesting and quite provocative opening, Sergio Fabbrini argues that the shift away from a multilateral

American foreign policy is the product of a complex process whereby the epicenter of U.S. politics moved from the East Coast to the southern states—in particular Texas. Therefore, transatlantic differences reflect “radically divergent visions—nationalist, in the American case, and post- or supra-national in the European case” (p. 23).

Fabbrini’s argument that the Republican takeover of Congress in 1994 was a triumph for neoconservatism exaggerates the extent to which the Republican Party can be described as neoconservative in the 1990s. After all, many Republicans were deeply skeptical about using force to spread democracy or for nation building. At the same time, this argument neglects the role of unilateralism in historic American foreign policy. In many respects, Vietnam was a more unilateral war than the current conflict in Iraq. It is also problematic to argue that “America after September 11 is certainly a more conservative country than it has ever been in the past” (p. 26), not least because conservatives in America today accept many policies that would have been anathema to their conservative predecessors.

After the introduction, the book is divided into three parts. Part One focuses on the rise of neoconservatism in the United States. Mario Del Pero ably identifies the doctrine’s historical and ideological roots, showing why neoconservatism or “crisis internationalism” was well placed to dominate the political landscape in the wake of 9/11. In an interesting and noteworthy argument, Douglas T. Stuart demonstrates that the radical neoconservative agenda represents a response to a recurrent dilemma in U.S. foreign policy: Should the United States adapt to or transform the international environment? Meanwhile, Richard Crockatt situates neoconservatism in the various models of international order that scholars and policymakers have put forth, from the new world order of George H. W. Bush, to the thesis that America is an imperial state.

In Part Two, the book shifts focus toward the European reaction to American neoconservatism. Rob Kroes offers a very personal *cri de coeur* against the unilateral turn of the Bush administration. The essay is thought provoking but occasionally veers into the polemical, by comparing the Super Bowl in the 1990s with “the 1936 Olympics in Nazi Germany,” (p. 96) or, alternatively, depicting the Republican Party’s electoral strategy as having an “Orwellian 1984 quality” (p. 105). It is true that European protesters occasionally smash nearby McDonalds (p. 107). But they are far more likely to eat in such establishments—France is McDonald’s most profitable European subsidiary. This fact alone captures the complexity of European attitudes toward the United States and its most symbolic products.

Using content analysis, Carlo Ruzza and Emanuela Bozzini consider how peace movements have utilized anti-Americanism as a resource, alongside other intellectual traditions such as Christian pacifism. The data reveal some