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GEORGES CLEMENCEAU AND THE ENGLISH*

ROBERT K. HANKS
University of Toronto

ABSTRACT. *Georges Clemenceau has traditionally been portrayed as a narrow-minded French nationalist. In spite of this reputation, he had many personal friends in England and was widely considered during his lifetime to be France's most eminent anglophile. Although his biographers briefly mention these ties, no one has systematically explored their political and diplomatic implications. Making use of new archival and journalistic evidence, this article will examine Clemenceau's relationships with several English upper-class mavericks: the positivist Frederic Harrison, the headstrong and opinionated Maxse family, and the idiosyncratic social democratic leader Henry M. Hyndman. Their influence encouraged in him an attitude toward England which blended sincere anglophilia with a deep-rooted distrust of its governing classes. Only by exploring this paradox can we understand the roots of Clemenceau's ultimate disillusionment with England.*

'In France, we think too well and too ill of the English.'
L'Abbé le Blanc, *Letters on the French and English Nations*.[1]

John Maynard Keynes charged that Georges Clemenceau's one illusion was France and that his one disillusion was mankind.[2] Many historians have followed suit, depicting Clemenceau as an ardent nationalist who ruthlessly pursued French interests ahead of all else. If one confines one's gaze to the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, this judgement might seem vindicated by the famous quarrels between Clemenceau and British Prime Minister David Lloyd George. Taken in the broader contexts of Anglo-French rivalry, Jacobin xenophobia, and the exaggerated European nationalisms of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, there might seem little reason to challenge Keynes's depiction of 'the Tiger'. The question of his political persona would appear to be closed.

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[1] Robert Gibson, *Best of enemies: Anglo-French relations since the Norman conquest* (London, 1995), p. 81.

[2] John Maynard Keynes, *The economic consequences of the peace* (New York, 1920), p. 32.

This conventional view has been reinforced by broad historiographic trends. Under first the influence of the *Annales* school, and subsequently the deconstructionists, historians have emphasized broad social, psychological, and cultural trends to the detriment of political and diplomatic history. In no country have these tendencies gone so far as in France.[3] Ironically, these developments have been reinforced by diplomatic historians, who have been so overwhelmed by the vast amounts of official archival materials that they have often been forced to adopt national rather than international paradigms in their treatment of statesmen.[4] Such has been the case with most studies of Clemenceau, which have mainly relied upon French archives, and which have tended to situate his long political career in a French national political context extending from the July Monarchy to the *horizon bleu* chamber.[5] Such an approach, however, does not do justice to Clemenceau's cosmopolitan intellectual interests and/or to his complex relationship with England. Although most of his biographers mention his English friends, and have acknowledged that he was an anglophile, none have explored the political implications of these relationships.[6] In fact, the Tiger's key English acquaintances and friends

[3] Michael Harsgar, 'Total history: the *annales* school', *Journal of Comtemporary History*, 13 (1978), pp. 7–8; Josef Konvitz, 'Biography: the missing form in French historical studies', *European Studies Review*, 6 (1976), pp. 9–20; Donald Cameron Watt, *An inaugural address: What about the people? Abstraction and reality in history and the social sciences* (London, 1983), pp. 3–5, 8–11, 16. See also Robert J. Young, 'Partial recall: political memoirs and biography from the French Third Republic', in George Egerton, ed., *Political memoir: essays on the politics of memory* (London, 1994), pp. 62–75.

[4] On some of the limitations inherent in the historical profession and the daunting challenges posed by the massive quantities of government documents stored in archives, see Ernest R. May, *Lessons of the past: the use and misuse of history in American foreign policy* (New York, 1973), pp. 180–1, 184, 189; Ernest R. May, 'Writing contemporary history', *Diplomatic History*, 8 (1984), pp. 108–9.

[5] Clemenceau's biographers have generally contextualized his life in a national rather than an international context. Only Watson has made use of British archives. None has used American archives. See David Robin Watson, *Georges Clemenceau: a political biography* (New York, 1974). For more specific comments on the historiographical treatment of Clemenceau's relationship with England, see the footnote below.

[6] On the more specific question of the Tiger's English acquaintances, Wormser comments briefly that Admiral Maxse was a great friend of Clemenceau, but does not pursue this as a theme. Ellis mentions Hyndman and the Maxses briefly, but does not follow up on these leads in his psycho-biographical analysis, which in any case stops in 1891 and hence rules out the subsequent influence of the Maxse children a priori. Watson has nothing to say about Hyndman, but briefly notes that Clemenceau's 1884 tour of Britain was arranged by the admiral, who was his best friend, and that Clemenceau was a close friend of his daughter Violet. Holt makes numerous references to Admiral Maxse and Violet Maxse, but does not explore the political dimensions of these relationships, and has little to say about Hyndman. Insofar as it concerns this article, Duroselle's compendious study focuses mainly on Clemenceau's personal relations with Admiral Maxse and his two daughters Olive and Violet, but says little about Leo Maxse and Hyndman, and nothing at all on Ivor Maxse, or Maxse family politics, or Harrison. Dallas states that Clemenceau was an anglophile, but does not follow up on this theme. Newhall argues that Clemenceau was not a sentimental anglophile and that he had no illusions about English foreign policy or imperialism, but only makes the scantiest references to the Maxses and Hyndman. Miquel, who focuses on the war and the Peace Conference, never intended to explore Clemenceau's intellectual formation, about which he correspondingly has little to say. Georges Wormser, *Clemenceau vue de près: documents, épisodes oubliés, précisions nouvelles* (Paris, 1979), p. 29; Jack D. Ellis, *The early life of Georges Clemenceau*,

were part of a broad nineteenth-century tradition of European radicalism. Clemenceau's connections with these political partisans strengthened his personal ties with England but eventually complicated his political relationship with Lloyd George and the British state.

During his lifetime, Clemenceau had the reputation of being the most anglophile of France's politicians. While a broad prosopographical examination of the leading figures in the Third Republic is beyond the scope of this study, this claim appears to be largely justified. Of course, some of Clemenceau's rivals also considered themselves to be anglophiles. The French premier William Henry Waddington rowed for Cambridge and was known for his British sense of reserve (although according to Duroselle, he spoke English with too much of an English accent!).[7] The radical politician and aspiring wartime statesman, Henri Franklin-Bouillon, was born in Jersey, had a English mother, and also attended Cambridge, but was referred to by British wags as 'Boiling Frankie', a nickname which suggests he was not held in especially high regard.[8] In general, it appears that most French generals and politicians were unfamiliar with England. Few French in the nineteenth or early twentieth centuries bothered to learn English,[9] while most preferred to travel on the continent: in 1929 some 881,000 British travelled to France while only 55,000 French reciprocated the trip across the Channel.[10] Cognizant of these trends, Clemenceau himself believed that the French political class as a whole was too insular. As he complained in 1922 to British military correspondent, Colonel Charles à Court Repington: 'We had several troubles. One was that the French understood nothing at all of the English or the Americans. Also the Millerands, Poincarés and Briands were not men of the world and had not travelled. It was true … that if they had travelled they would not have understood what they saw so it would not have mattered'.[11]

1841–1893 (Lawrence, KS, 1980), pp. 93, 234–5 n79; Watson, *Georges Clemenceau*, pp. 88, 137; Edgar Holt, *The Tiger: the life of Georges Clemenceau, 1841–1929* (London, 1976); Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, *Clemenceau* (Paris, 1988), see, in particular pp. 284, 375–8, 404; Gregor Dallas, *At the heart of a Tiger: Clemenceau and his world, 1841–1929* (London, 1993), p. xi; David S. Newhall, *Clemenceau: a life at war* (Lewiston, 1991), pp. 173, 177, 180, 246, 278. Pierre Miquel, *Clemenceau: la guerre et la paix* (Paris, 1996).

[7] Gabriel Hanotaux, *Contemporary France* (4 vols., New York, 1909), IV, p. 442; A. J. P. Taylor, *Bismarck: the man and the statesman* (London, 1953), p. 177; Duroselle, *Clemenceau*, p. 85.

[8] 'French and British parliaments: Joint War Committee proposed. M. Bouillon's mission', *Times*, 13 Dec. 1915, p. 5; David R. Woodward, *Lloyd George and the generals* (Newark, 1983), pp. 210, 357.

[9] Paul Gerbod, 'La langue anglaise en France au XIX siècle, 1800–1871', *Revue Historique*, 557 (1986), pp. 109–28. According to the First World War American observer, William Mitchell, the most common foreign language amongst French officers was German. With the exception of the navy, and certain mercantile classes, few French learned English. Brigadier-General William Mitchell, *Memoirs of World War One: from start to finish of our greatest war* (New York, 1960), p. 147.

[10] Theodore Zeldin, *France, 1848–1945: intellect and pride* (Oxford, 1980), p. 87.

[11] Interview of Repington with Clemenceau, 17 May 1922, House of Lords Record Office, London, Lloyd George papers, F/5/3/14.

While it might be too much to expect a charitable opinion from Clemenceau about his French political peers, his own anglophile credentials were deeply rooted and widely recognized. Joseph Chamberlain wrote of him in 1883 that: '[h]is opinions are very much those of any sensible English radical'.[12] This description was in fact an understatement, for Clemenceau's interest in England extended to nearly every aspect of his life and political vision. He visited England frequently, spoke fluent English, wore English clothes, used the English handshake, bought his furniture at Maples, dined in the Parisian *Café des Anglais*, kept English dogs, admired English horses, attended races at Ascot, and even boasted in 1917 that he had read: 'every substantial book published in the English language in the past twenty years'.[13] From the early 1870s onward, he hoped that England and France could be brought together to maintain the political equilibrium in Europe on behalf of democracy,[14] while during the 1880s he hoped to recast France's chaotic multi-party system into a two-party system based on Whig–Tory lines. He was also one of the very few nineteenth-century French politicians who believed that the English poor law was worthy of emulation.[15] The German ambassador to Paris, Prince Radolin, agreed with the assessment that Clemenceau was a committed anglophile. In his initial report on Clemenceau's government in 1906, he unflatteringly described the French premier as a man lacking all principles or direction but one: 'L'idée fixe de Clemenceau est: "l'Angleterre"'.[16] One of the leading contemporary British commentators on the Third Republic, John Edward Courtenay Bodley, drew a similar but more flattering conclusion. Acquainted with Clemenceau since at least 1890, Bodley wrote in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* in 1910 that: 'of all French public men in all political groups he was throughout his long political career the most consistent friend of England'.[17]

The roots of Clemenceau's anglophilia can be traced back to the final years of the Second Empire. His radical politics initially alienated opinion among

[12] Joseph Chamberlain to Potter, 15 Oct. 1883, Paris, Musée Clemenceau (MC), Dossier 7.

