Reconciling Appraisal Love and Bestowal Love

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ABSTRACT: The appraisal model of love is object-centred and reasons-based: love is based on reasons derived from the valuable properties of the beloved. The bestowal model of love is subject-centred and non-reasons-based: love is not based on reasons derived from the valuable properties of the beloved, but rather originates in the lover. In this paper, I blend these disparate models, with the aim of preserving their virtues and overcoming their difficulties. I propose a subject-centred, reasons-based account: love arises within the lover, but, within the lover, love is based on the lover's motivating reasons.

RÉSUMÉ : Le modèle évaluatif de l'amour est centré sur l'objet et basé sur les raisons : l'amour se fonde sur des raisons dérivées des propriétés appréciables de l'aimé. Le modèle attributif de l'amour est axé sur le sujet et non fondé sur les raisons : l'amour n'est pas basé sur des raisons dérivées des propriétés appréciables de l'aimé, mais provient plutôt de l'amant. Dans cet article, je mélange ces modèles opposés dans le but de préserver leurs vertus et de surmonter leurs difficultés. Je propose un compte rendu de l'amour basé sur des motifs et axé sur le sujet : l'amour éclot chez l'amant mais, en lui, il repose sur les raisons qui motivent l'amant.

Keywords: love, appraisal, bestowal, no reasons, justifying reasons, motivating reasons

Introduction

Despite the amicable subject matter, the contemporary analytic philosophy of love is divided into warring factions. On the one side, there is the appraisal model, which is *object-centred* and *reasons-based*: love is based on reasons derived from the valuable properties of the beloved. Romeo loves Juliet because

of her valuable loyalty and confidence. On the other side, the bestowal model, which is *subject-centred* and *non-reasons-based*: love is not based on reasons derived from the valuable properties of the beloved, but rather originates in the lover. Something in Romeo's nature causes him to love Juliet, so he finds Juliet's loyalty and confidence valuable. While both of these models enjoy intuitive and conceptual support, they simultaneously suffer from trenchant objections. In this paper, I blend these disparate models, with the aim of preserving the virtues of each model, while simultaneously overcoming their associated difficulties. I do this by proposing a *subject-centred, reasons-based* account: love arises within the lover, but, within the lover, love is based on the lover's motivating reasons.

This paper is divided into five sections. I motivate but ultimately reject *subject-centred, non-reasons-based* love (§1). According to this model, Romeo's love for Juliet is not based on Juliet's loyalty, confidence, and thoughtfulness, but rather Romeo's love is based in Romeo's nature as a lover. This model secures the endurance and non-fungibility of love, but suffers from value relativism and from being arational. I then motivate and reject *object-centred, reasons-based* love (§2). According to this model, Romeo's love for Juliet is based on reasons, specifically Juliet's loyalty, confidence, and thoughtfulness. This model secures value realism and the rationality of love, at the expense of the endurance and non-fungibility of love. I then introduce (§3) and motivate (§4) *subject-centred, reasons-based* love, according to which Romeo's love for Juliet arises within Romeo, but is based on his motivating reasons. This model not only enjoys independent support, but secures the rationality, endurance, and non-fungibility of love. I then deal with two objections (§5). First, partakers of the *non-reasons-based* view insist that love lacks justifying reasons, which may sink *reasons-based* models. But, by emphasizing motivating reasons for love, I avoid these concerns while simultaneously preserving the insight that love has reasons. Second, partakers of the *object-centred* view of love insist on value realism. But, rather than rejecting *object-centred* love *tout court*, I only insist that love is substantially *subject-centred* as well.

1. Subject-Centred, Non-Reasons-Based Love

With only some imprecision, it is possible to agglomerate numerous contemporary analytic philosophers together in a shared model of love.[1] Some call it the "bestowal view,"[2] though others prefer the "no reasons view,"[3] or even "antirationalism."[4] I shall call it by the admittedly cumbersome, though hopefully

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[1]   De Sousa, 2015, 75; Smuts, 2014a; Smuts, 2014b; Zangwill, 2013; Frankfurt, 2004; Frankfurt, 1999; Frankfurt, 1998; Singer, 1966.

[2]   Singer, 1966.

[3]   Smuts, ms., 2.

[4]   Jollimore, 2011, 13.

informative, title of the '*subject-centred, non-reasons-based* view.' It is defined by the following two constitutive principles:

(1) *Subject-Centred:* The basis of love is in the lover, not the valuable properties of the beloved.
(2) *Non-Reasons-Based*: Love is not based on reasons.

With respect to (1), love originates in the lover, rather than in the valuable properties of the beloved. The particular originating locus of love within the lover is open, though several possibilities will be filled in below. But, love is sourced in the lover somewhere. Harry Frankfurt articulates this intuition as follows: "I loved [my children] even before they were born … The particular value that I attribute to my children is not inherent in them but depends upon my love for them."[5] Since the loving parent loves the child though the child lacks valuable properties, or, at least, the parent does not know what valuable properties the child has, love is not based on the valuable properties of the beloved, but originates in the loving parent.

With respect to (2), love is not based on reasons. The particular definition of reasons is open as well, though several possibilities will be filled in below. Here is a prototypical articulation of this conviction: "We do not love for reasons. Love is not subject to rational requirements."[6] Returning to the case of the child, the child lacks valuable properties, or, the parent does not know what these valuable properties are going to be, so the loving parent's love does not occur because of any particular reasons based on the valuable properties of the child. These two principles are typically conjoined as follows: (1) love originates in the lover, so love is (2) not based on reasons derived from the lover noticing valuable properties of the beloved.

Both of these principles enjoy intuitive support. First, *subject-centred* love can be supported by the fact that differing lovers are attracted to differing people. Here is an extreme example: Shrek walks into the tavern. When the tavern door opens, everyone looks to see who it is. Everyone is repulsed at the sight of Shrek, except for Fiona, whose heart melts at the sight of her beautiful ogre. The same Shrek, with the same properties, is perceived by each of the tavern patrons. There are no *object-centred* differences to Shrek. If love were solely based on the valuable properties of the beloved, one would expect unanimity, or at least minimal consensus, in the tavern patrons' responses to the valuable properties of the beloved. But, as it turns out, Fiona is smitten with the presence of her beloved, while the other tavern patrons are repulsed,

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5   Frankfurt, 2004, 39–40; cp. Solomon, 2007, 55.
6   Zangwill, 2013, 309; cp. De Sousa, 2015, 75; Smuts, 2014a; Smuts 2014b; Frankfurt, 2006, 184; Kraut, 1987, 417; Hamlyn, 1978, 13–16; Singer, 1966, 14; Pitcher, 1965, 341–342.

or at best indifferent. The difference lies in Fiona's nature, thereby supporting
the view that love is *subject-centred*.

