

states is a *morally* significant fact” (emphasis added, p. 271). Note that Caney does not pose the question of whether the existence of states is a *politically* significant fact. Viewed in the abstract, the restriction of political rights to the institution of the state would seem irrational (as would the division of the earth’s territory into sovereign states). In the abstract, there is no reason why the state should claim moral authority in the international sphere. Caney is right that there is then no *intrinsic* value to states (p. 271). However, in the concrete reality of politics as it is currently constituted, there are reasons for state sovereignty to be upheld as an ethical value. For example, on the grounds of universal rights of political equality: The state is currently the highest level at which political equality is recognized, the highest level at which political authority is accountable and at which self-government is possible. There is no higher source of legitimacy than the sovereign state. This is highlighted by the fact that even international or supranational institutions (such as the United Nations, NATO, and the European Union) derive their legitimacy from their constituent sovereign states.

The irony is that despite Caney’s talk about upholding universal rights of empowerment and his liberal egalitarianism, he seems to have very little faith in democracy. This is highlighted, for example, in his critique of state-based democracy: “Consider the incentives facing democratically elected officials in a world of states. Their incentive is to win elections and to do so to cater for the wishes and beliefs of their own citizens. They will therefore serve cosmopolitan ideals only if their citizens happen to have strong cosmopolitan beliefs. . . . A system of democratic states is, thus, not the most effective institutional system if we are to further cosmopolitan goals” (p. 169). It is as if Caney is suggesting that democracy is a barrier to universal rights (there is clearly no guarantee that voting per se, on any basis, will further cosmopolitan goals). Caney seems to lack the belief that people can be convinced to share his “cosmopolitan beliefs,” and nowhere does he suggest that there is any political or popular support for radically reorganizing the international system on the basis of cosmopolitan ethics. In his desperation to defend the idea of universal moral principles, he is even happy to state that they can play a role in criticizing injustice even where “there is no prospect of these principles playing a positive role” (p. 276).

To my mind, this book is strangely passionless for such an engaged and one-sided project. Caney has none of the aspirational commitment or engaging style demonstrated by other cosmopolitan theorists, such as Thomas Pogge, David Held, Andrew Linklater, Richard Falk, or Daniele Archibugi. The reader is left with the impression that, for Caney, this is a dry and hollow intellectual exercise. In many ways, it is. This is a work for the already converted. There is little new in terms of the development of cosmopolitan ethics. The potentially interesting aspect

of the book—the comprehensive survey of competing approaches—is undermined by the predictability and superficiality of the critiques of the competitors and the unchallenged cosmopolitan starting assumptions. In this respect, the work falls between two stools, and in the end, it is neither a development of cosmopolitan thinking nor a useful, comprehensive, survey of the field.

Unifying China, Integrating with the World: Securing Chinese Sovereignty in the Reform Era. By Allen Carlson.

Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005. 320p. \$55.00.

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— Mary E. Gallagher, *University of Michigan*

This is one of the first major works examining Chinese sovereignty in the post-Mao era. Unlike earlier works that have examined sovereignty through its manifestation in one or two policy areas—such as Taiwan, human rights, or economic integration—Allen Carlson’s synthesizes Chinese behavior and rhetoric over a range of issue areas, from Taiwanese independence to World Trade Organization accession.

Carlson finds Chinese policy on sovereignty to be contradictory. In the economic and human rights realms, the Chinese government has acquiesced to a certain degree of “boundary-transgressing” behavior that has weakened sovereign claims and made external actors more important to domestic debates and policy shifts. However, in other areas, most notably on the question of Taiwan, the Chinese government has acted relentlessly to stem the tide of sovereign loss through constant restatement of its commitment to use force to defend its claims to Taiwan. Sovereignty as one of the most critical principles in international relations is not pursued uniformly even in the Chinese case, a nation well known for its commitment to nationalist principles, such as noninterference in its domestic affairs and unwavering concentration on erasing the humiliations of the colonial era. As the author shows through his exploration of this range of sovereign issues, sovereignty is a bundle of rights. Invocation of these rights may not occur smoothly as states move to protect what is most important to them while giving up other rights in order to obtain different goals in the international system, such as economic integration, global legitimacy, and stable regional relations.

Carlson demonstrates this argument through examination of the four bundles of sovereign rights that he argues are most important to the concept of sovereignty. These rights include possession of territory (territorial sovereignty), jurisdiction over a certain population (jurisdictional sovereignty), the right to rule over the domestic population without interference from other states (sovereign authority), and the right to regulate economic activity within its own borders (economic sovereignty). Changes in China’s behavior and rhetoric are noted in all realms

but in varying directions. The Chinese state is giving away sovereignty with one hand while attempting to reign in other types of sovereign loss with the other.