[13] Wythe Williams, *The Tiger of France: conversations with Clemenceau* (New York, 1949), p. 204; Theodore Zeldin, *France, 1848–1945: anger and politics* (Oxford, 1980), p. 340; John, Viscount Morley, *Recollections* (2 vols., London, 1924), I, p. 166, II, p. 186; Peter T. Marsh, *Joseph Chamberlain: entrepreneur in politics* (New Haven, 1994), p. 307; Rudyard Kipling, *Souvenirs of France* (London, 1953), p. 59; Winston S. Churchill, *Great contemporaries* (London, 1948), p. 247. Quotation from Peyton C. March, *The nation at war* (New York, 1932), p. 32.

[14] Berthe Zuckerkandl Szeps, *Clemenceau tel que je l'ai connu* (Algiers, 1944), pp. 102–3; Austen Chamberlain, *Down the years* (London, 1935), p. 18.

[15] For Clemenceau's constitutional views, see Ellis, *The early life of Georges Clemenceau, 1841–1893*, p. 122. For his views on the poor law, see 'By his wife' [Harriet Barnett], *Canon Barnett: his life, work and friends* (2 vols., London, 1918), II, p. 45. For the French debate on the poor law, see Timothy B. Smith, 'The ideology of charity, the image of the English poor law, and debates over the right to assistance in France, 1830–1905', *Historical Journal*, 40 (1997), pp. 997–1032.

[16] Radolin to Bülow, 31 Oct. 1906, no. 7539, *La politique extérieure de l'Allemagne* (Paris, 1938), xxx, pp. 77–8.

[17] J. E. C. Bodley, *France* (2 vols., New York, 1900), I, p. 7; idem, *The romance of the battle-line in France* (London, 1919), p. 243.

British conservatives,[18] but he found a more sympathetic audience amongst England's radicals, republicans, positivists, and francophiles. In 1865, Clemenceau and his father were introduced to the eminent Victorian philosophers Herbert Spencer and John Stuart Mill, whose book *Auguste Comte and positivism* Clemenceau translated into French while living in New York. After returning from the United States, and serving as mayor of Montmartre in the siege of Paris, he established contacts with English supporters of the Commune, many of whom were also part of England's brief republican resurgence in the early 1870s.[19] Although Clemenceau met such prominent figures as Gladstone, Parnell, Bright, Morley, Dilke, and the Chamberlains during the 1870s and 1880s, the people who had the greatest influence on his career and life were far less prominent and far more unorthodox. These figures were the positivist Frederic Harrison, the erstwhile radical Rear-Admiral Frederick Maxse and his children, and the social democrat Henry M. Hyndman. These mavericks shared a vision of Anglo-French co-operation against Prussian militarism three decades before the onset of the Anglo-German naval rivalry. Only by understanding their relationships with Clemenceau can we fully appreciate the evolution of his attitude toward Britain during the First World War and the Paris Peace Conference from admiration to disillusionment.

I

Frederic Harrison (1831–1923) was not personally close to Clemenceau, but the two men shared an overlapping network of political ideas and personal contacts. The son of a wealthy merchant and the recipient of an Oxford education, Harrison led a privileged existence, but his positivism excluded him from the mainstream of British political life. Consequently he led an eclectic career which encompassed labour reform, education, law, journalism, and philosophy.[20] Although relations between the French and English Comtians were marked by bitter feuding, the English positivists, of whom Harrison was one of the foremost, were distinguished by ardent francophilia.

In 1866 a group of positivist thinkers in England led by Harrison published a volume of essays entitled *International diplomacy*. As dedicated admirers of the French Enlightenment and Comte, they believed that France represented the vanguard of humanity and civilization. They were abolitionist, anti-Russian,

[18] For Queen Victoria's attitude, see Holt, *The Tiger*, pp. 52–3; Giles St Aubyn, *Edward VII: prince and king* (London, 1979), p. 351. See also *Times*, 18 Aug. 1893, p. 3.

[19] David Nicholls, *The lost prime minister: a life of Sir Charles Dilke* (London, 1995), pp. 47, 56; Philip Magnus, *Gladstone* (London, 1954), p. 207. For refugees from the Commune, see Henry Myers Hyndman, *The record of an adventurous life* (London, 1911), p. 159; S. Hutchins, 'The communard exiles in Britain', *Marxism Today*, 15 (1971), pp. 90–2, 117–20, 180–6; Kenneth D. Brown, *John Burns* (London, 1977), pp. 8–9; see also the following two footnotes.

[20] For Harrison, see Martha S. Vogeler, *Frederick Harrison: the vocations of a positivist* (Oxford, 1984), passim, but esp. pp. 98–105. The following are also helpful: W. M. Simon, 'Auguste Comte's English disciples', *Victorian Studies*, 8 (1964), pp. 161–72; Warren Sylvester Smith, *The London heretics, 1870–1914* (New York, 1968), pp. 84–104.

anti-German, and anti-imperialistic. Most significantly, they advocated the creation of a liberal Anglo-French coalition that would police the world. To the positivists, it was England's duty to defend France against militaristic and backward Germany, not merely for strategic reasons, but in the interests of humanity. They were the only group in England to advocate intervention on the side of France during the Franco-Prussian War, particularly at a workers' meeting at St James's Hall on 10 January 1871, an event which became enshrined in positivist and republican memories. They further isolated themselves from the mainstream of British politics by aiding exiles from the Paris Commune, which was a very unpopular cause in Victorian society.[21]

Meeting Clemenceau in 1874, Harrison was impressed with '[his] energy, [his] strong sympathies with England and English Liberalism, and his perfect frankness'. However, he initially ranked the former mayor of Montmartre as a mere journalist and partisan orator rather than a great European statesman like Gambetta, or even Jules Ferry, whom he considered the most able French statesman of the 1880s.[22] There is little evidence that Harrison and Clemenceau maintained close ties over the years after their early meeting. Yet while Harrison was not a government official, and while Clemenceau was not a die-hard positivist,[23] they had much in common. Harrison worked closely with Clemenceau's friend Joseph Chamberlain in the church disestablishment movement in 1875–7,[24] while Clemenceau was accompanied in his tour of working-class neighbourhoods in Whitechapel in 1884 by Harrison's friend and colleague, the positivist Dr J. H. Bridges.[25] Harrison and Clemenceau also followed parallel paths on key political issues. Harrison fought for the secularization of education, opposed MacMahon during the *seize mai* crisis, denounced the British invasion of Egypt, opposed German militarism, defended the Dreyfusards, wished to increase the size of the British army before the First World War, and constantly advocated close Anglo-French relations.[26] Having been on the same side of so many issues, Harrison amended his opinion of

[21] Other members of this group included Richard Congreve and Professor E. S. Beesly. For Harrison's contribution to *International diplomacy*, see Frederic Harrison, 'England and France', in idem, *Realities and ideals, social, political, literary and artistic* (London, 1911), pp. 1–65. For biographical sketches of these little-known figures and their defence of the Commune, see Royden Harrison, ed., *The English defence of the commune* (London, 1971). For examples of their francophilia, see Frederic Harrison, 'Justice – English and French', *Positivist Review*, 82 (Oct. 1899), pp. 170–3; E. S. Beesly, 'Anglo-French relations', *Positivist Review*, 230 (Feb. 1912), pp. 38–40. For assessments of the positivists' place in British foreign policy, see: A. J. P. Taylor, *The trouble makers* (London, 1957), pp. 62–3; Vogeler, *Frederick Harrison*, p. 78.

[22] Frederic Harrison, *Autobiographic memoirs* (2 vols., London, 1911), II, pp. 44, 62–4.

[23] For Clemenceau's attitude toward positivism, see D. R. Watson, 'A note on Clemenceau, Comte and positivism', *Historical Journal*, 14 (1971), pp. 201–4. For the linkages between positivism, science, and the republican opposition under the Second Empire, see John Eros, 'The positivist generation of French republicanism', *Sociological Review*, n. s., 3 (1955), pp. 155–77.

[24] Austin Harrison, *Frederic Harrison: thoughts and memories* (London, 1926), p. 21.

[25] 'By his wife' [Harriet Barnett], *Canon Barnett*, II, p. 45.

[26] For Dreyfus, see Harrison, 'Justice – English and French', pp. 170–3. Otherwise, see Vogeler, *Frederic Harrison*, passim.

