

Globalization and Public Attitudes towards the State in the Asia-Pacific Region*

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Abstract

Globalization has led to a redefinition of the functions and roles of the state. Based on data drawn from a cross-national social survey, this article examines the influences of globalization on the public's attitudes towards their state in Australia, China, India, Japan, Russia, and the United States, by focusing on satisfaction with government performance and demands on the government. The six countries differ extensively in their sociopolitical and technological situations, as well as in the experiences of their people with globalization in terms of the following aspects: connectivity with the world through personal ties and digital means, English language capacity, and support for the forces of globalization. There are also huge disparities in the public rankings of government performance and demands for expanding government spending in a wide range of policy areas. Our analysis reveals that, although both intra- and inter-country variations in the influences of globalization on public attitudes towards the state are not particularly prominent, those who support globalization not only are more inclined than others to be satisfied with the government's performance, but also demand more government intervention.

* The authors are grateful to Professor Takashi Inoguchi for granting us permission to use the 2008 AsiaBarometer Survey dataset. We also thank Lok-yin Lai, Tze-wai Wong, and Winston Fung for research assistance funded by the Research Grants Council of the University Grants Committee of Hong Kong (RGC Project Number: 452508).

Introduction

We are living in an increasingly interconnected world, where capital, people, information, technology, culture, commodities, and services can move easily, rapidly, and massively across national boundaries. In the past two decades, not only have the size of the global economy and the economic ties between countries increased enormously,¹ many Western products ranging from food, clothes, films, music, and technology to architecture have become widespread. This is an age of globalization, although globalization is hardly a new historical phenomenon (Gills and Thompson, 2006). The distinctiveness of contemporary globalization lies in the convergence of revolutionary technological advances and socioeconomic forces that have collapsed time and space, deterritorialized social activities, and drawn more and more countries, cities, and people into interdependent economic, political, cultural, and ecological relationships of increasing intensity.² In step with globalization, regional cooperation has been thriving, which has transformed the architecture of the region.³ To ordinary people, never before have the forces of globalization appeared so vividly and intensely in their daily lives: the American financial crisis triggered by the bursting of the nation's housing bubble is hitting all major sectors of the global economy and the majority of countries; and food and product safety problems involving Chinese products have spread beyond the country's borders, endangering the health of people and pets all over the world.

The relationship between international relations, or globalization in the present era, and national government policies has always been a major concern of both scholars and policymakers. In the *Wealth of Nations*, Adam Smith (1776: 373–379) stated that the imposition of taxes by national governments can provoke capital flight. In *The Great Transformation*, Karl Polanyi (1944) contended that high levels of international economic openness are politically sustainable only when national governments insulate and compensate vulnerable groups in society (both quoted in Mosley, 2007: 110). Without such policy intervention and/or state capacity, states may resort to closing their economic borders, as some did in the 1920s. In the present era, when practically every government is expected to provide its citizens with social services, welfare, and security,

¹ Between 1990 and 2006, in the East Asia and Pacific region, trade increased from 47% to 87% of the region's gross domestic product (GDP) (World Bank, 2008: 317).

² In spite of the increasing number of studies on globalization, we still lack a commonly accepted definition and conceptual framework for analysing the phenomenon. This article regards globalization as 'a multi-dimensional phenomenon applicable to a variety of forms of social action – economic, political, legal, cultural, military, and technological – and sites of social action, such as the environment' (Perraton *et al.*, 1997: 258). It 'can be broken down into numerous complex and interrelated processes that have a dynamism of their own' (United Nations, 2000: 2).

³ For example, in Asia, the ten-country Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has implemented bilateral free trade agreements with most of its Dialogue Partners and is committed to establishing an ASEAN Economic Community by 2015. The United States, which is excluded from the East Asia Summit, has called for the formation of a Northeast Asia Regional Forum that would include the United States, China, Russia, Japan, and South Korea.

concerns have been mounting about the growing influences and pressures of external forces on the autonomy and authority of governments as well as on their national policymaking. In addition, globalization has led to a redefinition of the functions and roles of the state. What citizens expect and demand of their government are changing and growing. Apart from providing services and protection, the state has to be a strategic planner and a 'competent state' (Blind, 2006: 15). It has to be able to pursue fiscal conservatism, create wealth by offering an open and attractive environment for domestic and global capital, achieve proficiency in governance, ensure that market mechanisms and globalization result in win–win outcomes for all, be endowed with political legitimacy and accountability, and so forth. As stated by Angel Gurría (2007), the Secretary-General of the OECD, 'governments are more important today than ever' and 'governments in today's world have very little margin for error'.

Global structurations are still embedded inside national domains (Sassen, 2007: 99). Globalization is also 'a multicivilizational and technologically sustained process that is driven by conflicts among different cultural traditions and by competing interests among nations and among social strata within nations' (Rossi, 2007: 27). In view of these developments, we aim to compare the influences of globalization on the attitudes of the public towards their state in six countries that participated in the 2008 AsiaBarometer Survey – Australia, China, India, Japan, Russia, and the United States. The influences of globalization will be compared on both the societal and individual levels. Our major research question is: whether and to what extent do countries and individuals of different levels of globalization vary in their appraisal and expectations of the state? Specifically, after a brief review of related studies, we compare the six countries with respect to their socio-technological situations as well as the experiences of their people with globalization and whether they view globalization positively or negatively. We then examine the impact of globalization on the public's appraisal and expectations of the state by focusing on the extent to which they are satisfied with their government's performance and what they demand of the government. These countries differ in their socioeconomic and political situations, and are linked to the global community in different capacities. A comparison of their experiences would provide valuable information in the attempt to understand the dynamic relations between globalization and public attitudes towards the state.

Globalization and its consequences on public attitudes

Since the concept of 'globalization' burst onto the field of social sciences in the 1990s, there has been increasing discussion about the consequences of globalization for the state, including debates over such topics as how globalization affects sovereign autonomy (Hardt and Negri, 2000; Balakrishnan, 2003); macroeconomic management (Boix, 2000; Gilpin, 2001; Polillo and Guillén, 2005); fiscal governance (Mosley, 2003; Campbell, 2004; Dreher, 2006); government expenditure, social policy, and the welfare state (Rodrik, 1998; Garrett and Mitchell, 2001; Huber and Stephens, 2001; Korpi and

Palme, 2003; Brady, Beckfield and Seeleib-Kaiser, 2005; Dreher, Sturm and Ursprung, 2006); domestic politics (Berger, 2000; Rieger and Leibfried, 2003); and so forth.

Notwithstanding the diversity of scholarship on globalization and the state, these studies tend to share the assumption that the global and the national are mutually exclusive (Sassen, 2007: 94). And globalization poses additional challenges for governments. First, as mentioned earlier, globalization has led to the growing importance of international and global arrangements on governance as well as to a redefinition of the functions and roles of the state. Second, in Henry Kissinger's (2001: 24) words, 'Globalization has produced unprecedented prosperity, albeit not evenly.' The persistence and even growth of inequality and poverty is one of the outstanding features of globalization (Lister, 2006: 37–38). As global integration proceeds, even though developing countries have also expanded their share of the global economy,⁴ public concerns about globalization and its consequences are growing.⁵ Public unease about globalization is related to perceptions of unfairness in the distribution of the benefits and burdens of economic growth (BBC, 2008). Indeed, over the past two decades, the share of wages in national income has fallen and workers are increasingly worried about their ability to keep their jobs. The deepening of trade and the relocating of jobs offshore has been found to be one of the driving forces for this increase in feelings of vulnerability regarding wages and jobs (OECD, 2007). It is crucial for governments not only to make the most of globalization, but also to shelter their citizens from the related threats and damages. Third, globalization enables people to connect instantly and continuously with local, national, and international communities. Citizens are better informed and more aware of achievable policy alternatives that are practiced in different countries, ready to compare the performance and policies of governments around the world, and to demand that their government increase its efficiency and effectiveness.

