

usually harder than it looks—states often create the appearance of compliance without actually complying (p. 97).

What should smart policymakers do? They should encourage states to take on commitments to global norms that protect human rights but not take their responses at face value—states are full of trickery when it comes to putting the norms into effect. And they should customize international pressures to fit the domestic conditions of the problem state.

How has Cardenas come to these conclusions? She uses case studies to trace both the benefits and limitations of human rights pressures in Chile and Argentina, runs statistical analyses on 172 countries for the five-year period right after the Cold War (1992–96), and concludes with five short “mini” vignettes on Eastern Europe, South Africa, China, Israel, and Cuba.

This book makes two valuable contributions. First, it unpacks compliance in a constructive way. Scholars of international law and organization are hardly naive—few believe that compliance is a black-and-white affair. So why is this important? Because states commit to all kinds of international human rights norms and institutions. These commitments get confused with actual results; all too often, they are not followed up with the thing that matters: improvements on violations. When they are, reforms regularly are made to pull the wool over norm advocates’ eyes, as states facing pressures frequently make improvements on those violations that help them dodge responsibility for other violations that are still taking place (p. 13). States and, more specifically, the human rights perpetrators that reside in them, are smart and strategic. And so both pro-compliance and pro-repression constituencies should remain “relatively sober about the prospects for change,” despite the impressive growth of human rights tools (p. 31). All of this provides helpful clues about how to better study repression and ways to stop it.

Second, the author makes the case that varied structures of decision making lead to different state responses. This is not news to any scholar of human rights, or of compliance. But it is still a point worth making again because it reminds readers, especially those looking for international solutions, that a lot of repression is actually about domestic politics. And that, in turn, means that a lot of international pressures and policies are just not going to make a difference in stopping abuses unless they do something about the cause of violations—laws, nongovernmental organizations, and more coercive tools like sanctions often will not work, no matter how they are designed. A lot of repression is being driven by national security, and that limits what international norms can do. This also suggests that repression is not a discrete problem to be studied in special sections of the American Political Science Association; it should also be part of broader debates, and research, on national security.

No book is perfect, and *Conflict and Compliance* has its shortcomings, too. Human rights scholarship generally

suffers from a strong bias for studying certain parts of the world, especially Latin America and Eastern Europe. Certainly, these regions are important to know about. Yet more pages have been dedicated to unraveling the effects of human rights pressures in countries like Argentina and Chile, the focus of this book and its main sources for evidence, than just about anywhere else. But what has happened in Latin America (and Eastern Europe) is different from what has happened elsewhere; the points raised in this book are important enough that they need meaningful application somewhere else to really have traction. The five “mini cases” are a start, but they are more fleeting literature reviews than thorough analyses. That is not a criticism of the author; it is a call to her readers to take up her claims and see how far they actually go.

This book’s strength is that it offers a careful discussion of the complex contingencies of compliance—the “dependent variables” at the heart of the story; it takes less care in sorting out the other side of the equation—centering on the large and growing mass of norms and institutions that are placing pressures on states. The reader is often left wondering: compliance with *what*? The cases tell the reader all about the different kinds of pressures applied in Argentina and Chile, and they point to the apparent successes as well as failures with equal conviction. They are less successful in sorting through the pressures that did the job and those that failed, which is a hard task for any scholar since dozens of pressures get used at the same time. Much to her credit, Cardenas tries to sort this out using statistical analyses that separate out the effects of a few kinds of pressures, like sanctions and NGOs. But the findings are hard to connect to the case studies; many kinds of international norm pressures that appear in the cases do not appear in the statistical analyses; and parts of the main story—for example, that international norms are not likely to do much when pro-violation constituencies are strong and when the rules of exception are entrenched—are not really modeled (democracy is a weak proxy).

But no matter. Cardenas has put forth an appealing argument about compliance with international human rights pressures, and it is the argument, if not necessarily the evidence, that should spark debate. That is value added to the field. Read the book.

Bounding Power: Republican Security Theory from the Polis to the Global Village. By Daniel H. Deudney.

Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007. 391p. \$35.00.
DOI: 10.1017/S1537592707072660

— Charles A. Kupchan, *Georgetown University and Council on Foreign Relations*

Among books on international relations theory, this is one of the most important works to be published in recent years. Daniel Deudney synthesizes traditional IR theory with the logic of republican politics, producing a

book that is as creative and original as it is erudite and sophisticated.

