Japan Embraces Internationalism: Explaining Japanese Security Policy Expansion through an Identity-Regime Approach

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Abstract

The paper examines the domestic politics explanations to Japanese security policy expansion between the Cold War and post-Cold War periods. In response to the various explanations offered in the literature, such as the implementation of administrative and institutional reforms since 1994 that resulted in the centralization of the decision-making process, changes to the balance of power of political parties within the Japanese political system, and shift in the type of politicians that dominate the LDP, opposition parties and security policymaking structure, this paper argues that it is important to incorporate collective identity into understanding Japanese security policy expansion. Two reasons highlight the importance of collective identity – first, without collective identity, it is difficult to understand the type of security policy produced as the discussion of vision is omitted; and, second, collective identity reveals the organizational make-up of the security policymaking structure that is responsible for the formulation of security policy. To explicate the collective identity–institution relationship, this paper focuses on Japanese security identity and the Japanese security policymaking regime in the Cold War and post-Cold War periods. Two security identities for Japan are examined – the peace-state and international-state; and three elements of the regime are studied – the agents involved or marginalized in the security policymaking process, the decision-making structure of the security policymaking, and the role of the US. This paper aids in our understanding of how collective identities are sustained and supported within an institution, and how Japanese security policy expanded in the post-Cold War period.

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Introduction

One of the major developments in the East Asia strategic environment has been Japan's incremental security policy expansion between the Cold War and post-Cold War periods. During the Cold War, Japan employed a minimalist security policy, which entailed a dominant focus on economics and a limited involvement in external military-strategic affairs. In the post-Cold War period, Japan took significant strides to revise its minimalist policy through measures within and outside the US–Japan alliance. Some measures outside of the US–Japan alliance include the incorporation of humanitarian and disaster relief duties, including peacekeeping, into the mandate of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF) and Japan's contribution to the international antipiracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden through the deployment of Japan's Maritime SDF destroyers off the coast of Somalia to guard vessels from Japan and other countries. Within the US–Japan alliance, the government formalized an expanded role for the SDF within the alliance from the traditional policy of only using the military for self-defense to one that seeks to contribute to the maintenance of regional and international peace, even to the resolution of regional and global crises. This development led to the strengthening of bilateral defense cooperation and deepened interoperability of the militaries of the US and Japan, underscoring the central importance of the alliance to Japanese security policy.

To illustrate the significant shift in Japanese security policy, this paper focuses on the domestic politics explanations, particularly on the institutional structure responsible for Japanese security policy implementation. This focus is not new, as many published works have relied on institutionalism and realism frameworks. For the institutionalism-based works, the centralization of the decision-making process following the implementation of the administrative and institutional reforms since 1994 is an important contributing factor. Moreover, the accession of individuals, such as the charismatic former Prime Minister Koizumi Junichirō, was also critical as he took advantage of the centralized decision-making process to implement an activist security policy, especially during the US-led global war on terrorism, which saw the SDF involved in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).[1] Along with administrative and institutional reforms, the realism-based works highlight key changes to the Japanese political structure, including changes to the balance of power of Japanese political parties, the changing role of the LDP, and the shift in the type of politicians that dominate the LDP, opposition and security policymaking structure.[2]

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[1] Shinoda T. (2006), 'Japan's top-down policy process to dispatch the SDF to Iraq', *Japanese Journal of Political Science*, 7(1): 71–91; Shinoda T. (2007), *Koizumi Diplomacy: Japan's Kantei Approach to Foreign and Defence Affairs*, Seattle: University of Washington Press; T. Shinoda (2013), *Contemporary Japanese Politics: Institutional Change and Power Shifts*, New York: Columbia University Press; Krauss E.S. and Nyblade B. (2005), '"Presidentialization" in Japan? The prime minister, media and election in Japan', *British Journal of Political Science*, 35: 357–68; Pekkanen R. and Krauss E.S. (2005), 'Japan's 'Coalition of the Willing' on security policies', *Orbis*, 49(3): 429–44.

[2] Green M. J. (2003), *Japan's Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power*, New York: Palgrave and Council on Foreign Relations; Hughes C.W. (2004), *Japan Re-emergence as a*

These explanations however only tell part of the story. Though strong in showing changes to the inner workings of the policymaking process, these explanations have two main weaknesses. First, these works fail to elucidate what kind of policy is produced as they do not underscore the importance of the vision entrenched in the security policymaking structure.[3] Second, these analyses are unable to explain the contents of the institutional structure, assuming that the contents of the institutional structure are random, especially in terms of the elements involved and how they are organized within the policymaking structure responsible for the production of security policy.