Apart from these basic understandings, the extant literature yields no consensus on the specific impact of globalization on the major concerns in this article, i.e. satisfaction with the government's performance and demands on the government. The theoretical perspectives and empirical findings are similarly diverse. At their simplest, the prevailing views can be categorized into three contending perspectives.

First, globalization has no significant effect on the state; its direct influence on public attitudes towards the state is thus either limited or exaggerated. For example,

⁴ The share of developing economies in world trade rose from 18% in 1990 to 28% in 2007 (World Bank, 2009a: 320).

⁵ In the 18-country Asia–Europe Survey conducted in 2000, only 48% of the respondents held a definite view on whether globalization has had an effect on their lives. Of these, 71% felt that the effect has been positive (Blondel and Marsh, 2008: 82–83). A global poll conducted in 2007 revealed that although majorities in most countries continue to support the free market system, over the last two years support has eroded in 10 out of 18 countries (GlobeScan, 2008). Another BBC (2008) World Service Poll conducted in 34 countries in 2008 also found that half of the respondents feel that 'economic globalization, including trade and investment' is growing too quickly, while 35% hold the opposite opinion.

Castles (2004), using empirical data from 21 OECD countries over the period 1980–1998, concluded that the supposed significant impact of globalization on national social policy is a myth. Its effect on social expenditure is much less important than the domestic effects of programme maturation, economic growth, deindustrialization, and the legacy of leftist policies. Castles argued that the strongest tendency has been an intra-type convergence towards a ‘steady-state’ welfare state. Wilensky (2002) studied the development of 19 affluent democracies and found that globalization is not a major threat to labour standards, job security, stable economic performance, and the welfare state. National histories, cultures, and institutions continue to dominate the politics and system performance of each country. Furthermore, the obituaries to globalization, such as pronouncements on ‘the end of globalization’ (Rugman, 2001), ‘sinking globalization’ (Ferguson, 2005), that ‘the “age of globalization” is unexpectedly over’ (Rosenberg, 2005: 2), and on ‘the collapse of globalism’ (Saul, 2005), have been appearing with increasing frequency, particularly after the catastrophic events of 9/11. Scholars arguing for this ‘post-globalist’ turn concur that borders and boundaries, nationalism and protectionism, localism and ethnicity are going to define the following epoch of radical de-globalization (Held and McGrew, 2007: 1–2).

What the second and third perspectives on globalization have in common is the view that globalization is increasing and that it remains essential to any understanding of the contemporary human condition, including political satisfaction and demands. They differ in that proponents of one perspective claim that the effects of globalization on domestic social protection are negative, and the other that they are positive.

Those holding that the effects of globalization on domestic social protection are negative, e.g. proponents of the ‘efficient’ hypothesis (Garrett and Mitchell, 2001) and the ‘race to the bottom’ perspective (Mosley, 2007: 110–112), emphasize the imperatives of cross-national market competition and economic efficiency. Globalization reduces the public’s satisfaction with their government’s performance as well as increases the public’s demands on the government. There are three basic interrelated reasons for this. First, the significant increase in global capital flows has produced powerful incentives to engage in social dumping, by which governments are under pressure to reduce imposts so as to prevent capital flight and to attract more capital. A high level of participation in the global economy also creates pressures to cut social expenditure and initiate neoliberal restructuring to foster flexibility and competitiveness in world markets. Second, as claimed by the theories of issue-ownership, the public’s appraisal of their government depends on its ability to build and maintain a reputation for policy competence. Economic openness constrains administrative control over policy outcomes, moderates the capacity of policymakers to manage performance outcomes, and, as a consequence, to signal the government’s competence to the people. For example, Hellwig (2007) examined French public opinion and economic data from 1985 to 2002 and demonstrated that economic globalization does reduce the public’s confidence in its national policymakers. Third, globalization increases the individual’s awareness of economic insecurity and generates a demand for social protection and

redistribution. Greater foreign direct investment by multinational enterprises increases labour-demand elasticity through the substitution effect and the scale effect, which in turn can raise the volatility of wages and employment and individual perceptions of economic insecurity (Scheve and Slaughter, 2004).

Economic self-interest is a crucial determinant of redistributive preferences and demands. The higher the perceived exposure to occupational risk, the greater the demand for redistribution (Rehm, 2009). In sum, globalization has led to a growing sense of economic insecurity and thus an increasing demand for government protection and redistribution. However, national policy choices are severely constrained by economic forces beyond the control of the states. Global competition not only reduces the willingness and ability of governments to provide economically uncompetitive goods and services to their citizens, but also renders governments more accountable to external actors than to their own citizens. Globalization would thus lead to the stagnation or retrenchment of social policies and an adverse perception of policy efficacy, which inevitably fosters public dissatisfaction with governments.

By contrast, those holding that the effects of globalization on domestic social protection are positive, e.g. proponents of the ‘compensation’ hypothesis (Garrett and Mitchell, 2001) and the ‘embedded liberalism’ thesis (Hays *et al.*, 2005), suggest that every government is expected by its citizens to limit the costs and distribute the benefits of globalization through some form of government intervention and government spending, and that public support for the government and globalization depends on the willingness and ability of the government to fulfil such expectations. On the one hand, as mentioned earlier, globalization increases volatility, uncertainty, material inequality, and economic insecurity. These, in turn, would create political incentives for governments to appease citizens and to compensate the losers from globalization by expanding social policies, especially in representative democracies with competitive elections.⁶ Furthermore, in order to avert a protectionist backlash that would endanger the aggregate gain from globalization, policymakers are obliged to build a stable foundation for their engagement in globalization by sharing the gains more widely. The data on policy experience and public opinion in many countries reveal that there is greater support for open borders in countries that spend more on programmes for dislocated workers (Scheve and Slaughter, 2007: 46–47).

On the other hand, models of economic voting assert that people continuously evaluate the economic outcomes of government policy and hold policymakers accountable for them. When objective indicators (e.g. unemployment, economic growth, inflation) suggest that the economy is good, subjective evaluations (e.g. personal financial and sociotropic economic expectations and retrospections) become more favourable and then are translated into political satisfaction and support (Duckett and Miller, 2006: 174–179; Sattler *et al.*, 2008: 1214). For example, Scheve (2004) analysed longitudinal data for elections in 19 advanced industrial democracies and

⁶ See, for example, the Trade Adjustment Assistance programme in the United States for addressing the labour-market pressures of globalization.

concluded that globalization facilitates voter choice by increasing access to information about incumbent governments and enhancing democratic governance. Voters weigh economic performance more heavily in more open economies than in less open ones. Since trade openness contributes to more stable economic growth and aggregate benefits, globalization will increase the relationship between economic growth and support for the incumbent government if the incumbent government has control of the policy levers. The evidence for this is particularly strong in developing countries where the benefits from liberalizing trade and investment are substantial and extensively distributed. For example, Chen *et al.* (1997) found that the level of political support in China is not low and that evaluations of policy performance are important determinants. Wang (2005) also argued that the legitimacy of the Chinese government currently largely depends on its economic performance. Economic success has been accompanied by a steady improvement in living standards for the people, growing regional and global political influence through the promotion of multilateralism, economic diplomacy, and 'good neighbourliness' (Ikegami, 2009), an increasing emphasis on social stability and social harmony (Wang, 2006), a significant rise in nationalism (Zhao, 2004), and then the perpetuation of one-party authoritarian rule.

There are two basic reasons for the diversity in the debates over the influences of globalization. First, measuring globalization is difficult and the measurement methods are contested. Second, it is difficult to draw inferences about cause and effect between globalization and its outcomes, as the two tend to trend together (Brune and Garrett, 2005: 400). In view of this, we do not put forward definite hypotheses about the influences of globalization on public attitudes towards the state, but aim to portray a general picture of the matter as well as to explore the similarities and differences among the six Asia-Pacific countries in this respect.

