

## Self-Cathexis and Other-Cathexis Vicissitudes in the History of an Observation

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The history is traced of observations made of the phenomena associated with self-cathexis and other-cathexis. Owing to personal and other conflicts in the history of psychiatry and psychotherapy, the development of these observations was disturbed, and they were re-observed and re-described using different terminologies in accounts which have not hitherto been collected and compared. When this is done, a consensus appears which can be stated in a common language to facilitate further accretion of observation, and further research and debate.

In 1908 Karl Abraham published reflections on a certain clinical observation. The observation itself was not new, and may indeed have been a cliché of psychiatry at that time. As “all observers agree”, Abraham (1908) wrote, there exists a “fundamental antithesis” between dementia praecox and hysteria: dementia praecox patients have abnormally little feeling for others, while hysterics feel abnormally much for others. In his paper Abraham explained this, probably as a result of conversations with Freud in 1907 (Jones, 1927), by Freud’s sexual theory: the dementia praecox patient is in love only with himself, while the hysteric is neurotically (therefore excessively) in love with (makes a transference to) the other.

It would hardly occur to us now to make such an observation or to think it could have much significance if we did, schizophrenia being a psychosis, and hysteria, if it exists at all, a neurosis. But it was a starting point for observations of a kind of polarity or complementarity in neurotic and normal behaviour between emotional investment in the self, and emotional investment in others or in the object-world.

However, the development of this area of research was not at all smooth. It was almost immediately caught up in the hundred-year brawl that constitutes the history of modern psychotherapy. This paper attempts to show how the investigation was fragmented, how the phenomena persisted in attracting attention in different ways and in being described in different terminologies and from different points of view, and finally how it is possible by superimposing the different accounts to show a hitherto unrecognised consensus of observation, which on the face of it deserves at least more serious consideration, in view of its potential usefulness. Before examining this consensus I shall summarise the observations in historical sequence of ten (including Abraham) observers, with brief comment on the historical

context. The detailed clinical descriptions that back up the observations are to be found in the books and papers of each observer; owing to their great quantity they cannot be reviewed here. In this paper, ‘cathexis of’ is used to mean ‘investment of emotion in’.

The first vicissitude in the history of the observation was that it was caught up in the conflict between Freud and Jung. It was this observation that was under debate, and which was torn apart between them, at the time of the final parting of their ways.

### Observations of C. G. Jung

Jung read a paper on the theme in 1913, at the Psychoanalytical Congress in Munich, when Freud and Jung met for the last time (Jung, 1913). He did not refer to Abraham, but took the same starting point in the common observation: “It is well known,” he began, that hysterics feel abnormally much about others and schizophrenics abnormally little.

Jung went on to say that the doctor therefore can keep a rapport with hysterics, but not with schizophrenics – in hysteria the libido is directed outwards, in schizophrenia inwards. He added a further observation that Abraham had not mentioned that when each illness is fully developed, a compensatory opposite movement is seen: the hysteric’s libido turns inwards and he becomes obsessed with his symptoms and himself and withdraws from his usual social interactions; the schizophrenic’s libido turns outwards and he becomes crudely attention-seeking and intrusive, forcing himself on others with little sense of normal restraint.

Jung proposed the terms ‘extraversion’ and ‘introversion’ for the two movements of libido, calling them ‘regressive’ where pathological emotive fantasy falsifies the patient’s judgement. (Thus,

he said, 'regressive extraversion' is effectually the same as what Freud referred to as 'transference', and 'regressive introversion' the opposite phenomenon in schizophrenia where the fantasy refers to the subject.) Pathological, regressive forms are like crude, exaggerated, immature forms of a normal movement.