Clemenceau in his memoirs in 1911. Referring to the latter's first ministry (1906–9), he wrote that the Tiger had distinguished himself as head of the French republic.[27]

The outbreak of the First World War vindicated the traditional francophilia of England's small band of positivists. In a letter to *The Times* in August 1914 Harrison's long-time colleague, Professor E. S. Beesly (1831–1915), recalled the positivist meeting at St James's Hall in 1871 and warned Britain not to abandon France as it had done in 1870.[28] The equally venerable Harrison praised the war as a fight for positivism and civilization in both the *Positivist Review* and the *Fortnightly Review*. Initially he praised Lloyd George's energetic leadership, and even defended the government against General Maurice's charges that it had starved the British army in France of men,[29] but his faith in the British government was eroded as 1918 progressed. In June, he praised the 'dictatorships' of Woodrow Wilson and Clemenceau, favourably contrasting these to Lloyd George's ineffective parliamentary government.[30] As the allied armies advanced under French command in October 1918, he argued that Comte had foreseen the League of Nations and, Britain's monarchy notwithstanding, that the Entente was unified by republican values. Bucking the trend amongst progressives toward Wilsonianism, he wrote that France supplied the strategy for the alliance. Citing Comte, he declared: 'Paris is today the spiritual seat of the duel between Civilization and barbarism.' To Harrison, Germany, the Habsburgs, the Vatican, and the Turks represented the waning forces of feudalism and despotism.[31]

In a memoir about his father, Austin Harrison wrote: '[d]uring the war … my father was as stoutly pro-French as M. Clemenceau himself, with whom he had distinct points of resemblance'. However, the younger Harrison added: 'I must not pursue this delicate subject here.'[32] This caveat was probably inspired by his father's vacillating attitude toward the Paris Peace Conference. The elder Harrison had initially praised the Treaty of Versailles, writing: '[t]he treaties of 1815 and of 1871 were inspired by fear, passion and greed. The peace of 1919 is founded in union, confidence, sagacity and trust.'[33] Yet by January 1920 he had modified his position. His great hero was now Lloyd George, whom he considered to be the only true statesman of the conference, and his great villain was Woodrow Wilson, whose amateur diplomacy and utopian idealism, he believed, had caused the ruin of Europe. Having read Keynes's *Economic consequences of the peace* by March 1920, he became even further disillusioned. He endorsed the Cambridge economist's

[27] Harrison, *Autobiographical memoirs*, II, p. 44.

[28] Edward Spencer Beesly to the *Times*, 5 Aug. 1914, reprinted in *Positivist Review*, 261 (Sept. 1914), p. 215.

[29] Vogeler, *Frederic Harrison*, pp. 370–1.

[30] Frederic Harrison, 'Obiter scripter. VI', *Fortnightly Review*, n.s., 618 (June 1918), pp. 801–2.

[31] Frederic Harrison, 'The west', *Positivist Review*, 310 (Oct. 1918), p. 224.

[32] Harrison, *Frederic Harrison: thoughts and memories*, pp. 149–50.

[33] Frederic Harrison, 'Peace with justice: the new treaty and the old treaties', *Positivist Review*, 318 (June 1919), pp. 127–9.

criticisms of the Treaty's arrangements for reparations, but was inspired to go even further. Whereas Keynes estimated that Germany had the capacity to pay £2,000,000,000, Harrison only hoped for £1,000,000,000. Supplementing Keynes's arguments with Charles Sarolea's *Europe and the League of Nations* (1919), which included attacks on the effectiveness of the League of Nations and the strategic viability of Poland, Harrison now believed that there was an 'unanswerable' case for immediate revision of the Treaty.[34]

Harrison included Clemenceau's conduct of French foreign policy in his omnibus critique of the post-Versailles diplomatic order. He criticized the French premier for being overly attentive to his military advisers and for his 'fierce passion', which threatened to bind Britain to France's attempt to crush Germany. Harrison also made more general criticisms against France for expanding its empire in Cilicia and Syria and for unrealistically wishing to reclaim the pre-war Tsarist debts from the USSR.[35] Nevertheless, in comparison to his fulsome jeremiads against Woodrow Wilson, Harrison devoted relatively little criticism to Clemenceau. Perhaps he was restrained by his sympathy toward France or by the realization that until recently his own views had not been so different from those of Clemenceau. In any case, he still considered himself to be an ardent supporter of a non-militaristic France. To this end, he lauded the election of Clemenceau's bland rival to the French presidency, Paul Deschanel, heaping lavish praise upon the latter's new biography of Gambetta. After Deschanel was forced by poor health to resign, Harrison greeted the election of Alexandre Millerand with a reassertion of his old positivist faith in Anglo-French relations. Although England and France faced great difficulties in the aftermath of the war and the failure of Wilsonianism, he declared that they must hold together, or both would fall.[36]

Keynes's influence reinforced Harrison's tergiversations toward Clemenceau's conduct of diplomacy, but it did not negate the long-standing francophilia of the other British positivists. The president of the English Positivist Committee, S. H. Swinny, acknowledged Harrison's criticisms of the League's weaknesses, but could not bring himself to disapprove of a treaty which had restored Alsace-Lorraine to France and revived an independent Poland. Swinny also criticized Keynes for underestimating the ability of modern society to eliminate debt and hailed France as a force for international peace in comparison to Britain, praising Clemenceau's brave anglophilia and wartime leadership. For Swinny, close Anglo-French relations remained essential.[37] Another frequent contributor to the *Positivist Review*, Paul Descours,

[34] Frederic Harrison, 'The treaty of peace', *Positivist Review*, 327 (Mar. 1920), pp. 49–51. See also Frederic Harrison, 'Novissima verba. – (III.)', *Fortnightly Review*, n.s., 639 (Mar. 1920), pp. 338–40.

[35] Harrison, 'Novissima verba. – (III.)', pp. 337–42; idem, 'Novissima verba.– (VII.)', *Fortnightly Review*, n.s., 643 (July 1920), pp. 1–3; idem, 'Novissima verba. – (XI.)', *Fortnightly Review*, n.s., 647 (Nov. 1920), pp. 705–9.

[36] Harrison, 'Novissima verba. – (XI.)', p. 708.

[37] S. H. Swinny, 'Paragraphs', *Positivist Review*, 336 (Dec. 1920), pp. 86–7; idem, 'The economic situation', *Positivist Review*, 328 (Apr. 1920), pp. 93–4; idem, 'Mr. Harrison's latest

also supported Clemenceau. In 1918 Descours praised Clemenceau's 'many very eloquent speeches during the last year' which had embodied the spirit of fighting France against the threat posed to civilization by Prussian militarism. Commenting upon the treaty debate in France, Descours approvingly noted that Clemenceau had quoted Comte's words that the living are more and more governed by the dead. In 1920 he again defended the Treaty of Versailles, and attacked the idea held by 'some ignorant people' that Clemenceau was an imperialist because his nickname was 'the Tiger'.[38] Overall, in spite of Harrison's final doubts, the francophile tradition amongst British positivists provided an intellectual and moral framework for Clemenceau's views and policies which predated the Franco-Prussian War.

II

Positivism was also one of the initial building blocks in Clemenceau's relationship with Admiral Maxse and his family. A veteran of the Crimean War and an ardent francophile, Maxse was a member of the positivist Century Club,[39] and enjoyed brief prominence as a progressive politician, unsuccessfully standing for parliament as a radical Liberal candidate in the post-Reform Bill elections of 1868 and 1874. Unable to make his voice heard in parliament, he exercized his political passions through a series of speeches, letters, and pamphlets (he once had the effrontery to send a remarkably candid pro-republican, pro-French letter to Queen Victoria's private secretary).[40] In 1872, Maxse was introduced to Clemenceau by their mutual friend Louis Blanc. Clemenceau was a welcome addition to his circle of friends, which included Matthew Arnold, Leslie Stephen, John Morley, Joseph and Austen Chamberlain, and the novelist George Meredith. The Tiger and the admiral remained the closest of friends until Maxse's death in 1900. Both men saw eye to eye on many points. Like Clemenceau, Maxse was a radical from a well-to-do background who scorned Christianity, who had a passion for social justice and reform, but who also drifted to the political right when confronted by the rise of organized socialism. Both admired Mill (whom Maxse once described as the English Condorcet), but differed from Mill on the question of women's suffrage on the grounds that the 'fair sex' should not be allowed to vote because feminine sentimentality was inherently conservative and opposed to social

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book', *Positivist Review*, 349 (Jan. 1922), pp. 10–12; idem, 'Progress: the development of order', *Positivist Review*, 352 (Feb. 1923), pp. 23–4.

[38] Paul Descours, 'Paragraphs', *Positivist Review*, 312 (Dec. 1918), p. 287; idem, 'Paragraphs', *Positivist Review*, 323 (Nov. 1919), p. 261; idem, 'The election of M. Deschanel', *Positivist Review*, 327 (Mar. 1920), p. 65.

[39] Christopher Kent, *Brains and numbers: elitism, Comtism and democracy in mid-Victorian England* (Toronto, 1978), pp. 48–9.