The author's explanation for these complex policy shifts emerges from his accurate and intelligent critique of the new sovereignty literature in international relations theory. His empirical finding (Chinese policy shifts regarding sovereignty have not been uniform either over time or issue area) is used to extend the theoretical debate on the nature of sovereignty in the modern era. The power of each competing causal explanation in the literature (strongly held normative views, rational cost–benefit analysis, and external pressure from outside actors) also changes over time. He builds a dynamic argument that privileges leadership initiative in the early reform era (especially that of Deng Xiaoping), but then places far greater explanatory power in external pressure and norm diffusion for the substantial policy changes in economic sovereignty and Chinese engagement in the international human rights debate. Despite Carlson's identification with the constructivist school in international relations theory, he does not reject an interest-based argument. In fact, each explanation for the shifts in the four areas is built on the recognition that the Chinese state has shifted its stances on sovereignty in order to reap the benefits of globalization, economic integration, and greater mutual contact with the outside world. He argues that interests only, however, cannot explain why the Chinese government, for example, became much more willing to engage in the international human rights debate in the 1990s, almost immediately after the debacle of the suppression of the Tiananmen pro-democracy movement. He effectively uses the Chinese case to advance theoretical arguments that are significant for the ongoing explorations of how sovereignty is changing amid globalization in all its shapes and forms.

While the book is effective in its use of elite interviews and content analysis of an extensive number of documents to show that policy shifts have occurred, Carlson's argument does not delve deeply into the policymaking process. One wonders, then, what might have been missed given the importance that others have placed on the ways in which policy is made (and thwarted) by Chinese officialdom. For example, the broad changes in policy toward economic sovereignty may be at least partially explained by the actions of provincial and local leaders. Recent shifts in the human rights debate may have been advanced by domestic activists involved in the *weiquan yundong* (rights-protection movement). Given that the rights of sovereignty are as much about power over citizens as they are about power vis-à-vis other states, the author overemphasizes the role of elites, both domestic and international. As many studies of the Chinese reform era have now argued, radical policy change at the center is often prefaced by aggressive and daring actions of lower-level agents. Carlson tells us mainly about what those at the center have

said and written about the changes that have occurred; there is probably still even more to tell about what others *did* to advance policy change and to advance changing notions of sovereignty. Attention to this level of analysis does not contradict his general argument and is, in fact, entirely congruent with his findings that sovereignty has shifted more in the economic and social realms than in the territorial or jurisdictional ones.

Unifying China, Integrating with the World will be of interest to a broad array of scholars and policymakers. Its theoretical sophistication advances the general sovereignty debate in international relations theory, while the empirical arguments will be of great interest to policymakers who crave a more sophisticated picture of Chinese foreign policy than the engagement versus China threat debate. As China's role in the world becomes more important, this book should be effective in thwarting simplistic assumptions about how Chinese power, perhaps Chinese superpower, will be manifested.

Globalization from Below: Transnational Activists and Protest Networks.

By Donatella della Porta, Massimiliano Andretta, Lorenzo Mosca, and Herbert Reiter. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006. 300p. \$75.00 cloth, \$25.00 paper.

It Was Like a Fever: Storytelling in Protest and Politics.

By Francesca Polletta. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006. 242p. \$45.00 cloth, \$19.00 paper.
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— Robert M. Press, *University of Southern Mississippi*

While different in scope and intent, both books offer a refreshing and uplifting sense of the capacity and willingness of people to protest conditions in society, or the world, which they deem unjust. The authors may not have set out to highlight idealism in political activism, but they ended up doing so.

The question of the impact of political protests is still a murky area. Such impact is difficult to show, and the authors of these two important books have not come up with a magic formula to convince us that public protests change public policy. But they do offer useful insights into how protestors operate and what seems to motivate them. The contribution of both works is that they add fresh insights and examples in support of two current trends in the study of social movements and political protest: 1) an increasing focus on cultural explanations of activism, and 2) growing evidence that activists are willing to forge ahead even in the face of major obstacles, including repression. The two trends are related.

It Was Like a Fever offers yet another challenge to the straitjacket of self-interest analysis, by examining passion, emotion, excitement—and just plain fun—as other motivating factors that can lead to political protest. The debate over whether culture or material conditions lead to change in society is an old one, going back at least as far as Max