Supplementary examples of diverse attraction are legion: Tamir finds Monique's
introversion valuable, but Regis finds it boring; Jesse is raving about his new
love, all the while his friends are wondering what he sees in her; a relationship
breaks down, the grieving lover swears he cannot live without her, even though
seven billion other people have done so just fine; a new baby is born, the fawning
parents swear she is the cutest bundle of joy that ever there was, while others
complain of her runny nose, etc. As Woody Allen indicates: "to the lover the
loved one is always the most beautiful thing imaginable, even though to a
stranger she may be indistinguishable from an order of smelts. Beauty is in the
eye of the beholder."[7] Or, perhaps more eloquently: "my mistress' eyes are
nothing like the sun, coral is far more red than her lips' red … and yet, by God,
I think my love as rare as any she belied with false compare."[8]

The *non-reasons-based* view is supported by cases where the lover does not
appear to be motivated by reasons. Poets insist that love is blind, that love is caused
by the random strike of cupid's arrow, or the magic of a potion. They say that,
even at its most refined, love is still a falling, beyond the order of reason. In
Shakespeare's *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, after Titiana falls for the donkey-
faced Bottom, Bottom exclaims, "reason and love keep little company together
nowadays. The more the pity that some honest neighbors will not make them
friends."[9] Here are some possible cases: Taylor's list of things she is looking for in
Mr. Right includes the requirement that her mate must speak two languages, have
a sister, and treat his mother well, but she ends up falling for Mr. Wrong, who
exhibits none of these traits; a newborn lacks sufficient quantities of valuable prop-
erties to ground the mother's well-nigh endless love already present for the infant.

The *non-reasons-based* view is also supported by the plausibility of the view
that love has no justifying reasons. Justifying reasons, as discussed below, are
good reasons for love, making some love appropriate and other love inappro-
priate. Numerous authors motivate the *non-reasons-based* view by appealing to
the intuition that love lacks justifying reasons. Aaron Smuts, for example, says,
"The no-reasons view is just as it sounds. It holds that love cannot be justified,
or to put it somewhat ambiguously, there are no justifying reasons for love."[10]
Though Hichem Naar rejects the view, he summarizes it as follows: "The no-
reasons view of love is the view that there are no justifying reasons for love."[11]
Proponents of the no-justifying reasons view argue that (1) a lover's love is

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7   Allen, 1983, 110; cp. Solomon, 2007, 55.
8   Shakespeare, *Sonnet 130A*.
9   Shakespeare, *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, III.1; cp. De Sousa, 2015, 75; Kraut, 1987,
    417; Hamlyn, 1978, 13–16; Singer, 1966, 14; Pitcher, 1965, 341–342.
10 Smuts, 2014b, 519; cp. Schaubroeck, 2014; Zangwill, 2013; Shand, 2011, 5.
11 Naar, 2017, 198.

justified if the beloved has a corresponding formal object of 'being lovable'—but no such formal object of 'being lovable' exists.[12] And (2), a lover's love is justified if it is normatively appropriate—but love cannot be appropriate or inappropriate. Failing to fall in love with Mr. Right, or continuing to love one's wayward son, may be unfortunate and painful, but it is not morally bankrupt.[13]

Unfortunately, both of these principles suffer from trenchant defects as well. *Subject-centred* love faces the Relativism Problem. As gestured at above, *subject-centred* love lends itself to value relativism: love originates in the subject, and is not based on the valuable properties of the beloved, so value is relative to how the lover perceives the beloved.[14] Frankfurt acknowledges the concern: "It is true that nothing is inherently either worthy or unworthy of being loved, independently of what we are and what we care about. The ground of normativity is relative in part ...."[15] Detractors worry that this amounts to value relativism, which is both undesirable and false. Value relativism is undesirable because it implies that humans value things that ultimately lack objective value. It is common for four-year-olds to scour store floors for abandoned screws, stones, and bobby pins, calling them jewels and collecting them in treasure chests. But it would be embarrassing if adults likewise placed substantial value in objects lacking objective value. Value relativism may be false as well. The sunset is beautiful, while a landfill is not. Curing cancer is good, while torturing innocent people is not. Similar realist intuitions preside in the realm of love: *all* the boys on the baseball team go crazy over the Little Dutch Girl. Studies suggest that most people are attracted to the same traits in a prospective mate: mutual attraction, dependable character, and a pleasing disposition.[16] Meanwhile, few if any find cruelty, unfaithfulness, and boringness valuable.

Non-reasons-based love suffers from numerous difficulties as well.[17] First, the Coincidence Problem: if love is not based on reasons derivable from the valuable properties of the beloved, one may expect more arbitrariness to love than one in fact finds. Romeo should stand an equally likely chance to fall in love with a beautiful woman of approximately equal age and stage, as an elderly woman who is already happily married, or his own sister for that matter. But, as most are prone to do, Romeo falls for the belle of the ball. What a remarkable coincidence that love so happened to fall on the exact same person whose beauty would have naturally caught his eye, had her beauty had anything to do with it! As Irving Singer notices: "For most men it is easier to bestow value upon

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[12]   Zangwill, 2013, 304; Taylor, 1975, 152.

[13]   Smuts, 2014b, 519; Kolodny, 2003, 137–138; Adams, 1999, 161; Pitcher, 1965, 341.

[14]   De Sousa, 2015, 7–8; Foster, 2011, 826; Soble, 1990, 9; Brentlinger, 1989, 144–145.

[15]   Frankfurt, 2006, 199–200.

[16]   Buss et al., 1990, 18–20.

[17]   Kolodny, 2003; Keller, 2000; Soble, 2000, 295ff; Velleman, 1999; Adams, 1999, 160–171.

a beautiful rather than an ugly woman."[18] Given the unlikely coincidence associated with the *non-reasons-based* view, it is more likely that love is connected with reasons. Relatedly, the disappearance of love often correlates with reasons. Peter the Pumpkin Eater catches his wife cheating, and at the exact moment he knows of her unfaithfulness, he stops loving her and puts her in his pumpkin shell—however that happens. What a remarkable coincidence!

Second, the Motivating Reasons Problem: the beloved would certainly enjoy, if not occasionally insist upon, a list of reasons motivating the lover's love. But, on the *non-reasons-based* view, no such list is forthcoming. But, as Alan Soble warns, "A shrug of the shoulders, or 'I really don't have the foggiest,' in response to 'Why do you love me?' falls flat."[19] When Juliet asks Romeo why he loves her, Romeo ought not respond by shrugging his shoulders. Moreover, the lover's reasons ought to be derived from properties valued in the beloved. When Juliet asks why Romeo loves her, Romeo ought not provide an answer rooted in naturalistic causes, volitional fiat, or Cupid's blind arrow. With no such reasons forthcoming, Juliet may worry: 'why does he love me rather than Rosaline?[20] Why does he love me rather than hate me? Was he just looking for someone, anyone, to love, and I just came along at the right time.'[21] No reasons are available to Juliet, which poses problems for the *non-reasons-based* view.

