

where Portuguese colonialism ended in 1822, did well economically until the 1980s, when barriers to international trade, combined with excessive borrowing led to hyperinflation and currency collapse.

In his grand analysis, Krieckhaus reaches several conclusions. He notes that the primary advice given to developing nations today is to liberalize their markets. They are urged to adopt free trade, privatize, deregulate, and reduce governmental spending. This is labeled the *Washington Consensus*. To the contrary, the author finds that these policies have no clear effect on growth. One conclusion he does reach is that countries can make policy mistakes, such as the Mozambican overvaluation of the exchange rate during the 1970s. He goes on to observe that many so-called mistakes are really the result of outside factors such as the oil crises or extremely high international interest rates. The worst outside factor is war. Overall, developing countries have less control over their fates than is commonly assumed. The industrial world could help in several ways. The first would be more foreign aid, and the second would be to reduce tariffs, especially against farm products.

Krieckhaus has several good insights about the effect of war as a statistical variable. Standard data sets often lack information. For example, the Penn World Tables omit Vietnam during the period of the war there. No one knows the figures for economic growth, life expectancy, primary school enrollment, and so forth. Common sense says that all these were harmed, but by how much? The lack of data means these negative factors are ignored. Iraq is another country missing information. Its war with Iran from 1980 to 1988, its unsuccessful invasion of Kuwait and the Gulf War, and its invasion by the United States in 2003 all harmed the economy. But again, by how much?

*Dictating Development* has many good features. To paraphrase Lord Kelvin, unless you can measure something and express it in numbers, your knowledge is meager. Krieckhaus has certainly measured and expressed economic development in numbers. It is grand theory that can both inform and be debated by others willing to do similar statistical analysis. The author has agreed to make his data set available to other scholars for replication and testing. However, another researcher might use different starting dates or different factors and come up with different results.

The three case studies are a second good feature. Each ties the grand statistics of 91 countries to a single country. The cases consider elements such as government capacity, health, education, savings, and so forth in parallel. Unfortunately, modern publishing costs seem to dictate that scholarly books are limited to about 200 pages. This one would benefit from being twice as long with four or five more case studies. Finally, having the same author is a positive feature. Too often books of this sort are edited anthologies where the case studies by different authors do not mesh very well.

**The Financing of Politics: Latin American and European Perspectives.** Edited by Eduardo Posada-Carbó and Carlos Malamud. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution Press, 2005. 266p. \$65.00 cloth, \$19.95 paper.  
DOI: 10.1017/S1537592707071253

— Leslie Elliott Armijo, *Portland State University*

Edited books are never consistent across all chapters, but like this one, they can be fun. The book's organization is straightforward: a brief introduction, three increasingly specific theoretical chapters, and seven country case studies covering Latin Europe (Italy, Spain, and France), Britain, and South America (Colombia, Venezuela, Chile, and Uruguay).

The editors set out three big questions. *First*, how do political parties and candidates fund both ongoing activities and electoral campaigns? This question has multiple levels: What are the laws? Are they enforced? What are their results, in terms of both financial flows and political behaviors? The chapters on Europe principally explore the consequences of political financing patterns for government corruption, while the South American chapters map political financing in each country, either via a legislative and policy history of recent financing reforms, as in the selections on Chile (by Manuel Antonio Garretón) and Colombia (Fernando Cepeda Ulloa), or by illuminating critical twists in the money trail, as in the chapters on Venezuela (Diego Bautista Urbaneja) and Uruguay (Angel Eduardo Alvarez).

We have here tidbits for the connoisseur of political trivia, such as the claim by Justin Fisher that about 80% of spending by the British Conservative and Labour Parties is "routine" and in the nature of ongoing fixed costs not directly related to a general election, a funding pattern that creates a cash-flow problem, since voluntary donations reach their peak in the run-up to an election (pp. 116–17). There is also ample material for those in search of researchable theoretical hypotheses. For example, the discussions of Italy, by Véronique Pujas and Martin Rhodes, and Colombia, by Ulloa, suggest that cross-party power-sharing arrangements, once they become routinized, tend to institutionalize clientelism, graft, and kickbacks within the state. Those currently proposing power-sharing solutions to postconflict or highly polarized states may wish to note this plausible long-term consequence.