Globalization: differential opportunities and experiences

The locality: gateway to globalization

The six countries differ to varying degrees in their ethnic, historical, cultural, socioeconomic, and political situations (Table 1). China, India, and Russia, who, along with Brazil are members of the grouping known as the BRICs, are the developing-country heavyweights and globalization's newest frontier.⁷ Yet they all place relatively low on the Human Development Index, the Democracy Index, the Economic Freedom

⁷ Goldman Sachs anticipates that in less than 40 years, the economic power of the BRICs together could be larger than that of the G6 (Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United States). The BRICs are also expected to contribute almost half of all global growth in 2008 and 2009. Comparatively speaking, Russia and Brazil are players in commodity prices, particularly oil and gas in the case of Russia; while India and China are players in their low labour costs, which are expected to result in these countries taking a greater share of the global market in services and manufacturing respectively (A.T. Kearney/Foreign Policy, 2006: 78; *The Economist*, 2008a). Over the past 15 years, total trade grew by over 50% as a proportion of GDP in Russia, nearly doubled in China, and more than doubled in India (OECD, 2007: 12).

Table 1. *Socio-technological circumstances, 2008*

	Australia	Japan	USA	Russia	China	India
General background						
Population (million) ^a	21.3	127.7	304.4	142.0	1,327.7	1,190.5
GDP (billion US\$) ^a	1,010.7	4,923.8	14,264.6	1,676.6	4,401.6	1,209.7
GDP per capita (US\$) ^a	47,400.4	38,559.1	46,859.1	11,806.9	3,315.3	1,016.2
Religious culture ^b	Protestant	Japanese	Protestant	Orthodox	Confucian	Hindu
Ranking of Human Development Index ^{2, c}	2	10	13	71	92	134
Ranking of Democracy Index ^d	10	17	18	107	136	35
Ranking of Economic Freedom Index ^{1, e}	8	27	8	101	93	77
Ranking of World Press Freedom Index ^f	28	29	36	141	167	118
Access to the new media						
Internet						
Internet users (per 1,000 people) ^g	719.8	754.0	740.0	320.0	222.8	43.8
Broadband subscribers (per 1,000 people) ^g	243.9	236.5	234.6	65.6	62.3	4.5
International Internet bandwidth (bits per second per person) ^{2, h}	5,472	3,734	11,277	573	280	32
Price basket for Internet (US\$ per month) ^{2, h}	25.1	28.6	20.0	13.2	5.8	6.6
Mobile phones						
Mobile subscribers (per 1,000 people) ⁱ	1,049.6	867.3	867.9	1,411.1	474.1	293.6
Population covered by mobile signal (%) ^j	98.8	99.9	99.8 ¹	95.0 ¹	97.0 ²	60.9 ¹
Price basket for mobile phone use (US\$ per month) ^{2, h}	24.1	29.6	6.7	5.9	3.3	2.5

Notes: 1 = 2006 data. 2 = 2007 data.

Sources: a. International Monetary Fund (2009).

b. Norris and Inglehart (2004: 140–141).

c. United Nations (2009: 171–175).

d. *The Economist* (2008b).

e. Gwartney and Lawson (2008: 8).

f. Reporters Without Borders (2008).

g. International Telecommunication Union (2009b).

h. World Bank (2009b).

i. International Telecommunication Union (2009c).

j. International Telecommunication Union (2009a).

Index, and the World Press Freedom Index.⁸ Japan and the United States are two members of the G6 and the leaders of the world's wealthiest countries; while Australia's GDP per capita and its ranking on the above four indexes are among the highest in the world.

Globalizing localities. Two multi-dimensional composite indexes of globalization, i.e. the A.T. Kearney/Foreign Policy Globalization Index and the KOF Index of Globalization, were adopted to estimate the level of globalization of these six countries.

The A.T. Kearney/Foreign Policy Globalization Index is an annual study that assesses the extent to which the world's most populous countries are becoming more or less globally connected. It does this by means of 12 indicators such as international trade, foreign direct investment, international travel and tourism, remittances and personal transfers, Internet users, Internet hosts, membership in international organizations, personnel and financial contributions to United Nations' peacekeeping missions, international treaties ratified, and others. These indicators are grouped into four categories: economic integration, personal contact, technological connectivity, and political engagement. The 2007 Index, which drew on data from 72 countries that accounted for 97% of the world's GDP and 88% of the world's population, ranked Singapore as the most globalized country in the world. The respective rankings for the United States, Australia, Japan, Russia, China, and India are 7th, 13th, 28th, 62nd, 66th, and 71st (A.T. Kearney/Foreign Policy, 2007).

The KOF Index of Globalization, constructed by the Swiss Institute for Business Cycle Research, measures the economic, social, and political dimensions of globalization by means of 24 variables including trade, foreign direct investment, the mean tariff rate, taxes on international trade, outgoing telephone traffic, international tourism, foreign population, Internet users, the number of McDonald's restaurants, the number of embassies, membership in international organizations, and so forth. The KOF Index of Globalization 2008 is available for 122 countries. According to its calculations, Australia, the United States, Russia, China, Japan, and India rank 21st, 22nd, 33rd, 43rd, 51st, and 81st, respectively. Figure 1 traces the development of these six countries in the index over the period 1990–2006. It clearly shows that the rates of increase of the indexes for

⁸ The Human Development Index 2007 covers 182 member countries of the United Nations, as well as Hong Kong and the Palestinian territories.

The Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index covers 167 countries and territories. It is based on the ratings for 60 indicators grouped under five categories: electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the functioning of government; political participation; and political culture.

The Fraser Institute's Economic Freedom Index covers 141 countries and territories. It is comprised of 42 variables that are grouped into five areas: the size of government; the legal structure and security of property rights; access to sound money; the freedom to trade internationally; and the regulation of credit, labour, and business.

The Reporters Without Borders' World Press Freedom Index covers 173 countries and territories. It is based on 49 criteria that assess violations directly affecting journalists and the news media; self-censorship and the ability of the media to investigate and criticize; financial pressure; the legal framework for the media; the independence of the public media, and so forth.




Figure 1 KOF Index of Globalization, 1990–2006.

Note: The KOF Index measures globalization on a scale of 1–100.

Source: The raw data were obtained from the KOF Swiss Economic Institute (2009).

India (80.1%), Russia (74.4%), and China (72.2%) have surpassed those of Australia (9.4%), the United States (9.6%), and Japan (26.9%) to a remarkable degree (KOF Swiss Economic Institute, 2009).

These two indexes give different rankings for the six countries. The differing rankings for Japan, in particular, are not at all unexpected.⁹ Yet there are two common findings on which our analysis, which follows below, can be based. First, the six countries can be classified into two broad groups: (1) the highly globalized, which includes Australia and the United States; and (2) the moderately globalized, which includes Japan, Russia, China, and India. Second, among the six countries, India is undoubtedly the least globalized. We assume that people in less globalized countries tend to be more deprived of opportunities to connect with the world.

Differential access to the new media. Having the capability to access information and communicate with others beyond a locality is a primary prerequisite for engaging in global networks of flows. In this regard, the role of the interactive, digital media is much more important than that of the ‘old media’ (such as printed newspapers, magazines and, to some extent, television). Obviously, not everyone is capable of having this kind of anytime, anywhere, on-demand access to the global community. One’s capacity to access global information via electronic communication depends first and foremost on online freedom. According to the assessment of Reporters Without Borders (2008),

⁹ The difference in the rankings for Japan is mainly due to the inclusion in the KOF Index of the component of barriers to trade. The KOF adopts the Fraser Institute’s ‘Freedom to Trade Internationally’ rating that ranks Japan 117th out of 141 countries (Gwartney and Lawson, 2008: 9–12).

