

societies torn apart by the children of pride. Part 1 also includes a criticism of Carole Pateman's reading of Hobbes.

In Part 2, Slomp begins a more analytic or choice-theoretic treatment. Game theoretic approaches to Hobbes by Gauthier, Hampton, and Kavka are criticized, but so is the criticism of such approaches by Patrick Neal. Combining what she takes to be the best from both camps, Slomp redescribes the situation of rational actors in the state of nature: They are not involved in a prisoner's dilemma but are locked in an insoluble game of chicken (Who will veer off the road first?). Slomp's "Chicken with Spices" leaves players paralyzed between the demands of vainglory and the "incommensurably negative value of death."

This is followed by a chapter entitled "Hobbes's Impossibility Theorem." The reference is to Arrow's theorem by the same name, although Slomp's proof, unlike Arrow, involves the strategic interaction of game players. "*In a state of unrestricted liberty (UL), for men who regard death as the greatest evil that might occur to them (S) and know that other people, too, are concerned about their survival but might be glory-seeking (G), it is rational (R) to decide to kill, which decision, because of the equal dangerousness and vulnerability of men, is against reason (non R)*" (p. 147, emphasis original). The only way out is to introduce, *ex machina*, the all-powerful sovereign (nullifying the condition of unrestricted liberty).

Moreover, it is Slomp's innovation to suggest that rational actors living in the state of nature are themselves incapable of resolving the problem. As such, one must stand back from the conflict, in the calm of an already peaceful society where one is able to realize the need for such as sovereign. With this assertion, Slomp joins a growing crowd of Hobbes scholars who argue that the works are best seen as directed toward the minds of persons already within societies, rather than as advice for those living in the state of nature.

Slomp's game-theoretic treatments are constructed from at least one opportunistic reading of Hobbes's work. The assumption of "equal dangerousness" is drawn, in part, from Hobbes's claim that we are all equals primarily because we are capable of killing one another. In Slomp's formulation, however, equality in physical conflict must always conclude with both parties destroying one another (p. 137). Life in the state of nature may be solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short, but is it so short that we must assume every physical conflict between every two individuals always results in the death of both? The very idea that some persons seek glory through the subordination of others suggests that Hobbes knows that some individuals walk away the victor from physical conflict, even when the other side resists. Slomp hypothesizes that the state of war in the state of nature may be nothing more than a "war of minds" (p. 146), but that does not solve the problem for her game participants, who must mull the possibility of something more immediately treacherous. Such a fighter's life may not last long in comparison with Hobbes's own, but contra Slomp, it surely need not end as soon as a potentially equal opponent puts up a fight.

**The Comedy and Tragedy of Machiavelli: Essays on the Literary Works.** Edited by Vickie B. Sullivan. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000. 246p. \$40.00 cloth, \$18.00 paper.

Markus Fischer, *Georgetown University*

In addition to his well-known political tracts, Machiavelli composed a variety of comedies, poems, and familiar letters.

Literary scholars have studied these works for some time and, more recently, applied their craft to his political writings as well (e.g., Albert Russell Ascoli and Victoria Kahn, eds., *Machiavelli and the Discourse of Literature*, 1993); in their view, Machiavelli took politics to consist of rhetoric and wrote accordingly. The present volume constitutes an important rejoinder to this endeavor, insofar as its more significant essays assume that Machiavelli was a political philosopher and that his literary creations apply his political theory to the private sphere.

More explicitly, the theme that holds this collection together is the question of whether Machiavelli's literary effort tends more to comedy or tragedy. According to Arlene Saxonhouse, comedy breaks down traditional boundaries in order to open the distinct and peculiar to the common and to show the fluidity of all forms (pp. 57–8). Thus, Machiavelli's literary works are comic because they reveal the private life of respectable men and women to be a game for sexual gratification, wealth, and reputation, with success going to the clever—those who know how to assume the most effective speech and guise.