This paper argues for the incorporation of the ideational, in this case, collective identity, into the institutional analyses. The incorporation of collective identity into the analysis overcomes the weaknesses highlighted above in two ways. First, it reveals the dominant vision that is entrenched in the institutional structure that informs why a certain type of policy is produced and re-produced. Second, the focus on collective identity resolves the false assumption that the type of actors involved, and how they are organized within the security policymaking structure, is a random process. Instead, the embedded collective identity reveals the make-up (or elements) of the institutional or organizational design and the manner in which both are organized within the institutional structure. The collective identity and organizational/institutional design have a mutually constitutive relationship that results in a normative framework (also referred to as collectively held ideas),[4] which directly shapes the outcome of a state's security policy. Any change in the dominant collective identity will result in a restructuring of the make-up of the institutional/organizational design. The point here is that a synthesized identity–institution analysis offers a more complete explanation to understand Japanese security policy expansion from a domestic politics perspective.

To explain the collective identity–institution relationship, this paper focuses on the security identity–security policymaking regime relationship in Japan, studying the peace-state and international-state security identities. The peace-state identity formed the basis of Japan's minimalist security policy during the Cold War, which was defined by self-defense objectives and the avoidance of any engagement with external affairs in military-strategic terms. The international-state identity formed the basis of an activist security policy during the post-Cold War that resulted in the expansion of the SDF's missions both within and outside of the US–Japan alliance to address key security challenges and contribute to global peace and stability. The institutional element focused on here is the security policymaking regime. Three core elements of

'*Normal' Military Power*, Oxford: Oxford University Press for International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS); Hughes C.W. (2009), *Japan's Remilitarisation*, Abingdon: Routledge for International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS); Samuels R.J. (2007), *Securing Japan: Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

3 Lieberman R.C. (2002), 'Ideas, institutions, and political order: explaining political change', *American Political Science Review*, 96(4): 697.

4 Legro J.W. (2009), 'The plasticity of identity under anarchy', *European Journal of International Relations*, 15(1): 37–65.

the regime are highlighted – the agents/actors involved or marginalized in the security policymaking process, the decision-making process that produces security policy, and the role of the US. The actors involved are responsible for the vision (and related interests) for Japan's security policy practice. The decision-making process reveals the arrangement that facilitates the realization of the vision supported by the dominant actors. Any analysis on Japanese security policy requires the incorporation of the US factor. The US element is analyzed based on whether there was high or low pressure on the Japanese security policymaking elite to pursue an activist security policy – the preferred policy for the US.

The paper's contribution lies in two main areas. First, this paper adds collective identity to complement a long range of other ideational variables that have been utilized within the institutional analyses to study Japanese security policy behavior, such as 'symbolic boundaries and images', social and legal norms, political culture and ideology.[5] It is the contention of the paper that the incorporation of collective identity is particularly important because it reveals the dominant vision entrenched in the institutional structure that informs why a state pursues a certain type of policy. Even though others, such as Oros, have utilized collective identity to the understanding of Japanese security policy practice, none of them has analyzed its impact on the security policymaking regime.[6] Second, the paper contributes to the understanding on how collective identities are embedded or supported within an institution. Instead of showing how collective identity causes change in a state's security policy, this paper has a more modest objective, that is, to show how collective identity is embedded in the institutional structure. This is important because it reveals the make-up (or elements) of the institutional or organizational design and the manner in which they are organized within the institutional structure, as discussed above. Also, this is a first-order concern, along with other similar concerns, such as the contents of a collective identity and its usefulness in shaping state action.[7] Only after grasping how a collective identity is embedded in an institutional context, can other effects of collective identity, such as identity change[8] or its influence on interests,[9] be further investigated.

5 For 'symbolic boundaries and images', see Chai S.-K. (1997), 'Entrenching the Yoshida defence doctrine: three techniques for institutionalization', *International Organization*, 51(3): 389–412; for social and legal norms, see Katzenstein P.J. and Okawara N. (1993), 'Japan's national security: structures, norms and policies', *International Security*, 17(4): 265–99; for political culture, see Berger T.U. (1998), *Cultures of Anti-militarism: National Security in Germany and Japan*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 1998; and for ideology, see Babb J. (2013), 'The new generation of conservatives politicians', *Japanese Journal of Political Science*, 14(3): 355–78.

