

## DEMETRIUS OF LACONIA AND THE DEBATE BETWEEN THE STOICS AND THE EPICUREANS ON THE NATURE OF PARENTAL LOVE\*

Epicurus denies that human beings have natural parental love for their children,<sup>1</sup> and his account of the development of justice and human political community does not involve any natural affinity between human beings in general but rather a form of social contract.<sup>2</sup> The Stoics to the contrary assert that parental love is natural,<sup>3</sup> and, moreover, they maintain that natural parental love is the first principle of social οἰκείωσις,<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Demetr. Lac. *P.Herc.* 1012, cols. LXVI–LXVIII Puglia; Cic. *Att.* 7.2.4 = 125 SB; Arr. *Epict. Diss.* 1.23; Plut. *De amore prolis* 495A–C, *Adv. Col.* 1123A; Lactant. *Div. Inst.* 3.17.5. With the exception of Demetrius of Laconia, the evidence is presented in 525–9 Usener. It is not uncommon to see Epicurus making such provocative claims about sex, children and marriage, in keeping with his wider practice of challenging established social norms (e.g. Diog. Laert. 10.119; Arr. *Epict. Diss.* 3.7.19; Clem. Al. *Strom.* 2.23.181.25; Lactant. *Div. Inst.* 3.17.5). See further, in particular, T. Brennan, ‘Epicurus on sex, marriage, and children’, *CPh* 91 (1996), 346–52; R.D. Brown, *Lucretius on Love and Sex: A Commentary on De Rerum Natura IV, 1030–1287 with Prolegomena, Text, and Translation* (Leiden, 1987), 118–22; and C.W. Chilton, ‘Did Epicurus approve of marriage? A study of Diogenes Laertius X, 119’, *Phronesis* 5 (1960), 71–4.

<sup>2</sup> Epicurus, *RS* 31–40; Lucr. 5.925–1027; Hermarchus *ap. Porph. Abst.* 1.7.1–12.7. For detailed discussion, see further, for example, S. McConnell, ‘Lucretius and civil strife’, *Phoenix* 66 (2012), 97–121, at 102–3; G. Campbell, *Lucretius on Creation and Evolution: A Commentary on De Rerum Natura 5.772–1104* (Oxford, 2003), 252–83; K. Algra, ‘Lucretius and the Epicurean other’, in K. Algra, M. Koenen and P. Schrijvers (edd.), *Lucretius and his Intellectual Background* (Amsterdam, 1997), 141–50; J.M. Armstrong, ‘Epicurean justice’, *Phronesis* 42 (1997), 324–34; A. Alberti, ‘The Epicurean theory of law and justice’, in A. Laks and M. Schofield (edd.), *Justice and Generosity: Studies in Hellenistic Social and Political Philosophy* (Cambridge, 1995), 164–75; P.A. Vander Waerdt, ‘Hermarchus and the Epicurean genealogy of morals’, *TAPhA* 118 (1988), 87–106; P.A. Vander Waerdt, ‘The justice of the Epicurean wise man’, *CQ* 37 (1987), 402–22; and A.A. Long, ‘Pleasure and social utility: the virtues of being Epicurean’, in H. Flashar and O. Gigon (edd.), *Aspects de la philosophie hellénistique* (Geneva, 1986), 283–324, at 285–94 and 313–16.

<sup>3</sup> Diogenes Laertius reports: φασὶ δὲ καὶ τὴν πρὸς τὰ τέκνα φιλοστοργίαν φυσικὴν εἶναι αὐτοῖς καὶ ἐν φαύλοις μὴ εἶναι (‘And they [the Stoics] also say that affection for one’s children is natural for them [good men] and that it is not in bad people’, 7.120). See also Cic. *Fin.* 3.62. For the Stoics φιλοστοργία is a virtue, defined as φιλοτεχνία τις οὐσα περὶ στέργειν φίλων ἢ οἰκείων (‘a certain skill with regard to loving friends and relatives’, Clem. Al. *Strom.* 2.9.41.6; cf. *SVF* 3.62 Ant.; Arr. *Epict. Diss.* 1.11, 3.24.58–118; M. Aur. *Med.* 1.17.7, 2.5, 6.30.1, 11.18.9). For detailed critical discussion of the Stoic conception of φιλοστοργία, see further G. Roskam, ‘Plutarch against Epicurus on affection for offspring. A reading of *De amore prolis*’, in G. Roskam and L. van der Stockt (edd.), *Virtues for the People: Aspects of Plutarchan Ethics* (Leuven, 2011), 175–201, at 178–88.

<sup>4</sup> Cicero’s Stoic spokesman Cato remarks: *pertinere autem ad rem arbitrantur intellegi natura fieri ut liberi a parentibus amentur; a quo initio profectam communem humani generis societatem*

which provides the basis for the naturalness of justice and human political community.<sup>5</sup> The Stoics are, therefore, obliged to refute Epicurus' denial of the naturalness of parental love in order to support their own theory of social οἰκειώσις; and we have good evidence for the arguments that they employed against the Epicureans on this account.<sup>6</sup>

*persequimur* ('Again they [the Stoics] hold that it is important to understand that it happens by nature that children are loved by their parents; from which first principle we trace the origin of the communal fellowship of the human race', *Fin.* 3.62).

<sup>5</sup> M.W. Blundell, 'Parental nature and Stoic οἰκειώσις', *AncPhil* 10 (1990), 221–42, at 221: 'Stoic οἰκειώσις is the process by which we recognize our natural affinity first to ourselves and subsequently to various features of our environment, which we pursue as being οἰκεῖος or "belonging to us". This natural tendency comes in two forms: towards ourselves and towards others. These have been called "personal" and "social" οἰκειώσις respectively (B. Inwood, 'The two forms of οἰκειώσις in Arius and the Stoa', in W.W. Fortenbaugh [ed.], *On Stoic and Peripatetic Ethics* [New Brunswick, 1983], 190–201, at 193). The theory was supported by careful observation of human and animal nature, especially the urge to self-preservation, which underpins the concept of personal οἰκειώσις, and the love of parents for their offspring, which provides the strongest evidence for social οἰκειώσις.' The key sources for the Stoic notion of social οἰκειώσις, and in particular the role played by natural parental love, are Cic. *Fin.* 3.62–8; Diog. Laert. 7.85–6; Sen. *Ep.* 121.6–15; Hierocles 1.34–9, 1.51–7, 2.1–9, 9.3–10, 11.14–18; Stob. *Ecl.* 4.671.7–673.11; Plut. *De Stoic. rep.* 1038B. The evidence can be found along with helpful commentary in A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley, *The Hellenistic Philosophers* (Cambridge, 1987), 1.346–54. For social οἰκειώσις as a foundation of justice, see also Plut. *De soll. an.* 962A; Porph. *Abst.* 3.19; Stob. *Ecl.* 2.120.8–14; Anon. *In Plat. Theat.* 5.19–20. For critical discussion of the Stoic arguments concerning οἰκειώσις, see further, for example, S.G. Pembroke, 'Oikeiōsis', in A.A. Long (ed.), *Problems in Stoicism* (London, 1971), 114–49; G. Striker, 'The role of οἰκειώσις in Stoic ethics', *OSAPH* 1 (1983), 145–68; J. Brunshwig, 'The cradle argument in Epicureanism and Stoicism', in M. Schofield and G. Striker (edd.), *The Norms of Nature: Studies in Hellenistic Ethics* (Cambridge, 1986), 113–44; T. Engberg-Pederson, 'Discovering the good: οἰκειώσις and καθῆκοντα in Stoic ethics', in M. Schofield and G. Striker (edd.), *The Norms of Nature: Studies in Hellenistic Ethics* (Cambridge, 1986), 145–83; T. Engberg-Pederson, *The Stoic Theory of Oikeiōsis: Moral Development and Social Interaction in Early Stoicism* (Aarhus, 1990); Blundell (this note); Inwood (this note [1983]); B. Inwood, *Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism* (Oxford, 1985), 182–201; and B. Inwood, 'L'οἰκειώσις sociale chez Epictète', in K.A. Algra, P.W. van der Horst and D.T. Runia (edd.), *Polyhistor: Studies in the History and Historiography of Ancient Philosophy Presented to Jaap Mansfeld on his Sixtieth Birthday* (Leiden, 1996), 243–64.