Third, the Justifying Reasons Problem: it seems like someone's love can be considered unjustified. Romeo's father suddenly transfers his love away from Romeo onto a stranger child, loving the stranger as his own for the rest of his life.[22] Meanwhile, Romeo is spontaneously infatuated with a random picnic table,[23] while Juliet continues to love Romeo after Romeo becomes abusive to her.[24] Seemingly, love derails in these scenarios. This love is unjustified, and unjustifiable. To understand the difficulty, Soble introduces the agapic hater,[25] someone who hates for no reason: 'I do not like thee Doctor Fell, the reason why I cannot tell.' It is unjustifiable to hate Dr. Fell for no reason. Or, the agapic fearer: for no reason, Little Miss Muffet is terrified of the kind-hearted spider, who merely hoped to sit down beside her. Surely, her arachnophobia is unjustified, as is Romeo's love for a picnic table.

2. Object-Centred, Reasons-Based Love

Given that *subject-centred, non-reasons-based* love suffers from numerous difficulties, an alternate model is needed. Fortunately, another one is available,

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18   Singer, 1966, 23.

19   Soble, 2000, 296.

20   Soble, 2015 , 28–29.

21   Soble, 2000, 297.

22   Smuts, *ms*., 25.

23   Bagley, 2015, 482; cp. Jollimore, 2011, 22–23; Pitcher, 1965, 341.

24   Kolodny, 2003, 137.

25   Soble, 2015, 28.

as numerous authors approximately converge around an alternative model of love.[26] Many follow Singer in calling it the "appraisal view."[27] Others prefer to call it the "property based" model,[28] the property view,"[29] "trait based love,"[30] or the "quality theory" of love.[31] I shall once again sacrifice literary nimbleness in favour of precision by calling it the '*object-centred, reasons-based*' model of love, and it is constituted by the following two principles:

(1) *Object-Centred:* The basis of love is in the valuable properties of the beloved, not the lover.
(2) *Reasons-Based*: Love is based on reasons.

With respect to (1), *contra* the principle of *subject-centred* love, love does not originate in the lover. Rather, love is based on the valuable properties of the beloved. As Robert Brown says: "… we can only love what we take to be inherently worthwhile in some respect. To love what we took to be completely worthless would be like fearing what we thought was completely harmless."[32] This principle presumes that the beloved has valuable properties—a presumption that will stir up some controversy.

   With respect to (2), the lover has reasons for love. Again, possible definitions of 'reasons' will be canvassed below. But, for now, contra *non-reasons-based*, love is based on reasons. As Simon Keller claims, even hopes: "she should love me because of the properties I have and others lack."[33] Keller wants to know her reasons for loving him rather than another. These two principles are typically conjoined as follows: (1) the beloved has valuable properties, which serves as the ultimate source of love. The lover notices these valuable properties, and loves the beloved because of these valuable properties. This being the case, (2) the lover can provide reasons for his love, specifically, by recounting the valuable properties of the beloved that originally drew him to her. As Troy Jollimore summarizes: "Love is a response to, and is rendered reasonable by, its object's attractive, desirable, or otherwise valuable qualities."[34]

   Both of these principles enjoy intuitive support. Not surprisingly, their intuitive strength is derived from the same considerations weakening their opposing principles in §1. Namely, *subject-centred* love led to an undesirable

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[26]   López, 2016; Price, 2012; Soble, 2000; Keller, 2000; Delaney, 1996.
[27]   Singer, 1966, 3; cp. Scavone, 2016; Foster, 2009.
[28]   Soble, 1990, 4.
[29]   Matthes, 2016, 241.
[30]   López, 2016, 1. Page references follow the online first version.
[31]   Kolodny, 2003, 135.
[32]   Brown, 1987, 115; cp. López, 2016, 21.
[33]   Keller, 2000, 163; cp. López, 2016, 1; Johnson, 2001, 13.
[34]   Jollimore, 2017, 4; cp. Brogaard, 2015, 69; Kolodny, 2003, 137–138; Soble, 2000, 295.

and implausible value relativism, so *object-centred* love is supported by the value realism espoused above. *Non-reasons-based* love led to a coincidental love that lacked motivating and justifying reasons, so *reasons-based* love is supported by the fact that love is not coincidental, and does involve motivating reasons and justifying reasons, as outlined above.

Unfortunately, *object-centred, reasons-based* love suffers from numerous objections as well. Not surprisingly, some of these difficulties are rooted in the same considerations strengthening their opposing principles in §1. *Subject-centred* love is supported by diverse attraction. *Object-centred* love sources love in the valuable properties of the beloved, hence does not straightforwardly acknowledge the role of the lover, which is an incomplete analysis. *Non-reasons-based* love is consistent with the plausible view that love lacks motivating reasons and justifying reasons. *Reasons-based* love says that love has reasons, hence, fails to incorporate those occasions when love does, and ought to, lack reasons.

Object-centred, reasons-based love also suffers from the fact that it cannot accommodate several virtues that are commonly or ideally ascribed to love. Namely, love appears to be unconditional, enduring, and non-fungible, none of which naturally fall out of *object-centred, reasons-based* love. That love may be unconditional is recounted in traditional wedding vows: "… For richer, for poorer, in sickness and in health …," and is eloquently summarized by Shakespeare: "Love is not love which alters when it alteration finds, or bends with the remover to remove. O no, it is an ever fixed mark."[35] Meanwhile, the opposite view, conditional love, which says 'I will love you if you do X, but I will withdraw my love if you do Y,' does not look much like love.

It is also common to suspect that love is enduring. Traditional wedding vows promise: "… from this day forward … until death do us part," and Shakespeare remarks that "Love's not time's fool … Love alters not with his brief hours and weeks, but bears it out even to the edge of doom."[36] The beloved's hair turns grey, the beloved's steely optimism erodes into battle-worn pessimism, yet love endures. Love is robust, even tenacious, it survives through storms and persists through changes to the beloved. Imagine the opposite view, the fragile love view: 'If you crash my car, I will disown you forever' said few parents, ever. Or, 'If you gain a few pounds, my love may fade away,' said few lovers who truly loved.