6 Oros A.L. (2008), *Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity, and the Evolution of Security Practice*, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press and NUS Press.

7 Abdelal R., Herrera Y.M., Johnston A.I., and McDermott R. (2006), 'Identity as a variable', *Perspectives on Politics*, 4(4): 695–711.

8 Legro, 'The plasticity of identity under anarchy'.

9 Banchoff T. (1999), 'German identity and European integration', *European Journal of International Relations*, 5(3): 259–89; Wendt A. (1992), 'Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics', *International Organisation*, 46(2): 391–425; Wendt A. (1994), 'Collective identity formation and the international state', *American Political Science Review*, 88(2): 384–96.

This article is divided into three sections. The first section provides a detailed discussion on the notion of security identity, along with introducing the peace-state and international-state security identities; the security policymaking regime and the elements that make-up the regime relevant to the argument here; the security identity–regime interaction. The second section discusses how the identity–regime interaction supporting the peace-state security identity during the Cold War produced Japan's minimalist security policy. The final section discusses the identity–regime interaction supporting the international-state security identity during the post-Cold War that resulted in the implementation of an activist security policy for Japan. The analysis of this paper is confined to the period from the onset of the post-war period to the end of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)'s political rule in August 2009 following its electoral defeat to the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). This period represents the LDP's dominant tenure of the Japanese political system (1955–2009), with the exception of ten months during 1993–4 and illustrates clearly the contrasting Japanese security policy practices. The changes witnessed during this period set the stage for the subsequent DPJ (2009–12) and Abe (2012–) governments to further reinforce practices that support Japan's international-state security identity – a point discussed in the conclusion.

Security identity–regime interaction

This section discusses in detail the notions of security identity and the security policymaking regime, and how they interact.

Security identity

Collective identity is widely accepted as a core variable in the analysis of states' foreign and security policy.[10] As Goldstein and Keohane wrote, "[t]he key issue ... is not whether identities matter but *how* they matter, and how their effects can be systematically studied by social scientists".[11] The paper focuses on a specific facet of national identity – security identity. Though integrally linked to other domains of national identity, it is possible to analyze security identity independently in conceptual and empirical terms, as states possess specific role conceptions that shape security behavior and determine the outcome of security policy.[12] Security identity, according to Oros, refers to collectively held principles that determine a state's policy in the domain

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[10] Abdelal *et al.*, 'Identity as a variable'; Chafetz G., Spirtas M., and Frankel B. (1998/9), 'Introduction: tracing the influence of identity on foreign policy', *Security Studies*, 8(2/3): vii–xxii; P. J. Katzenstein (ed.) (1996), *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, New York: Columbia University Press; Legro, 'The plasticity of identity under anarchy'; Smith R.M. (2004), 'Identities, interests, and the future of political science', *Perspectives on Politics*, 2(2): 301–12.

[11] Goldstein J. and Keohane R.O. (1993), 'Ideas and foreign policy: an analytical framework', in J. Goldstein and R.O. Keohane (eds.), *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, p. 6 (italics from original).

[12] Oros, *Normalizing Japan*; Singh B. (2013), *Japan's Security Identity: From a Peace State to an International State*, Abingdon and New York: Routledge.

of security affairs. These principles shape actions and decisions of the policymaking elite and other major actors in both state and society that are responsible for the formulation of the state's security policy.[13] These principles define the overarching normative framework that shapes the outcome of a state's security policy implemented to achieve its security interests.[14] The security identity becomes dominant in shaping the state's security policy only when the majority of actors within the state and society perceive it to be legitimate, and embrace it.[15]

This article focuses on two sets of security identities that have largely dominated Japanese security discourse – peace-state identity during the Cold War and international-state identity during the post-Cold War period.[16] Both identities have overlapping interests and preferences.[17] For example, Japan's peace-state and international-state security identities have the concept of peace at their core, and stress the importance of the UN and the US in Japan's security policy. However, a clear distinction is made here for analytical and methodological reasons. First, both peace-state and international-state security identities have particular definitions that result in different security policy behavior. For example, the means towards achieving peace differs for both identities. While the peace-state conception stresses the use of economics, the international-state identity involves achieving peace by the use of the SDF. Moreover, each of the identities is a product of a separate institutional context that supports a specific security policy for Japan. Second, the distinction between the two identities is made for methodological reasons to highlight the significant change in Japan's security policy between the Cold War and the post-Cold War periods. Japan's security policy is undergoing a change that has consequently altered the nature of security policy. This significant change is best shown when the two categories of identities are treated separately. The origins and meanings of the two identities are discussed as follows:

Peace-state identity

The origins of the peace-state identity lie in Japan's World War II defeat and the American occupation of Japan thereafter (1945–52). Led by General Douglas MacArthur, the Occupation authorities imposed a series of reforms aimed at democratizing and demilitarizing Japan.[18] One of the most significant reforms was Japan's adoption of

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[13] Oros, *Normalizing Japan*, 9.