<sup>6</sup> The two key Stoic critics are Cicero and Epictetus. In a letter to Atticus (7.2.4 = 125 SB) Cicero attacks the Epicureans with two arguments: (1) first-hand experience refutes the Epicurean position, as Atticus himself—a professed Epicurean—has shown: even though his new-born daughter gives him pleasure, Atticus admits that it is not because of calculations of pleasure that he loves his daughter but rather because of nature, so implying that parental love is natural and that he would love his daughter regardless of the pleasure that results; and (2) the reality of human political community proves that parental love is natural because it is a necessary condition of human political community, a point Cicero reiterates in a number of his philosophical works (e.g. *Leg.* 1.42–3; *Fin.* 1.23, 3.57, 3.62–8, 4.17, 5.65, 5.68–9, 5.81–2, 5.84; *Tusc.* 5.5; *Off.* 1.12, 1.54). Furthermore, in certain speeches Cicero presents the naturalness of parental love as essentially an obvious fact that all reasonable people will assent to without question—indeed, questioning the naturalness of parental love or, worse, acting against nature by neglecting one's children is a sure sign that one is a base and degenerate, perhaps even sub-human, individual (e.g. *Dom.* 97–8; *Cael.* 79–80; *Rosc.* 40–1, 52–5, 62–3). On Cicero's views on parental love, see in particular S. Treggiari, 'Putting the family across: Cicero on natural affection', in M. George (ed.), *The Roman Family in the Empire: Rome, Italy, and Beyond* (Oxford, 2005), 9–36. Epictetus (A.D. 55–135) directs further arguments against Epicurus' views on parental love in *Discourse* 1.23, a short polemical piece that has the title πρὸς Ἐπίκουρον (*In Answer to Epicurus*). This tract can be seen as a supplement to *Discourse* 1.11, in which Epictetus presents in detail his own positive Stoic views on φιλοστοργία (cf. also *Disc.* 3.22.67–72 and 3.24.58–118). Further, Plutarch's short tract περὶ τῆς εἰς τὰ ἐγγονα φιλοστοργίας (*De amore prolis* or *On the Love of One's Offspring*) contains a number of arguments that can be seen as a critique of Epicurus' position, although they do not appear to have a Stoic provenance; see in particular Roskam (n. 3) and A. Barigazzi, 'Ancora una declamazione contro Epicuro: *De amore prolis*', in id., *Studi su Plutarco* (Florence, 1994), 99–114.

Likewise, the Epicureans are obliged not only to defend their own position but also to undermine the competing Stoic theory of social *οικειώσεις*; and the foundational premise of a natural bond between parent and child is an obvious target. However, beyond dogmatically restating Epicurus' denial of natural parental love, the evidence for the Epicurean line of attack against the Stoics is currently unclear. In this paper I argue that we can go some way towards uncovering it via an analysis of some fragmentary passages from an unidentified work of the Epicurean Demetrius of Laconia (c.150–75 B.C.) that contain a puzzling discussion of Epicurus' stance on parental love.

Demetrius of Laconia was a prolific author, some of whose works survive in fragments among the Herculaneum papyri.<sup>7</sup> He was a contemporary of the Epicurean Zeno of Sidon (who was a teacher of Philodemus) and active during the late second and early first centuries B.C.<sup>8</sup> His surviving work portrays a combative character who engaged in debate with critics of Epicurus (for instance, in *On Signs* Philodemus provides a detailed account of Demetrius' response to critics—most likely Stoics—whom he considers have misunderstood Epicurean views on methods of inference; cols. XXVIII–XXX De Lacy and De Lacy)<sup>9</sup> and who sought to resolve internal disputes and inconsistencies within the Epicurean school, concerning both the authenticity of various views attributed to Epicurus himself in later Epicurean texts and the interpretation of Epicurus' teachings (for instance, Sextus Empiricus records his interpretation of Epicurus' declaration that 'time is an accident of accidents'; *Math.* 10.219–27).<sup>10</sup> The evidence concerning parental love is as follows:

(1) Demetr. Lac. *P.Herc.* 1012, col. LXVI Puglia

[ - - ] ἵνα διὰ τῆς ἀντιθέσεως | τῶν διδασκαλιῶν ἀντίθεσις ὑπονοῆται καὶ δοξῶν, | καὶ τις μὴ πεπεκῶς τοῦ<sup>5</sup> ταραχθῆσεται. καὶ πῶς | ὁ Ἐπίκ[ο]υρος κάτοπον ἐλέγην πολ[λ]άκις | μὴ φυσικὴν | εἶναι [τ]ῆν πρὸς τὰ τέκνα | [σ]τοργίην; κ[αὶ] γὰρ σημα[ί] |<sup>10</sup> νομέν[ου] ὑπὸ [πολλ]ῶν [ῥ]α, | τῆς φύσε[ως] οὐσης τ[ῆ]ς | πρὸς τὰ τέκν[α] φιλοστο[ργ]ία, κατ' ἀνάγ[κ]η[ς] | γένου[ι]τ' ἄν, | λέγ[ο]υσιν [ . . . ] κάτοπον μ[ὴ] φυσ[ι]κὴν ἀπὸ τῆν εἶναι - - ] γὰρ δὴ ...

<sup>7</sup> The works attributed to Demetrius are *Unsolved Questions of Polyaeus* (*P.Herc.* 1083, 1258, 1429, 1642, 1647, 1822), *Quaestiones convivales* (*P.Herc.* 1006), *On Geometry* (*P.Herc.* 1061), *On Poems* (*P.Herc.* 188, 1014), *On the Size of the Sun* (*P.Herc.* 1013), *On Fickleness* (*P.Herc.* 831), an untitled theological work usually called *On the Form of God* (*P.Herc.* 1055), an unidentified rhetorical work (*P.Herc.* 128), two untitled works (*P.Herc.* 1786, 124), in addition to the untitled *P.Herc.* 1012 that contains philological critique of Epicurus' writings and is given the title 'Problems in the text of Epicurus' by E. Puglia, *Demetrio Lacone: Aporie testuali ed esegetiche in Epicuro* (Naples, 1988).

<sup>8</sup> For detailed discussion of biographical details, see D. Clay, 'The philosophical writings of Demetrius of Laconia', in R. Sorabji and R.W. Sharples (edd.), *Greek and Roman Philosophy 100BC-200AD* (London, 2007), 1.207–11; and Puglia (n. 7), 11–23.