China is still listed as one of the ‘enemies of the Internet’. However, with China enjoying increasing geopolitical influence, people are worrying that its Internet model, based on censorship and surveillance, may one day be imposed on the rest of the world. The United States was on the list of ten ‘Countries to Watch’ in 2005.

Apart from the regulatory environment, network infrastructure and equipment are indispensable for driving on the information superhighway. As Table 1 shows, there is clearly an infrastructural divide between developed and developing countries, as well as a digital divide within developing countries. The ubiquity of broadband is the way to a new era of personal or participatory media. Japan and Australia take the lead in Internet and broadband penetration rates, respectively. By contrast, although India has the lowest price basket for the mobile phone, as well as a flourishing information technology industry with global leading firms (e.g. Infosys), it lags far behind the other five countries in the diffusion of information and communications technologies (ICTs). The gap is particularly glaring for international Internet bandwidths – while there is a mere 32 bits per second per person in India, 280 bits in China, and 573 bits in Russia, the amount of international cybertraffic is as high as 5,472 bits in Australia and 11,277 bits in the United States.

The individual: no longer local in a globalizing world

Connectivity with the world: digital and personal. The Web-enabled platform that facilitates the global sharing of information, communication, and collaboration irrespective of time and distance has the potential to affect everyone on earth. As Thomas Friedman (2005) succinctly expressed it: ‘More people from more places, on more days, in more ways, are going to be able to collaborate on more different kinds of work and compete for more different kinds of work than any time before in the history of the world. It is this leveling of the competitive and collaborative playing fields on the individual level, rather than the level of the country or the company, that I think defines the next stage of globalization.’ This era of globalization is about the necessity and opportunity for individuals to globalize themselves and to collaborate and compete globally with other individuals. ‘Being local in a globalized world is a sign of social deprivation and degradation’ (Bauman, 1998: 2).

Being connected to the world is a prerequisite to globalization at the level of the individual. In this article, connectivity beyond locality in daily life is examined in terms of two aspects: digital connectivity and personal contact. First, being connected to the world via ICTs is crucial if one is to surpass the constraints of time and space.¹⁰ In addition to the sharing of information, the American experience reveals that online

¹⁰ The ICTs, with their properties of decentralized access, simultaneity, and interconnectivity, are recognized not only as a medium of communication, but also as a development enabler. They are acclaimed as an important tool to access knowledge and information; to create translocal networks for change and advocacy; to cultivate a more informed, competent, and active citizenry; to empower civil society actors and stakeholders; and to achieve internationally agreed-on development goals (OECD, 2001; World Summit on the Information Society, 2005).

participation has the functions of both bridging and bonding: it has the capacity to deepen linkages among people who share similar beliefs and to serve as a virtual community that cuts across some traditional social divisions (Norris, 2002). We assume that the frequency of use of ICTs is positively related to global connectivity. Three forms of digital media use – Internet browsing, the use of email, and the use of mobile phone messaging – were used to reflect the level of digital connectivity. Scoring standards for the frequency of use were as follows: the respondents received two points for using such digital media ‘almost every day’ or ‘several times a week’, and one point for ‘several times a month’. The score for each medium ranged from ‘0’ to ‘2’. The score range for the ‘digital connectivity index’, a simple composite index of the above three items, is ‘0’ to ‘6’ (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.79). The higher the score is, the stronger is the digital connectivity of the respondent.

Second, international ties and contacts are believed to offer people greater opportunities to reach beyond local experiences. To explore the range of their personal contacts with overseas people and foreign cultures, the respondents were asked whether they had the following connections or practices: (1) family members or relatives living abroad; (2) experience with international travel (at least three times in the past three years); (3) local foreign friends; (4) often watch foreign television programmes; (5) often communicate with overseas people via the Internet or email; and (6) maintain business contacts with foreign organizations or people. The following scoring standards for international ties and contacts were used: A positive response received one point. Each score ranged from ‘0’ to ‘1’. The score range for the ‘personal contact index’, a simple composite index of the above six items, is ‘0’ to ‘6’ (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.70). The higher the score is, the stronger is the respondent’s international ties.

An analysis of individual data confirms what is already known from data relating to the infrastructural digital divide between highly and moderately globalized countries: levels of digital connectivity are much higher in the highly globalized countries (Table 2). The gaps are particularly wide in the areas of Internet browsing and the use of email services. For example, while 67.3% of Americans and 65.4% of Australians use the Internet at least several times a week, only 13.9% of Indians and 19.0% of Russians show the same pattern of usage. As for the four moderately globalized countries, people in Japan and China browse the Internet and use email much more often than those in Russia and India. It is noteworthy that although the mobile phone penetration rate in China is very much lower than in Australia, the United States, and Japan, Chinese people are relatively more active in using mobile phone messaging. On the whole, according to the digital connectivity index, Australia tops our ranking of digital media use (3.95), followed by the United States (3.65), Japan (2.98), China (2.74), Russia (1.70), and India (1.59).

The disparity in personal international ties and contacts between highly and moderately globalized countries remains wide (Table 3). People in highly globalized countries generally have more personal contacts with overseas people and foreign cultures. Yet inter-country variations are larger here than those in the area of digital

Table 2. *Digital connectivity: frequency of use of digital media (%)*

	Highly globalized		Moderately globalized			
	Australia	USA	Japan	Russia	China	India
Internet browsing						
Low	29.7	26.3	50.4	77.2	57.2	81.0
Medium	4.9	6.4	5.4	3.9	6.2	5.1
High	65.4	67.3	44.2	19.0	36.6	13.9
<i>Mean score</i>	<i>1.36</i>	<i>1.41</i>	<i>0.94</i>	<i>0.42</i>	<i>0.79</i>	<i>0.33</i>
<i>Ranking</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>6</i>
Email usage						
Low	33.0	29.1	61.4	79.3	68.9	80.2
Medium	6.1	7.6	4.9	3.6	7.7	5.1
High	60.9	63.3	33.7	17.1	23.4	14.6
<i>Mean score</i>	<i>1.28</i>	<i>1.34</i>	<i>0.72</i>	<i>0.38</i>	<i>0.55</i>	<i>0.34</i>
<i>Ranking</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>6</i>
Mobile phone messaging						
Low	31.2	52.7	32.0	50.6	26.6	50.2
Medium	6.3	5.1	4.3	8.4	7.2	7.5
High	62.5	42.2	63.6	40.9	66.2	42.3
<i>Mean score</i>	<i>1.31</i>	<i>0.90</i>	<i>1.32</i>	<i>0.90</i>	<i>1.40</i>	<i>0.92</i>
<i>Ranking</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>4</i>
Digital connectivity index (mean)	3.95	3.65	2.98	1.70	2.74	1.59
<i>Ranking of the index</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>6</i>

Notes: Frequency of use: Low = seldom or less (0 point); Medium = several times a month (1 point); High = several times a week or more (2 points).

Digital connectivity index: 0 = lowest; 6 = highest.

Source: 2008 AsiaBarometer Survey.

connectivity. In this comparison, Australia stands out, with 55.4% having family members or relatives living abroad, 19.5% having travelled internationally, 54.2% having local foreign friends, 54.4% often watching foreign television programmes, 39.4% often communicating with overseas people via the Internet or email; and 15.8% maintaining business contacts with foreign organizations or people. The respective percentages for Russia are only 7.0%, 5.6%, 5.5%, 17.4%, 2.9%, and 2.6%. In the personal contact index ranking, Australia heads the list again (2.39), followed far behind by the United States (1.36), Japan (0.77), China (0.51), India (0.42), and Russia (0.41).