[40] Admiral Maxse to Henry Ponsonby, 16 Oct. [undated, probably 1871], in Arthur Ponsonby, *Henry Ponsonby: Queen Victoria's private secretary* (London, 1943), pp. 314–15.

reform. Most importantly, they were in accord on the key questions of foreign affairs. Both had favoured the Federal cause during the American Civil War and felt that force was justified on behalf of a just cause.[41] On the crucial question of Franco-German relations, Maxse was firmly opposed to Germany. As one of the more forceful speakers at the positivist meeting in St James's Hall in 1871, he had argued that Britain should intervene on behalf of France against Germany, with military means if necessary, and had declared: 'Germany has only obtained a temporary advantage over a giant. France will rise yet again, and all that is noble in her will passionately strive for the elevation of mankind.'[42]

As a passionate francophile, Maxse was deeply distressed by the Panama Scandal, which had resulted in Clemenceau's (temporary) exile from electoral politics in France, and by the Dreyfus Affair, which disgraced France in the court of international public opinion. Referring to the attempt to discredit Clemenceau with the Norton forgeries, which had attempted to portray the Tiger as a paid English spy, Maxse declared in the *National Review* in 1899 that French democracy had been betrayed by an absence of strong leadership. As he despairingly wrote: 'It is as if the very key-stone of European civilization has fallen out.' So impassioned was this critique that Beesly actually attacked Maxse as a jingo, writing: 'He poses as the life-long friend of France who is obliged unwillingly to confess her decadence.'[43] Ironically, Maxse's despair over the state of France politics during the Dreyfus Affair merely mirrored Clemenceau's own pessimistic diagnosis of the situation. Clemenceau in fact considered the English admiral to be 'a pure and perfect idealist'. Upon greeting a visiting delegation of English parliamentarians to the Chamber of Deputies in 1916, he warmly recalled the admiral's pro-French stand during the Franco-Prussian War.[44]

The Maxse household was a natural environment for the Tiger. The admiral and his wife were the parents of four intelligent and strong-willed children, Ivor (b. 1862), Leo (b. 1864), Olive (b. 1868), and Violet (b. 1872). Holding advanced views on education, the Maxses brought up their children to become

[41] Maxse was the model for the protagonist in George Meredith's novel *Beauchamp's progress*. For this and a character sketch of Maxse, see John Baynes, *Far from a donkey: the life of General Sir Ivor Maxse* (London, 1995), pp. 7–9; John A. Hutcheson Jr, *Leopold Maxse and the National Review* (New York, 1989), pp. 6–7, 12; S. M. Ellis, *George Meredith: his life and friends in relation to his work* (London, 1919), pp. 103, 284–6. For Maxse's endorsement of the use of force, see 'Admiral Maxse on our Egyptian policy', *Pall Mall Gazette*, 19 Mar. 1884, p. 11. For the references to Condorcet and the American Civil War, see Admiral Maxse, *The Irish question and Victor Hugo* (London, 1881). For the family's views on suffrage, see Vice-Admiral Maxse, *Reasons for opposing suffrage* (London, 1884); Mary Maxse, 'Votes for women', *National Review*, 52 (Nov. 1908), pp. 387–98.

[42] Captain [Frederick] Maxse, *A plea for intervention* (London, 1871).

[43] Fredk. A. Maxse, 'The civil war in France', *National Review*, 33 (July 1899), pp. 734–9; E. S. Beesly, 'France and her critics', *Positivist Review*, 80 (Aug. 1899), pp. 137–43.

[44] For Clemenceau's description of Maxse, see Morley to Violet Cecil, 8 May 1901, Violet Milner papers, Department of western manuscripts, Bodleian Library, Oxford (DWM), dossier 47; Senator Clemenceau, 'France and England', *National Review*, 67 (Apr. 1916), pp. 223–4.

independent critical thinkers. From a very young age, the children were encouraged to study world politics, to evaluate books, and to defend their points of view. Breakfast for the Maxse family was an intellectual forum in which cultural and political matters were passionately discussed. The children were thrilled to watch their parents test wits with their distinguished French visitor, and eagerly joined in the debate themselves.[45] Only once, apparently, did the Tiger's arguments with the admiral strain their relationship. As Clemenceau wrote in a letter to Violet during the Boer War, the admiral 'm'a beaucoup grondé dans ces derniers temps parce qu'il me trouvait pas assez *Anglophile*' [sic]. With a mixture of irony and affection, he went on to remark: 'Ce n'est pas la réputation que j'ai dans mon pays … Mais si mon esprit peut n'être pas toujours d'accord avec celui de mes amis, ce ne peut *jamais* [sic] être le cas de mon coeur. Je suis avec vous où que vous alliez et quoi qu'il arrive parce que je vous aime de la plus grande affection.'[46]

For the Maxses, and in particular the children, Clemenceau was 'one of the most powerful and brilliant personalities of the Third Republic'.[47] For Clemenceau in turn, the Maxses provided a cultural and emotional haven from his own troubled family life as well as from the turmoil of French politics. Visiting them frequently in England, he enjoyed being treated as an honoured and exalted guest, while in France he played the role of genial host, riding with them in the Bois de Boulogne, or acting as a guide to the museums and theatres of Paris. In a letter written during the height of the Dreyfus Affair to his favourite, Violet, he described the importance of their friendship in the most moving terms:

> je puis vous dire en toute sincerité c'est que l'amitié de 'ma famille anglaise' est, dans les agitations de ma vie, un précieux trésor dont je jouis en vieil égoiste revenu des soucis et des fatigues d'un altruisme échevelé. Si je vous donne une distraction passagère, j'en suis heureux. Vous faites plus pour moi: vous me rendez de la confiance, du courage et de l'espoir. Telle est la force de l'amitié, même silencieuse. S'il existait, le créateur des mondes, lui-même, ne pourrait pas me faire un plus beau présent.[48]

Clemenceau's evolution as a statesman became intertwined with the Maxse family's self-image. One of their functions was to introduce Clemenceau to the

[45] John Gore, ed., *Mary Maxse, 1870–1944: a record compiled by her family and friends* (London, 1946), pp. 32–3, 53.

[46] 'That is not the reputation which I have in my country … But if my mind does not always match those of my friends, that can never be said for my heart. I am with you wherever you go and whatever may happen, for I love you with the greatest affection.' Clemenceau to Lady Edward Cecil, 24 Nov. 1899, MC, dossier 5.

[47] 'Episodes of the month', *National Review*, 53 (Aug. 1909), pp. 885–6.

[48] 'I can say in all sincerity that the friendship of "my English family" is, in all the agitations of my life, a precious treasure which I enjoy as a selfish old man, getting over worries and fatigues of frenzied altruism. If I can afford you some fleeting distraction, that pleases me. You do much more for me: you return to me my confidence, courage and hope. Such is the force of friendship, even silent friendship. If he existed, the creator himself could not give me a greater gift.' Clemenceau to Lady Edward Cecil, 27 Apr. 1898, MC, dossier 5.

English political world, at first on the left, and with their subsequent drift to the political right, to prominent figures in British conservative circles. The admiral acted as Clemenceau's host during a whirlwind tour of English factories and liberal clubs in 1882.[49] It later became a Maxse family legend that the Entente Cordiale had been established by Joe Chamberlain and Clemenceau at one of their dinner parties in 1891.[50] A variant on this enthusiastic theme emerged when Olive Maxse met Clemenceau and Foch at the French embassy in December 1918. During a luncheon in which Clemenceau and Foch staged a mock trial of Kaiser Wilhelm II (with Clemenceau acting for the prosecution), they reminisced about the admiral. In Olive's exuberant words, he 'was one of the first Englishmen if not the only one who was so tremendously keen about the Entente, and it was he who introduce[d] Clémenceau to King Edward who founded (with his usual perspicacity) the "Entente cordial" [sic]'.[51]

On a somewhat less regal level, in 1894 Violet Maxse married one of Lord Salisbury's younger sons, Lord Edward Cecil. Relations between the atheistic, independent-minded Violet and the devout, establishment Cecils were predictably unhappy. As her husband wrote in exasperation: 'You should … never argue with one of the Maxse family about the French Revolution or anything else. It is a pure waste of breath.'[52] In spite of her strained relations with her in-laws, Violet acted as a tie between Clemenceau and the highest level of English conservative circles. Through her, he made acquaintance with Dr Jameson, Rudyard Kipling, and Lord Milner. The poet laureate became one of Clemenceau's ardent personal admirers, while Milner and the Tiger were later both members of the inter-allied Supreme War Council in 1917–19. More poignantly, when Violet's son George was killed in the French sector of the trenches in 1915, Clemenceau helped to secure permission for Milner to visit the front and find the body.[53] This family tragedy did not diminish Violet's love of France. When a commission was set up in 1919 to determine the final resting places of the war dead, she wrote a letter to the French government asking that her son 'should remain with his men, asleep in the soil of France, which will become dearer to me because my child is buried there'.[54] Later yet in life, she proudly recalled in her memoirs that the three Englishmen who had publicly protested against Bismarck's seizure of Alsace-Lorraine in 1871 were John Morley, Frederic Harrison, and her father.[55]

[49] *Pall Mall Gazette*, 16 Feb. 1884, pp. 3, 8, 10; *Pall Mall Gazette*, 17 Feb. 1884, p. 7; *Pall Mall Gazette*, 20 Feb. 1884, p. 7.

[50] Gore, ed., *Mary Maxse*, p. 32.

[51] Olive Maxse, 'A memorable lunch at the French embassy', 2 Dec. 1918, DWM, Violet Milner papers, dossier 14.

[52] Kenneth Rose, *The later Cecils* (London, 1975), pp. 192–5, 209–11. Quotation from p. 211.

[53] Rudyard Kipling, *The letters of Rudyard Kipling*, ed. Thomas Pinney (4 vols., London, 1996), III, p. 390; Ian Colvin, *The life of Jameson* (2 vols., London, 1922), II, p. 287. For Milner's visit to the front, see P. B. Gheusi, *Guerre et théatre, 1914–1918* (Paris, 1919), p. 146.

[54] Jay Winter, *Sites of memory, sites of mourning: the great war in European cultural history* (Cambridge, 1995), pp. 24–5.

[55] The Viscountess Milner, *My picture gallery, 1886–1901* (London, 1951), pp. 67–8. Violet married Lord Milner after the death of her first husband.

As a martial family, the Maxses provided Clemenceau with an insider's perspective into the notoriously insular British military world. The fact that Clemenceau's best friend was an English admiral takes some of the steam out of claims by Lord Haldane and Lloyd George that he did not understand the importance of the Royal Navy.[56] In this regard, it is worth noting that the Tiger shared Leo Maxse's belief that the proposed channel tunnel project of 1907 was a threat to English security – he even declared that if he were an Englishman he would strongly oppose the scheme.[57] This suggests that his subsequent disagreements with Lloyd George on shipping owed more to Anglo-French strategic differences rather than an inability to understand Britain's maritime tradition.

