measure of corruption. In some of the most corrupt systems, there are few scandals because the politicians exercise strong control over the media and/or the judicial system. They argue, for example, that just because Japan saw few scandals between 1967 and 1972 (when Kakuei Tanaka emerged as the leading political figure), we should not assume that politics was clean. During this period, both the media and prosecutors seem to have been cowed by the strong influence of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) over the media and courts. Reporters and prosecutors stopped looking for corruption because their previous efforts to publicize and prosecute it had failed to convict or defeat corrupt politicians. But when foreign media coverage of the Tanaka scandals gave these actors an opportunity to dig, their revelations of extremely disturbing behaviors suggested that there was actually much more activity of this type going on beneath the surface.

Similarly, the authors argue, a large count of scandals—such as the numerous cabinet ministers forced to resign over improper campaign finance reporting between 1997 and 2012—should not be regarded as proof that corruption was highest during these periods. Many of these scandals involved relatively trivial violations of campaign law, such as cases where a minister accepted a modest donation from a Korean resident of Japan who was not a citizen. Some involved activity that had been legal or easy to hide until reforms tightened restrictions and disclosure requirements. There were more scandals during this period because corrupt activity was easier to find, not because there was more corruption after the reforms were implemented. Carlson and Reed thus argue for a careful qualitative review of scandals that pays attention to exactly what behaviors were revealed; how they were revealed; whether they led to convictions, resignations, or campaign defeats; and how campaign finance and bribery laws were adapted in response.

This careful analysis gives us a convincing measurement of the level of corruption across time in Japan. The authors argue that it was high in the 1950s through the 1980s but has fallen off significantly since 1994. The analysis also shows the central role played by scandals in causing corruption to rise or fall. When scandals are infrequent, corruption can continue beneath the surface since politicians expect to face few consequences. When they are frequent, politicians have an opportunity to *learn*. They watch a colleague being forced to resign a cabinet seat, and they modify their behavior. The authors report that at least 12 senior Diet members revised their campaign reports immediately after Prime Minister Shinzo Abe announced, after a string of scandals in his first term, that he would appoint to the cabinet only politicians whose reports were flawless (p. 155).

Because scandals are so important to the process of reducing corruption, the authors argue, the factors that are most important in reducing corruption are those that facilitate these revelations. Disclosure rules that forced politicians to account for their income and expenditures in much greater detail were critical. Also important were changes to bribery statutes that made "mediation bribery" illegal. A politicians did not need to be the cabinet minister officially in charge to be prosecuted. Senior politicians with deep networks in the bureaucracy could be held responsible just for calling up and asking officials to give a donor's bid favorable consideration, even when they held no technical authority over that contracting decision. This change allowed prosecutors to take on corruption of this type, which had been endemic in the LDP, and reveal it to the public.

Finally, Japanese politics has become less corrupt because electoral reforms in 1994 changed the environment in several ways. They eliminated intraparty competition, which had incentivized politicians to build expensive personal support networks, allowing politicians to make (much cheaper) appeal for votes by taking popular positions on *policy*; they provided parties with public funds to cover political expenses; and they fostered the emergence of a two-party system, which increased the incentive for the opposition to dig and find evidence of corruption in order to win elections, and increased the likelihood of a party being knocked out of government if it failed to clean up its act.

The book suffers from repetition at points, covering campaign finance scandals in chronological chapters and then again in a chapter on "sex and campaign finance scandals." It also delivers critical information on changes in campaign finance regulations in dribs and drabs over the full length of the text, rather than in a single coherent section. But these deficiencies are more than offset by the lively writing and depth of empirical detail about the many scandals covered. *Political Corruption and Scandals in Japan* is a must-read for scholars of Japanese politics and those who study corruption in other places and times.

Brexit: Why Britain Voted to Leave the European Union. By Harold D. Clarke, Matthew Goodwin, and Paul Whiteley. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017. 272p. $59.99 cloth, $19.99 paper.
doi:10.1017/S1537592718003870

— Matthew J. Gabel, *Washington University in St. Louis*

On June 20, 2016, citizens of the United Kingdom voted in a referendum asking whether the UK should remain a member of the European Union or leave, causing "Brexit." The slim victory for Brexit came as a surprise, if not a shock, to many observers. Resolving what exactly the vote meant and how best to respond to it has dominated UK politics ever since.