He was to develop the theme further in a book and several papers (Jung, 1917, 1921, 1923, 1931, 1936). He observed the phenomena as they appear also in normal psychology: we all turn outwards to others sometimes, and inwards to ourselves sometimes, in a natural rhythm, like systole and diastole, but some of us, without necessarily reaching pathological states, habitually use one mode more than the other. As Jung saw them, healthy extraversion and introversion are both ways of relating to others – it is just that the introvert tends rather to start from himself, and the extravert to start from the other. It is only in *regressive* introversion that the introvert withdraws, devaluing the environment and other people as a defence, trying to cling to his autonomy, while the regressive extravert clings to others and disowns or represses any urges in him that would damage the bonds with others. The introvert's devaluing of others corresponds to the extravert's repression of his own impulses and wishes.

Jung observed that if one does habitually cultivate one style more, then one has the other in one's background, in the unconscious. It is in a less developed or regressive form, socially unadapted and childish, and liable to cause trouble unless one finds some means of cultivating it too, and developing it into a useful co-operation with one's dominant style.

In 1913, reading his paper at the congress, Jung concluded by applying this observation of a normal polarity between self-cathexis and other-cathexis, which becomes pathological when extreme, to the great dissension between Freud and Adler, which had reached its climax only two years earlier in 1911. Jung thought they were both right, but that Freud described the psychology of extraversion, while Adler described the psychology of introversion. Jung said that Freud described a subject striving for pleasure in the object, using the infantile transference of subjective fantasies into the object in his attempts to achieve this aim, while Adler described a subject striving for his own supremacy, who defends himself against the threatening object-world by "masculine protest" and stubborn cultivation of his "guiding fiction". What can Freud have thought as he sat and listened to that?

By this time Freud's personal rejection of Jung was practically complete. For him, friendship could not contain differences of opinion as great as that between him and Jung. For example, Jung's idea that

the incest motif in dream or fantasy could have a symbolic or religious meaning as well as the literal one was intolerable to him. He saw Jung as religious, and religion was Freud's *bête noir*. For him religion was a repressive society's means of suffocating thought (Freud, 1930). Four years earlier (according to Jung's (1963) account), when they were still friends, Freud had tried to enlist Jung's support in the erection of his sexual theory into a "dogma", as a "bulwark" against "the black tide of mud . . . of occultism", as though he saw in religion a serious threat to the recognition of the profound importance in neurosis, and, in human life, of sexuality – which for him was far more than just a medical-psychological discovery. Freud was not only a doctor treating patients, but also an original genius rebelling against the culture in which he found himself living. His faith and loyalty were devoted to "the mighty and primordial melody of the instincts" (which he thought Jung and others simply did not hear (Freud, 1914a)). This was the basis of the ideological, socially relevant aspect of Freud's work. To promote it, he hijacked psychotherapy, brand-named it 'psychoanalysis', and made it into a 'movement' (the 'psychoanalytical movement') as the vehicle of a powerful ideological thrust. It was bad luck for the humble, practical, medical procedure of psychotherapy that it should find itself caught up, like a peasant in a war between pope and emperor, in high ideological conflicts that should have been above its head, and whatever good Freud's ideological thrust had done to society, it made trouble for psychotherapy, as the history of the observation under discussion illustrates.

By 1913 Jung had come himself to represent to Freud the "black tide of mud", and from this Freud had to distance himself. In the May before the congress he wrote in a letter that he was near the end of writing *Totem and Taboo*, which came, he said, at the right time to deepen the gap between himself and Jung "by fathoms", and "serve to make a sharp division between us and all Aryan religiosity" (Jones, 1955).

In September in Munich, when Jung brought his paper on the subject to its conclusion, there is no way one could imagine Freud sitting there feeling glad and grateful to Jung for 'explaining' him. His riposte came in the following year, first in *On the History of the Psychoanalytic Movement* (Freud, 1914a) and then, specifically on the self-cathexis/other-cathexis theme, in *Narcissism: an Introduction* (Freud, 1914b).