Object-centred, reasons-based love is based on, hence conditioned upon, hence endurant upon, the valuable properties of the beloved. What if the beloved's properties shift or evaporate, as they are prone to doing? Love shifts or evaporates as well, since love is based on these shifting and evaporating properties. Romeo loves Juliet because of her youth and vibrancy, but as she ages she becomes wise and graceful, or, worse, she becomes pessimistic,

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35   Shakespeare, *Sonnet 116*; cp. Protasi, 2016, 231; Bhadwar, 2005, 50–51; Mendus, 1989, 238.

36   Shakespeare, *Sonnet 116*.

boring, and she starts to cast spells on cats. The foundation of Romeo's love is gone. As John Donne says, "Love built on beauty, soon as beauty, dies."[37] But love is not so fragile,[38] so the *object-centred, reasons-based* model fails to fully capture the nature of love.

Not only does the *object-centred, reasons-based* model have difficulties when the same beloved has differing properties, but also when differing beloveds have the same properties. Here are two problems pertaining to this. First, the Trading-Up Problem: Romeo loves Juliet for her loyalty and confidence, but along comes Cordelia, with even more loyalty and confidence. Romeo has reason, based on the valuable properties that are the source of love, to trade up to Cordelia. But love is not fungible in this way, which poses difficulties for the model.[39] Second, the Doppelganger Problem: Romeo loves Juliet for her loyalty and confidence, but somehow an exact duplicate of Juliet is formed, with exactly corresponding loyalty and confidence (and everything else besides). Romeo has reason to love both of them equally, or pick the clone over the original model. But, again, the fungibility embedded in the doppelganger scenario is an affront to love.[40]

3. Defining Subject-Centred, Reasons-Based Love

So far, we have this: *subject-centred, non-reasons-based* love is based in the lover, so love does not have reasons derived from the valuable properties of the beloved. *Object-centred, reasons-based* love is love based in the valuable properties of the beloved, so love has reasons derived from the valuable properties of the beloved. This way of categorizing the two models are well established in the literature. Here is how Soble distinguishes between what I term '*object-centred, reasons-based*' love from *subject-centred, non-reasons-based* love:

> In the first view of personal love … love is what I will call "property based": When *x* loves *y*, this can be explained as the result of *y*'s having … some set *S* of attractive, admirable, or valuable properties … love is "object-centric" … When *x* loves *y*, *x* will be able to answer "Why do you love *y*?" by supplying reasons for loving *y* in terms of *y*'s having *S* … The second view of personal love denies that love is property-based: the love of *x* for *y* is not grounded in *y*'s attractive properties *S* … if anything, the opposite is true: that is, *x* finds the properties that *y* has attractive … because *x* loves *y*. The ground of personal love is … something about *x*, something in the nature of the lover; thus, personal love is subject-centric rather than object-centric … Since

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[37]   Donne, *Elegies II*.

[38]   Protasi, 2016, 220; De Sousa, 2015, 8; Kolodny, 2003, 140; Nozick, 1989, 75.

[39]   Smuts, 2014b, 520; Kolodny, 2003, 135; Nozick, 1989, 78–82; Brown, 1987, 41; Kraut, 1987, 422.

[40]   Protasi, 2016, 219–220; Jollimore, 2011, 127; Dixon, 2007, 377; Frankfurt, 2004, 170; Solomon, 2002, 6.

x values *y*'s properties in virtue of loving *y*, *y*'s valuable properties cannot explain why *x* loves *y*. Love, then, is incomprehensible.[41]

Here Soble captures the distinction between *subject-centred, non-reasons-based* love and *object-centred, reasons-based* love. Or again, Alex Scavone likewise summarizes the distinctions between the two accounts:

> The recent debate on the nature of love has yielded two competing value positions. The first suggests that love is a way of valuing an object based on its desirable qualities, the other, a way of creating value in an object that is not quality-dependent, but comes from the subject's projecting value on it.[42]

Scavone here points out the relevant distinction between *subject-centred, non-reasons-based* love and *object-centred, reasons-based* love as well. Seemingly, the interpretive framework depicted in §1-§2 aligns with orthodox interpretations.

This is unfortunate, for two reasons. First, it means that the two established and entrenched positions are both fraught with grave difficulties. Seemingly, reconciliation attempts would be worthwhile.[43] But, second,

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[41]   Soble, 1990, 4–5; cp. De Sousa, 2015, 7–8; Foster, 2011, 826; Brentlinger, 1989, 144–145.

[42]   Scavone, 2016, 105.

[43]   There are established attempts at reconciliation. First, perhaps love begins as appraisal, but turns into bestowal (Singer, 1966; Nozick, 1989, 75; Dixon, 2007, 379). Romeo's love is first based upon the valuable properties that Juliet possesses, which separates her from the others at the party. But, over time, Romeo values Juliet for her own sake, regardless of whether she retains the original properties that first drew him. Perhaps this is so, but the opposite scenarios occur as well: an arranged marriage, and a mother's love for the baby in her womb, both begin as bestowing value onto the beloved, where the lover only later discovers the valuable properties of the beloved. And, presumably, appraisal love is not limited to love's first bloom: elderly couples no doubt continue to find valuable properties in each other. Second, perhaps love involves open-ended appraisal. The lover responds to valuable properties in the beloved, but is open to finding the new properties that the beloved acquires valuable (Velleman, 2008, 205–206; Delaney, 1996, 349; Brown, 1987, 106–107). Shrek falls in love with Fiona for her petite, proper humanness, but when she transforms into a combative, thick-boned ogre, Shrek finds this valuable as well—even more so. Love *is* love which alters when it alteration finds. Again, perhaps. But, how open ended is this love? Is Shrek still open to loving Fiona if she becomes morally bankrupt, or the next spell turns her into a frog? If so, this love may be too wildly permissive (cp. Keller, 2000, 170-171; Soble, 1989, 498). But, if not, this love may still be too conditional and non-endurant.

since these two established positions fall under such starkly opposed defi-
nitions, it is difficult to imagine how such a reconciliation might succeed.
For what remains of this section, I will outline a reconciliation of these two
views called '*subject-centred, reasons-based*' love. There are others that locate
themselves within the same neighbourhood of logical space, very broadly
construed.[44] Here is the short cut to get there: by fusing the *subject-centred*
love from the first model, and the *reasons-based* love from the second model,
I arrive at *subject-centred, reasons-based* love. In order to do so, two slight
expansions must first occur. First, it is consistent with *subject-centred* love
to argue that love is *subject-centred, non-reasons-based* or *subject-centred,
reasons-based*, where I ultimately endorse the latter. Second, it is consis-
tent with *reasons-based* love to argue that love involves *motivating reasons*
or *justifying reasons*, where I only insist upon the former. The result is
a *subject-centred, reasons-based* love, where '*reasons-based*' love means
'*motivating reasons*.'