<sup>9</sup> See further A.A. Long, 'Reply to Jonathan Barnes, "Epicurean signs"', in J. Annas and R.H. Grimm (edd.), *OSAPh Supplementary Volume 1988* (Oxford, 1988), 135–44; J. Barnes, 'Epicurean signs', in J. Annas and R.H. Grimm (edd.), *OSAPh Supplementary Volume 1988* (Oxford, 1988), 91–134; D.N. Sedley, 'On signs', in J. Barnes, J. Brunschwig, M. Burnyeat and M. Schofield (edd.), *Science and Speculation: Studies in Hellenistic Theory and Practice* (Cambridge, 1982), 239–72; and P.H. De Lacy and E.A. De Lacy, *Philodemus: On Methods of Inference* (Naples, 1978), 156–230.

<sup>10</sup> See further especially Puglia (n. 7), 49–104; Clay (n. 8), 208–11; M. Gigante, *Philodemus in Italy: The Books from Herculaneum* (trans. D. Obbink) (Ann Arbor, 1995), 18–20; and D.N. Sedley, 'Philosophical allegiance in the Greco-Roman world', in M.T. Griffin and J. Barnes (edd.), *Philosophia Togata* (Oxford, 1989), 97–119, at 107; also E. Puglia, 'L'Enchiridion di Demetrio Lacone', *CronErc* 16 (1986), 45–51; M. Ferrario, 'La nascita della filologia epicurea: Demetrio Lacone e Filodemo', *CronErc* 30 (2000), 53–61; and F. Longo Auricchio and A. Tepedino Guerra, 'Aspetti e problemi della dissidenza epicurea', *CronErc* 11 (1981), 25–40.

... so that because of the contradiction of the *didaskalia*, a contradiction of the *doxai*, too, is suspected; and whoever has not determined this precisely will be disturbed. And how did Epicurus also often say an absurd thing:<sup>11</sup> that love for one's children is not natural?<sup>12</sup> For, actually, having been shown evidence by many that, if love towards children were natural, it would arise by necessity, they say that it is absurd that it is not natural ... for indeed ...

(2) Demetr. Lac. *P.Herc.* 1012, col. LXVII Puglia

- - - φύσει γὰρ λέγεται ὁ ἄνθρωπος ποριστικὸς εἶναι [τρο]||φῆς, ἐπειδὴ περ ἄδιαστρό|φως, φύσει δὲ πόνων εἶναι δεκτικὸς, ἐπειδὴ κα|τ{ατ}ηναγκασμένως, φύ|<sup>5</sup>σει δὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν δῶ|κειν, ἐπεὶ συμφερόντως, | φύσει δὲ τὰς πρώτας τῶν | ὀνομάτων ἀναφωνήσεις | γεγόνενα λέγομεν, καθὸ |<sup>10</sup> ...

... for it is said that man is 'by nature' able to procure nourishment, in so far as he is not distorted, and that he is 'by nature' able to bear pains, seeing that it is necessary, and 'by nature' to seek virtue, since it is advantageous, and we say that the first utterances of the names come 'by nature', in so far as ...

(3) Demetr. Lac. *P.Herc.* 1012, col. LXVIII Puglia

- - - [ἀλλ' οὐ φύσει ἐστὶν ἡ πρὸς τὰ τέκνα στοργή,] || ἐπειδὴ περ οὐ κατηγα|κασμένως στέργουσιν οἱ | ἄνθρωποι τὰ ἔκγ[ο]να. τῶν | γὰρ κατ' ἀνάγκην γεινομέ|<sup>5</sup>νων ἴδιον τὸ ἀκουσίον, πα|ρακολούθημα δ' ἀκουσίον | ἢ ἀντίπραξις, ὃ προδήλως | ἄπεστιν τῆς τῶ[v] τέκνων | στοργῆς' [καὶ πῶς τα|ραχθῆ | [σετα]ί τι[ς] ...

... but love for one's children is not by nature, because human beings do not necessarily love their children. For the involuntary/unwilling is distinctive of the things that happen in accordance with necessity, and resistance is a consequence of the involuntary/unwilling, which clearly is absent from the love of one's children. And how one is disturbed by ...

This evidence has received little critical scholarly attention: Brown suggests that Demetrius 'argues on Epicurean grounds that the love of parents for children is natural' (and so rejects Epicurus' own thesis);<sup>13</sup> both Puglia and Alesse maintain that Demetrius is addressing a contemporary debate within the Epicurean school, proposing that some later Epicureans were unhappy with either the soundness or the authenticity of Epicurus' denial of the naturalness of parental love.<sup>14</sup> I question the cogency of these interpretations: a fresh analysis of the material reveals that Demetrius is defending Epicurus' thesis by presenting a sophisticated but otherwise unattested dialectical argument against the Stoics on the topic of parental love.

In the first section I outline the dogmatic arguments denying the naturalness of parental love that are present in other Epicurean texts so as to highlight the distinctive nature of Demetrius' argument. In the second section I undertake a close reading of

<sup>11</sup> Vander Waerdt (n. 2 [1988]), 93 n. 26 translates: 'How was it absurd for Epicurus to say [that affection for one's children is not natural]'.

<sup>12</sup> Here Demetrius denotes parental love with the Greek phrase *στοργή πρὸς τὰ τέκνα* (it appears without editorial reconstruction in line 9 of column LXVIII), which is a phrase replicated by Cicero in a letter to Atticus (7.2.4 = 125 SB). In other sources the term *φιλοστοργία* is used in place of *στοργή*. Both terms appear to be interchangeable. Demetrius uses *φιλοστοργία* in column LXVI.12–13 and Cicero also uses *φιλοστοργία* twice, although with regard to affection between friends rather than love between parents and children; *Att.* 13.9.1 = 317 SB, 15.17.2 = 394 SB. It must be said, however, that later sources tend to favour *φιλοστοργία*. There is no extant first-hand example of Epicurus himself using either term.

<sup>13</sup> Brown (n. 1), 119 n. 56.

<sup>14</sup> Puglia (n. 7), 297–302 and F. Alesse, 'TEKNOΠΟΙΙΑ e amore parentale in Epicuro e nell'epicureismo', *CronErc* 41 (2011), 207–15.

the fragmentary texts and show that Demetrius is engaging with Stoic ideas, indicated in particular by his use of technical Stoic philosophical vocabulary, in an attempt to force the Stoic critic to draw the Epicurean conclusion from his own Stoic premises.

### 1. A NEW EPICUREAN ARGUMENT

The preceding and the following columns in *P.Herc.* 1012 appear unrelated and do not help us locate the three passages in a wider discussion, so we are left to reconstruct matters solely on the basis of columns LXVI–LXVIII. In column LXVI Demetrius tells us that Epicurus asserts that we do not have natural parental love for our children at all and that there is a dispute about this claim. For, despite being shown that, if love for one's children were natural, it must arise by necessity, certain people say that Epicurus' view is absurd. *Pace* Brown, it appears that Demetrius is committed to defending Epicurus' claim that parental love is not natural. It is immediately striking that Demetrius' explanation, which relies on the claim that parental love is not natural because it is not necessary, does not obviously replicate either of the two dogmatic arguments that we see in other Epicurean texts.