Whereas the admiral provided Clemenceau with a Royal Navy perspective not available to most French politicians, the younger generation of Maxses provided a key link to the British army. Ivor Maxse joined the colours in 1882 and served as an important source of information and contacts both for Clemenceau and for Leo's magazine, the *National Review*. Propelled by both social status and ability, he rose steadily through a series of prestigious posts and earned a reputation as one of the most innovative tactical thinkers in the British army, establishing close connections with Lord Roberts as well as such young military stars as William Robertson, Henry Wilson, and Douglas Haig. As a general in the British army on the western front during the First World War, Ivor was visited by Clemenceau several times,[58] and was most certainly the author of an anonymous letter from a British general published in Clemenceau's newspaper *L'Homme Enchaîné* which praised the results of Anglo-French artillery training.[59] When Ivor's XVIII Corps was badly defeated in the Germany offensive of March 1918 and forced to uncover the flank of the French army, contributing to the unity of command crisis, the political sting of this setback was probably reduced by Clemenceau's confidence in his military abilities.[60] It certainly did not lessen their old friendship: in 1926 Clemenceau

[56] Major-General Sir Frederick Maurice, *Haldane, 1856–1915: the life of Viscount Haldane of Cloan* (London, 1937), p. 228; David Lloyd George, *War memoirs of David Lloyd George* (2 vols., London, 1938), II, pp. 1564, 1608–9.

[57] 'Episodes of the month', *National Review*, 48 (Feb. 1907), pp. 925–6; 'General report on France for the year 1907', Sir Francis Bertie to Sir Edward Grey, 15 Apr. 1908, *British documents on foreign affairs … , part 1, series F, xii, France, 1905–1908*, ed. John F. V. Keiger (Frederick, MD, 1989), p. 373.

[58] For Ivor Maxse's record as a divisional commander, see Peter Simkins, 'The war experience of a typical Kitchener division – the 18th division', in Peter Liddle, ed., *Facing armageddon: the First World War experienced* (London, 1996), pp. 299–304. For his military career and Clemenceau, see Baynes, *Far from a donkey*, pp. 103, 132, 168.

[59] 'British training at the front: French tuition for our gunners: mixed batteries', *Times*, 31 Aug. 1915, p. 5.

[60] There is no direct evidence regarding Clemenceau's attitude toward Ivor Maxse during the military crisis of March 1918, but it is reasonable to assume that he believed that Ivor had done his best against very heavy odds. For Marshal Foch's high opinion of Ivor, see Olive Maxse, 'A memorable lunch at the French embassy', 2 Dec. 1918, DWM, Violet Milner papers, dossier 14. For different interpretations of Ivor's battlefield conduct and troop deployments in March 1918,

was pleased to note that his book on the Athenian statesman Demosthenes had elicited: 'une charmante lettre du général Maxse'.[61]

Leo Maxse's journal, the *National Review*, also served as an important connection to Britain for Clemenceau on political, military, and diplomatic issues. Leo's monthly magazine was ardently conservative, Unionist, anti-socialist, anti-German, and extremely pro-French. A prolific and energetic editor, Leo consistently attacked Berlin from 1901 onward, and repeatedly urged that Britain make up its differences with France and Russia.[62] In the belief that the Dreyfus Affair represented a greater threat to healthy Anglo-French relations than either Egypt or Fashoda, the *National Review* became the leading Dreyfusard voice in Great Britain.[63] Inspired by Clemenceau, Leo was also the frequent beneficiary of direct information and opinions from the Tiger, responding with all of the eagerness of a schoolboy. He was proud to be entrusted with his famous patron's confidences,[64] and ironically became better known in England for his defence of Dreyfus than Clemenceau himself.[65]

A passionate crusader by temperament, Leo Maxse believed that only extreme and intransigent men made great movements possible. He was unsparing in his attacks on British politicians who failed to live up to his high standards. He revelled in denouncing 'the Rt. Hon. Faintheart and the Rt. Hon. Feebleguts'.[66] Asquith, Haldane, Churchill, Balfour, and especially Lloyd George were frequent targets of his pen. When the Marconi scandal

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see Tim Travers, *The killing ground* (London, 1987), p. 233; Robert K. Hanks, 'How the First World War was almost lost: Anglo-French relations and the March crisis of 1918' (MA thesis, University of Calgary, 1992), pp. 69–70; Baynes, *Far from a donkey*, pp. 184–204. For the political dimensions of the March crisis, see Hanks, 'How the First World War was almost lost', pp. 110–68.

[61] Clemenceau to Mme Baldensperger, 29 Apr. 1926, *Lettres à une amie*, ed. Pierre Brive (Paris, 1970), p. 273.

[62] Paul M. Kennedy, *The rise of the Anglo-German antagonism, 1860–1914* (London, 1980), pp. 256, 261, 318.

[63] Although Leo had been prominent in the defence of Dreyfus, by 1911 he was denouncing the alleged pro-German sympathies of the 'International Jew'. This odd transformation has not been adequately explained by relevant secondary literature: Hutcheson, *Leopold Maxse*, pp. 94–6, 101–3, 460; Gisela C. Lebzelter, *Political anti-semitism in England, 1918–1939* (Oxford, 1978), pp. 19–20, 22; Kenneth Lunn, 'Political anti-semitism before 1914', in Kenneth Lunn and Richard C. Thurlow, eds., *British fascism: essays on the radical right in inter-war Britain* (London, 1980), pp. 26–7.

[64] L. J. Maxse, 'Side-lights on the Great War', *National Review*, 76 (Dec. 1920), pp. 556–7, 570.

[65] Clemenceau was not nearly so well known for his role in the Dreyfus Affair in the United States and Britain as Zola and Piquart. Walter Littlefield, 'Dreyfus case slight big factor', *New York Times*, 2 Feb. 1930, Section 3, p. 8. This judgement seems borne out by surveys of the *New York Times' Index*, as well as by Egal Feldman and Robert Tombs. Egal Feldman, *The Dreyfus Affair and the American conscience, 1895–1906* (Detroit, 1981), pp. 10, 121, 146; Robert Tombs, '"Lesser breeds without the law": the British establishment and the Dreyfus Affair', *Historical Journal*, 41 (1998), p. 504.

[66] 'Episodes of the month', *National Review*, 70 (Sept. 1917), p. 24. For Maxse's views on political leadership, see E. T. Raymond, *All & sundry* (London, 1919), p. 229; Sir Austen Chamberlain, *Politics from inside: an epistolary chronicle, 1906–1914* (London, 1936), p. 81.

broke, Leo worked himself into a rage and single-handedly wrote an entire issue on the subject, denouncing the embarrassed Welshman to the *National Review*'s 20,000 readers.[67] Leo went on during the war to criticize Lloyd George's conduct of strategy and diplomacy. He was convinced that Lloyd George's decision to send South African statesman Jan Smuts to Switzerland in early 1918 to sound out the Austrians for peace terms was treacherous, and made the rounds of military and diplomatic circles in Paris denouncing the British prime minister in the strongest terms.[68]

In stark contrast, Leo regarded the Tiger as 'a great European as well as a great Frenchman'.[69] He lauded Clemenceau's defence of private property against the utopianism and collectivism of French socialist leader Jean Jaurès,[70] and in 1906 he suggested that Clemenceau's vigilant defence policy meant that French radicalism was more robust than the decadent English variety of the Campbell-Bannerman government.[71] After Clemenceau formed his wartime government, Leo reassured the *National Review*'s readers that the (weary) French army was at the 'top of its form' because its officers and men believed in their premier. In a shot at intriguing politicians and generals, Leo declared that Clemenceau was free from the paltry jealousies of ambition and that his clear statement of war aims had filled men with purpose. For good measure, he added:

> Men fight better under tigers than under monkeys and jackals – or charlatans … 'The Tiger' has the heart of a lion. With all of his seventy-six years, men of action leave his presence as they left the presence of Pitt, who was half his age, feeling braver than when they came. It would be impossible to overrate the value of such a personality at such a crisis, not only to the Republic, but to the entire Entente.[72]

In the Maxse family tradition, Leo provided Clemenceau a link with the British army. Leo Maxse had close ties with many officers of Unionist sympathy, which enabled the *National Review* to run frequent articles by leading military authorities, including contributions from Lord Roberts.[73] With the outbreak of war, Leo went from theory to practice, playing an energetic backroom role in August 1914 rallying the Curragh mutineers and sym-

[67] Leo Maxse, 'The great Marconi mystery', *National Review*, 61 (May 1913), pp. 405–596, esp. pp. 537–64. For circulation figures at the height of the Marconi scandal, see Lunn, 'Political anti-semitism before 1914', p. 26.

[68] Wilson diary, 4 Jan. 1918, Imperial War Museum, London (IWM), Sir Henry Wilson papers. See also Esher diary, 6 Jan. 1918, Churchill Archives Centre, Churchill College, Cambridge, Viscount Esher papers, 2/21.

[69] 'Episodes of the month', *National Review*, 71 (Apr. 1918), p. 137. See also 'Episodes of the month', *National Review*, 53 (Aug. 1909), pp. 885–6.

[70] 'Episodes of the month', *National Review*, 47 (July 1906), pp. 734–5.

[71] 'Episodes of the month', *National Review*, 48 (Nov. 1906), p. 388.

[72] 'Episodes of the month', *National Review*, 71 (Mar. 1918), p. 9.