#### Observations of Freud

In the latter, Freud (1914b) does refer to Abraham's original paper, but he starts with the definition of

Nacke (following Havelock Ellis) of narcissism as the attitude of one who “experiences sexual pleasure in gazing at, caressing and fondling his body, till complete gratification ensues . . . .” Developed this far, Freud goes on, narcissism is a perversion, but in other cases, he continues, it is rather “the libidinal component to the egoism of the instinct of self-preservation”.

In a key passage Freud takes the polarity Abraham described back to a development origin: “We say that the human being has originally two sexual objects: himself and the woman who tends him, and thereby we postulate a primary narcissism in everyone . . . .” There are two possible choices: narcissistic object choice and an anaclitic object choice. Both options are open to each individual, and some individuals in adulthood, especially those whose libidinal development has been disturbed, such as homosexuals and perverts, love persons who are like themselves rather than like their mother because they really seek themselves as love objects.

Freud goes on to explain how, normally, with maturation the narcissistic libido is turned not on the ego but on the ‘ego ideal’ as introjected from the parents, and conscience is the “special psychical agency which performs the task of seeing that narcissistic satisfaction from the ego ideal is ensured. . . .” So the conflict between instinctual demands and conscience, or between sexual instincts and social demands, or what had previously appeared as a conflict between sexual instincts and ego instincts (self-preservation), is, at root, the conflict between two forms of sensuality: narcissism and object love. From this standpoint Freud rejects vigorously the assumption of Adler that self-assertiveness or the “masculine protest” is not rooted in sexuality, and Jung’s conception of libido as energy not specifically sexual. Also, in the course of his argument, Freud comments that hysterics are over-attached not to the object but to inner fantasies of the object, which, he adds, would be the only legitimate meaning for the word ‘introversion’.

Thus the polarity between self-cathexis and other-cathexis, first generally observed as schizophrenic-hysteric, which Jung restated as introvert–extravert, became for Freud narcissistic–anaclitic, polemically defined so as to invalidate Jung and Adler. As far as the psychoanalytic movement was concerned, that was the end of Jung’s attempt at an integration of Adler’s and Freud’s viewpoints, and also of his terminology of ‘introvert–extravert’.

#### Observations of Adler

Alfred Adler had already commented on this theme. In 1910, in a paper about psychic hermaphroditism,

he had given a surprising importance to the possible consequences of this same polarity, the polarity between emotional investment in (cathexis of) oneself, and emotional investment in the other person, but he expressed himself (typically of Adler) in the simplest possible terms, and referred to childhood rather than infancy. He wrote:

“One can now easily see that the child plays a double role for a while. He shows tendencies of submission to the parents and educators on the one hand, and wishes, fantasies and actions which express his striving for independence, a will of his own, and significance on the other hand. This inner disunion in the child is a prototype and foundation of the most important psychological phenomena, especially neurosis, the splitting of consciousness, and indecision, and may result in a variety of outcomes in later life.” (Adler, 1910)

Around 1910–20, then, there were at least three ways of seeing the polarity. Freud saw it as an erotic choice, between narcissism and object love, with the latter as the mature, normal option. Jung gave self-cathexis an equal value with other-cathexis, and saw self-cathexis, in its normal form, as including cathexis not only of the ego, but also of the individual’s inner world, in effect the creative id or unconscious which is the source of one’s gifts to the other. Adler saw the polarity not only between the self and any particular other, but also as between the self and the group. Like Freud, Adler saw mostly the negative, regressive side of self-cathexis: he saw it as very close to that search for individual superiority and power that destroys social feeling.

After 1914, however, after Freud’s *Narcissism*, any chance of a harmonious programme of research and progressive development of the observation, shared by the different schools of thought, was gone. The divisive tower-of-Babel effect of the different terminologies, and the neglect by each school of the others’ literature, led to some scholastic dogmatic development on the one hand, and naive rediscovery of the phenomenon under new terminology on the other.