English language capacity: a tool to globalize. English has become a dominant international language in nearly all areas of life, for example, communications, science, business, the professions and occupations, entertainment, and the Internet. Although the English-speaking bloc is not the sole socioeconomic centre in the world, proficiency in the English language is critical if one is to access the global flow of information. In

Table 3. *Personal international ties and contacts (% giving a positive response)*

	Highly globalized		Moderately globalized			
	Australia	USA	Japan	Russia	China	India
Family members or relatives living abroad	55.4	23.8	12.5	7.0	6.7	12.7
Experience with international travel	19.5	15.8	11.9	5.6	2.8	1.1
Local foreign friends	54.2	38.5	12.1	5.5	4.9	3.4
Watch foreign television programmes	54.4	24.9	26.7	17.4	26.1	19.8
Communicate with overseas people via Internet or email	39.4	19.1	5.5	2.9	3.7	3.2
Business contact with foreign organizations or people	15.8	14.4	8.6	2.6	6.3	2.0
Personal contact index (mean)	2.39	1.36	0.77	0.41	0.51	0.42
<i>Ranking of the index</i>	1	2	3	6	4	5

Note: Personal contact index: 0 = lowest; 6 = highest.

Source: 2008 AsiaBarometer Survey.

this article, fluency in spoken English was used to reflect a respondent's overall English language capacity. The respondents were asked, 'How well do you speak English?' The scoring standards for fluency in spoken English were as follows: the respondents received three points for being able to speak fluently, two points for being able to speak well enough to get by in daily life, and one point for being able to speak very little English. Scores ranged from '0' to '3'.

As Australia and the United States are English-speaking countries, their people naturally stand out for their English language capacity, with 95% or more able to speak English fluently (Table 4). India, a former British colony, comes third, but a significant 54.0% of the respondents believe that they do not speak English well enough to get by in daily life. Lower down the list are Japan, China, and Russia. Nearly nine out of ten of the respondents in these countries indicated that they speak very little or no English.

We conducted ordinary least square (OLS) regressions to examine the contribution of personal sociodemographic attributes (including gender, age, marital status, educational attainment, and household income) and English language capacity to explain an individual's digital connectivity index and personal contact index scores. In order to take into account the presence of unobserved country-specific variations, we began with a fixed-effects regression for the pooled sample of societies. India, which has the lowest level of globalization, was taken as the baseline for comparison, and five country dummy variables were included in the regression. We then performed the regression in each country to test whether the results in the pooled analysis are driven by any particular country and whether the results are consistent across the six societies. Both the results of the fixed-effects and the country-level regressions are briefly listed in Table 5.

Table 4. *Fluency in spoken English (%)*

	Highly globalized		Moderately globalized			
	Australia	USA	Japan	Russia	China	India
Not at all	0.4	0.2	33.7	61.3	49.8	17.2
Very little	0.1	0.6	53.5	27.6	41.8	36.8
Well enough to get by in daily life	4.7	3.0	12.3	9.6	6.9	29.1
Able to speak fluently	94.8	96.2	0.6	1.5	1.4	17.0
<i>Mean score</i>	<i>2.94</i>	<i>2.95</i>	<i>0.80</i>	<i>0.51</i>	<i>0.60</i>	<i>1.46</i>
<i>Ranking</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>3</i>

Note: Scoring standard: 0 = not at all; 1 = very little; 2 = well enough to get by in daily life; 3 = able to speak fluently.

Source: 2008 AsiaBarometer Survey.

In the pooled sample, almost all of the country dummies, which represent the difference in the level of globalization between each society and India, are positive, as expected. When country-specific variations are allowed, personal sociodemographic attributes and English language capacity can explain 43.9% and 31.9% of the variance in the digital connectivity index and the personal contact index scores, respectively. Only age and marital status have no significant independent influence on personal contacts with overseas people and foreign cultures.

In the country-level regressions, these six independent variables can explain 27.4% (the United States) to 51.4% (China) of the variance in the digital connectivity index. Age, educational attainment, and household income are found to have a significant independent effect on digital connectivity in all of the six societies. English language capacity is also positively related to digital connectivity, except for Australia: the lower the age and the higher the educational attainment, household income, and English language capacity are, the higher is the level of an individual's digital connectivity. Yet the relative effect of these variables differs across societies. In the three developed countries, i.e. Australia, the United States, and Japan, age has the strongest inhibiting effect on digital connectivity. In other countries, the most influential variable is significantly different. In Russia, household income turns out to be the most influential variable. In China, educational attainment has the strongest explanatory power, whereas in India, it is English language capacity. In Russia, China, and India, married people tend to be less digitally connected than those who are unmarried. As expected, gender inequality is most prominent in India. Only in this country does gender exert an independent effect – women are less digitally connected than men.

Second, sociodemographic variations in personal contacts with overseas people and foreign cultures are found to be not as pronounced as those in the area of digital connectivity. The six independent variables together can only explain 7.0% (India) to 18.1% (China) of the variance in the personal contact index. Gender and marital status

Table 5. Standardized regression coefficients of sociodemographic variables and English language capacity on digital connectivity index and personal contact index (β)

	Highly globalized		Moderately globalized				Pooled sample
	Australia	USA	Japan	Russia	China	India	
Digital connectivity index							
Gender	-0.032	0.019	0.012	-0.022	0.035	0.164***	0.036***
Age	-0.351***	-0.294***	-0.285***	-0.217***	-0.245***	-0.153***	-0.263***
Marital status	0.028	-0.046	0.015	-0.094**	-0.076**	-0.197***	-0.051***
Educational attainment	0.229***	0.226***	0.279***	0.061*	0.369***	0.141***	0.224***
Household income	0.286***	0.287***	0.157***	0.308***	0.141***	0.064*	0.196***
English language capacity	0.015	0.068*	0.159***	0.244***	0.150***	0.224***	0.252***
Australia							0.218***
USA							0.184***
Japan							0.294***
Russia							0.058***
China							0.275***
Adjusted R ²	0.334	0.274	0.327	0.416	0.514	0.347	0.439
F	63.826***	53.148***	62.914***	107.632***	175.780***	92.155***	376.147***
Personal contact index							
Gender	0.005	0.020	-0.014	0.053	0.069*	0.012	0.023*
Age	-0.017	-0.120***	0.060	-0.033	0.070	-0.030	-0.026
Marital status	-0.015	-0.023	-0.019	0.053	-0.095**	-0.016	-0.003
Educational attainment	0.282***	0.175***	0.051	0.040	0.076*	0.132***	0.132***
Household income	0.161***	0.186***	0.079*	0.180***	0.167***	-0.045	0.120***
English language capacity	-0.050	-0.142***	0.362***	0.294***	0.269***	0.165***	0.140***
Australia							0.421***
USA							0.172***
Japan							0.113***
Russia							-0.001
China							0.058***
Adjusted R ²	0.129	0.097	0.158	0.178	0.181	0.070	0.319
F	19.568***	15.921***	24.875***	33.322***	37.467***	13.902***	225.379***

Notes: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Gender: 0 = female; 1 = male; Age: 1 = under 30; 2 = 30–50; 3 = over 50; Marital status: 0 = unmarried; 1 = others; Educational attainment: 1 = low; 2 = middle; 3 = high; Household income: 1 = low; 2 = middle; 3 = high; English language capacity: 0 = not at all; 1 = very little; 2 = well enough to get by in daily life; 3 = able to speak fluently.

Source: 2008 AsiaBarometer Survey.

exert minor effects only in China. Age is negatively related to the personal contact index only in the United States. Educational attainment has a significant positive effect, except for Japan and Russia. Household income and English language capacity are significantly related to the personal contact index, with the exception of India and Australia, respectively. English language capacity is also the most influential variable in the four non-English-speaking countries: the higher a person's level of English proficiency is, the more international ties and contacts he/she has. The relationship is opposite in the United States.