Now for the long cut. Love as *subject-centred* is broad, stating only that
love originates in the subject, without specifying how this occurs, or which
parts of the subject are involved. This being the case, the following two
interpretations are consistent with love as *subject-centred*: (1) *subject-centred,
non-reasons-based* love; (2) *subject-centred, reasons-based* love. *Subject-
centred, non-reasons-based* love indicates that love originates in the subject,
but, within the subject, love does not have cognitive causes. Frankfurt, for
example, argues that love is based in the subject, where, within the subject,
love arises as a species of caring, where caring involves first- and second-
order desires. For example, caring involves the involuntary first-order desire
of 'I desire that my beloved flourishes,' and caring involves the second-
order desire that 'I desire to continue desiring that my beloved flourishes.'[45]
According to this model, love is partially based in desire, and is a volitional
structure, but is not based on reasons. Frankfurt is clear on this: "love is
not a conclusion. It is not the outcome of reasoning, or a consequence of
reasons."[46] Rather, love has naturalistic causes within the lover, such as,
for example, biological causes,[47] or perhaps love arises in the lover as the
product of accidental historical association or habit.[48] *Subject-centred,
non-reasons-based* love, however, by virtue of it being *non-reasons-based*,
suffers from the Coincidence Problem, No Motivating Reasons Problem

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[44] Scavone, 2016; Protasi, 2016, 225ff; Schaubroeck, 2014, 119–120; Adams, 1999,
161–170; Soble, 1990, 9–11; Lyons, 1980, 79–80; Taylor, 1975, 152–155; Singer,
1966, 9.

[45] Frankfurt, 2004, 16; Frankfurt, 1999, 160–161.

[46] Frankfurt, 2006, 184; cp. Frankfurt, 2006, 41, 45, 195.

[47] Frankfurt, 2004, 40.

[48] Zangwill, 2013, 312.

and No-Justifying Reasons Problem, as discussed in §1, so I will consider it a dead option.

Option (2), *subject-centred, reasons-based* love, however, by virtue of being *reasons-based*, remains a live option. *Subject-centred, reasons-based* love is love that arises within the subject, and within the subject, love is *reasons-based*. Notice, however, that love as *reasons-based* is broad as well, stating only that love is based on reasons, without discriminating what sorts of reasons. This being the case, the following two interpretations are consistent with love as *reasons-based*: (1) justifying reasons love; (2) motivating reasons love. Justifying reasons are good reasons for acting, while motivating reasons are any reasons that actually caused the agent to act.[49] Hermione believes that Leontes cheated on him, and he desires a faithful partner, so he grows angry and throws Leontes in prison. Hermione has motivating reasons for his angry act, since these reasons actually cause him to throw Leontes in prison. But, Hermione lacks justifying reasons for his angry act because Hermione did not actually cheat, and, even if she had, it is unclear that throwing her in prison is an appropriate reaction. Or, with respect to love, Eva loves Hitler for his calmness and cruelty. This love lacks justifying reasons, since Hitler does not possess calmness, and cruelty is not worth loving. But Eva's love has motivating reasons, since, no matter how strange it sounds, these are the reasons actually causing Eva to love Hitler.

As discussed above, numerous authors reject the possibility that love has justifying reasons. Not only do they doubt that love is normatively evaluable, but they also typically marshal the concerns levied against the *reasons-based* view as proof that love has *no justifying reasons*.[50] That is, if Romeo's love for Juliet is justified based on Juliet's valuable thoughtfulness and confidence, and Rosaline or a Juliet clone is equally thoughtful and confident, Romeo is justified in loving Rosaline and the Juliet clone as well—a conclusion that is an affront to love. And, if Romeo's love for Juliet is justified based on Juliet's valuable thoughtfulness and confidence, and Juliet loses these properties over time, Romeo is no longer justified in loving Juliet—a conclusion that renders love more fragile than typically imagined.

It is possible to remain neutral about whether love has justifying reasons, and still endorse *reasons-based* love by virtue of the fact that love has motivating reasons. Such a position, broadly construed, is becoming increasingly popular. Katrien Schaubroeck, for example, argues that love lacks justifying reasons, but nevertheless, "there is a class of reasons which I described as 'rationalisations' and which are defined by their perspective-dependency."[51]

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[49] Crisp, 2006, 36ff; Dancy, 2000, 20ff; Raz, 1975.
[50] Smuts, 2014b, 520; Schaubroeck, 2014.
[51] Schaubroeck, 2014, 119.

Or, Sara Protasi argues that "perspectival properties" contribute to grounding love, where perspectival properties "depend on the response of the subject,"[52] where these responses depend in part on the subject's standards and judgements. Or, Scavone argues that "the appraisal process of love … is made subjectively rather than objectively … meaning that the object becomes valuable to the lover because it satisfies the lover's interests and desires."[53] Or, finally, Hilla Jacobson argues that "it is the lover's (conative) attitudes, rather than the beloved's (transcendent) features, that bestow upon the beloved the personal significance he has as a beloved."[54] Disparate though these views are in detail, in broad outline they agree that love is dependent, in substantial part, on the lover's reasons, whether the lover's reasons be the lover's beliefs, desires, interests, attitudes, or standards.

While I will not be fussy on the precise definition of '*subject-centred*' reasons, I will presently take them to be motivating reasons, which I will take to be a logical relation between the lover's belief/desire pairing and the occurrence of love in the lover.[55] For example, Romeo believes Juliet is loyal and Romeo desires a loyal mate, which jointly constitute one of Romeo's motivating reasons for valuing Juliet. As evident from the views expressed above, motivating reasons are naturally suited to being, in whole or in substantial part, *subject-centred*, since motivating reasons are any reasons that actually cause an agent to act, including her particular beliefs and desires. Thus, for the remainder of this paper, I will motivate and defend *subject-centred, reasons-based* love, which is love that is substantially grounded in the lover, and within the lover, love that is substantially grounded in the lover's motivating reasons, which are logically related belief/desire pairings leading to the occurrence of love in the lover.

4. Motivating Subject-Centred, Reasons-Based Love

Subject-centred, reasons-based love enjoys intuitive, philosophical, and theoretical support. First for the intuitive support: prior to love, the lover must first possess certain foundational beliefs and desires about the prospective beloved. Most basically, the lover must believe the beloved is a human, the lover must desire humans. The lover must believe the beloved is not a toxic substance, but could instead potentially contribute to the lover's wellbeing and/or goal achieval. Some further examples: love of one's offspring may not arise if one did not first believe this child to be one's offspring; Romeo's love of Juliet would not arise if he believed she was an evil alien disguised as Juliet who is bent on his destruction. Or, as the case of Jeffrey Ingram shows, when the lover

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52   Protasi, 2016, 225.
53   Scavone, 2016, 112–113.
54   Jacobson, 2016, 577.
55   Davidson, 1963.

forgets the beloved, the lover's love evaporates as well, indicating that some love engendering antecedent cognitive architecture is a necessary condition on the formation of love.