#### Observations of Eysenck

Jung developed the observation further along his own lines in the publications cited above. In the Jungian tradition it had remained much as he left it, but it is curious that introversion/extraversion is the only psychodynamic idea to have been taken up by behavioural psychology. From the 1940s, Hans Eysenck developed it, on the basis that some members of a population are more subjective in attitude, more thinking and inhibited, while others are more objective, acting, and impulsive (Eysenck, 1947).

At that time he thought the factor of sociability had more to do with neuroticism than with extraversion (Eysenck, 1947), although later among his associates sociability and impulsiveness seemed to become more important as discriminative factors (Wilson, 1977).

Eysenck and his associates found some useful and interesting things (Eysenck, 1947, 1970, 1976; Wilson, 1977): for example, a normal distribution curve of the two tendencies in the population, and that introversion apparently goes with greater internal or physiological arousal (which corresponds with the finding that in schizophrenia withdrawal is associated with high arousal (Venables & Wing, 1962)). Introverts are commoner in the upper and lower classes, are more socialised, although less sociable (i.e. more conscientious, reliable, adapted), are safer drivers, more likely to be obsessional, avoid rather than seek sensation, suffer more pain when tortured, are less sexually active, will secrete more saliva than extraverts do when lemon juice is dropped on their tongues, and are less likely to be in prison or be unmarried mothers, and so on. Eysenck's theory, however, excluding the unconscious as it did, remained a single-decker one rather than a double-decker like Jung's, in that Eysenck did not expect unconscious compensation for a dominant trend, nor recognise mature and immature forms of each trend. But Eysenck seems to have felt that his and his associates' development of the theme had left Jung far behind, for he wrote, "Psychologists will have to learn the plain historical fact that the personality types of extraversion and introversion owe very little to Jung, and the sooner this message reaches psychological textbooks the better" (Eysenck, 1970).

#### Observations of Horney

Karen Horney was analysed by Abraham in Berlin in 1910, but she was reading Adler about the same time and her developed ideas owe much to him. Like Adler, she saw pathological craving for dishonest substitutes for real self-esteem as central to neurosis. Like him too, she saw that claims to neurotic superiority can be well disguised, for example as a pride in subservience, as well as more blatantly showing in, say, a compulsive need for power. She thought that Freud himself had a blind spot about power, because he was immersed in a competitive power-seeking society which he took to be normal, and that he did not realise, as she put it, that omnipotence, secondary narcissism, and the tyranny of the ego ideal are all expressions of one powerful current, the compensatory search for superiority (Horney, 1951).

Horney "discarded Freud's theory of instincts, and saw the core of human neurosis in human relationship" (Horney, 1951). Psychopathology she saw as morbid exaggeration or diminution (due to the search for superiority) of four simple normal aspects of interaction with others: closeness, distance, domination, and submission (Horney, 1937). (Later, by overlapping closeness and submission, she ended up with three rather than four basic attitudes (Horney, 1951).) Her descriptions of morbid forms of closeness and of distance correspond well to hysterical and schizoid behaviour, and the rich clinical detail she gives of the emotional and behavioural processes involved add greatly to our understanding of these conditions. For example just two of her chapter headings, "The self-effacing solution: the appeal of love" and "Resignation: the appeal of freedom" (Horney, 1951), refer to very useful additional observations: the morbidly dependent person idealises 'love', and sees self-effacement as a virtue, while the morbidly independent person idealises freedom and cultivates resignation - 'doing without' becomes a virtue. Whichever is over-cultivated, the personality will show only uncultivated, inferior, and troublesome forms of the other.

Like Jung, Horney expected cure to include the development and integration of the neglected trend or trends.

#### Observations of Fairbairn

W. Ronald D. Fairbairn (1952) described a group of individuals as 'schizoid', who were characterised by: "1. an attitude of omnipotence, 2. an attitude of isolation and detachment, and 3. a preoccupation with inner reality." He commented that the concept "corresponds remarkably closely . . . to the concept of the 'Introvert' type as formulated by Jung . . .," but after weighing the advantages of the two words, 'introvert' and 'schizoid', he settled for 'schizoid'. Then, as he developed his observations of the splitting of the ego, he thought he saw hysterics split in the same way as schizoids, and so could not regard their pathology as any kind of opposite. Nevertheless, his observations (which there is not room to summarise here) add much to our knowledge of pathological self-cathexis.

