

Introduction

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All the articles in this number are devoted to a critical discussion of Brian Barry's *Justice as Impartiality*, which is the second volume of his multi-volume *Treatise on Social Justice*. Each of the papers covers a different aspect of Barry's argument. Jonathan Wolff focuses on Barry's account of the rival theories of justice that he addresses in the first part of his book. In particular, he examines the account of 'justice as reciprocity', Barry's third theory, which he presents alongside 'justice as mutual advantage' and 'justice as impartiality'. Simon Caney concentrates on whether Barry's conception of justice as impartiality gives rise to a genuinely neutral theory, devoting attention to Barry's use of scepticism to ground impartiality. Andrew Mason develops this concern with scepticism and Barry's account of reasonable agreement which forms part of the account of the circumstances of justice. Mason's concern is with Barry's account of the nature of fundamental disagreement over ends. John Horton presents a number of criticisms of the scope of Barry's project of grounding an impartialist theory of justice. In particular he raises some concerns about Barry's use of the concept of harm. Matt Matravers pursues a narrower line, exploring the relationship between wrongs of unfairness and wrongness in itself. Finally my own paper picks up a number of themes arising from Barry's treatment of utilitarianism.

Four of the papers were originally presented at a symposium on *Justice as Impartiality*, at University College London on 18 April 1996, hosted by the International Society for Utilitarian Studies. The two remaining papers and Barry's response were invited to complete this issue. As the convenor of the original symposium I would like to thank the participants, and especially Brian Barry, who found the time to respond to the papers despite suffering a major accident in late 1995. I would also like to thank Dr Philip Schofield of the Bentham Project at University College London and the International Society for Utilitarian Studies for the support given to this venture. I am grateful to Fred Rosen, Editor of *Utilitas*, for his support for the original plan to devote a special issue to Barry's book. Finally I would like to thank Katherine Barber and Catherine Fuller of the Bentham Project, and Lorraine Clarke of the LSE for their assistance in the organization of the symposium and its coming to fruition in this special issue.