Now for the philosophical support, in the form of two arguments. First, as discussed above, different people respond differently to the same prospective beloved. Jane cherishes conservative values, while Julie cherishes progressive values. William, the conservative, enters into a discussion with both of them, and Jane finds him attractive, while Julie does not. Presumably, William is the same in both cases, but Julie's and Jane's background beliefs and desires are different. If love is largely based on reasons derived from the valuable properties of the beloved, we should expect roughly equivalent attraction, which we do not find. But, if love is based on the lover's motivating reasons, we should expect differing levels of attraction correspondingly fluctuating with their background beliefs and desires, which is exactly what happens. Conclusion: love is substantially based on the lover's motivating reasons.

Second, the same person responds differently over time to the same beloved. Years after the beginning of the William-Jane romance, William stays the same but Jane becomes passionately progressive, and her love for William sours. Presumably, if love is based on the valuable properties of the beloved, and William did not change, the love ought not change—but it did. But, if love is based on the beliefs/desires of the lover, and those motivating reasons shifted, we should expect love to shift—which it did. Conclusion: love is substantially based on the motivating reasons of the lover.

Now for the theoretical support. It is common, though not unanimous, to view love as (partially constituted by) emotion. As David Hamlyn says: "If love and hate are not emotions, what is?"[56] Indeed, when asked how confident students are that a listed word is an emotion, 'love' commonly ranks first as being most prototypically emotional.[57] Emotion, however, involves cognition, at least, according to the dominant cognitive model of emotion. Cognition includes a subject's appraisal of whether and how the stimulus is relevant to the wellbeing of the organism. Thus, appraisal is a substantially *subject-centred, reasons-based* analysis of the relevance of the stimulus for one's own wellbeing. As Magda Arnold summarizes, emotion arises from "appraisal of good or bad for me."[58] For example, when an organism notices that the sky is still blue, no emotional reaction arises due to the irrelevance of the stimuli for her wellbeing. But, if John's boss calls him into the office during

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[56] Hamlyn, 1978, 5; cp. Brogaard, 2015; Price, 2012; Abramson and Leite, 2011; Helm, 2009, 42ff; Velleman, 1999; Solomon, 2002; Brown, 1987.

[57] Fehr and Russell, 1984.

[58] Arnold, 1970, 174; cp. Moors et al., 2013, 119–120; Ellsworth, 2013; Deonna and Scherer, 2010, 50; Lazarus, 2001.

a time of company-wide layoffs, John appraises the situation as potentially harmful to his wellbeing, thereby eliciting fear. Or, when Romeo notices Juliet from across the room, he first appraises her as relevant to his wellbeing (i.e., she is human, she is alive, and as such she has potential to further or hinder Romeo's desires, etc.). He then appraises her as prospectively beneficial to his wellbeing (i.e., she has potential to further mating desires, she has potential to increase wellbeing, etc.), which then gives rise to positively valenced emotions within him. He then appraises her as receptive to pair-bonding with him, and as definitively possessing desired traits, which gives rise to love within him. Clearly, on the dominant cognitive model of emotion, love involves appraisals involving *subject-centred* beliefs and desires, or, in other words, love involves motivating reasons.

Not only is *subject-centred, reasons-based* love well motivated by these considerations, but it is also supported by its capability of preserving the virtues of *subject-centred* love and *reasons-based* love, as outlined in §1 and §2, respectively. *Subject-centred* love was motivated by diverse attraction, where Fiona loves Shrek, even though others find him repulsive, or simply neutral. *Subject-centred, reasons-based* love, by virtue of it being *subject-centred*, also supports diverse attraction. Fiona desires a cantankerous ogre, and believes that Shrek is a cantankerous ogre, which together serve as a motivating reason for love to arise within Fiona. Antoinette does not desire a cantankerous ogre, so she lacks motivating reasons for loving Shrek, so love does not arise in her.

Love was considered *reasons based* because it dissolves the appearance of coincidence, and supports the view that love has motivating reasons and justifying reasons. *Subject-centred, reasons-based* love, by virtue of being *reasons based*, preserves these intuitions. Romeo falls for the woman he would have otherwise wanted to fall for, which is explained by the fact that his love is substantially based on his desires. Likewise, with respect to motivating reasons, when Juliet asks Romeo why he loves her, he can explain how he desires a good listener because he was such an extrovert. Plausibly, *subject-centred, reasons-based* love does not automatically establish that love has *justifying reasons*. After all, love is justified if the beloved has the formal object of 'being lovable' or is normatively appropriate. The former condition is *object-centred*, so *subject-centred* love does not automatically establish that love has justifying reasons. The latter condition does not automatically fall out from motivating reasons for love either, since motivating reasons are not good reasons to love, but are only the actual reasons for the agent's love.

It is consistent with *subject-centred, reasons-based* love to conclude that love lacks justifying reasons, since justifying reasons for love are not entailed by the model, and ample motivation against *justifying reasons* for love was provided in §1. It is also consistent with *subject-centred, reasons-based* love to conclude that love has justifying reasons, since justifying reasons for love are

consistent with the model, and ample motivation in favour of *justifying reasons* for love was provided in §1. In fact, it is possible to recast *justifying reasons* in a manner that aligns with *subject-centred, reasons-based* love, and that avoids the arguments raised against justifying reasons for love. Here is how: it follows from *subject-centred, reasons-based* love that the lover has a series of goals and desires. If the lover loves in such a way as to achieve those goals and desires, there is a sense in which that love is appropriate and rational. If Romeo desires an honest partner, and believes Juliet is honest, his love would be appropriate. If the lover loves in such a way as to hinder those goals and desires, there is a sense in which that love is inappropriate and irrational. If Romeo has the goal of a long-term relationship with someone capable of sparkling conversation, and he falls in love with a picnic table or Rosaline, erroneously thinking the picnic table to be capable of sparkling conversation, or erroneously thinking Rosaline wanted a long-term relationship, his love would be inappropriate or irrational insofar as it subverts his own goals and desires.

In other words, love has prudentially justified reasons whenever the lover's love is consistent with his goal achieval, and the love lacks prudentially justified reasons (though still has motivating reasons) whenever the lover's love subverts his goal achieval. Prudentially justified reasons for love may not exhaust the varieties of justifying reasons for love, however. Imagine that John desires a mate he can secure absolute control over, and believes that Jenny is such a mate. In this case, John's love for Jenny would have prudentially justified reasons. But, since these reasons for love are not morally justifiable, John's love would be inappropriate and unjustified in another sense—John's love lacks morally justified reasons. This is not a problematic result, however. After all, whether love can be morally (in)appropriate is not clear in the literature. And, if the result is that there are morally justifying reasons for love, this result is still consistent with *subject-centred, reasons-based* love, as there is nothing in the model preventing morally justifying reasons for love.