#### Observations of Balint

In *Thrills and Regressions*, Michael Balint (1959) opened with a wonderful clinical description of two contrasting patients. Balint refused to *define* the difference between them, asking the reader to let the

vignette portraits themselves stand as the basic reference points for his book. Also he said that the two contrasting pictures are not merely opposites.

The two patients are clearly recognisable as respectively hysteric/extravert/anaclitic, or other-cathecting, and schizoid/introvert/narcissistic, or self-cathecting, but Balint used none of these terms. Instead he coined new terms 'ocnophil' and 'philobat' for the two attitudes. The ocnophil shows an absolute demand for the object, and cannot live without objects. The philobat loves to move unhampered and free in the friendly open spaces between objects, looking out for objects as dangerous, and developing expertise in managing and disarming them.

Both are ambivalent: the ocnophil, as well as loving the object, feels humiliated by needing him and resents him, and is always mistrustful, critical and suspicious, while the philobat, although he treats his objects very well to avoid trouble, is always, whether it shows or not, superior and condescending. Balint recognised that the extremes of each are regressive, longing to go back to a heavenly infant state of primary love, before the infant noticed with distress that he and the mother are separate beings. At that point of crisis the ocnophil tries to cancel the separateness by panicky clinging (which, tragically, interferes with being held, which is what the ocnophil really wants), while the philobat tries to do it by developing an exaggerated self-sufficiency, and great skill in reducing conflict with the object (and tragically, therefore, real interaction) to an absolute minimum, to give a kind of illusion of primary harmony.

In analysis Balint aimed to enable his regressed patients to make a new, less panicky, beginning out of a state of something like primary love with the analyst, developing into a separateness combining better, less regressive forms of *both* modes of interacting, philobat and ocnophil.

#### Observations of Kohut

With Heinz Kohut, much of the rejected contribution of Adler was reinstated but articulated in Freudian vocabulary. Kohut observed what Adler and Horney had observed: the enormous force of the 'powerful current' (Horney) towards superiority, power, self-worth, personal significance (Adler), and the need for respect. Like Horney, Kohut also thought Freud had a blind spot about power, and repeatedly commented on the exchange between Freud and Binswanger in which Binswanger remarked on Freud's own enormous will to power, and Freud replied that he might well have such a will of which he was unaware, as one can be unaware of the core of one's own ego (Kohut, 1966, 1971).

Kohut was an orthodox-enough Freudian to refer to such regressive self-cathexis simply as 'narcissism'. To use that word might imply belief in a sensual root of the need for a sense of worth or superiority, but in practice Kohut treated it like a primary need in its own right. Like Horney, he realised that its inferior forms should be cultivated, not discouraged. He pointed out that the word had become nearly a term of abuse among psychoanalysts, and he showed that if narcissism in any of its immature forms, in a grandiose exhibitionistic form for example, is treated as a phenomenon appropriate to early childhood and accepted by the analyst, indeed if the analyst responds to and *fosters* it into normal self-esteem the way a mother would do with her child, the patient responds well (Kohut, 1971).

But Kohut was also very impressed by his observation that there are what look like two opposite kinds of narcissism, two opposite ways in which the small child attempts to preserve an original perfect state of feeling completely good: in one the child idealises the object and derives self-esteem from it, and in the other he idealises himself. In the first, the child "attempts to save the original narcissism by giving it over to a narcissistically experienced omnipotent and perfect self-object." The motto here is 'You are perfect, but I am part of you'. In the other, "the child attempts to save the originally all-embracing narcissism by concentrating perfection and power upon the self – here called the grandiose self – and by turning away disdainfully from an outside to which all imperfections have been assigned." The motto here is 'I am perfect'. Kohut referred to these attitudes as "the two basic psychological functions" of "the bipolar self".