[73] For example Spenser Wilkinson, 'The defence of London', *National Review*, 29 (Mar. 1897), pp. 42–50; Field Marshal the Earl Roberts, 'An ominous parallel: France, 1866–1870 – the United Kingdom, 1903–1913', *National Review*, 62 (Feb. 1914), pp. 921–31.

pathizers to the government so that Britain could send the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) to France.[74] Consistent with the strategic beliefs of most Unionists, he subsequently became a vociferous 'westerner', fully supporting Field Marshal Haig and the BEF in northern France against the distractions and demands of other military theatres. Never shy to express his opinion, Leo freely offered private military advice to the French premier. This interference prompted Haig's rival, General Sir Henry Wilson, to advise Clemenceau: 'I told him not to pay any attention to what Leo Maxse was writing to him … because Leo was doing it because he thought Haig was the first General in the world.' Wilson declared to his diary that his remark had 'killed all Leo's power for mischief', a hope that was certainly overly-sanguine.[75]

Leo's military influence on Clemenceau should neither be exaggerated nor underrated. As French premier, Clemenceau obviously needed little convincing that Britain's military presence on the western front wanted strengthening. Moreover, Clemenceau did not share Leo's high opinion of Haig (nor did Ivor Maxse for that matter). While Clemenceau considered Haig to be a fine man, he shared the widespread French scepticism about his military abilities, and came to the conclusion that General Allenby was a more capable general.[76] In spite of such differences, the Maxse brothers were valuable inside sources into the BEF's *mentalité* and fractional quarrels. Their influence helps to account for Clemenceau's sure touch in relations with the BEF and the 'cult' of affection which most British generals on the western front had for him.[77]

Leo could also be counted upon to take a pro-Clemenceau line on major defence and foreign policy issues. This was evident at the Paris Peace Conference. Leo sent Clemenceau a complimentary advance copy of an attack on the American President, 'Too Much Wilson'.[78] In private, he was even more scathing toward Clemenceau's opponents, prompting Henry Wilson again to complain: 'It was clear Clemenceau had slipped all sorts of nonsense into him as against L. G. [Lloyd George].'[79] The publication of Keynes's *The economic consequences of the peace* thus naturally aroused Leo's full ire. As usual, he praised the clarity of Clemenceau's programme for victory while deriding Whitehall's lack of preparedness for war in 1914 and Lloyd George's ongoing reluctance to

[74] L. J. Maxse. 'Retrospect and reminiscence: IV. A fateful breakfast', *National Review*, 71 (Aug. 1918), pp. 746–52. See also Leo Amery, *The Leo Amery diaries*, ed. John Barnes and David Nicholson (2 vols., London, 1980), I, pp. 102–7.

[75] Wilson diary, 17 Dec. 1917, IWM.

[76] For Ivor's opinions, see Wilson diary, 26 Apr. 1918, 18 Aug. 1918, IWM. For Clemenceau's opinions, see House diary, 11 June 1922, Sterling Library, Yale University (SLYU), Colonel E. M. House papers; Wilson diary, 13 Dec. 1917, IWM; 'Notes of an interview between M. Clemenceau, Colonel House and myself', 7 Mar. 1919, in David Lloyd George, *The truth about the peace treaties* (2 vols., London, 1938), I, p. 289.

[77] J. J. H. Mordacq, *Le Ministère Clemenceau: journal d'un témoin* (4 vols., Paris, 1930–1), II, pp. 282–3.

[78] L. J. Maxse, 'Too much Wilson', Château de Vincennes, Paris, Service historique de l'armée de terre (SHA), 6N 75, Dossier Etats Unis, or, idem, 'Too much Wilson', *National Review*, 72 (Feb. 1919), pp. 786–800.

[79] Wilson diary, 5 Apr. 1919, IWM.

consult professional diplomatic advisers for British policy toward France.[80] Unlike Harrison, Leo was utterly unimpressed with Keynes. He had no respect for Keynes's academic qualifications or his ties to the treasury, denouncing him as a mere Cambridge don who had retired from the Peace Conference because Woodrow Wilson was insufficiently Wilsonian. In contrast to Harrison, Leo pointed out that while Keynes had 'demonstrated' that the maximum the Germans could pay even with Allied assistance was £2,000,000,000, the Germans themselves had indicated that £5,000,000,000 was within their capacity to pay. Leo contemptuously noted: 'Like many British bureaucrats this gentleman seems to be even more German than the Germans.'[81]

III

Clemenceau's strained relationship with British officialdom was further influenced by his friendship with another British political extremist – the top-hat socialist Henry M. Hyndman. Like Harrison and the Maxses, Hyndman was a maverick from a privileged background. He was the pioneering Marxist writer in English, founding the Social-Democratic Federation and the British Socialist Party, but he fell out with Marx and Engels for allegedly plagiarizing *Das Kapital*. In spite of his commitment and enthusiasm, Hyndman's eccentric and combative personality nullified his chances of obtaining a large following. As George Bernard Shaw quipped: 'Hyndman has charming manners and is the worst leader that ever drove his followers into every other camp – even into the cabinet – to escape from his leadership.'[82] Hyndman's socialists never elected a member of parliament, but their role in the Hyde Park riots of 1884 nevertheless ensured them a degree of prominence and notoriety. Always a fervent social democrat, Hyndman believed for forty years that revolution was always just around the corner. His energy and enthusiasm made him a recognized fixture in British politics until his death in 1922.[83]

Throughout his life, Hyndman forged connections with continental radicals and socialists, including Mazzini, Wilhelm Liebknecht, Jaurès, and Clemenceau. Hyndman thought that Clemenceau's individualism was barren, and hoped that he would take a progressive socialistic stance, but was unable to convince the Tiger that collectivism would be acceptable to the individualistic, property-owning French peasantry.[84] Clemenceau in fact thanked Admiral Maxse in 1897 for writing a letter to *The Times* which took exception to

[80] L. J. Maxse, *Politicians on the war path* (London, 1920), pp. 76, 27–8. [81] Ibid., p. 93.

[82] George Bernard Shaw, *Pen portraits and reviews* (London, 1932), p. 128.

[83] Smith, *The London heretics*, pp. 19–21. See also: Chushichi Tsuzuki, *H. M. Hyndman and British socialism* (Oxford, 1961); Stanley Pierson, *Marxism and the origins of British socialism* (Ithica, NY, 1972), pp. 59–70, 178–84; idem, *British socialism: the journey from fantasy to politics* (Cambridge, MA, 1979), pp. 81–4, 255–6, 271–80, 297–302; E. P. Thompson, *William Morris: romantic to revolutionary* (New York, 1955), pp. 292–6.

[84] Henry Myers Hyndman, *The record of an adventurous life* (London, 1911), pp. 320–2; idem, 'The French elections', *Justice: The Organ of the Social Democracy*, 6 (28 Sept. 1889), p. 2; idem, 'M. Clemenceau's administration', *Justice*, 23 (27 Oct. 1906), p. 3.

Hyndman's faith in the growing strength of French socialism.[85] Yet in spite of their differing opinions on the future of socialism, he and Hyndman still had much in common, sharing a respect for positivism and for John Stuart Mill, a belief in free institutions and Anglo-French friendship, as well as a deep distrust of both the Catholic church and Prussian militarism. Although Hyndman had strong anti-semitic tendencies, linking Jews with imperialism, he grudgingly defended Dreyfus, in part because of his respect for Clemenceau.[86] As a socialist, he was more critical of the Tiger's pre-war politics than either Harrison or Leo Maxse, but he still glowingly described the French leader in his memoirs in 1911 as 'the best leader of opposition, the best debater, the best conversationalist, the best shot, and the best fencer in France'.[87]

Hyndman and Clemenceau found grounds for co-operation in military and foreign policy. Inspired by the Jacobin *levée en masse* and by Jean Jaurès's model for a citizen's militia, Hyndman believed that the French model of the nation in arms provided splendid democratic training for workers and peasants, and should be applied to Britain. Operating from this premise, his journal *Justice* advocated a people's militia. It praised Harrison's warning in the *Positivist Review* that Britain could not rely upon the 'obsolete maxims of Gladstone, Bright and Cobden' against German arms, and even expressed guarded support for Lord Roberts's proposal to introduce conscription in Britain.[88] When Clemenceau attempted to win over Edward VII to the idea of a larger British army in 1908, he noted to the king that Hyndman's socialists supported such an expansion.[89] Clemenceau and Hyndman differed in 1913 when Hyndman expressed reservations over Clemenceau's support of the Three Year Service law in France, worrying that this moved France too close to the Prussian military model,[90] but the two closed ranks with the outbreak of the war. In 1915, Clemenceau published Hyndman's attacks on the anti-French pamphlets of the British Independent Labour Party and E. D. Morel's Union of Democratic Control.[91] When elements of the French and British left were

[85] H. M. Hyndman, 'The Liberal Party and socialism', *Times*, 14 Sept. 1897, p. 9; Frederick A. Maxse, 'M. Clemenceau's defeat in the Var: letter to the editor', *Times*, 18 Sept. 1897, p. 6; Clemenceau to F. A. Maxse, 29 Sept. 1897, DWM, Violet Milner papers, VM 1.

[86] Hyndman, 'Déroulède and Dreyfus', *Justice*, 16 (15 July 1899), p. 1. For Hyndman's response to well-founded charges of anti-semitism, see 'Hyndman at Walworth', *Justice*, 16 (11 Nov. 1899), p. 8. See also Claire Hirshfield, 'The British left and the "Jewish conspiracy": a case study of modern antisemitism', *Jewish Social Studies*, 43 (1981), pp. 95–112, esp. pp. 97–9.

[87] Hyndman, *The record of an adventurous life*, p. 315. See also 'M. Clemenceau', *Justice*, 23 (17 Mar. 1906), p. 1.

[88] H. M. Hyndman, 'Vive La République', *Justice*, 9 (24 Dec. 1892), p. 2; 'The menace to peace', *Justice*, 26 (13 Mar. 1909), p. 12; 'Critical chronicle: the citizen army again', *Justice*, 25 (28 Nov. 1908), p. 1. *Justice* continued to speak with the voice of Hyndman after he gave up the editorship in 1888. Tsuzuki, *H. M. Hyndman*, p. 273.

[89] Wickham Steed, *Through thirty years, 1892–1922: a personal narrative* (2 vols., Garden City, NY, 1924), I, p. 287.

[90] H. M. Hyndman, 'The crisis in France: republic or empire?', *Justice*, 30 (7 June 1913), p. 5.