This book is an ambitious and impressive attempt to explain the Brexit vote. What sets the book apart from other accounts is that it engages the topic

comprehensively and brings original survey evidence to bear on a broad set of important questions about which we have largely only speculated. Harold D. Clarke, Matthew Goodwin, and Paul Whitely use this evidence to address both popular accounts of the Brexit campaign and vote and the academic literature on related general topics—for example, referendum voting behavior. Their findings suggest that many popular conceptions of the referendum need revision. Moreover, the forces they identify as being at work in the referendum may prove important for understanding domestic and international politics in Europe for some time to come.

The book is organized chronologically, but with valuable asides to add context. The authors set the stage with a review of the political context surrounding then–Prime Minister David Cameron's execution of his campaign promise to renegotiate the UK's membership and then put it to a popular vote. This includes a detailed description of the campaign and the strategies employed by the "Remain" and "Leave" sides. The authors then step back from the unfolding drama to engage two important topics. First, they analyze trends in UK public support for EU membership and advance a "valence" argument for why support has varied—sometimes quite dramatically—since the mid-2000s. Second, they examine the rise of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP). This is based on an original survey of UKIP members and a study of electoral support for the party. These two pieces of the puzzle are then used to explain the referendum vote itself. The explanation features original survey data collected directly before and after the referendum. *Brexit* concludes with a discussion of the likely consequences of the vote for the UK and for European politics more generally.

The evidence from the authors' analyses supports several revisions to the conventional account of the vote. Perhaps the most striking finding is that, for many voters, the referendum was largely about domestic political considerations, not EU membership. Clarke, Goodwin, and Whitely show that even late in the campaign, large shares of the UK public did not consider leaving the EU consequential for foreign affairs, immigration, their personal finances, or the economy overall. More generally, the UK public had not considered the EU a pressing or significant political issue for several years prior to the referendum (Ipsos Mori Issues Index, July 2018). It is not surprising then that voters' evaluations of leaving the EU were driven primarily by valence considerations: for example, their views of party leaders, their partisanship, their national identity, and the performance of the government in addressing the dominant issues of the day. Consequently, we should not have been surprised that the electorate failed to follow the broad elite consensus opposing Brexit based on the merits of membership.

According to the authors' valence politics argument, the domestic political context was key to the vote, and that context likely tipped the balance in favor of Brexit. First, the traditional parties were nominally supportive of Remain, but their popularity and internal divisions limited their influence on voters. The Conservative government was not highly popular or seen as effective at managing the key political problems of the day—the National Health Service (NHS) and immigration. Moreover, the traditional home for protest votes—the pro-Remain Liberal Democrats—had lost that role by serving in coalition with the Conservatives. That left only pro-Brexit leaders to captivate the disaffected voters. Boris Johnson was, at the time, the most favorably viewed politician in the public debate. And, UKIP provided the main protest party. Johnson and UKIP aggressively campaigned for Leave. Finally, the Leave campaign was much more effective at engaging the top issues to voters, connecting departure from the EU with improved financing for the NHS and greater control over immigration. The authors show that these factors mattered for vote choice and probably swung it. It is interesting to note that this explanation also underscores that the timing of the vote was important. Held under different conditions, such as with Johnson's current low popularity level, the vote could have gone the other way.

Second, the book presents fascinating evidence about UKIP and its electoral base. The chapters on UKIP feature data from an original survey of its members. This provides interesting comparisons of UKIP supporters with the general UK electorate. For instance, we learn that the highly negative views of UKIP voters regarding immigration, ethnic minorities, and the banking industry are very similar to those of the UK public. UKIP voters stand out in their frustration with the political system and the saliency of immigration and EU membership as political problems.

The authors conclude by assessing campaign claims about the consequences of the vote for economic growth in the UK, the level of immigration, and the quality of UK governance. The strength of this chapter is that it answers these questions with original empirical evidence based on the EU's and the UK's postwar experience. This is clearly superior to much of the casual argumentation during the campaign and in current public discourse. Their evidence suggests little, if any, costs from Brexit on these fronts. However, the analyses fall short of the high standards set in the earlier chapters. For example, Clarke, Goodwin, and Whitely conclude that EU membership has had no effect on the UK's economic growth, based on a statistical analysis of the UK's postwar economic performance. The key finding is that EU membership had no direct effect on growth after controlling for a standard set of domestic economic factors. But they fail to review or engage relevant literature (e.g., Barry Eichengreen and Andrea Boltho, "The Economic Impact of European Integration." *Cambridge Economic History of*

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Modern Europe, 2010) in designing the analysis. This is important, since all arguments of which I am aware expect the economic integration associated with EU membership to stimulate growth through the domestic economic factors that are included in the statistical model. That is, the effect of membership on growth should be indirect, which is consistent with their findings. Finally, this chapter addresses only a fraction of the prominent forecasts regarding Brexit and ignores several of the most salient from the Leave campaign—for example, that leaving the EU would shore up NHS funding with Brexit savings.