[14] Oros, *Normalizing Japan*, 9.

[15] Oros, *Normalizing Japan*, 9–10; Bukovansky M. (2002), *Legitimacy and Power Politics: The American and French Revolutions in International Political Culture*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

[16] For an extensive discussion on both identities, see Singh, *Japan's Security Identity*, 52–67.

[17] For a good example of how Japan's peace-based and international objectives overlap in the context of peace-building diplomacy, see Lam P. E. (2009), *Japan's Peace-building Diplomacy in Asia: Seeking a More Active Political Role*, New York and London: Routledge.

[18] See Dower J.W. (1999), *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Aftermath of World War II*, London: Allen Lane 1999; Welfield J. (1988), *An Empire in Eclipse: Japan in the Postwar American Alliance System – A Study in the Interaction of Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy*, London: Athlone Press.

the Peace Constitution or Article 9.[19] It imposed a legal restriction on the use of force as a tool in Japan's security policy and the maintenance of a war potential. Though controversial, Japanese state and society embraced Article 9. It became the embodiment of the peace discourse in Japan. Attempts by the US to reverse the demilitarization process were either rejected or accepted only within the constraints of the peace-state identity. The position was defended based on Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru's vision of reconstructing Japan as a merchant nation (*shōnin kokka*), in which all efforts were concentrated on achieving the main goal of economic resuscitation and development, while maintaining a low profile in military-strategic affairs. This strategy came to be known as the Yoshida Doctrine and it formed the foundation of the peace-state security identity.

Despite challenges from those who opposed the *shōnin kokka* vision in the 1950s, the peace-state identity dominated Japan's national security discourse from the 1960s. This was due to the mishandling of US–Japan Security Treaty Revision Crisis by the anti-Yoshida politicians (led by the revisionist Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke) and the success of Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato's (Kishi's successor and pro-Yoshida politician) announcement of income doubling, which set Japan on the path of high-speed economic growth.[20] Though Yoshida was not convinced about its long-term appropriateness, the peace-state identity, nevertheless, became the main conception that shaped Japan's security policy practice. In fact, most Japanese prime ministers (with the exception of Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro (1982–7)) not only grounded Japan's security policy in this strategy but pursued the institutionalization of social and legal measures that supported a low-profile security role even though Japan was internationalized in other areas, such as economics, finance, technology, and investment.[21]

International-state identity

The notion of constructing Japan as an international-state is not a post-Cold War phenomenon but a continuation of a process that began in the late 1970s when efforts were made to incorporate a new sense of internationalism into Japan's national purpose. Although Ōhira Masayoshi (1978–80) initiated the process in the area of Japanese foreign and security policy, it was Nakasone who adopted the bold initiatives that set Japan on the course of distancing itself from the Yoshida Doctrine and its related peace-state identity. Nakasone saw the world as being at a crossroads and was concerned

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[19] The peace clause of the Constitution, Article 9, reads as follows: 'Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputesIn order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.'

[20] See Samuels, *Securing Japan*, 34–6.

[21] Katzenstein, and Okawara, 'Japan's national security'. For Japan's internationalization in areas other than security, see Hook G.D. and Weiner M. (eds.) (1992), *Internationalization of Japan*, London and New York: Routledge.

with how Japan could play a part in shaping international politics over the next several decades.[22] Not only did he share the view that Japan's future was dependent on the international community but Nakasone declared that the future of the international community depended on Japan as well.[23] Nakasone introduced his 'grand design' to transform Japan into an international-state (*kokusai kokka*), which entailed, amongst other dimensions, Japan's assumption of an active role in global military-strategic affairs.[24]