In the language of the others above, the first of these alternatives (idealising and depending so much on an object, for whatever reason) would be hysterical/extravert/anaclitic/morbidly dependent/ocnophil, rather than schizoid/introvert/narcissistic, etc., and it is confusing to hear Kohut describe such a strong, dependent object-cathexis as 'narcissistic'. It may be that here Kohut inherits an intellectual confusion introduced in 1914 by Freud's polemical need at that time to find the root of conscience by hook or by crook in the erotic instinct, and this makes it harder for Kohut to describe clearly the subtle manipulations of one drive by another. (That is an important theme but outside the scope of this paper.) Limited in his available vocabulary, Kohut used the word 'narcissism' for two opposite forms of the need for worth, rather obscuring certain differences.

Kohut went very far in his 'rehabilitation' of narcissism. For him narcissism is the source of

man's highest achievements: creativity, humour, ability to empathise, the capacity to contemplate one's own finiteness; and even ultimate wisdom – "a participation in a supraindividual and timeless existence" – is achieved "on the strength of a new, expanded, transformed narcissism: a cosmic narcissism which has transcended the bounds of the individual" (Kohut, 1966). So the word that came into psychotherapeutic jargon in 1899 meaning sensually caressing and loving one's own body, extended by Freud in 1914 to subsume the activities of conscience, by 1966 has reached out to embrace the galaxies. But ludicrous as Kohut's phrase "cosmic narcissism" might sound to the ordinary English-speaker, he is striving to describe a real experience (similar to that covered by Jung's 'introversion'), in the only words left available after an intellectual amputation of cultural roots in a struggle for intellectual freedom, which of course characterised not only the psychoanalytic movement but also other modern movements.

#### Observations of Mahler and others

It is remarkable what an exact corroboration the observations made of infants and very small children by Margaret Mahler and others have provided for Balint's deductions made from observations of regressed adult patients. These observers intimately and vividly describe the hazards of negotiating the gradual separation out of an original identity and then symbiosis with the mother into psychological independence and autonomy, and show how failure in this process may tend towards contrasting extreme forms of 'empty clinging' – a fusion and lack of differentiation between self and other – on the one hand, and on the other a cold, autistic detachment or premature independence (Tustin, 1972; Mahler *et al*, 1975). The stage, which Mahler describes as 'symbiosis', corresponds well to Balint's 'primary love'. Describing a healthy state of affairs at this very early stage (four or five months) she uses words reminiscent of Jung's 'systole and diastole' of introversion and extraversion:

"One would expect that when inner pleasure, due to safe anchorage within the symbiotic orbit . . . continues and pleasure in the maturationally increasing outer sensory perception . . . stimulates outward-directed attention cathexis, these two forms of attention cathexis can oscillate freely . . . ." (Mahler *et al*, 1975)

Mahler describes how out of such a healthy state of symbiosis the infant can develop into what she terms the "separation-individuation" phase. She sees separation and individuation as two intertwined

developmental tracks which do not necessarily progress in harmony or at the same pace.

Although for purposes of definition she describes 'separation' as a kind of disengagement from the mother, the moving and fascinating descriptions she and her coworkers give of small children negotiating these tracks show clearly how the child is not losing contact with the mother or 'separating' in the ordinary descriptive sense (as losing the mother by death or hospital admission, etc.), but changing the nature of the bonds with her, making them more flexible and versatile, able to reach the mother across increasing distances of time and space, and actually becoming more related to her in an active, conscious way (using speech and ideas more for example) rather than less related. So the successful child manages to combine the two tracks: the need for autonomy and freedom of Balint's philobats, and the need for object-relatedness of his ocnophils: self-cathexis harmonising with other-cathexis. For Mahler, the end achievement of the separation-individuation phase is correspondingly twofold: the achievement of a definite individuality, and the achievement of object constancy (Mahler *et al*, 1975). This needs to be worked at by both mother and child, and Mahler's and others' infant observations show much more than previous writers the part played by the mother in influencing clinging or withdrawal behaviour, and how the outcome results from mutual interaction.