Deudney's principal intellectual contribution arises from his argument that the institutions and practices of republicanism—political freedom, popular sovereignty, and limited government—offer considerable promise of transcending the security threats stemming from both anarchy and hierarchy. In an anarchic international system, the prerequisites of security encourage competition and war. At the other end of the spectrum is hierarchy, which manifests itself as empire and/or domestic tyranny, both of which are prone to repression, rebellion, and violence. Deudney's suggested remedy is "negarchy," a systemic alternative in which the political constraints associated with republican rule check the dangers of unfettered competition as well as the excesses that often accompany stark power asymmetries: "Republican political orders are defined and configured as the systematic negation of pure power politics that mark the extremes of anarchy and hierarchy" (p. 15).

Deudney probes the intellectual roots of republican security theory, convincingly demonstrating that it is not far removed from the traditions of liberalism and realism. Liberalism recognizes the benefits of mutual constraint; theorists linking peace to liberal democracy, commercial interdependence, or institutional networks all highlight the salience of power-checking mechanisms. They have, however, tended to neglect systemic and material contexts. Although contemporary realists are more mindful of structural incentives, they have abandoned their earlier concerns with the threats to security arising from domestic tyranny.

Deudney reclaims the importance of material concerns by developing the notion of violence interdependence—a basic measure of the ability of actors to do physical harm to each other. Geography, topography, transportation and weapons technology, and state size are among the most important variables determining violence interdependence. As violence interdependence has increased, republican polities have had to increase their size to remain viable—from democratic city-state, to constitutional nation-state, to federal republic. Spatial and technological demands have driven the institutional innovations—such as the compound republic—that made possible continental federations of the size and scope of the United States.

Bounding Power also brings back to theoretical center stage the fact that "governments can themselves pose as severe a security threat" as anarchy (p. 46). America's Founding Fathers, for example, were at least as concerned about domestic tyranny as they were about foreign invasion—hence, a constitutional separation of powers despite its potentially adverse consequences for the conduct of U.S. statecraft. Moreover, "extremes of hierarchy and anarchy feed upon one another" (p. 55). Domestic repression provokes rebellion and civil war, contributing to inter-

national anarchy. Meanwhile, the external threats stemming from systemic anarchy encourage the centralization of power inside states.

To check the dual and interconnected dangers of anarchy and hierarchy, republican security theory looks to "socially constructed practices and structures of restraint" that bound power within states and cobind them to each other (p. 4). Domestically, popular sovereignty and institutional checks and balances prevent dangerous concentrations of power in the hands of government. Internationally, republics are particularly well suited to fashion interstate unions and other institutions of mutual restraint. Pursuing strategies of cobinding not only enables republics to avoid excessive centralization at home but also comes naturally inasmuch it entails only the replication of "their fundamental constitutional arrangements on a more extensive spatial scale" (p. 58).

Amid the nuclear age and its intense violence interdependence, Deudney argues, republican strategies for producing security are more needed than ever: "As power potentials bound upward, security comes from new configurations of power bounding" (p. 267). He is, however, guarded in his assessment of the likelihood that a republican global order is in the offing, locating himself in between the "tragic worldview" of realism and the "post-security agendas and relentless optimism" of liberalism (p. 270).

The author follows his theoretical exploration of republicanism with a magisterial survey of its intellectual and institutional origins. He ranges from the early political associations of ancient Greece and Rome to the maturing republican formations of Europe to the rise of the United States as a constitutional states-union. These historical chapters are carefully executed and well integrated with the book's theoretical apparatus.

The book frustrates on two counts. First, it is more complicated than it needs to be. To be sure, Deudney charts new theoretical terrain and is justified in generating new concepts to do so. But he effectively develops his own vocabulary, requiring that readers clear fairly high barriers to entry. Mastering the turgid terminology is well worth the challenge, but the task is unnecessarily onerous.

Second, Deudney might have gone further in drawing out the implications of his study for today's global challenges. The response of the United States to international terrorism, for example, raises profound and pressing questions about the ongoing feedback loop between external anarchy and domestic hierarchy. But this topic gets precious little attention.

In similar fashion, the concluding chapter might have addressed a host of contemporary issues, including the changing nature of republican practices within the European Union; the likely fate of the network of international institutions erected by the West during the Cold War; and the prospects for spreading republican international orders

to parts of the world yet to embrace republican politics at home. Instead, Deudney closes with a somewhat esoteric reflection on “nuclear one worldism.”