First, Demetrius does not address parental love in the framework of the hedonic calculus. Plutarch reports Epicurus' views on human familial love as follows: 'it is for a return (μισθός) that a father loves his son, a mother her child, and children their parents' (*De amore proliis* 495A). According to Epicurus, we determine each and every choice or action by weighing the pleasures and pains it brings us;<sup>15</sup> evidently parental love is also the result of a rational weighing of the advantages and disadvantages to oneself of loving one's child.<sup>16</sup> It follows that parents may or may not love their children depending on the outcome of a rational hedonistic deliberation: parental love is a choice. It would appear, then, that parental love is not natural simply because it is not hard-wired into human beings: it is not a brute biological fact of human nature, which would imply that it is not subject to the hedonic calculus; nor does it appear to be a 'natural emotion', an unavoidable physical 'bite' or 'sting' like grief or anger (cf. for example Philo. *On Anger* cols. XL–XLI Indelli, *On Death* col. XXV.2–9 Henry; 120 Usener).<sup>17</sup> To be

<sup>15</sup> Epicurus, *Ep. Men.* 128–30, *Sent. Vat.* 25; Diog. Laert. 10.34. On the so-called hedonic calculus, see further J. Warren, 'Epicurus and the pleasures of the future', *OSAPh* 21 (2001), 135–80, at 138–48.

<sup>16</sup> Note that both Clement of Alexandria (*Strom.* 2.23.181.25) and Lactantius (*Div. Inst.* 3.17.5) refer to the pains that children might bring as Epicurean reasons for remaining childless in the first place.

<sup>17</sup> Philodemus, an Epicurean writing in Italy in the first century B.C., suggests that certain emotions are natural and unavoidable in certain situations, simply owing to physiological facts about human nature (hence the 'bite' or 'sting' image). In so far as one ought to control one's emotions, it is a matter of forming the correct mental dispositions (forming Epicurean beliefs, for example). This allows one to have emotions such as anger only in appropriate contexts—to have only natural emotions. This entails a division of emotions into valid and invalid forms, with the natural emotion alone being justified. Anger is the best example to illustrate this: θυμός is depicted as anger that is uncontrolled or out of proportion whereas ὀργή refers to appropriate and controlled anger; in other words, θυμός is 'empty anger' whereas ὀργή is 'natural anger'. Philodemus maintains that the sage only experiences ὀργή (*On Anger* col. XLV.5–23 Indelli); see further V. Tsouna, *The Ethics of Philodemus* (Oxford, 2007), 196–238; and E. Asmis, 'The necessity of anger in Philodemus' *On Anger*', in J. Fish and K. Sanders (edd.), *Epicurus and the Epicurean Tradition* (Cambridge, 2011), 152–82. Parental love might seem another candidate for an Epicurean treatment of this kind. However, we have no extant evidence for Philodemus addressing the topic of natural parental love towards children at all, in this or in any

sure, this hedonist argument does not deny the reality or ubiquity of parental love, nor does it presuppose an absence of any feelings on the part of the parent towards the child. Rather, it draws a distinction between any raw emotive feelings a parent might have, in the basic Epicurean sense where *πάθη* indicate whether something is an immediate source of pleasure or pain,<sup>18</sup> and a reflective judgement on whether to love the child. Such feelings are factors in the deliberation that might sway things heavily towards choosing to love the child; for on the basis of a *πάθος* one might judge that the child is a source of pleasure. But do such immediate feelings and the potential future pleasures outweigh the pains that might arise from loving the child, involving economic and other considerations—for instance, if one cannot afford to raise the child? In such cases a choice might be made to expose the child or to not love it, despite such immediate feelings. This is the sort of deliberation the Epicurean hedonist faces; and parental love is deemed a result of a reasoned judgement about advantages to oneself.

Second, Demetrius does not present parental love as being a result of human cultural development. In *De rerum natura* Lucretius places marriage before child-rearing in the first stages of the development of human communities (5.1011–18). In the state of nature human beings are originally unattached individuals (5.958–61) and there appears to be no relationship between parent and child beyond the biological facts of birth: there is no notion of any impulse to care for one's offspring; nor is there any notion of parental possession or ownership of one's children.<sup>19</sup> Human reproduction is explained as being a result of chance sexual encounters between unattached individuals, at times involving rape, prostitution or bribery (5.962–5). Lucretius does not mention the lot of the resulting children at all. Elsewhere he stresses the vulnerability of human babies and the care needed if they are to survive (5.222–34, 5.1026–7), but perhaps he assumes that in the state of nature new-born humans were merely left to their own devices after birth, and by chance some happened to survive and become the unattached individuals he describes. At any rate, human beings do not appear to have any concerns at all about children until such time as the formation of domestic units and the softening effects of fire, of easy access to sex and of exposure to the sweet charms of their own children, which result (5.1015–18). At this stage of human cultural development, owing to a collective concern for security, friendships or alliances emerge, as well as justice in the form of a social contract neither to harm nor to be harmed (5.1019–23). Lucretius says explicitly that men included in such an agreement a provision for the protection of their women and children, for it is fair to pity the weak. This suggests a real degree of love for one's children, a desire for their well-being, that is at odds with the strictly

other context (the only extant use of *φιλοστοργία* refers to affection towards a sage; *On Frank Speech* col. VIIIb.1-5 Konstan et al.). For further discussion of Epicurean views on the emotions, and the extent to which Philodemus is influenced by the Stoics and diverges from Epicurus' own doctrine, see, for example, C. Gill, 'Stoicism and Epicureanism', in P. Goldie (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion* (Oxford, 2009), 143–66; Tsouna (this note), 32–51; D. Armstrong, "'Be angry and sin not": Philodemus versus the Stoics on natural bites and emotions', in J.T. Fitzgerald (ed.), *Passions and Moral Progress in Greco-Roman Thought* (London, 2008), 79–121; Asmis (this note); and D. Konstan, 'Lucretius and the Epicurean attitude towards grief', in D. Lehoux, A.D. Morrison and A. Sharrock (edd.), *Lucretius: Poetry, Philosophy, Science* (Oxford, 2013), 193–209.

<sup>18</sup> See further D. Konstan, *A Life Worthy of the Gods: The Materialist Psychology of Epicurus* (Las Vegas, 2008), 1–25.

<sup>19</sup> As Campbell (n. 2), 222 rightly observes, 'clearly there is no sign here of any innate affection of *φιλανθρωπία* between the first humans that we find in Stoic and Aristotelian theories'. This lack of interpersonal affection extends to the case of parents and children: there is no real sign of any parental love, let alone natural parental love.



egoistic thinking usually involved in Epicurean practical reasoning.<sup>20</sup> Setting aside that vexed issue for the moment, on this Epicurean model affectionate bonds between parent and child arise at a relatively late stage of human civilization and only following the softening of human nature, which finds its full unadulterated expression in the state of nature.<sup>21</sup>

In his commentary on these lines Campbell contends that at this stage human nature changes so that parental love for one's children is indeed now a natural impulse: 'For humans with their slow-maturing offspring, an innate psychological inclination towards caring for children is as much a mechanism for survival as strength for lions (5.862) and speed for deer (5.863).'<sup>22</sup> This interpretation maintains that parental love is natural now, but was not originally, which hardly gives due weight to Epicurus' reported denial of the naturalness of parental love and affection. Rather, the force of Lucretius' argument appears to be this: parental love is simply not natural, for without culture to soften human nature there would be no affectionate bonds between parents and children; parental love was and *continues to be* a result of cultural influences and, *pace* Campbell, present human beings do not have an innate psychological inclination towards caring for their offspring that qualifies parental love as being natural.<sup>23</sup>

Demetrius' argument denying the naturalness of parental love takes a different approach to the issue. In the next section I reconstruct the full details of Demetrius' argument and demonstrate how it functions as a dialectical refutation of the opposing Stoic view on parental love.