#### Discussion

I have shown how work on a valuable observation was fragmented by the intellectual and personal conflicts in the history of psychotherapy, and how the same observation was repeatedly reported using different vocabularies. It is easy to put the fragments together again; superimposing the above versions of the observation shows how much common ground they share. The common ground, with compatible individual additions, may be briefly recapitulated thus:

(a) Self-cathexis and other-cathexis are distinguishable activities which ideally ought to flourish in balance and harmony, but often do not (Abraham, Jung, Adler, Freud, Horney, Balint, Kohut, Mahler). Whether one gets both of them well cultivated and well married or not depends on early interaction with the mother, as one separates and individuates out of original unity or symbiosis with her (Freud, Balint, Kohut, Mahler). The earliest and worst failure of this separating/individuating process (and one of the most instructive for psychotherapists) appears in

infantile autism (Tustin), and failures at later stages appear in other pathologies (Freud, Balint, Kohut, Mahler). To succeed in this aspect of development, one needs to retain and indeed deepen capacity for intimacy and relatedness, while developing autonomy and independence (Balint, Mahler). As well as cuddles and food and warmth, the child needs esteem and worth, and has to negotiate a reasonable harmony between the high opinion of himself that comes from within (through self-cathecting trends), and value derived from the mother and others (through other-cathecting trends) (Kohut). If it goes badly, and the infant or small child loses some confidence in the mother and in life, he may panic and trust too exclusively to one of these two modes of relating to others – self-cathexis or other-cathexis (Balint).

(b) The preferred mode then will have a less than optimal form, narrow and somewhat immature, although it may be more or less successful (even in some way very successful) (Jung, Horney, Balint). The other-cathecter (hysteric, extravert, anaclitic lover, ocnophil, etc.) will seek dependently to derive warmth and worth from close bonds with the other, disowning or even dissociating (repressing) any part of his personality, or anything arising from the inner world (impulses, thoughts, emotions) that would alienate the other, but generally over cultivating emotions because they are the links to the other, and preferring warmth to worth. The self-cathecter (schizoid, introvert, narcissist, philobat, etc.) will depend mostly on himself for warmth and worth, generating a sense of superiority from within, keeping the other at an emotional distance by calculated kindness or false submissiveness or domination or careful non-stimulation, relatively well aware of all stirrings in his own inner world (impulses, thoughts, emotions), but tending to hoard rather than discharge them, and playing down emotions because they could involve him with the dangerous other. He will be more ready to sacrifice warmth for the sake of worth. (Abraham, Jung, Adler, Freud, Horney, Balint.)

(c) Whichever mode one prefers, the other is neglected, and the neglected mode will be more unconscious, and even more infantile and unadapted than the preferred mode. Thus the ostensible other-cathecter will consciously dread loneliness but be unconsciously like an emotionally isolated infant, while the self-cathecter will dread fusion but unconsciously be abnormally liable to emotional infection and loss of identity to those around him, in an infantile way. (Jung, Horney, Balint.)

(d) The therapist as substitute parental family fosters maturation of the infantile aspects of both modes, especially the more rejected, and arranges a harmonious marriage between them (Jung, Horney, Balint).

If this is true, and such a consensus among conflicting authorities surely deserves to be re-tested and reassessed, it looks as though many of our troubles arise because life has opted not to exist as some enormous monad but as discrete individuals who have to separate one from another, by the division of cells and all that that entails, and then relate to each other, in families and groups. It is the learning to be separate and individual yet related, to harmonise the needs of one's unfolding individuality with the needs of one's group, to combine deep sensual bonding with emotional and spiritual freedom, cultivate friendship that can contain radical differences of vision, be "sincere and tactful" (Tustin, 1986), and so on, through the endless forms of this great essential conflict, that is so difficult.