*Second*, what do private political contributors expect in return? Political contributors may simply support substantive policy positions, legitimately giving money to the candidate best embodying their preferences. Laurence Whitehead, erudite as always, observes that moral outrage at the existence of seepage between the formally impermeable spheres of money and politics would be naive. Of course, the wealthy invest in political access. We can acknowledge this reality, while nonetheless pursuing the promise of political equity implicit within

democracy. Both Whitehead and Emilio Lamo de Espinosa emphasize that democratic legitimacy depends on citizens trusting government. In Lamo de Espinosa's careful terminology, one problem arises because voters react to perceptions of government *corruption* (that is, an elected official providing a favor to a contributor, and thus both parties cheating the citizenry at large) by conceptualizing *fraud* (a citizen cheating the state, as through tax evasion) as morally acceptable. He also raises the intriguing question of why political corruption exists. Is it a case of incomplete modernization, "a sort of ethical transition following political and economic transitions" (pp. 31 ff.), or instead a question of economic incentives created by particular institutional designs, such as the 1990s decisions in many countries of both Europe and Latin America to privatize large portions of the state without adequate regulatory oversight (pp. 39–42)?

Contributors often do seek favors. Kevin Casas-Zamora's description of "friendliness" in Uruguay (pp. 220–24) offers pithy examples of the "delicate" quid pro quo between politicians and contributors. And what if party activists employ otherwise legitimate funds to "reward" potential voters ("vote-buying"), as in several of the Latin American cases discussed? An even more pernicious practice, though not one much discussed in the volume, is use of party funds to purchase the votes of wavering members of a multiparty legislative coalition, as recently occurred in Brazil's *mensalão* (monthly stipend) scandal, in which the ruling Workers Party (PT) distributed allowances to friendly federal deputies from other parties.

*Third*, does public financing of campaigns and parties constitute an important piece of the solution to unequal access for the wealthy? Parties of the Left, whose natural partisans are poorer, tend to believe so—but sadly, several European leftist parties have been among those recently accused of corruption. Pujas and Rhodes (pp. 70 and passim) in their chapter on Western Europe suggest that the problem is not public financing per se, but rather a combination of opportunity (inadequate checks and balances) and heightened incentives to incumbents due to increased partisan political competition (see also Pilar del Castillo on Spain). Another question is whether public financing tends to institutionalize spoils distribution while keeping new ideas and parties permanently shut out—a concern running particularly through the South American chapters. The countries profiled here, excepting Britain, all have substantial public financing of politics, though the Latin Americans are moving toward greater use of public financing, while the Europeans are inching back toward greater use of private funds. The other institutional option is the Anglo-American system of caps on private contributions from individuals and firms, often accompanied by prohibitions on certain donations, for example, from foreigners or state-owned enterprises. It is interesting to note that the United States is among the

increasing number of countries that prohibit political contributions from noncitizens—although the U.S. National Endowment for Democracy proudly finances partisan campaigns abroad.

In a refreshing admission, the contributors openly acknowledge the volume's most notable flaws, which are the lack of a tight comparative framework and similar data across cases. Eduardo Posado-Carbo's introduction laments the dearth of good cross-national data, even for the advanced industrial democracies. Like Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, I cannot resist repeating Elizabeth Drew's informant's quip that the less-than-perfect disclosure rules in the United States lead to "over-regulating the penguins on the tip of the iceberg" (p. 67). Pinto-Duschinsky also recalls that until recently political finance was not thought a respectable subject for scholarly study (p. 56). A quick Web search did lead this reviewer to relevant cross-national data on "Governance and Corruption" at the World Bank ([www.worldbank.org](http://www.worldbank.org)) and a series of country papers on comparative political financing at the National Institute for Democracy ([www.accessdemocracy.org](http://www.accessdemocracy.org)), and so perhaps the topic finally is catching on. One hopes so.

**Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements in Nondemocracies.** By Kurt Schock. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005. \$67.50 cloth, \$22.50 paper.

**Citizen Power, Politics, and the Asian Miracle: Reassessing the Dynamics.** By O. Fiona Yap. Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner, 2005. \$49.95.  
DOI: 10.1017/S1537592707071265

— Teresa Wright, *California State University at Long Beach*

These works exemplify the kind of broadly comparative study that many political scientists call for, yet few actually undertake. Kurt Schock studies six different popular movements against authoritarian rule, and O. Fiona Yap analyzes the interaction between citizens and government in four Asian newly industrialized countries (NICs). Together, they illuminate the dynamics of state-society relations in illiberal political contexts.

Most importantly, Schock and Yap both demonstrate that citizens in nondemocracies are not impotent, but rather have the ability to elicit favorable government responses through noninstitutional means. They both argue that, even in the most authoritarian of settings, government is not truly autonomous, but rather derives its power from sources within society. Thus, the citizenry always retains some power to influence the government. Both Schock and Yap provide concrete examples that illustrate how citizens in nondemocracies may use this power to successfully challenge existing policies. For both, a key strategy is the withdrawal of the economic resources upon which the ruling regime relies. Crucial in this regard is the power of labor, which tends to be an especially important resource in developing states. Consequently, by engaging in strikes