[91] 'Une lettre de M. Hyndman', *L'Homme Enchainé*, 7 Mar. 1915, p. 1; Tsuzuki, *H. M. Hyndman*, pp. 227–8.

considering a plebiscite in 1918 to decide the future of Alsace-Lorraine, Clemenceau's *L'Homme Libre* published Hyndman's reminder that Marx, Liebknecht, and Bebel had all condemned the injustice of the original Prussian conquest.[92] Hyndman privately agreed with France's claims to the Rhineland,[93] and for a short time even entertained the fanciful notion that his friendship with Clemenceau and his professed expertise in European affairs qualified him to be a member of the British delegation to the Paris Peace Conference.[94] Denied this opportunity, he cheered France on from the sidelines throughout 1919: he supported French peace claims against Lloyd George and Woodrow Wilson, argued that no country had sacrificed as much for the Allied cause as France and declared 'that a weakened France means a weakened Britain'.[95] In a letter to the *Morning Post* in July 1919, Hyndman chastised French socialists for refusing to recognize the 'magnificent work' done for them by Clemenceau.[96]

Like the Maxse connection, Hyndman and Clemenceau reinforced each other's tendency to disparage centrist British politicians. Early during their acquaintance in the 1880s, Hyndman had been impressed by Clemenceau's description that the Third Republic was simply 'l'Empire Républicanisé'.[97] When Clemenceau visited England in 1882 under the guiding hand of Admiral Maxse, Hyndman praised 'the worthy Admiral' who had 'championed' the Paris Commune, but warned Clemenceau against association with 'the smug free trade adulterators of the Cobden Club'.[98] If anything, the outset of war in 1914 sharpened Hyndman's scathing attitude: in his view the cause of social democracy was equally imperilled by the twin threats of German militarism and the ineptitude of Britain's reactionary ruling caste. As he made clear in a typical diatribe:

> I regard our whole Foreign Office as clear evidence that the whole Pluto-Aristocratic *system* is played out. Fitzmaurice, Grey & Cecil could not possibly have done worse if their names were Brown, Jones & Robinson, men replete with ignorance, fresh from the farm, the forge & the factory. It is the fashion of our greedy & incompetent rulers to say that 'democracy' must fail. Democracy has never yet had a trial in this country. Pluto-Aristocracy with its bankers, brewers, gin-distillers, advertisement-press-owners, lawyers, multiple-shopkeepers[?] has been tried and has landed us in the most horrible war the world has ever seen unprepared & lied to us throughout.[99]

This attitude struck a chord with the French premier. When Clemenceau

[92] 'L'Alsace-Lorraine et les socialistes anglais', *L'Homme Libre*, 26 Jan. 1918, p. 1.

[93] R. T. H. [Rosalind Travers Hyndman], 'Why France is aggrieved', *Justice*, 37 (22 Dec. 1921), p. 1.

[94] 'The Peace Conference', *Justice*, 35 (28 Nov. 1918), p. 4.

[95] H. M. Hyndman, 'France and her claims', *Justice*, 36 (10 Apr. 1919), p. 1.

[96] *Morning Post*, 8 July 1919, cited in De Fleuriau to Pichon, No. 436, SHA, 6N 162.

[97] Hyndman used this idea in 'The revolutionary agitation', *Justice*, 1 (16 Feb. 1884), p. 3. He later attributed its origins to Clemenceau: idem, 'The crisis in France: republic or empire?' *Justice*, 30 (7 June 1913), p. 5.

[98] 'M. Clemenceau Cobdenised', *Justice*, 1 (23 Feb. 1884), p. 1.

[99] Hyndman to Seton-Watson, 23 Dec. 1916, School of Slavonic and Eastern European Studies, University of London (SSEES), Seton-Watson papers, Hyndman File.

made his state visit to London in December 1918, he made time for a private interview with Hyndman, during which the two old friends regaled one another with attacks on Britain's political leadership. As Hyndman recalled: 'I had a long & personally delightful chat with Clemenceau. What he told me politically about the attitude of our own folk here was *by no means* so pleasant. I cannot trust more than that to a letter.'[100]

In spite of Hyndman's reticence, the tone, and perhaps the substance, of this conversation can be reconstructed from other private and public sources. Hyndman and Clemenceau had quite similar views on Sir Edward Grey's promise in 1916 to give Constantinople to the Russians – in Hyndman's eyes, Grey was 'incompetent and corrupt'; to Clemenceau, Grey's action was proof that he was an 'idiot'.[101] Like Leo Maxse, Clemenceau and Hyndman believed that Jan Smuts was ill-qualified to serve as British secret emissary to Austria in early 1918. Clemenceau remarked to Henry Wilson that Smuts 'did not know where Austria was', while Hyndman's *Justice* wrote that Smuts 'did not know the difference between Slovaks and Slovenes'.[102] Most importantly, Clemenceau and Hyndman shared a strong dislike of Lloyd George. While Clemenceau never lacked grounds for dispute with Lloyd George over military and diplomatic affairs, Hyndman certainly reinforced his feelings. Hyndman's indictment of Lloyd George intermingled domestic, military, and diplomatic criticisms. Before the war, he had zestfully attacked the Welsh politician for lying like a 'gasmeter' over the Marconi scandal and the safety record of British merchant shipping.[103] Hyndman's Marconi allegations against Lloyd George continued into the war: *Justice* castigated the appointment of Lloyd George's Marconi associate Lord Reading as ambassador to Washington as a national disgrace and charged that the government had misused its wartime powers to halt potentially embarrassing proceedings ensuing from the scandal.[104] *Justice* also attacked Lloyd George's management of the war, characterizing his semi-clandestine peace feelers to the Austrian Empire in early 1918 as 'disgraceful' and supporting General Maurice on the manpower issue.[105] In June 1918 Hyndman summed up these attacks against the British prime minister with a

[100] Hyndman to Seton-Watson, 5 Dec. 1918, SSEES, Seton-Watson papers, Hyndman file. For a similar description of this conversation, see Rosalind Travers Hyndman, *The last years of H. M. Hyndman* (London, 1923), pp. 183–4.

[101] Hyndman to Seton-Watson, 18 Feb. 1916, SSEES, Seton-Watson papers, Hyndman File. For Clemenceau, see Wilson diary, 5 May 1916, IWM.

[102] 'Mr. Lloyd George as Talleyrand', *Justice*, 36 (18 Dec. 1919), p. 4. For Clemenceau, see Wilson diary, 5 Jan. 1918, IWM.

[103] 'The official murdering of British seamen: Hyndman's challenge to Lloyd George', *Justice*, 30 (19 Apr. 1913), p. 5.

[104] 'Marconi wins', *Justice*, 34 (10 Jan. 1918), p. 4; 'Critical chronicle: "Marconi" – deeper and deeper still', *Justice*, 35 (28 Mar. 1918), p. 4.

[105] 'Critical chronicle: the secret diplomacy of Lloyd George', *Justice*, 35 (25 Apr. 1918), p. 4; 'Critical chronicle: General Maurice and the war cabinet', *Justice*, 35 (9 May 1918), p. 4. For Maurice, see also 'Critical chronicle: Mr. Lloyd George: a danger to the country', *Justice*, 35 (16 May 1918), p. 4.

signed article in *Justice* provocatively entitled 'The approaching collapse of Lloyd George'.[106] In July 1918 he resorted to his own clandestine diplomacy, warning Clemenceau by private courier that treachery was afoot in London.[107] To Hyndman, Lloyd George was 'a politician, first, foremost, second and third', while Clemenceau considered the Welsh premier to be a politician rather than a statesman and one of the 'greatest liars he had ever met'.[108]

Hyndman firmly believed that wartime Britain had not produced 'one quite first-rate, nor even high second-rate, man'.[109] Confronted with this dearth of leadership against the threat of Prussian militarism, he took solace in the example set by Clemenceau. When Leo Maxse allowed him the honour of including a biographical tribute to Clemenceau in the June 1918 issue of the *National Review*, Hyndman drew upon the old example of the Second Empire when he unflatteringly described Lloyd George's entourage as somewhat less corrupt than that of Napoleon III. Despairingly, he prayed: 'May we Englishmen in this time of difficulty and danger yet bring forth a statesman of the character and genius of Georges Clemenceau!'[110]

Hyndman elaborated upon this *cri de cœur* by publishing the first full-length English language biography of the French premier in early 1919. Enriched by decades of personal acquaintance with its subject and with French politics, this book was not a simple hagiography. It took Clemenceau's pre-war ministry (1906–9) to task for its policy of expansion in Morocco and its heavy-handed use of force against striking workers and wine growers.[111] After its publication, Hyndman also privately criticized Clemenceau's domestic political performance. Reflecting upon the election of the *horizon bleu* chamber in November 1919 and the Tiger's loss of the French presidency to Deschanel in January 1920, he wrote in a letter to a friend that Clemenceau owed his defeat: 'entirely to himself: first by forming that Conservative bloc, next by jerrymandering the constituencies in its interest, & then by not saying "yes" or "no" to his own candidature. The very men he made the bloc for let him in.'[112]

Yet in spite of these reservations, Hyndman retained his belief that Clemenceau was the Entente's most eminent statesman. In his biography's conclusion he trumpeted: 'Clemenceau's influence in the Council Chamber of the Allies was and is supreme … Many dangerous intrigues during the past few months, of which the world has heard little, were snuffed clean out by Clemenceau's force of character and overwhelming personality.'[113] After the

[106] H. M. Hyndman, 'The approaching collapse of Lloyd George', *Justice*, 35 (6 June 1918), p. 1.

[107] Hyndman to Seton-Watson, 7 July 1918, SSEES, Seton-Watson papers, Hyndman file.

[108] H. M. Hyndman, 'France and her claims', *Justice*, 36 (10 Apr. 1919), p. 1. For Clemenceau, see House diary, 21 Sept. 1919, SLYU.

[109] Hyndman to Seton-Watson, 15 July 1917, SSEES, Seton-Watson papers, Hyndman file.