## 2. DEMETRIUS AGAINST THE STOICS

Whom does Demetrius have in mind when he refers in column LXVI to certain people who say that Epicurus' view is absurd? There are three broad possibilities: they are members of the Epicurean school; they are philosophical opponents of the school; they are a generalized set of people, some of whom may be undertaking formal basic education in Epicureanism. At first blush, owing to the fact that these people are prepared to say that they find Epicurus' view absurd, they appear to be outsiders of the school, either philosophical opponents or a generalized set of people. Puglia and Alesse, however, make the case that they are most likely Epicureans who themselves were unhappy with Epicurus' reported view on parental love.<sup>24</sup> They argue that Demetrius has a habit of engaging in internal school debates and that he seeks to secure greater doctrinal

<sup>20</sup> On Epicurus' egoistic moral psychology, see in particular R. Woolf, 'What kind of hedonist was Epicurus?' *Phronesis* 49 (2004), 303–22.

<sup>21</sup> For detailed commentary on Lucretius' account of early human beings and the shift to a softer human nature, see Campbell (n. 2), 217–27.

<sup>22</sup> Campbell (n. 2), 272.

<sup>23</sup> There are then two distinct Epicurean arguments for the non-naturalness of parental love: (1) it is a matter of cultural conditioning, arising only after certain influences of communal life but then essentially ubiquitous among domesticated human beings; (2) it is a matter of individual choice, a straightforward weighing of advantages and disadvantages in the hedonic calculus. In order to reconcile these two arguments, Epicurus might hazard the following: presently a parent does have immediate affectionate feelings for the new-born child, brought about by cultural conditioning, but it is the subsequent formal acceptance of the child into the family unit that involves a choice or a decision to love the child.

<sup>24</sup> Puglia (n. 7), 297–302 and Alesse (n. 14), 210–15.

consensus and continuity, which is certainly true.<sup>25</sup> In particular, elsewhere in this unidentified treatise (*P.Herc.* 1012)—which Puglia entitles ‘Problems in the text of Epicurus’ (*Aporie testuali ed esegetiche in Epicuro*)—Demetrius seeks to establish and defend certain philological criteria both to justify Epicurus’ phrasing (which is sometimes odd and difficult to follow) and to discriminate between what is genuinely from Epicurus and what is erroneous material that has entered the manuscripts and later Epicurean digests and compendia (for example, cols. XXII, XXXI, XXXV, XLI Puglia).<sup>26</sup> Alesse suggests that the Greek τῶν διδασκαλιῶν in line 2 of column LXVI might also refer to doctrines in such later Epicurean texts.<sup>27</sup> Further, they argue that the Greek παραχθήσεται in line 5 of column LXVI (and παραχθή in line 9 of column LXVII) captures the sort of psychic disharmony that would beset a person who has accepted a number of Epicurus’ claims, but then strikes one they really cannot handle—perhaps despite all argumentation to convince them. This also accords with the first line of the column, which indicates some sort of contradiction (ἀντίθεσις) between precepts. So, presuming that καὶ πῶς in line 5 maintains continuity between what precedes and what follows, either these people cannot reconcile their own beliefs as Epicureans since they cannot accept the denial of natural parental love, or they claim that Epicurus himself has failed to reconcile his ideas, as the texts are inconsistent. In either case, it is an internal school issue, and Demetrius seeks to solve both problems in this part of the treatise. Moreover, we know that there were divergences in the Epicurean school around the first and the second centuries B.C. concerning sensitive ethical topics such as friendship, with certain ‘more timid’ (*timidiores*) figures seeking to weaken or qualify Epicurus’ original claims so as to allow a greater degree of other concern and to bring the Epicureans more in line with commonly held attitudes (*Cic. Fin.* 1.65–70); perhaps the topic of parental love met a similar fate.<sup>28</sup>

Puglia and Alesse certainly have a plausible case.<sup>29</sup> However, καὶ πῶς in line 5 of column LXVI appears to indicate a transition to a new point, which deflates much of the force of their argument. I suggest that it is more likely that these people who say that Epicurus’ view is absurd are outsiders. In particular, I think we can discern that Demetrius has in mind a Stoic opponent, or at least a person who is both familiar with and sympathetic towards Stoic precepts. Such a candidate accords readily with the fragmentary text of the columns.

<sup>25</sup> For further discussion, see the works cited in note 9 above.

<sup>26</sup> Puglia (n. 7), 49–104 discusses this in depth.

<sup>27</sup> Alesse (n. 14), 210–12.

<sup>28</sup> In addition, Alesse (n. 14), 212 seeks to confirm the internal school debate by citing two extracts from the *Life of Philonides* (*P.Herc.* 1044) that mention parental love (fr. 8.4, 49.6–9 Gallo). Philonides (200–130 B.C.) was an Epicurean philosopher and mathematician resident in the Seleucid court. Only fragment 49 bears any weight: it states that Philonides accepted Epicurus’ views on celestial phenomena and then mentions parental love before breaking off. Alesse claims that this indicates a deviation on the part of Philonides, thus showing disparate views on parental love in the Epicurean school. The evidence, however, is too fragmentary to be conclusive.

<sup>29</sup> It is even tempting to see Demetrius engaging with the Epicurean model of natural and necessary desires with respect to parental love in column LXVI: in order to be a natural desire it would have to be unavoidable like desires for food, sex, shelter and so forth, in which case one could then judge whether it is natural and necessary (if its fulfilment is necessary for happiness) or natural and unnecessary (if a lack of fulfilment leads to no real harm). That parental love is a natural and unnecessary desire might be an appealing position for Epicureans to hold, for it avoids the unsettling denial of natural parental love. However, Demetrius shows that parental love falls at the very first hurdle—it does not arise ‘by nature’.



For a start, the Stoics clearly consider it absurd to claim that parental love is not natural. In particular, despite ‘having been shown evidence by many that, if love towards children were natural, it would arise by necessity’ (col. LXVI.9–15 Puglia), they think that the evidence indicates that parental love indeed does arise ‘by necessity’. In fact, they insist on the naturalness of parental love in so far as it is: (1) a virtue and as such is always advantageous (for example, Diog. Laert. 7.120; Clem. Al. *Strom.* 2.9.41.6; *SVF* 3.62 Ant.; Arr. *Epict. Diss.* 1.11, 3.24.58–118; M. Aur. *Med.* 1.17.7, 2.5, 6.30.1, 11.18.9);<sup>30</sup> (2) a proper function of the human organism and as such expressed unless somehow distorted (for example, Arr. *Epict. Diss.* 1.11; Cic. *Dom.* 97–8; *Rosc.* 40–1, 52–5, 62–3); (3) something necessary or unavoidable: as Epictetus says, ‘once a child is born it is no longer up to us not to love and care for it’ (ὄν ἅπαρξ γένηται παιδίον, οὐκέτι ἐφ’ ἡμῖν ἐστί μὴ στέργειν μηδὲ φροντίζειν ἐπ’ αὐτῶ, Arr. *Epict. Diss.* 1.23.5).