These shortcomings notwithstanding, *Bounding Power* is destined to become a classic work of IR theory, blending with remarkable innovation and insight the long tradition of republican theory with the field’s more familiar paradigms.

All Politics Is Global: Explaining International Regulatory Regimes. By Daniel W. Drezner. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007. 234p. \$29.95.
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— David P. Fidler, *Indiana University*

Daniel Drezner begins his book by throwing down a gauntlet: “Globalization is responsible for a lot of bad international relations theory” (p. 3). This assertion caused this reviewer to nod in agreement, but it heightened my expectations for what Drezner would produce. These expectations grew as he identified promulgators of “bad international relations theory,” which ranged from commentators, such as Thomas Friedman, to schools of international relations theory, including realism and liberal institutionalism, but especially theories that privilege the agency of nonstate actors in world politics. By and large, the author met this reader’s expectations by crafting a rigorous, robust, and accessible analysis of international regulatory regimes.

All Politics Is Global has a simple structure. In Part I, Drezner constructs a “revisionist” theory of international regulatory regimes. In the first three chapters, he announces his intent to bring the great powers back into the analysis of global governance, develops a theory of regulatory outcomes that supports privileging the great powers, and provides a typology of global governance processes to demonstrate that regulatory outcomes differ from regulatory processes.

In Part II, the author explores four case studies to test how well his theory explains them in comparison to other theories: global governance of the Internet (Chapter 4), the international financial system (Chapter 5), genetically modified organisms (GMOs) (Chapter 6), and intellectual property rights and public health (Chapter 7). In the final chapter, he summarizes his arguments, discusses his theory’s limitations, and speculates about how changes in international relations may affect international regulatory regimes in the future.

Drezner’s salvo against bad IR theory makes his theoretical efforts worthy of heightened scrutiny. His theory explains why “[a] great power concert is a necessary and sufficient condition for effective global governance over any transnational issue” (p. 5). This state-centric, power-oriented approach rejects other interpretations of globalization, which have intergovernmental organizations

(IGOs) or nonstate actors (e.g., nongovernmental organizations) primarily shaping regulatory cooperation. Unlike realists, Drezner takes account of IGO/NGO participation in international regulatory politics. Similarly, following liberalism, he argues that domestic actors and institutions determine state preferences, even those of the great powers, rather than the anarchical structure of international politics.

Initially, Drezner’s theory sounded as though he had merely visited the IR theory buffet table and taken the bits he liked best. But does it represent a coherent theory? This question highlights the importance of his “theory of regulatory outcomes,” which he develops using game theory models. (For the mathematically oriented, the author provides an appendix describing proofs for his propositions.) His theory building explains 1) how state preferences flow from domestic calculations of economic adjustment costs created by different outcomes in regulatory cooperation, and 2) why the market size of the great powers alters the nature of outcomes over such cooperation.

Drezner carefully defines his terms, and he defines the “great powers” in international regulatory cooperation as the United States and the European Union, based on their respective market sizes and reduced vulnerabilities to external disruptions (pp. 35–36). The great power concert that is necessary and sufficient for effective global governance depends on how U.S. and EU preferences align. Drezner acknowledges that the countries that qualify as great powers can change, and that changes, such as China’s continued rise, could make international regulatory cooperation increasingly difficult (p. 219).

After constructing his model, the author argues that it is “unaffected by the introduction of new actors” (p. 63). In assessing the impact of IGOs or NGOs, he distinguishes regulatory outcomes, which the great powers determine, from governance processes, which can involve state and nonstate actors. For Drezner, the key to separating outcomes from processes is the great powers’ ability to “forum shop” for governance processes conducive to achieving the outcomes they want (p. 63). This approach leads to his “typology of regulatory coordination,” which predicts four regulatory outcomes (sham standards, rival standards, club standards, and harmonized standards) based on the divergence among 1) the great powers’ interests and 2) the great powers’ interests and those of other international actors (p. 72).

Drezner tests his model in four case studies, which analyze the development of harmonized standards (e.g., governance of Internet technical protocols), club standards (e.g., international financial standards), rival standards (e.g., data privacy and the Internet; GMO regulation), and sham standards (e.g., regulation of Internet content) predicted by the typology of regulatory coordination. He concludes that his model explains international regulatory regimes better than competing frameworks (see particularly Table 8.1, p. 207).