[110] H. M. Hyndman, 'Clemenceau', *National Review*, 71 (June 1918), pp. 447, 459.

[111] Henry Mayers Hyndman, *Clemenceau, the man and his time* (New York, 1919), pp. 213–22, 235–7.

[112] Hyndman to Seton-Watson, 27 Jan. 1920, SSEES, Seton-Watson papers, Hyndman file.

[113] Hyndman, *Clemenceau, the man and his time*, pp. 337–8.

Tiger's retirement, *Justice* further proclaimed: 'Georges Clemenceau did a glorious work for France and for Europe … Not France alone but every nation in Europe had at last discovered a Man. His fearlessness, his determination, his extra-ordinary energy made him the rallying point of all who had decided that the Prussian menace to the higher aspirations of European civilisation should finally be crushed.'[114]

On a more personal level, Clemenceau fully appreciated his friend's ardent support during what was unquestionably a time of great crisis. When Hyndman wrote to Clemenceau in the summer of 1918 asking for information, probably with regard to the biography, Clemenceau regretfully informed him that it was impossible to furnish it because he had not maintained records. In spite of the tremendous battle then in progress on the western front at that moment, he took the time to write:

Je ne peux vraiment que vous remercier de la trop flatteuse lettre inspirée par notre vieille amité. Je n'ai rien à dire de moi même, si non que je fais de mon mieux, avec le sentiment que ce ne sera jamais assez … Dans un si grand drame, mon cher ami, ma personalité ne compte pas. J'ai eu tort ou raison à certaines heures, cela ne m'interesse même plus puisque c'est du passé … Je ne puis que vous exprimer ma gratitude pour votre amicale intention. Je ne demande qu'à voir le jour de la grande victoire. Après cela, je serai récompensé bien au déla de mes mérites, surtout si vous y ajoutez la continuation de vos sentiments fraternels.[115]

Upon Hyndman's death in 1922, Clemenceau sent another moving letter to his widow, an excerpt of which was reprinted in *Justice*. Overlooking their past differences, and tactfully omitting any reference to the role played by Hyndman during the war, Clemenceau's eulogy paid eloquent tribute to his old comrade:

I have at last been able to communicate with you, but only in time to join my regret to yours and to cherish the memory of the man who was so dear to us both. He passed through this world in perfect serenity of soul, for he could not and would not see anything but the great things in life, never the small. I am glad indeed to learn how the good comrades who shared his hopes and his toil gave their utterance to their love for him by his grave … It is no small thing for the success of his great work that so noble a chief should receive the fullest assurance of his friends' enduring fidelity in the hour when he must depart. It helps on the great cause to which Hyndman, in his simple and smiling heroism, gave all the best years of his life.[116]

In a further telling epitaph, when the American portrait artist Cecelia Beaux

[114] 'Critical chronicle: the retirement of Clemenceau', *Justice*, 27 (22 Jan. 1920), p. 4.

[115] 'I can only but thank you for the too flattering letter inspired by our old friendship. I have nothing to say of myself, if only that I am doing my best, with the sentiment that that will never be enough … In a tragedy of this magnitude, my dear friend, my personality counts for naught. Whether I was right or wrong at certain times, is not even of interest to me since it is all in the past … I can only express to you my gratitude for kind intentions. I ask only to see the day of the great victory. After that, I will be rewarded well beyond my merits, especially if you add the continuation of your fraternal sentiments.' Clemenceau to Hyndman, 1 July 1918, MC, dossier 4.

[116] 'Clemenceau's tribute to H. M. H.', *Justice*, 37 (22 Dec. 1922), p. 4.

asked Clemenceau which of the biographies on him then in print he preferred, he at once replied: 'H. M. Hyndman's'.[117]

IV

Historians have underestimated the political influence of Clemenceau's English acquaintances and friends. This historiographic lacunae can be accounted for: by Keynes's influence; by the tendency to frame historical questions in national rather than international paradigms; and by the fragmentary nature of the existing archival, memoir, and epistolary evidence, which remains incomplete unless integrated into the rich material provided by pamphlets, magazines, and newspapers. It can also be explained by Clemenceau's own behaviour. Not only did he have a notorious disdain for the preservation of documents, but it also seems plausible that he deliberately compartmentalized the different aspects of his life in order to preserve his much-valued privacy, with the result that many people who thought they knew him well remained unaware of the full scope of his interests and activities. For example, neither the memoirs of his French secretary Jean Martet nor his American confidant Wythe Williams demonstrate cognizance of Clemenceau's close personal ties to England.[118] Such reticence by Clemenceau toward England may have been further reinforced before 1914 by the eagerness of the French right to attack him for being too sympathetic to England. Conversely, after 1917 it would have been potentially embarrassing for him to acknowledge proximity with polemicists like Leo Maxse and Hyndman while negotiating with the same men under attack in the *National Review* and *Justice*. In any case, it is interesting to note that when Henry Wilson confronted Clemenceau about Leo Maxse's interference in English military affairs, he observed that Clemenceau 'was rather astonished at my knowing!'[119]

As a working politician and diplomat, Clemenceau never had the freedom from responsibility and compromise which these English intellectuals enjoyed. As shown above, he appreciated the sincerity demonstrated by Admiral Maxse and Hyndman, but also considered them 'pure' or 'simple' idealists. His own greater sense of realism was demonstrated in his jest: 'Mr. Lloyd George annoys me less when I see him than when I don't see him.'[120] Yet although Clemenceau was more practical than Harrison, the Maxses, and Hyndman, it is clear that they had an impact on his conduct of Anglo-French relations. They shared with him the intellectual heritage of the old positivist and republican ideal of Anglo-French solidarity against Prussian militarism, they provided Clemenceau with connections to the British political and military worlds, they lobbied for a British military commitment in support of France, and, with the

[117] Cecelia Beaux, *Background with figures: reminiscences of a painter* (Boston, 1930), p. 289.

[118] Jean Martet, *Clemenceau: the events of his life as told by himself to his former secretary Jean Martet* (London, 1930); Williams, *The tiger of France*.

[119] Wilson diary, 17 Dec. 1917, IWM.

[120] L. J. Maxse. 'Side-lights on the Great War', *National Review*, 76 (Dec. 1920), pp. 556–7.

exception of Harrison's defence of Lloyd George, they acted as Clemenceau's propagandists in England, frequently extolling him above their own government. Like them, Clemenceau believed that war against Germany was just and that it should be prosecuted *jusqu'au bout*. Like Leo Maxse and Hyndman, he believed that politicians everywhere were 'a rotten gang'.[121]

Clemenceau's English connections do much to explain his decision to join Lord Robert's National Service League in the summer of 1911, which he justified to Roberts on the grounds that a strong English army was a general European concern.[122] An unorthodox step, this would have been unthinkable for any foreign statesman in an era of intense national passions who did not have close personal ties with Britain or the assurance that he understood English politics. Again, when Clemenceau put intense diplomatic pressure on Lloyd George to increase the level of British recruiting in the summer of 1918, he justified his conduct in part by pointing out: 'there is always a certain number of enlightened and professional men in your country who persist in thinking that the military effort of Great Britain could be intensified'.[123] The implication of this rejoinder was that not only were Lloyd George's manpower policies unenlightened, but that Clemenceau understood Britain's military capacity better than the British prime minister.

As a man of great independence and strongly held views, it was characteristic that Clemenceau's closest English friends should also be iconoclastic political critics of their own country. To a certain extent, this meant that his disputes with the English state were conducted within an intellectual framework of anglophilia, for like them, he simultaneously held idealistic hopes for Anglo-French relations alongside a scathing attitude toward British politicians. Ultimately, this paradox proved to be intellectually untenable. It was Clemenceau's hope that the wartime alliance of France, Britain, Italy, and the United States could be preserved in some form. Even as late as a meeting in London in December 1919, he tenuously asserted the old positivist idea that '[t]he most important thing … to his mind, was that France and England should be in absolute agreement on all big questions'.[124] Yet his old dream of Anglo-French co-operation had been battered by the costs of the First World War, the disputes of the Peace Conference, and the international influences of domestic partisan politics. In sharp contrast to Keynes's claim that Clemenceau's one disillusion was mankind, his exasperation with British policies in the autumn of 1919 had led him to complain that all English politicians were

[121] Lord Bertie of Thame, *The diary of Lord Bertie of Thame, 1914–1918*, ed. Lady Algernon Lennox (2 vols., London, 1924), I, p. 233.

[122] Clemenceau to Lord Roberts, 1 June 1911, in David James, *Lord Roberts* (London, 1954), pp. 449–50. Newhall refers to this letter in a footnote, but does not incorporate it into any larger arguments or themes. Newhall, *Clemenceau*, p. 308 n. 33.

[123] Clemenceau to Lloyd George, 16 Aug. 1918, p. 10, House of Lords Record Office, London, Lloyd George papers, F/50/3/18.

[124] 'Secretary's notes of an Anglo-French conference held at 10, Downing Street … December 13, 1919, at 11:00 a.m', SHA, 6N 72.

untrustworthy and to exclaim: 'L'Angleterre est la désillusion de ma vie!!'[125] Although this disillusionment vindicated his natural pessimism, it also betrayed the hopes which had for so long formed an integral part of his personality and political vision. France's post-war estrangement from Britain was brought about by a combination of military, diplomatic, and economic disagreements, but the disillusionment of its most eminent anglophile had its roots in his unorthodox partisan friendships.[126]

[125] House diary, 21 Sept. 1919, SLYU. Quotation from André François-Poncet, *De Versailles à Potsdam* (Paris, 1948), p. 65.

[126] The Anglo-French manpower disputes in 1918 are explored in greater depth in Robert K Hanks, 'Culture versus diplomacy: Clemenceau and Anglo-American relations during the first World War' (Ph.D thesis, University of Toronto, 1992), chap. 4.