The Stoics indeed hold that parental love fits all the criteria for naturalness listed in column LXVII. There Demetrius gives some examples of the ways in which ‘by nature’ (φύσει) is said, in order to illustrate some qualifying traits: being able to procure nourishment is ‘by nature’, in so far as it involves the uninterrupted or undistorted functioning of the human organism (ἐπειδὴ περ ὀδίαστροφῶς); being able to bear pain is ‘by nature’, in so far as pain is necessary or unavoidable (ἐπειδὴ κατ’ἀναγκασιμῶς); seeking virtue is ‘by nature’, since it is advantageous (ἐπεὶ συμφερόντως)—presumably, it instantiates or is the means to our natural end; and speech is ‘by nature’, but the text breaks off before we are told why. There are then (at least) three senses in which something qualifies as ‘by nature’: it is an aspect of ‘proper functioning’; it is ‘necessary’; it is ‘advantageous’, presumably in the particularly strong sense where it is never disadvantageous (as in the case of virtue).<sup>31</sup> One can anticipate that Demetrius will demonstrate that parental love fails to meet any of these conditions.

In column LXVIII Demetrius focusses on a proof that parental love is not ‘by necessity’ and so, I suggest, he seeks to demolish that particular claim for the naturalness of parental love.<sup>32</sup> He presents what he obviously thinks is a simple and devastating proof:

- 1) Love for one’s children is not natural because it does not arise necessarily, and the lack of necessity is proven by the simple fact that not all human beings love their children.
- 2) We can also determine that love for one’s children does not arise necessarily, because it does not have the distinctive (ἴδιον) feature of the unwilling or the involuntary that accompanies things that arise by necessity.
- 3) We can tell that love for one’s children lacks such a distinctive feature because resistance (ἀντίπραξις), which is a consequence (παρακολούθημα) of the unwilling or the involuntary, is missing.

<sup>30</sup> To be sure, in *Discourse* 3.24 in particular, Epictetus presents parental love as coming in a variety of forms, some of which are in fact vicious and disadvantageous. He stresses that in order for parental love to be a virtue, it must accord with our reason; and in so far as there is such a virtue of parental love, it is always advantageous to have it. See further Roskam (n. 3), 181–3.

<sup>31</sup> See further Puglia (n. 7), 300–2 and Alesse (n. 14), 210–11.

<sup>32</sup> This suggests that he has elsewhere dismissed the claims that parental love is always advantageous (that it is a virtue) and that it is a natural instinct or capacity like procuring nourishment, which would in all likelihood involve the two Epicurean arguments that we see in other sources.

The argument appeals to empirical evidence to refute the claim that parental love is natural on the basis that it is ‘by necessity’ (κατ’ ἀνάγκην). If parental love were natural in the sense of arising ‘by necessity’, then all human beings would unavoidably, as a matter of course, love their children, but the empirical evidence does not confirm the prediction and that suffices to prove Epicurus’ point. Moreover, the necessary accompaniments of what is ‘by necessity’ are not apparent in the case of parental love: again the evidence does not confirm the prediction if parental love is in fact natural. This second point depends on an analysis of what ‘by necessity’ means or entails, in particular when it comes to human choices and actions: Demetrius relies on the notion that ‘necessity’ is coercive, so that, if something is ‘by necessity’, it follows that there is no possible way one could do otherwise, even if one chooses or desires otherwise (there is no real choice, as the outcome is unavoidable).<sup>33</sup> The Stoic flavour of this discussion is indicated most of all by the pedigree of the terms ἀντίπραξις (‘resistance’) and παρακολούθημα (‘consequence’).

Let us take the case of ἀντίπραξις first. There is no other extant example of an Epicurean using the term,<sup>34</sup> and somewhat surprisingly there is no extant evidence for any philosopher using it before Demetrius himself. Indeed, ἀντίπραξις is a rather rare word in the entire extant Greek corpus, with most examples surviving in much later authors.<sup>35</sup> Intriguingly, the *Suda* lists ἀντίπραξις along with νόησις (‘intelligence’) as the definition of ὑπόληψις (‘understanding’). The contrast with νόησις suggests that ἀντίπραξις involves some sort of error, and so ἀντίπραξις means something like ‘opposing view’, where that view is flawed. A sense of opposition to some sort of compelling force or correct opinion accords in broad terms with most of the other extant usages of ἀντίπραξις; but in particular it resonates with instances of ἀντίπραξις in later Stoic sources, where it appears to function as a technical term in the context of their theory of action.

In a fragmentary column of Hierocles’ partially extant second-century A.D. treatise *Elements of Ethics* (ἠθικὴ στοιχειώσις), which contains an account of self-perception that is premised on the Stoic theory of οἰκειώσις,<sup>36</sup> an instance of ἀντίπραξις survives, although there is unfortunately too little context to judge its precise meaning (col. XII.13).<sup>37</sup> It is a passage from Epictetus (A.D. 55–135), preserved by Stobaeus (fifth century A.D.), which forms our best evidence for the term’s technical Stoic meaning (Stob. *Ecl.* 4.44.66 = Epictetus fr. 3 Oldfather):

<sup>33</sup> Demetrius’ argument posits a very strong connection between naturalness, necessity, the involuntary and ἀντίπραξις. But he is not committed to the view that one *always* chooses or desires otherwise in such cases where things are ‘by necessity’, making involuntary all things that are ‘by necessity’. Instead, he implies that choosing or desiring otherwise to see if one can do otherwise is simply a way of ascertaining whether or not something is ‘by necessity’: if one cannot do otherwise even despite choosing to, then one’s action is ‘by necessity’ and involuntary, but at times one will choose voluntarily to follow necessity. This is indicated by the statement that the involuntary is ἴδιον (‘distinctive’) in the case of things that are ‘by necessity’; ἀντίπραξις (‘resistance’) in turn is a παρακολούθημα (‘consequence’) of the involuntary.

<sup>34</sup> There is a sole usage of the verb ἀντιπράσσω (‘oppose’) by Demetrius of Laconia in *On the Appearance of God* (col. XXIV.4 Santoro).

<sup>35</sup> A TLG search on all cognate forms generates twenty-four examples, most of which are to be found in works of ecclesiastical or Byzantine origin.

<sup>36</sup> The surviving fragments of the text appear with an English translation in I. Ramelli, *Hierocles the Stoic: Elements of Ethics, Fragments and Excerpts* (Atlanta, 2009).

<sup>37</sup> ἀντίπραξις appears towards the end of the final extant column, which is very poorly preserved (only the first third or so of each line survives), before the papyrus breaks off.