Table 6. *Support for the forces of globalization (% giving a positive response)*

	Highly globalized		Moderately globalized			
	Australia	USA	Japan	Russia	China	India
The EU has a good influence	40.4	37.1	22.9	29.7	34.7	19.2
Trust the WTO	51.6	38.1	43.3	15.7	58.4	49.4
Trust the UN	67.5	53.3	50.5	27.7	54.9	56.0
Trust the World Bank	43.8	36.1	35.2	18.3	57.7	57.5
Trust the IMF	40.6	33.1	37.1	16.3	57.1	43.2
Trust multinational companies	35.7	32.9	28.1	19.8	53.6	51.8
Support for globalization forces index (mean)	2.80	2.31	2.17	1.27	3.16	2.77
<i>Ranking of the index</i>	2	4	5	6	1	3

Note: Support for globalization forces index: 0 = lowest; 6 = highest.

Source: 2008 AsiaBarometer Survey.

Support for the forces of globalization

Globalization involves actors at the local, regional, national, multinational, and international levels. Along with the processes of globalization, the authority of supranational agencies to govern the emerging global community as well as their influences on actors at the other levels have progressively increased. We assume that people who look favourably on supranational agencies should be more supportive of the forces of globalization. We chose the following three sets of questions to measure the respondents' support for the forces of globalization:

- 1 'Do you think the EU has a good influence or a bad influence on your society?'
- 2 'To what extent do you trust (1) the World Trade Organization (WTO), (2) the United Nations (UN), (3) the World Bank, and (4) the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to operate in the best interests of your society?'
- 3 'To what extent do you trust multinational companies operating in your country to operate in the best interests of your society?'

A positive response received one point. Each score ranged from '0' to '1'. The score range for the 'support for globalization forces index', a simple composite index of the above six items, is '0' to '6' (Cronbach's alpha = 0.79). It was assumed that those who favour globalization tend to judge the EU's global reach positively, and to trust the WTO, UN, World Bank, IMF, and multinational companies. The higher the index score is, the greater is the support for the forces of globalization.

As Table 6 shows, the variations among levels of trust in these supranational agencies and among countries are both remarkable. First, with the exception of Russia, public attitudes towards the EU are generally less positive than towards the other international organizations. The most favourable evaluation is found in the highly globalized countries (Australia: 40.4%; the United States: 37.1%), and the least in India (19.2%) and Japan (22.9%).

Second, although international organizations enjoy a relatively higher level of public trust, cross-national variations are most remarkable in the public's trust in the WTO, the only international organization that deals with the rules of trade between nations. In Australia, China, and India, about half of the respondents trust the WTO to operate in the best interests of their societies. About four out of ten Japanese and Americans also have trust in the WTO. Russia, which applied for accession in 1993 but which is still barred from joining the organization, is the only exception: 15.7% of Russians gave a positive response when asked whether they trust the WTO.

Third, multinational companies have always been regarded as self-interested superpowers that profit by exploiting the resources of developing countries. National differences in trust in multinational companies are obvious: trust is strongest in China (53.6%) and India (51.8%); and weakest in Russia (19.8%) and Japan (28.1%). That Chinese and Indians have a more favourable view of multinational companies than the respondents from the other four countries is indeed supported by findings reported in the *OECD Employment Outlook 2008*. The OECD found that foreign-owned affiliates of multinational firms tend to provide better pay and working conditions than their domestic counterparts, especially when they operate in developing and emerging economies (OECD, 2008: Chapter 5).

Overall support for globalization, as measured by the support for globalization forces index, is strongest in China (3.16), followed by Australia (2.80) and India (2.77). Far behind are the United States (2.31), Japan (2.17), and Russia (1.27). The cases of China, India, and Japan have illustrated that the circumstances of possessing the technological capacity for globalization and supporting the forces of globalization are not necessarily related.

We then conducted both fixed-effects and the country-level OLS regressions to examine the contribution of the five personal sociodemographic variables and three globalization-related variables (i.e. English language capacity, digital connectivity, and personal contact) to explain an individual's support for the forces of globalization.

The pooled analysis indicated that when country-specific variations are allowed, these independent variables can only explain 11.9% of the variance in the support for globalization forces index. People of different gender, age, marital status, and educational attainment vary slightly in this respect. The positive effects of personal contact and English language capacity are stronger than those of household income and digital connectivity. All of the countries are significantly different from India, with only people in China being more supportive of the forces of globalization than those in India.

The country-level analyses further confirmed that the explanatory power of these variables is very weak, with the highest variance seen for Japan and the lowest for China. The independent effects of these sociodemographic and globalization-related variables are sporadic and relatively weak. For example, except for household income in India and the United States, educational attainment in Australia and Japan, and gender in Russia and China, variations among the sociodemographic groups are negligible. The positive effect of English language capacity is significant only in Japan, and digital connectivity

Table 7. Standardized regression coefficients of sociodemographic and globalization-related variables on support for globalization forces index (β)

	Highly globalized		Moderately globalized			Pooled sample	
	Australia	USA	Japan	Russia	China		India
Sociodemographic variables							
Gender	-0.030	0.041	0.036	-0.094**	0.064*	-0.022	0.008
Age	-0.018	-0.062	-0.021	-0.076	0.031	0.013	-0.018
Marital status	0.025	0.043	-0.021	-0.040	-0.017	-0.008	0.005
Educational attainment	0.111**	0.048	0.093*	0.009	-0.022	0.006	0.025
Household income	0.001	0.083*	0.014	0.023	0.055	0.145***	0.053***
Globalization-related variables							
English language capacity	-0.024	-0.013	0.134***	0.028	0.026	0.051	0.094***
Digital connectivity index	0.070	-0.075	0.059	0.103*	-0.018	0.130***	0.041*
Personal contact index	0.058	0.153***	0.115**	0.079*	0.073*	0.097**	0.111***
Australia							-0.116***
USA							-0.168***
Japan							-0.103***
Russia							-0.256***
China							0.084***
Adjusted R ²	0.026	0.033	0.084	0.058	0.008	0.069	0.119
F	3.547***	4.551***	9.704***	7.874***	1.979*	10.557***	55.719***

Note: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Source: 2008 AsiaBarometer Survey.

only in Russia and India. However, with the exception of Australia, personal contact is positively related with an individual's level of support for globalization (Table 7).

Public attitudes towards the state

Satisfaction with government performance

Government administration covers different domains. Therefore, we chose the following ten domains for respondents to evaluate: (1) dealing with the economy, (2) dealing with the problem of unemployment, (3) dealing with problems of political corruption, (4) dealing with the problem of crime, (5) dealing with human rights problems, (6) dealing with public services problems, (7) dealing with the increase in immigration, (8) dealing with ethnic conflicts, (9) dealing with religious conflicts, and (10) dealing with environmental problems. A positive response received one point. Each score ranged from '0' to '1'. The score range for the 'satisfaction with government index', a simple composite index of the above ten items, is '0' to '10' (Cronbach's alpha = 0.83). The higher the index score is, the higher is the level of satisfaction with the government's performance.

The six countries differ notably in their public's ratings of their government's performance in several ways. First, the order of ranking in terms of the satisfaction with

government index is: China (5.90), Australia (5.34), India (4.43), the United States (3.57), Russia (2.88), and Japan (2.54) (Table 8). Second, variations among the four moderately globalized countries are also wider than the variations between highly and moderately globalized countries. At one extreme, in China, over half of the respondents (ranging from 53.4% to 73.9%) gave positive evaluations of the government's performance in nearly all of the examined domains, except for unemployment (40.1%) and political corruption (34.7%). At the other extreme, in Japan, in none of these domains did the government's performance receive a positive evaluation from over half of the respondents, with positive evaluations ranging from 9.3% (political corruption) to 45.5% (environmental problems).

Third, there are huge disparities in the intra-country rankings of the ten domains. China and India have relatively similar rankings, with the exception of the ethnic conflicts rating, which is ranked third in China and sixth in India. Among the six countries, there is greater diversity in the public's ratings of their government's performance in dealing with the economy, the problems of unemployment, crime, public services, and the environment. For example, the government's performance in dealing with the economy leads the ratings in Russia, China, and India, but ranks at the bottom in the United States.