Not only does *subject-centred, reasons-based* love secure the virtues associated with *subject-centred* and *reasons based* love, but it overcomes the drawbacks of *object-centred, reasons-based* love. *Object-centred, reasons-based* love was problematic because it failed to secure the unconditionality and endurance of love, while also leading to the fungibility of love. Love was conditional and non-endurant on the *object-centred, reasons-based* model because love was based on, hence conditioned upon, and endurant upon, the valuable properties of the beloved. *Subject-centred, reasons-based* love, by virtue of being *subject-centred*, is not conditioned upon or endurant upon the valuable properties of the beloved. Romeo finds value in Juliet's confidence, but as she ages her confidence is replaced by insecurity, but his love need not wane, since his love for Juliet is not based on, or conditional upon, or endurant upon, Juliet's confidence. Indeed, if one of his motivating reasons includes

long-term pair-bonding, he has reasons for his love to endure through her transformation.[59]

Likewise, love was fungible because it was based on the valuable properties of the beloved. *Subject-centred, reasons-based* love, by virtue of being *subject-centred*, is not based on the valuable properties of the beloved, so is not fungible. Romeo finds value in Juliet's confidence and thoughtfulness, but, though he finds Rosaline to be confident and thoughtful as well, he need not love Rosaline as well, since his love is not based on these valuable properties. Indeed, if one of his motivating reasons include monogamy, he will have reasons against loving Rosaline as well. And, if Romeo should happen upon a Juliet clone, and he has motivating reasons in favour of monogamy and faithfulness to Juliet, he has motivating reasons not to love the clone as well, or instead, respectively.

5. Defending Subject-Centred, Reasons-Based Love

Having articulated (§3) and advocated for (§4) the model, I now defend *subject-centred, reasons-based* love from objections. There are two immediate concerns. First, *subject-centred, reasons-based* love, by virtue of being *reasons-based*, fails to accommodate the virtues of the *non-reasons-based* view, which include the intuition that love lacks motivating reasons and justifying reasons.

Having already dealt with the justifying reasons issue, I move on to the more troubling possibility that there may in fact be no motivating reasons for love. As discussed in §1, love is blind at times. People fall in love with the strangest

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59 Sometimes limits are suggested for the unconditionality and endurance of love (cp. Dixon, 2007, 385; Edyvane, 2003; Wilson, 1995, 172–173; Hales, 1995). If Juliet repeatedly attempts to murder Romeo, surely Romeo's unconditional love, and enduring love, for Juliet will falter. This reality is often used as an objection to *subject-centred, non-reasons-based* love. Namely, love is, within limits, conditional and non-endurant, but *subject-centred, non-reasons-based* love is love that would be unconditionally endurant, since it is not based on the properties of the beloved. The result is that *subject-centred, non-reasons-based* love is too robust, but *object-centred, reasons-based* love is too fragile. *Subject-centred, reasons-based* love overcomes both of these difficulties. Namely, on this model, love is based on the motivating reasons of the lover, so the lover sets the limits for the conditions and endurance of love. If Romeo desires a faithful partner, he will set this condition upon his love, and his love will last for so long as he believes Juliet is faithful, and for so long as he continues to desire a faithful partner. Not only does *subject-centred, reasons-based* love acknowledge the possibility of limits, but it empowers the lover to set these limits, rather than leaving love as too fragile by being dependent upon the shifting properties of the beloved, or too robust by being guaranteed to endure despite abuse or hatred in return.

of people, for the most unreasonable and mysterious of causes, sometimes against previously stated desires and goals, which goes against the view that love is based on motivating reasons. In response, I grant that love appears blind sometimes. But, this only means that love's motivating reasons are not fully conscious, not that love lacks motivating reasons. Love's motivating reasons include primitive, unconscious beliefs and desires. As mentioned, love is based on foundational beliefs and desires, much of which is unconsciously processed. Romeo's love for Juliet depends upon his belief that she is human, that not all humans are destructive, that she probably isn't destructive, but rather that she may meet certain mating desires. But, had Romeo not possessed these types of beliefs and desires, love would not have arisen in him, indicating that love is based on motivating reasons, even if these motivating reasons are unconsciously processed. This conclusion follows from the cognitive model of emotion as well, according to which, "appraisals are often automatic and unconscious."[60] This being the case, if Taylor falls for Mr. Wrong instead of the Mr. Right spelled out in her list, this does not mean that love is blind. It means that the lover is blind to her hidden desires and beliefs, which love is following all the while. As Robert Solomon says: "there are reasons for loving someone that may be operative but may not be conscious or articulate at all. As Pascal so famously said … 'the heart has its reasons which reason cannot know.'"[61]

Here is the second concern: *subject-centred, reasons-based* love, by virtue of being *subject-centred*, fails to accommodate the virtues of *object-centred* love, which are the desirability and truth of the value realism implicit in the view that love is based on the valuable properties of the beloved. In response, I first of all grant that it is common in the literature to presume that love is more *object-centred* than *subject-centred*, or, that love is primarily rooted in the valuable properties of the beloved rather than primarily rooted in the lover's preferences. Here is a brief sampling: "love responds to a value in its object,"[62] or, in the words of Carolyn Price, "love is always a response to the lovable personal qualities of the beloved."[63] Or, "ideal romantic love is love for properties,"[64] or, for Niko Kolodny, "the features that constitute reasons for loving a person are the person's lovable qualities, such as beauty, wit, or vivacity."[65] Or, most radically, and subject to the nuance discussed below, Soble says, "the possession of valuable properties by the beloved is both necessary and sufficient

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[60] Ellsworth and Scherer, 2003, 574; cp. Lazarus, 2001, 55.
[61] Solomon, 2002, 8; cp. Brogaard, 2015, 143ff; Naar, 2017, 199; Lamy, 2016, 102; Brown, 2012, 2–3.
[62] Lopez, 2016, 21.
[63] Price, 2012, 220.
[64] Keller, 2000, 165.
[65] Kolodny, 2003, 138.

for love."[66] It is clearly common to assume that the originating source of love resides in the valuable properties of the beloved.