*Mandragola*, for instance, is a play that celebrates the fraud by which Callimaco exploits the aged Messer Nicia's desire for sons in order to bed his young wife Lucrezia, whose morals are corrupted by her ambitious mother and a churchman who takes the biblical story of Lot's rape by his daughters to imply that good effects excuse evil means, in evident reflection of Machiavelli's infamous advice to princes. Moreover, the fact that Lucrezia is so pleased with Callimaco's embrace that she makes him her lover and gets her grateful husband to offer him a room in their house suggests that a new order, useful and satisfying to all parties, can be constructed by letting go of moral scruples, just as Machiavelli's republic maintains internal stability by abandoning the classical idea of a community of virtue and joining nobles and commoners in the mutually rewarding pursuit of glory and empire by external conquest.

According to Harvey Mansfield, *Mandragola* portrays the moral failing of Lucrezia as the failing of Christian morality in coming to terms with the wicked deeds that many good outcomes in practice require (p. 22). Intriguingly, Mansfield raises the further possibility that Messer Nicia allowed himself to be cuckolded in order to gain respectability as the progenitor of a family, in imitation of Junius Brutus, who played crazy and used the rape of the Roman Lucretia to gain glory as the founder of the Roman republic (p. 28). In the words of Robert Faulkner, Machiavelli replaced classical comedy, which drew ethical lessons from the laughable, with a utilitarian rhetoric that constructs associations for the mutual satisfaction of desire—be they households or modern societies (pp. 53, 56).

The absence of ethical seriousness from Machiavelli's literary oeuvre also disqualifies it as tragedy in the classical sense, as Faulkner further suggests (p. 35). Tragedy signified to the ancient Greeks that the hero's unflinching pursuit of one good inevitably negated another, owing to the fundamental incoherence of reality. In the Renaissance, however, the tragic merely meant that great success was characteristically followed by abject defeat, due to man's subjection to the whims of Fortune, as Ronald Martinez avers (pp. 110–1). Accordingly, the ruin of once glorious Italy by the French and Spanish invasions constituted a tragedy, and recounting it in grave and poetic terms, as Machiavelli did, made the writer a tragedian (pp. 102–3, 116–9). But Martinez's more significant contribution consists of interpreting Machiavelli's comedies as parodies of tragic episodes from antiquity, which, in turn, suggests Italy's calamitous decline. In particular, whereas the

tale of the Roman Lucretia—who committed suicide after being compelled by Sextus Tarquinius to yield her body, which prompted the outraged Romans to overthrow the Tarquins and establish a great republic—qualifies as tragedy, the story of the Italian Lucretia amounts merely to comedy (pp. 105–7). In other words, the tragedy of Italy consists of no longer being capable of the tragic catharsis that alone could renew its body politic.

According to Michael Harvey, a similar mingling of comic and tragic strains is evident from Machiavelli's poem *L'Asino*, a tale of a man's descent into the forest of Circe. Usually, we take Machiavelli's view of sexuality as one in which men of *virtù* subdue women by fraud and force, as expressed in his famous metaphor of the prince who conquers Fortune by beating and striking her down. In *L'Asino*, however, the hero's *virtù*—in particular that of his sexual organ—shrinks before the terrifying power of Circe, revealing the anguish felt by men who must forever prove their manliness in a solitary and agonistic world (p. 133). Even more uncharacteristically, Machiavelli responds to this vulnerability with a tale in which the hero regains his *virtù* through the loving embrace of a kind and understanding woman, which offers a rare glimpse of a world of mutuality and friendship (p. 129). Here, Harvey adds an important nuance to our understanding of Machiavelli's psychology.

Susan Meld Shell rounds off this political interpretation of Machiavelli's literary works by drawing out their propositions on language. Accordingly, linguistic boundaries are shaped by political forces, as conquerors impose their tongues on the provinces they settle (pp. 83, 98). Language itself operates by the principles of politics as understood by Machiavelli. Action words are more "powerful" than articles and nouns (p. 83). Native tongues need to dominate imported words to remain beautiful (p. 87). Italy's common language does not consist of the abstract universals imagined by Dante but of the impure mix of concrete particulars used by the Italians (pp. 86–7). And the value of an idiom depends not on its aptness for expressing the worthiest things but on its practical effectiveness—hence comedy's use of coarse speech to instruct the many in useful things (p. 92).