Fourth, although China and India are generally regarded as the winners in economic globalization, a prevailing sense of economic insecurity has accompanied economic progress in these countries. The evidence for this is the gap between the rating of the government's performance in dealing with the economy and that with the problem of unemployment. This gap is apparently narrower in Australia, the United States, Japan, and Russia.

Apart from the above inter-country differences, it is noteworthy that the public's ratings of their government's performance in dealing with political corruption rank at the bottom in Japan and China and almost at the bottom in the United States, Russia, and India. This is the only domain in which none of the governments of any of the six countries received a positive evaluation from over half of the respondents, with positive evaluations ranging from 9.3% (Japan) to 49.3% (Australia). Perceived corruption in politics is found to be one of the most important factors contributing to the decline in levels of trust in the governments of both the developed and developing countries (Catterberg and Moreno, 2005; Blind, 2006: 11–14).

Demands on the government

As mentioned above, empirical work has produced inconclusive results on the influences of globalization, economic globalization in particular, on government spending. Since the focus of our research is on the subjective perceptions and expectations of the people, we chose the following set of questions to measure the respondent's demands for government spending: 'Listed below are various areas of government spending. Please indicate whether you would like to see more or less government spending in each area. Please bear in mind that more spending

Table 8. Attitudes towards the state (% giving a positive response)

	Highly globalized		Moderately globalized			
	Australia	USA	Japan	Russia	China	India
Satisfaction with government performance						
The economy	62.4 (3)	15.9 (10)	23.0 (5)	48.2 (1)	73.9 (1)	61.6 (1)
Unemployment	64.6 (2)	29.2 (7)	14.6 (9)	33.7 (3)	40.1 (9)	33.0 (9)
Political corruption	49.3 (6)	22.4 (9)	9.3 (10)	18.1 (9)	34.7 (10)	35.2 (8)
Crime	48.6 (7)	48.9 (3)	39.8 (2)	24.9 (6)	53.4 (8)	30.6 (10)
Human rights	65.4 (1)	47.3 (4)	36.3 (3)	32.8 (4)	68.6 (2)	53.1 (2)
Public services	53.2 (4)	53.3 (1)	29.9 (4)	17.0 (10)	68.0 (5)	51.8 (3)
Increase in immigration	47.5 (8)	22.8 (8)	20.3 (6)	22.7 (8)	54.3 (7)	39.9 (7)
Ethnic conflicts	46.8 (9)	36.8 (5)	18.0 (7)	31.4 (5)	68.5 (3)	41.5 (6)
Religious conflicts	50.7 (5)	50.2 (2)	17.5 (8)	35.5 (2)	68.3 (4)	48.2 (4)
Environmental problems	45.4 (10)	30.6 (6)	45.5 (1)	24.1 (7)	60.5 (6)	48.2 (4)
Satisfaction with government index (mean)	5.34	3.57	2.54	2.88	5.90	4.43
<i>Ranking of the index</i>	2	4	6	5	1	3
Demand for more government spending						
Policing and law enforcement	68.1 (6)	44.6 (5)	23.6 (7)	49.5 (10)	71.0 (6)	53.7 (5)
The military and defense	35.1 (9)	31.5 (8)	8.7 (10)	69.2 (6)	67.7 (7)	62.5 (3)
Unemployment benefits	36.3 (8)	38.1 (7)	39.2 (5)	70.7 (5)	73.6 (5)	46.3 (8)
Old-age pensions	80.8 (3)	55.4 (3)	57.6 (3)	92.4 (1)	78.5 (2)	46.7 (7)
Health	91.2 (1)	75.1 (1)	75.7 (1)	90.7 (2)	80.2 (1)	67.1 (2)
Education	82.8 (2)	65.7 (2)	55.6 (4)	82.9 (3)	74.9 (4)	69.7 (1)
Public transport, telecommunications infrastructure	74.7 (4)	40.2 (6)	18.7 (8)	54.3 (9)	57.9 (8)	42.6 (9)
Culture and the arts	26.6 (10)	22.8 (10)	17.5 (9)	60.7 (8)	45.0 (10)	42.5 (10)
Improvement of the social status of women	44.5 (7)	28.6 (9)	31.9 (6)	62.0 (7)	56.1 (9)	53.2 (6)
The environment	70.4 (5)	53.5 (4)	62.1 (2)	76.2 (4)	77.7 (3)	62.0 (4)
Demands on the government index (mean)	6.11	4.56	3.91	7.09	6.83	5.46
<i>Ranking of the index</i>	3	5	6	1	2	4

Notes: Satisfaction with the government index: 0 = lowest; 10 = highest.

Demands on the government index: 0 = lowest; 10 = highest.

The figures inside the parentheses denote intra-country ranking in descending order.

Source: 2008 AsiaBarometer Survey.

may require a tax increase.’ The respondents were asked to give their response to spending in ten areas: (1) policing and law enforcement, (2) the military and defense, (3) unemployment benefits, (4) old-age pensions, (5) health, (6) education, (7) public transport, telecommunications infrastructure, (8) culture and the arts, (9) improvement of the social status of women, and (10) the environment. A positive response received one point. Each score ranged from ‘0’ to ‘1’. The score range for the ‘demands on the government index’, a simple composite index of the above ten items, is ‘0’ to ‘10’ (Cronbach’s $\alpha = 0.77$). The higher the index score is, the higher the level of demand for more government spending.

It is clear that the people of all six countries, especially those of Russia, China, and Australia, are quite positive about expanding government spending. Out of a total of 60 responses, 38 (63.3%) received a positive response from over half of the respondents and another 9 (15.0%) received a positive response from over 40% of the respondents. Russia tops the rankings in the demands on the government index (7.09), followed by China (6.83). Trailing behind are Australia (6.11), India (5.46), the United States (4.56), and Japan (3.91) (Table 8). The following results are noteworthy.

First, the Japanese are very consistent in their attitudes towards the state. They are the least likely to be satisfied with their government’s performance, as well as to demand government intervention.

Second, Australia is rather exceptional within the group of highly globalized and developed countries in terms of its public’s demand for government provisions and intervention. As a result, the variations among the four moderately globalized countries are again wider than those between the highly and moderately globalized countries.

Third, inter-country variations regarding the intra-country ranking of the ten domains are smaller than those of satisfaction with the government’s performance. The demand for more government spending in the area of health, ranging from 67.1% to 91.2% of the respondents, ranks at the top in four countries (Australia, the United States, Japan, and China) and comes second in Russia and India. Public demand for government intervention in the areas of education and old-age pensions is also rather consistent, with the exception of old-age pensions in India. In contrast, the people of all six countries tend to accord the lowest priority to the area of culture and art – with this category ranking at the bottom in Australia, the United States, China, and India; eighth in Russia and ninth in Japan.

Fourth, despite widespread dissatisfaction with the government’s performance in dealing with the problem of unemployment, people, particularly those in the developed countries as well as India, do not expect their government to spend more on unemployment benefits. The intra-country ranking of unemployment benefits ranges from fifth (Japan, Russia, and China) to eighth (Australia and India).

Fifth, India is a unique case with respect to the relative ranking of the military and defense. While this area ranks sixth (Russia) to tenth (Japan) in the other five countries, it comes only after education and health and occupies the third position in India.

Finally, notwithstanding the growing importance of developing public transport and telecommunications infrastructure to socioeconomic progress and globalization, people in the moderately globalized countries all accorded this category a lower priority – it ranks either eighth or ninth in the moderately globalized countries, as compared with fourth in Australia and sixth in the United States.

Conclusion: the influences of globalization

Two sets of fixed-effects and country-level regressions were conducted to explore how personal sociodemographic attributes, globalization capacity, experiences, and preference, after controlling for state-related attitudinal orientations (including national identity and trust in government),¹¹ affect an individual's satisfaction with the government's performance and demands on the government.