πάντα ὑπακούει τῷ κόσμῳ καὶ ὑπηρετεῖ καὶ γῆ καὶ θάλασσα καὶ ἥλιος καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ἄστρα καὶ τὰ γῆς φυτὰ καὶ ζῶα· ὑπακούει δὲ αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ ἡμέτερον σῶμα καὶ νοσοῦν καὶ ὑγιαῖνον, ὅταν ἐκεῖνος θέλῃ, καὶ νεῶζον καὶ γηρῶν καὶ τὰς ἄλλας διερχόμενον μεταβολάς, οὐκοῦν εὐλογον καί, ὃ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστὶ, τουτέστι τὴν κρίσιν, μὴ ἀντιτείνειν μόνην πρὸς αὐτόν· καὶ γὰρ ἰσχυρὸς ἐστὶ καὶ κρείσσων καὶ ἄμεινον ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν βεβούλευται μετὰ τῶν ὅλων καὶ ἡμᾶς συνδιοικῶν. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις καὶ ἡ ἀντίπραξις μετὰ τοῦ ἀλόγου καὶ πλέον οὐδὲν ποιοῦσα πλὴν τὸ διακενῆς σπᾶσθαι καὶ περιπίπτειν ὀδύνας καὶ λύπαις ποιεῖ.

All things obey and comply with the cosmos—land and sea and sun and the remaining stars and the plants and animals of earth. And our body obeys it—sick and healthy, young and old, and passing through the other changes—whenever the cosmos wishes. Therefore, it is reasonable too that the very thing which is ‘up to us’, namely our decision-making capacity, should not be the only thing to offer resistance towards it. For it is mighty and more powerful [than us] and it has decided more rightly for us [than we could], arranging us too together with the whole universe. Furthermore, resistance is irrational, and while it accomplishes nothing more than jerking us around in vain, it makes us fall into pains and agonies.

The passage contains a description of the universal reach of nature’s power, including over our κρίσις, our decision-making capacity. In this context, ἀντίπραξις involves striving to act against nature’s power and design, which involves acting contrary to reason (it is ἄλογον rather than εὐλογον). Crucially, any such choice is futile and will not come to fruition because it goes against the power of nature, against what is necessary: one will ‘accomplish nothing’ and be ‘jerked around in vain’. As such, ἀντίπραξις appears to capture the notion of being compelled to act against one’s choice, that is, unwillingly or involuntarily or ‘counter-voluntarily’: one wishes to do something different (something that goes against the path ordained by nature) and yet nature prevails. In such cases there is an attitude of resistance rather than voluntary assent to nature’s prompting, even though in physical terms the same action ultimately takes place.

The Stoic analogy of the dog and the cart reported by Hippolytus of Rome (A.D. 170–235) contains similar motifs and helps to clarify things here (Hippolytus of Rome, *Refutation of All Heresies* 1.21 = *SVF* 2.975):

καὶ αὐτοὶ δὲ τὸ καθ’ εἰμαρμένην εἶναι πάντα διεβεβαίωσαντο, παραδείγματα χρησάμενοι τοιοῦτο· ὅτι ὡσπερ ὀχήματος ἐὰν ἡ ἐξηρημένος κύων, ἐὰν μὲν βούληται ἔπεσθαι, καὶ ἔλκεται καὶ ἔπειται, ποιῶν καὶ τὸ αὐτεξούσιον μετὰ τῆς ἀνάγκης [οἷον τῆς εἰμαρμένης]· ἐὰν δὲ μὴ βούληται ἔπεσθαι, πάντως ἀναγκασθήσεται. τὸ αὐτὸ δήπου καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων· καὶ μὴ βουλόμενοι γὰρ ἀκολουθεῖν ἀναγκασθήσονται πάντως εἰς τὸ περιωμένον εἰσελθεῖν.

They too [Zeno and Chrysippus] affirmed that everything is fated, with the following model. When a dog is tied to a cart, if it wants to follow, it is pulled and follows, making its spontaneous act coincide with necessity, but if it does not want to follow, it will be compelled in any case. So it is with men too: even if they do not want to, they will be compelled in any case to follow what is destined. (trans. Long and Sedley)

The moral is that resistance is futile and it is rational to assent to nature’s causal processes, thus placing oneself in harmony with nature (cf. *SVF* 1.527). In the Stoic theory of action, assent to nature’s prompting (which comes in the form of impressions—φαντασίαι) generates an impulse (ὁρμή) that motivates a rational action, which the Stoics term a πράξις (for example, *SVF* 2.1002; *Diog. Laert.* 7.108);<sup>38</sup> and by living

<sup>38</sup> On πράξις in particular, see further Inwood (n. 5 [1985]), 52–3 and S. Bobzien, *Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy* (Oxford, 1998), 240–2.

in accordance with nature one leads a tranquil and happy life.<sup>39</sup> The alternative is to seek to go against nature, which is contrary to reason and a futile course of action—one can resist but be dragged along unwillingly none the less, suffering in the process. The evidence available is admittedly both scanty and from the Imperial period, but I posit a tentative conclusion: in contrast with πράξις it appears likely that the Stoic label for an action that takes place without assent to nature's prompting—and indeed specifically with active resistance against it (not the neutral withholding of assent but actual dissent)—is ἀντίπραξις. The question of whether or not this was already the case when Demetrius was writing in the late second or early first century B.C. is of course unresolvable with any degree of certainty.

At this point, however, we can consider further the scope of the term παρακολούθημα ('consequence') in Demetrius' column LXVIII. Uses of the verb παρακολουθέω ('to follow closely' or, figuratively, 'to understand') are extremely common in the extant Greek corpus, but uses of the noun forms τὸ παρακολούθημα and ἡ παρακολούθησις are surprisingly rare (the vast majority of instances are concentrated in much later philosophical authors such as Ammonius, Porphyry, Plotinus, Simplicius, Philoponus and Iamblichus).<sup>40</sup> There is no extant example of an Epicurean using either τὸ παρακολούθημα or ἡ παρακολούθησις other than Demetrius in column LXVIII, and once again the Stoic pedigree appears crucial in decoding Demetrius' use of the term.<sup>41</sup> The key interpretative question is whether παρακολούθημα designates that ἀντίπραξις is a necessary or an incidental consequence of 'the involuntary'. A surviving example of ἡ παρακολούθησις in *Stoicorum veterum fragmenta* suggests that it is a necessary consequence of a very particular kind: Aulus Gellius (A.D. c.123–170) reports that in his discussion of theodicy in the fourth book of his *On Providence* (περὶ προνοίας)—a treatise addressing various issues pertaining to fate, freedom and necessity—Chrysippus (c.279–206 B.C.) uses the technical phrase κατὰ παρακολούθησιν to denote the specific causal processes that lead to 'an inevitable or necessary consequence', with examples of negative by-products of nature's good designs, such as disease and vice and the vulnerability of the human head, firmly in mind (*NA* 7.1.1–13 = *SVF* 2.1170).<sup>42</sup> The phrase κατὰ παρακολούθησιν captures a key Stoic thought, namely

<sup>39</sup> For detailed accounts of the Stoic theory of action see, for example, Inwood (n. 5 [1985]), Bobzien (n. 38) and T. Brennan, *The Stoic Life: Emotions, Duties, and Fate* (Oxford, 2005), 49–113, with further references.

<sup>40</sup> A *TLG* search indicates that τὸ παρακολούθημα is the more common term. However, with the exception of Demetrius himself, all the extant examples appear in the work of much later figures.