The contributions by Mansfield, Faulkner, Saxonhouse, Shell, Martinez, and Harvey make this book highly commendable to those seeking to fathom the literary form of Machiavelli's thought. This form consists of both comedy and tragedy, shorn of their traditional moral lessons. As comedy, it reveals the noble to be a mere appearance of the vulgar and applauds the clever manipulation of appearances. As tragedy, it glorifies men who do battle with Fortune even though she will eventually ruin both them and their orders. In the final analysis, Machiavellian comedy and tragedy are but two expressions—light and grave—of a reality devoid of purposive, ethical order. Moreover, the literary form may have lured Machiavelli into giving voice to a dread that this worshipper of manly action would otherwise not admit: that a world of endless strife and contingency is a cause for despair, rather than celebration.

**Democracy and Association.** By Mark E. Warren. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001. 265p. \$55.00 cloth. \$17.95 paper.

Nancy L. Rosenblum, *Harvard University*

Mark Warren joins the lively discussion on voluntary association with a circumscribed purpose: to identify the specifically democratic effects of associations in the United States and to create a typology of groups. His goal requires him to

perform two preliminary tasks. First, he distinguishes the effects of association from a group's formal purposes and members' intentions; associations formed for a variety of goods may have democratic effects. Second, he sets his project apart from work concerned with the broader moral or socially integrative effects of association, ranging from diffuse social capital to individual virtues, as well as from theories of association that focus on political devolution and subsidiary forms of self-government. It should be said that, as in most of this literature, the political conditions that shape the ecology of associations are eclipsed, and the focus is on the one-way effects of association on political life.

What counts as a "democratic effect," how we value it, and what forms of association contribute to democracy all depend, of course, on underlying democratic theory. Warren adopts a moderate version of Habermas's spheres, distinguishing among government, market, and "life-world," which includes the social structures that support "public spheres" of opinion formation. Consensual associational relations based on neither power nor money can be found in every sphere, but the organizational form, voluntary association, which is based on social attachments and normative resources and is intrinsically communicative, dominates civil society. This framework allows the author to set aside government and business. (And with them the workplace, which is a contentious point, Warren recognizes, since work is arguably the venue that affords most adults the experience of collective action and deliberation under conditions of ethnic and racial heterogeneity.)

The Habermasian framework also emphasizes social differentiation, the "migration" of collective action beyond states and markets, and the multiplication of politically relevant arenas. This underscores Warren's argument that democracy depends on a number of different and independent associational functions that need to be carefully disaggregated; the key is associations' "contributions" to democracy in the plural. The Habermasian framework puts a premium on associations that connect individual life-worlds to public spaces, encourage collective judgments, and create the networks of communication that comprise "public spheres." That said, the usefulness of Warren's typology does not depend on subscribing to Habermas's conceptualization of spheres of collective action, and the author does not employ "public reasoning" or "deliberation" as philosophical terms of art.

Very briefly, Warren identifies three categories of democratic effects. One set constitutes "public spheres" of democratic judgment. Another is personal developmental effects: a sense of efficacy, political skills such as negotiation and coalition-building, civic virtues, and capacities for deliberation, among others. The third category is effects that underwrite democratic institutions, including representation, legitimation, or resistance. Against this background Warren works out a typology of associations based on a number of identifiable factors that tend to produce one or more of these democratic effects.

The principal point flowing from this typology is that trade-offs among democratic effects are inevitable. For example, associations that put a premium on the absence of internal conflict are unlikely to develop members' political skills. Associations from which exit is costless are unlikely to experience pressures from members for "voice" and are "lethal to critical skills." Warren challenges facile assumptions about voluntary associations as sites of unrestricted dialogue. Associations that foster deliberative capacities are less likely to develop the strong consistent public positions necessary for advocacy and other vital contributions to