On satisfaction with the government's performance, the results of the pooled analysis confirmed that Australians and Chinese report a higher level of satisfaction with the government's performance than Indians, while Americans, Russians, and Japanese are significantly less satisfied. When country-specific variations are allowed, those who are male, younger, have a lower English language capacity, and are more supportive of the forces of globalization are more likely to report a higher level of satisfaction with the government's performance than their counterparts. In the country-level regressions, these independent variables can explain 14.1% (China) to 22.2% (the United States) of the variance in the satisfaction with government index.

When individual societies are examined, first, support for the forces of globalization turns out to be the most influential variable in predicting satisfaction with the government's performance in all of the six countries. Second, the influences of personal sociodemographic attributes are weak and vary across societies – gender exerts a significant independent effect only in Australia and Japan; and age and educational attainment have a minor effect in India and Russia, respectively. Third, the three individual variables of globalization have either a sporadic or insignificant independent effect in all of the six countries – English language capacity is negatively related to satisfaction with the government's performance in the United States, digital connectivity has a weak positive effect in India, and personal contact has a minor negative impact in China and India (Table 9).

On demands on the government, the results of the pooled analysis also confirmed that Russians and Chinese demand significantly more of their government than do Indians, while Australians have a similar level of demands, and Americans and Japanese a lower level. Those who are female, have a lower household income, a higher English

¹¹ National identity was measured by a single item with dichotomized responses: 'Throughout the world, many people identify themselves by their nationality. Do you think of yourself in this way?' A simple composite index of trust in government was measured by two items with dichotomized responses (Cronbach's alpha = 0.70): 'To what extent do you trust the central government to operate in the best interests of your society?' and 'To what extent do you trust your local government to operate in the best interests of your society?'

Table 9. Standardized regression coefficients of sociodemographic and globalization-related variables on the satisfaction with government index (β)

	Highly globalized		Moderately globalized			Pooled sample	
	Australia	USA	Japan	Russia	China		India
Sociodemographic variables							
Gender	0.138***	0.029	0.067*	0.024	-0.010	0.053	0.048***
Age	-0.037	-0.030	0.006	-0.071	0.019	-0.075*	-0.051***
Marital status	-0.016	0.064	-0.057	0.000	-0.004	0.039	0.019
Educational attainment	0.059	-0.053	0.059	0.102**	0.033	-0.037	0.009
Household income	0.005	0.003	-0.052	-0.061	0.015	-0.004	-0.005
Globalization-related variables							
English language capacity	-0.001	-0.087**	-0.010	0.002	-0.039	-0.056	-0.083**
Digital connectivity index	0.047	0.052	-0.010	-0.017	-0.019	0.075*	0.021
Personal contact index	0.013	-0.008	0.003	0.046	-0.096**	-0.076*	-0.003
Support for globalization forces index	0.198***	0.290***	0.279***	0.242***	0.207***	0.105***	0.205***
Australia							0.150***
USA							-0.038*
Japan							-0.141***
Russia							-0.132***
China							0.119***
Adjusted R ²	0.207	0.222	0.194	0.215	0.141	0.177	0.286
F	17.405***	20.711***	16.317***	21.436***	14.589***	21.131***	124.951***

Notes: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Coefficients for control variables, including national identity, trust in government, and demands on the government index, are not shown.

Source: 2008 AsiaBarometer Survey.

language capacity, and are more supportive of the forces of globalization tend to report a higher level of demand for government spending than other groups.

The results of the country-level analysis reveal that, with the exception of India, these independent variables are definitely insufficient to predict the public's demand for government spending (the adjusted R^2 values range from 0.012 in Russia to 0.200 in India). None of the variables studied exerts a significant independent effect in all of the six countries. Support for the forces of globalization is the only variable that has a significant positive influence on demands on the government in five countries. In this respect, Russia is an exceptional case. There seems to be no consistent pattern regarding the influence of other variables. For example, in the United States, Russia, and China, females are more likely to demand more from the government than males. But the effect of gender is negligible in Australia, Japan, and India. The effect of age is positive in Japan, but negative in India. Educational attainment is negatively related to demands on the government in India; but its effect is negligible in the other five countries. Personal contact with overseas people and foreign cultures has a positive, minor effect in Russia and China, but not in Australia, the United States, Japan, and India (Table 10).

Table 10. Standardized regression coefficients of sociodemographic and globalization-related variables on the demands on the government index (β)

	Highly globalized		Moderately globalized				Pooled sample
	Australia	USA	Japan	Russia	China	India	
Sociodemographic variables							
Gender	-0.014	-0.072*	0.058	-0.072*	-0.067*	-0.001	-0.029*
Age	0.066	0.034	0.095*	0.047	0.036	-0.071*	0.027
Marital status	0.050	-0.117**	-0.078*	0.034	-0.043	0.032	-0.027
Educational attainment	-0.017	0.013	0.038	0.042	0.028	-0.124***	-0.011
Household income	-0.042	-0.086*	-0.022	-0.071	0.010	-0.084**	-0.055***
Globalization-related variables							
English language capacity	-0.052	-0.014	0.094*	0.032	0.092*	0.100**	0.097***
Digital connectivity index	-0.051	0.012	-0.055	0.005	-0.049	-0.002	-0.009
Personal contact index	-0.026	-0.009	0.018	0.082*	0.074*	0.044	0.022
Support for globalization forces index	0.085*	0.162***	0.162***	0.008	0.125***	0.070*	0.079***
Australia							0.034
USA							-0.157***
Japan							-0.156***
Russia							0.304***
China							0.221***
Adjusted R ²	0.018	0.050	0.040	0.012	0.031	0.200	0.187
F	2.130*	4.623***	3.630***	1.876*	3.666***	24.299***	72.233***

Notes: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Coefficients for control variables, including national identity, trust in government, and satisfaction with government index, are not shown.

Source: 2008 AsiaBarometer Survey.

In sum, our analysis seems to suggest that, although these six Asia-Pacific countries differ extensively in their sociopolitical and technological situations, both intra- and inter-country variations in the influences of globalization on public attitudes towards the state are not particularly prominent. The most consistent finding is that support for globalization turns out to be the only variable that exerts an independent influence on the two state-related attitudinal variables in almost all of the six countries under study – that is to say, those who support globalization are more inclined than others to be satisfied with the government's performance and to demand more government intervention. The only exception is the effect of support for globalization on the demands on the government in Russia.

In the final analysis, the central concern is whether or not the degree of globalization at the level of the individual has actually affected the attitudes of individuals towards the state, including their satisfaction with their government's performance and the extent of their demands on their government. The empirical analysis in this paper has so far yielded the following findings.

First, factors related to globalization at the individual level have no uniform or directional effects on a person's satisfaction with the government's performance. In other words, in different countries the more globalized a citizen tends to be, he or she

can be either more positive or more negative towards the performance of his/her own government. That means the impact of globalization can be complex and it is not either positive or negative.

Second, concerning the relationships between individual globalization experiences and demands for government spending, again, no conclusive findings can be made. However, it seems that the more one is inclined to support the forces of globalization, the greater one's demands on the government. To come to this tentative assertion is not really surprising, as exposure to the forces of globalization can actually facilitate the public's ability to demand that their government make better use of the public's resources. That also means that globalization does make a difference on a citizen's changing expectations and demands on his/her government.

Finally, contrary to the notion prevailing in some of the literature on globalization, this study suggests that support for globalization not only is related to satisfaction with the government's performance, but also connected with a demand for more government intervention. Globalization is obviously not antithetical to the image that the public has of the state and its attitudes towards the state. On the contrary, the more one supports globalization, the more one may first be demanding that the government take greater responsibility in various areas and be more responsive towards the public. Then, once the state has indeed acted on the public's demands, the greater the support that more globalized citizens will render to their government. This finding in one way or another does shed some light on the existing contradictory hypotheses concerning globalization and public response to the state.

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