While this *object-centred* love is commonly espoused, *object-centredness* is not, *contra* Soble, a sufficient condition for love. Most radically, imagine that Juliet has valuable properties, but no other human exists. Clearly, love will not arise (notwithstanding self-love), since, at the very least, the presence of a lover is necessary as well. Not only is the presence of a lover necessary, but the lover must possess an appropriate psychological profile as well, in order to be receptive to loving Juliet's valuable properties. A fox notices Juliet's properties, but does not love her. Many, though not all, of the women in the world notice Juliet's valuable properties, but will not romantically love her. Many of the young and old, and Juliet's relatives as well, notice Juliet's valuable properties, but will not romantically love her, since they lack the appropriate psychological profile needed to render them receptive to loving Juliet's valuable properties. Alas, many of the remaining people will not find her properties that lovable either— she is too thoughtful for Moe, but not thoughtful enough for Curly, etc. Even if Juliet has the most ideal configuration of valuable properties, Mercutio still may not love her. These considerations reveal that the valuable properties of the beloved are not sufficient for love, the lover having an appropriate psychological profile is necessary as well. Perhaps for these reasons, it is common to balance the origin of love between the role of the beloved's valuable properties and the lover's intake of those valuable properties. Love involves: "favorable appraisal of the beloved's qualities,"[67] or, "subjectively recognizing the value an object has."[68] Or, as Soble concedes, "*x* would not love *y* if *y* were not, say, beautiful, charming, or intelligent, at least from the perspective of the lover."[69]

This much only shows that love is *object-centred* and *subject-centred*. Soble concedes this, yet seems to still conclude that love is more substantially *object-centred* than *subject-centred*: "even if *x* loves y in virtue of subjective property *Q*, something about the beloved, some raw material, encourages the lover to find value in the beloved."[70] But, if love is more substantially *object-centred* than *subject-centred*, we would expect many lovers equally motivated to flock to the same beloved for these same valuable properties. This proposal has some limited support. As discussed above, *all* the boys on the baseball team go crazy over the Little Dutch Girl, and most people agree that, for example, dependable character and a pleasing disposition, are valuable properties in a beloved. But, these considerations are also consistent with the view that there simply exists widespread *subject-centred* agreement. Perhaps many people just desire

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66 Soble, 2000, 295.
67 Dixon, 2007, 373.
68 Scavone, 2016, 109.
69 Soble, 2000, 296; cp. Soble, 1990, 10.
70 Soble, 1990, 11.

dependable character as a way of meeting their mating goals, rather than dependable character actually being an objectively valuable property of the beloved. And, if agreement among value judgements supports the view that love is more substantially *object-centred*, then diversity among value judgements supports the view that love is more substantially *subject-centred*. As discussed, examples of diversity abound: Jane cherishes conservative values, while Julie cherishes progressive values, so William the conservative has valuable properties in the eyes of Jane, but dis-valuable properties in the eyes of Julie. Sandra is quiet while Sally is outgoing, where Fred, since he desires a quiet person, find's Sandra's quietness valuable. But Frank, since he desires an outgoing person, finds Sally's outgoingness valuable, but not Sandra's quietness. At worst, *subject-centred* love and *object-centred* love equally contribute to the formation of love.

While I only insist on this conclusion that love is equally *subject-centred*, it is possible to go two steps further. First, there is reason to suspect that *object-centredness* is not even a necessary condition for love. This is not to say that the existence of the beloved is not necessary, or that the beloved lacks valuable properties. But rather, love can form when the beloved lacks valuable properties, since love often arises based on quirks, suffering, or dis-valuable properties as well.[71] Alegra, in the movie *Hitch*, recounts how Albert won her heart: "[he] dance[d] like a buffoon [and] I can't dance either … [he] dropped mustard on his shirt, so [I] feel less like a dork … it was adorable." Alegra's quirky love is not based on Albert's valuable properties, since these are not valuable properties and these quirks are quirks that would only inspire Alegra to love. Love sometimes arises from suffering as well: Florence falls in love with her patient, out of pity for his difficult situation; Taylor falls in love with Mr. Wrong because he needs so much fixing, etc. These types of love are not based on the beloved's valuable properties, since these are not valuable properties, and they are heavily dependent on the lover finding them attractive. Love sometimes arises from dis-valuable properties as well: Eva fell in love with Hitler; Marie falls for the gangster, attracted to his toughness and ruthlessness. In these cases, love is not based on the valuable properties of the beloved, since these are not valuable properties at all, and the lover's psychological dispositions are integral to the occurrence of this love.

It is possible to go one step further, to argue that love cannot be *object-centred* at all. This is not to abandon value realism by saying that the beloved does not have valuable properties. Rather, even if it is granted that the beloved has valuable properties, it is possible that love is not based on these valuable properties, since love is, by definition, personal,[72] hence exclusive and non-universalizable.[73] To see this point, contrast love with art. Imagine that Juliet has the most ideal configuration of valuable properties of any woman

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[71]   Jacobson, 2016, 577; Brown, 2012, 68.

[72]   De Sousa, 2015, 7; Solomon, 2002, 4; Singer, 1966, 12.

[73]   Frankfurt, 1999, 116; Jacobson, 2016, 569–570.

alive, and the Mona Lisa, the Last Supper, and the Scream have the most ideal configuration of aesthetic properties of any painting that exists. If we allow the art lovers to be drawn to whichever work of art they most prefer, we would expect, and indeed hope, that many of them would gather around these three paintings. Art is, after all, universalizable and non-exclusive. There is no constraint indicating that only one art lover can love the Mona Lisa, while only one other can love the Last Supper, and there is no constraint indicating that the same art lover who loves the Mona Lisa cannot later bask in the beauty of the Scream.

Love is not like that at all. If Juliet's valuable properties are the basis of love, we should expect and hope for many lovers to converge on Juliet—but Romeo would certainly protest even one other potential lover converging on Juliet. And, if Juliet's valuable properties are the basis of love, we should not be surprised to see Romeo basking in the glow of the many other women who closely resemble Juliet—but Juliet would certainly protest against Romeo's wandering eyes! Even if Juliet has valuable properties, the exclusive and non-universalizable nature of personal love reveals that these valuable properties may not be the basis of love. As mentioned, I do not insist on these last two steps. It suffices to conclude that love is substantially *subject-centred*, even if it is *object-centred* as well.

In summary, *subject-centred, non-reasons-based* love has certain virtues, but faces trenchant objections. *Object-centred, reasons-based* love has other virtues, but faces other objections. I propose *subject-centred, reasons-based* love, which is a blend of the two models, and which states that love is substantially based on the lover, and, within the subject, love is based on the lover's motivating reasons, which is a belief/desire pairing leading to the occurrence of love in the lover. This blend is plausible on its own merits, retains the virtues of the prior models, and simultaneously overcomes the objections plaguing the other models. Certainly, this new model raises concerns beyond those dealt with in this paper. But, given the stalemate gripping the starkly opposed traditional views, such a blend offers a fresh analysis of the source of love.[74]

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