<sup>41</sup> Note that the meaning of ἡ παρακολούθησις is sometimes 'understanding' or 'interrelation' rather than 'consequence': Aristotle uses ἡ παρακολούθησις only once, in his *Posterior Analytics*, with regard to the interrelation between *explanans* and *explanandum* (ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν σχημάτων ὁδε ἀποδώσει ζητοῦσι τὴν παρακολούθησιν τοῦ αἰτίου καὶ οὐ αἰτίου, 99a30); and some centuries later the Stoic Epictetus uses ἡ παρακολούθησις to denote 'understanding' (*Arr. Epict. Diss.* 1.6.13, 1.6.21, 2.8.6–8).

<sup>42</sup> For ease of reference, here is the full text of *NA* 7.1.7–13: *idem Chrysippus in eodem libro tractat consideratque dignumque esse id quaeri putat, εἰ αἱ τῶν ἀνθρώπων νόσοι κατὰ φύσιν γίνονται, id est, si natura ipsa rerum uel prouidentia, quae compagem hanc mundi et genus hominum fecit, morbos quoque et debilitates et aegritudines corporum, quas patiuntur homines, fecerit. existimat autem non fuisse hoc principale naturae consilium, ut faceret homines morbis obnoxios; numquam enim hoc conuenisse naturae auctori parentique omnium rerum bonarum. 'sed cum multa' inquit 'atque magna gigneret pareretque attissima et utilissima, alia quoque simul adgnata sunt incommoda his ipsis, quae faciebat, cohaerentia'; eaque non per naturam, sed per sequellas quasdam necessarias facta dicit, quod ipse appellat κατὰ παρακολούθησιν. 'sicut', inquit 'cum corpora hominum natura fingeret, ratio subtilior et utilitas ipsa operis postulauit, ut tenuissimis minutisque ossiculis caput compingeret. sed hanc utilitatem rei maioris alia quaedam incommunitas extrinsecus consecuta est, ut fieret caput tenuiter*

that certain things are inevitable negative consequences of nature's good design—the possibility of virtue brings with it the possibility of vice, health the possibility of disease, and so forth—but themselves should not be considered *κατὰ φύσιν* or *per naturam* ('according to nature'). A particular bad thing that results *κατὰ παρακολούθησιν* ('as a consequence') rather than *κατὰ φύσιν* (which would make it a good thing) might well be coined a *παρακολούθημα* ('a thing which follows')—and, from what we have seen in the *Suda* and in later Stoic sources such as Epictetus, *ἀντίπραξις* is indeed such a bad thing that is not *κατὰ φύσιν* but *κατὰ παρακολούθησιν*: either it is the negative by-product of the good faculty of understanding (*ὑπόληψις*) and as such is contrasted with right thinking or *νόησις*; or it is the negative by-product of our having a decision-making faculty (*κρίσις*) that is up to us and as such is contrasted with right action or *πράξις*, which involves proper assent to nature's prompting.

Chrysippus' *Investigations in Logic* (*P.Herc.* 307) and *On Providence* (*P.Herc.* 1038, 1421) have been identified among the Herculaneum papyri, which suggests that the Epicureans were reading him and perhaps directly critiquing his work.<sup>43</sup> Moreover, in Philodemus' *On Signs* (cols. XXVIII–XXX De Lacy and De Lacy) it appears that Demetrius himself was familiar with Stoic views on logic and able to criticize their objections to Epicurean precepts.<sup>44</sup> Although the evidence is largely circumstantial, it seems to me highly likely that in *P.Herc.* 1012 Demetrius is discussing criticisms of Epicurus' position on parental love in a recognizably Stoic framework.

At any rate, the Stoic connotations of the terms *ἀντίπραξις* and *παρακολούθημα* accord readily with the force of Demetrius' argument in column LXVIII, which we can now interpret as a dialectical justification of Epicurus' denial of the naturalness of parental love in the following manner. Demetrius posits a Stoic premise: he states that *ἀντίπραξις* is an inevitable consequence (*παρακολούθημα*) of the unwilling or involuntary—that is, *ἀντίπραξις* arises when one assents to a course of action that is contrary to nature and hence futile, leading to pain and distress, which only occurs in the case of those things that happen 'by necessity' (*κατ' ἀνάγκην*).<sup>45</sup> From this Stoic premise he reaches an Epicurean conclusion: *ἀντίπραξις* is not an inevitable consequence (*παρακολούθημα*) in the case of parental love, for the simple reason that parental love is not a matter of necessity; despite Stoic claims that 'once a child is born it is no longer up to us (*ἐφ' ἡμῖν*) not to love and care for it' (*Arr. Epict. Diss.* 1.23.5), if parental love truly were 'by necessity', then one might expect that a parent could be pulled along like the dog tied to the cart, compelled to love his child despite resistance against nature's prompting—but that, observes Demetrius, is just not the case ('and resistance is a consequence of the involuntary/unwilling, which clearly is absent from

*munitum et ictibus offensionibusque parvis fragile. proinde morbi quoque et aegritudines partae sunt, dum salus paritur. sicut hercle, inquit 'dum uirtus hominibus per consilium naturae gignitur, uitia ibidem per adfinitatem contrariam nata sunt'.*

<sup>43</sup> See further L. Marrone, 'Le *Questioni logiche* di Crisippo (*P.Herc.* 307)', *CronErc* 27 (1997), 83–100, and G. Del Mastro, 'Il *P.Herc.* 1380: Crisippo, *Opera logica*', *CronErc* 35 (2005), 61–70.

<sup>44</sup> See Sedley (n. 9), 243–5 and 257 n. 46. He suggests that Demetrius is engaging with Stoic critics who are two generations after Chrysippus.

<sup>45</sup> This premise rests on the Stoic notion, unexpressed in the extant passages from Demetrius, that *ἀντίπραξις* is an inevitable negative consequence (*παρακολούθημα*) of nature providing us with a faculty of assent to its prompting that is 'up to us' (*ἐφ' ἡμῖν*): such a faculty is a good thing but has an unavoidable in-built capacity for error (one might fail to assent to nature's prompting and vainly resist instead).

the love of one's children', col. LXVIII.5–9 Puglia): either parents choose to love their children willingly and do (however much they curse the decision or depict it as a 'necessary' imposition to which they have not assented), or willingly choose not to and do not (they expose their children and so forth); hence parental love is not by necessity and hence, as Epicurus states, it is not natural.

### 3. CONCLUSION

The fragmentary evidence from *P.Herc.* 1012 cols. LXVI–LXVIII is not a denial of Epicurus' claim that parental love is not natural, nor is it indicative of internal debates within the Epicurean school; rather, it forms a robust dialectical critique of the opposing Stoic position on the naturalness of parental love. I defer judgement on the cogency of the argument or on the possible Stoic responses to it; suffice it to say that the Stoics clearly did not abandon their position. The vigour and the urgency of Epicurean engagement with the Stoics increases noticeably in the late second and early first centuries B.C.,<sup>46</sup> and this neglected material from Demetrius of Laconia provides further evidence of both the complexity and the scope of inter-school ethical debate during this period.

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<sup>46</sup> E. Kechagia, 'Rethinking a professional rivalry: early Epicureans against the Stoa', *CQ* 60 (2010), 132–55 attributes this to the Stoics' growing profile, the increasing sophistication of their doctrine, and their shift away from their Cynic origins (early Epicurean criticisms of the Cynics are common).