The potential value of this skeleton key to human psychology and psychopathology and therapy appears more if one always asks the question: what is this person doing with his self-cathexis and what with his other-cathexis? How is he satisfying these twin needs, and are they acting in harmony or in conflict? The pattern mostly described by the above writers, of obvious one sidedness, is not all that common. (Although, incidentally, it does seem to settle the question of what 'hysteria' really is – all the features ever ascribed to hysteria, as neurosis or conversion symptoms or histrionic personality, are the expressions or panicky infantile other-cathexis.) More often one finds more complex states, like for example an anorexic who is defending against an infantile other-cathexis – a longing for fusion – by using an equally infantile self-cathexis – a merely negativistic anti-mother or antifamily pseudo-independence expressed by not eating. Another example might be an obsessional person, whose immature, anxious self-cathexis, in order to avoid frank conflict with others, makes him spin off into a futile repetitive internal conflict, while his regressive, sadistic other-cathexis uses his obsessions to make life miserable for his family, unconsciously feeding on their distress. Then there are mosaic chaotic states more complex still, as in borderline personality. But it does seem to bring clarity to many a diagnostic and psychopathological puzzle to ask this question.

So much for the area of overlap between the different observations, translated out of their different terminologies into one. There is not space to go into all the advantages of bringing together the

areas of observation of the above writers which do *not* overlap, but I shall offer one example, of two of them who are strikingly complementary, Jung and Balint.

Balint (1959) explicitly states that his study concentrates on the attitudes of philobats and ocnophils to the outer world of objects, and that he says almost nothing about their respective attitudes to their inner worlds.

Jung is exactly the opposite: nearly all his material is about the encounters of introversion with the phenomena of the inner world (especially the archetypes and collective unconscious). His case histories usually omit the external life of the patients, and even his autobiography is all about his inner life, with a frustrating lack of information about his encounters with external reality.

Balint's attitude to the inner world was by contrast reticent and cautious, as appeared for example in his comments on creativity (Balint, 1968). In creativity, as Balint saw it, the subject produces something out of himself, with no external object present. "We know that there are no 'objects' in the area of creation, but we also know that for most – or some – of the time the subject is not entirely alone there. The trouble is that our language has no words to describe, or even to indicate, the 'somethings' that are there when the subject is not completely alone . . . ." Jung wrote 18 volumes, some of them very thick too, largely about these 'somethings', on the basis that all human languages are very rich indeed in words to describe them, in particular the words of religion and mythology, and art. So it is a clear and simple gain to add Jung's knowledge of the adventures of the philobat (or of any balanced individual employing his well cultivated philobatism) in his inner world, to Balint's knowledge of how both introvert and extravert deal with their outer worlds.

However, the consensus on self-cathexis and other-cathexis says nothing about selfishness and altruism (although some current usage of the word 'narcissism' tends to confuse this).

The overcultivation of either self- or other-cathexis in any person is more immediately obvious to the observer than his concomitant neglect of the other mode, and maybe the words we use should emphasise the correct psychodynamic understanding. For example, if (as I would suggest myself) the psychopathology involved is always some form of learned avoidance of the risks of whole love, then the words should reflect this, and the hysterical group of reactions should be described as something like 'autonomy fearing', and the schizoid group as 'relatedness fearing', but these are unwieldy words. The conflicts in the history of psychiatry and

psychotherapy have left a problem of terminology: none of the vocabulary previously used in this area is really satisfactory. Abraham's terms refer too narrowly to pathology. Jung's term 'introversion' suggests only one aspect of self-cathexis. Freud's terms are too tendentious. Balint's just have not caught on. Horney's may be the best so far, but they have not gathered the richness of connotation of all the others. It may be that in this and other areas of psychotherapy, vocabulary will gradually improve, as psychiatry continues gradually to reclaim psychotherapy from ideological influences.

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