Nakasone pushed for Japan to accept greater responsibility in confronting the communist threat from the Soviet Union through greater integration into the US military strategy. Some policies included: (a) the approval to transfer military technology to the US that was announced during Nakasone's meeting with President Ronald Reagan in January 1983 in Washington – a clear departure from the 1967 restrictions on arms exports; (b) the announcement of Japan's willingness to contribute to patrolling the Sea of Japan to monitor Soviet submarines and other naval activities during an emergency – a reversal of Japan's previous inactive security posture within the US containment strategy; and (c) the show of bold support during the Group of Seven (G7) meeting in Williamsburg in May 1983 for the US decision to confront the Soviet installation of SS-20 nuclear missiles in Europe and Asia – a clear declaration of Japan's alignment with the West. At home, Nakasone challenged long-held taboos owing to the peace-state identity that came in the form of attempts to break the 1% limitation on defense spending and publicly talking about a constitutional revision of Article 9.[25]

Though successful in triggering a public debate, Nakasone was unable to challenge the dominant role of the peace-state identity. The transformation of Japan's security identity from a peace-state to an international-state only gained momentum in the post-Cold War period.[26] The shift in the international material and normative structures following the end of the Cold War compelled Japanese policymakers to review Japan's

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[22] Edström B. (1999), *Japan's Evolving Foreign Policy Doctrine: From Yoshida to Miyazawa*, London: Macmillan Press, p. 120.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Pyle K.E. (1992), *The Japanese Question: Power and Purpose in a New Era*, Washington, DC: AEI Press, p. 89; Pyle K.E. (1987), 'In pursuit of a grand design: Nakasone betwixt the past and the future', *Journal of Japanese Studies*, 13:2, 254–68.

[25] Pyle K.E. (2007), *Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose*, New York: Public Affairs (A Century Foundation Book).; Pyle, 'In pursuit of a grand design', 266–8.

[26] Many competing identities emerged for Japan in the post-Cold War period, such as 'global civilian power', 'normal' state and 'ordinary' state. However, the international-state term is preferred as it corresponds to Japan's official security discourse that frequently expressed the need for Japan to adopt international responsibilities in the areas of economics and military-strategic affairs. See Maull H. (1990), 'The new civilian powers: Germany and Japan', *Foreign Affairs*, 69(5): 91–106; Funabashi Y. (1991/92), 'Japan and the New World Order', *Foreign Affairs*, 70(5): 58–74; Hughes, *Japan Re-emergence as a 'Normal' Military Power*; Ozawa I. (1994), *Blueprint for a New Japan: The Rethinking of a Nation*, Tokyo: Kodansha International; and Inoguchi T. and Bacon P. (2006), 'Japan's emerging role as a global ordinary power', *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, 6(1): 1–21.

minimalist role in external security affairs. The transformation of the security identity away from peace-state to international-state was signaled by the proactive participation of Japan in international missions in areas such as humanitarian and disaster relief duties, including peacekeeping, the anti-piracy campaign off the coast of Somalia, the US-led war on terror, and the widening of responsibilities within the US–Japan alliance.

Security policymaking regime

While the institutionalization of collective identity has been widely studied in various institutional contexts, such as regional organizations,[27] domestic foreign policymaking structures[28] and security communities[29] , this article focuses on another type of institution – the security policymaking regime. This refers to the range of critical elements that make up the state's security policymaking process such as the institutional structure (ministries and agencies), actors involved and marginalized (politicians, bureaucrats, academics, and others), political processes, laws, rules and embedded norms, the decision-making structure (consisting of both formal and informal procedures), public opinion and external factors (such as, influence from allies and partners, threat perceptions, international and regional institutions, international and regional norms, and major events in the strategic environment among several other factors). The regime here is however analyzed in terms of its composition, that is identifying the dominant elements, and its organization, that is how elements are organized.

Three elements of the Japanese security policymaking regime are studied. The first relates to the actors or agents who are involved or marginalized in the security policymaking process. The question here is who is in and who is out; and, in turn, whose interests are incorporated (and become dominant) and whose are excluded.[30] The 'in' agents are those who control the policymaking process by influencing which vision/interests are met. The 'out' actors belong to the marginalized group whose vision/interests are excluded from influencing the policy outcome. In the case of Japan, the important agents that make up the security policymaking elite during both the Cold War and post-Cold War periods loosely comprise the Prime Minister, officials from the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) and Cabinet Secretariat, the Chief Cabinet Secretaries

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[27] Acharya A. (1997), 'Ideas, identity, and institution-building: from the "ASEAN way" to the "Asia-Pacific Way"', *The Pacific Review*, 10(3): 319–46; Risse-Kappen, T. (1996), 'Collective identity in a democratic community: the case of NATO', in Katzenstein (ed.), *The Culture of National Security*, 357–99.