In sum, *Brexit* is a timely and fascinating description and analysis of the 2016 UK referendum on EU membership. The analysis provides both a compelling explanation for what has happened and a framework for understanding future acts in this ongoing drama. Moreover, the argument advanced should prove helpful for understanding the politics surrounding current populist antagonism to the EU in other countries.

Rentier Islamism: The Influence of the Muslim Brotherhood in Gulf Monarchies. By Courtney Freer. New York: Oxford University Press, 2018. 296p. $74.00 cloth.
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— Birol Baskan, *The Middle East Institute*

In 2014, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), joined by Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, accused Qatar of endangering its security and withdrew its ambassador. At the heart of the crisis, which reerupted even more severely in 2017, was the Muslim Brotherhood. More specifically, while Qatar was quite friendly toward the movement, the UAE was quite hostile, to the extent that it outlawed and even declared the Brotherhood a terrorist organization. The whole episode clearly illustrated the continuing political significance of the Muslim Brotherhood movement in the Gulf. How did this religious movement that originated outside of the Gulf spread to and acquire such political significance in the region?

In *Rentier Islamism*, Courtney Freer addresses this question, tracing the origin of the Muslim Brotherhood and its rise to political prominence in three Gulf states: Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE. As described in Chapter 4, the Brotherhood expanded to these Gulf states as they began to build modern educational systems in the 1950s. Lacking locals to staff their new modern schools, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE relied on expatriate teachers and imported them in numbers from other Arab states. Among those who came and settled in these countries were members of the Muslim Brotherhood. It was students of these teachers who founded the local organizations of the Brotherhood and became carriers of its ideology in Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE.

The Brotherhood's most serious ideological rival, Pan-Arabism, which had its own adherents among teachers from other Arab states, began to wane in influence throughout the Middle East in the 1970s. As Freer shows in Chapter 5, this had an immediate impact on the fortunes of the Brotherhood in the Gulf as it did elsewhere in the region. The movement filled in the ensuing ideological vacuum and experienced a marked rise in influence in Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE. As the Brotherhood expanded its social base, however, it also became politically active, demanding a greater say in the political decision making in their countries.

Yet this political activism came at a price: The relations between the Muslim Brotherhood and three Gulf states began to change in the 1980s. As detailed in Chapters 6 and 7, the Brotherhood continued to be politically active in Kuwait, thanks to the more open political system in this country, and eventually anchored itself in the opposition. In Qatar, the movement dissolved its organization in the late 1990s, but kept its presence informally. More dramatically, in the UAE the movement became increasingly alienated by the regime and, with the eruption of the Arab Spring, became criminalized. Yet in all three cases, the movement has kept its political significance, through active political engagement and social activities in Kuwait, backstage campaigning for the implementation of conservative policies in Qatar, and, finally, ideological-religious opposition to widespread Westernization in the UAE.

Freer constructs her narrative by bringing together an impressive array of empirical material, hitherto buried in the memories of former and current members of the movement and through other primary sources. Given the extreme difficulty of getting access to these sources, the book is the fruit of Freer's tirelessly conducted research. This in and of itself makes the book valuable.

In addition, *Rentier Islamism* makes two further contributions. First, it fills a serious gap in the scholarship on Islamism. Ever-growing since the 1970s, this literature has paid closer attention to major cases, such as Turkey, Egypt, Iran, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia and ignored minor cases, including such small Gulf states as Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE. I know of only one book and a few unpublished dissertations in English on Islamism in Kuwait, and no such lengthy studies in English on Islamism in Qatar and the UAE.

Second, on the more theoretical front, the book challenges the literature on rentier states, or states that derive substantial portions of their incomes from the sale of natural resources, particularly oil. Because rentier states do not rely on taxation, but can still provide generous welfare services to their citizens, the literature portrays their societies as extremely apolitical (due to the supposed rentier effect) and disorganized (due to the group formation effect). The literature further concludes that