[28] Barnett M. (1999), 'Culture, strategy and foreign policy change: Israel's road to Oslo', *European Journal of International Relations*, 5(1): 5–36; Berger, T.U. (1996), 'Norms, identity and national security in Germany and Japan', in Katzenstein (ed.) *The Culture of National Security*, pp. 317–56; Herman, R.G. (1996), 'Identity, norms, and national security: the Soviet foreign policy revolution and the end of the Cold War', in Katzenstein (ed.) *The Culture of National Security*, pp. 271–316; Hopf T. (2002), *Social Construction of International Politics: Identities and Foreign Policies, Moscow, 1955 and 1999*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

[29] Adler E. and Barnett M. (1998), *Security Communities*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Mattern J. B. (2001), 'The power politics of identity', *European Journal of International Relations*, 7(3): 349–97.

[30] Barnett, 'Culture, strategy and foreign policy change', 16.

and their deputies, the ministers and other high-ranking political appointees, and bureaucrats from various ministries, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), Japan Defense Agency (JDA) or Ministry of Defense (MOD) since January 2007, Ministry of Finance (MOF), Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), or Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) since 2001, and selected members of the ruling LDP, opposition parties (such as the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) or Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ), and Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ)), and academia in Japan.

The people in this group could broadly be classified into three subgroups with separate visions (or ideological positions) related to Japanese security policy that emerged in the early postwar period – mainstream conservatives, revisionists,[31] and progressives. The ideological positions of each camp shaped their vision of Japan's role in the world and the type of security policy Japan must exercise to achieve the desired vision and security objectives. The mainstream conservatives, who included Yoshida Shigeru, Ikeda Hayato, Satō Eisaku, Ohira Masayoshi and Miyazawa Kiichi, envisaged Japan as directing all efforts toward Japan's return to the international community after the devastating war experience, with respect and dignity. This goal was to be reached through economic development and technological autonomy, while keeping a low profile in military-strategic affairs.[32] Also known as the pragmatists, this group was committed to strengthening the US–Japan security relationship, as developing an autonomous defense capability was understood as an economically and politically costly option. They also supported the retention of Article 9 of the Peace Constitution, which became a useful tool to deflect US pressure on Japan to adopt international military roles that were regarded as inimical to Japan's strategic interests.[33] Opposing this vision were the revisionist politicians that included Ashida Hitoshi, Hatoyama Ichirō, Kishi Nobusuke, Fukuda Takeo, Nakasone Yasuhiro, and Abe Shintarō. Like the mainstream conservatives, they supported the existence of the US–Japan security treaty. However, they viewed Japan's delegation of full security responsibilities to the US as a 'humiliation'.[34] To gain respect and restore Japan's 'proper' place in the international community, they pushed for a greater degree of security independence from the US through an autonomous defense policy and activist security policy. To support this, the

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[31] See Boyd, J.P. and Samuels, R.J. (2005), 'Nine lives?: the politics of constitutional reform in Japan', *Policy Studies*, 19, Washington, DC: East West Centre. What is referred to as revisionist here is normal nationalist for Samuels, military realist for Mochizuki and Tamamoto, and the assertive conservative right for Togo (Mochizuki M.M. (1983/84), 'Japan's search for strategy', *International Security*, 8(3): 152–79; Samuels, *Securing Japan*; Tamamoto M. (1990), 'Japan's search for a world role', *World Policy Journal*, 7(3): 493–520; Togo K. (2010), 'The assertive conservative right in Japan: their formation and perspective', *SAIS Review*, 30(1): 77–89). For a detailed discussion on the historical background, policies, position on security issues and members of this group, see Samuels, *Securing Japan*, 18–36; and Togo, 'The assertive conservative right in Japan'.

[32] Berger, 'Norms, identity and national security in Germany and Japan', 336–7.

[33] Samuels, *Securing Japan*, 32–33; Boyd and Samuels, 'Nine lives?', 26; Berger, *Cultures of Anti-militarism*, 104

[34] Inoguchi and Bacon, 'Japan's emerging role as a global ordinary power', 2.

revisionist politicians called for a revision of Article 9, a rearmament of Japan, and the widening of the SDF's role in external security affairs.[35] On the extreme left were the progressives who comprised the intellectuals, labor activists, and left-of-centre politicians from the JSP and Japan Communist Party (JCP). Their pacifist vision was articulated by the Heiwa Mondai Danwakai (Peace Issues Discussion Group), stating that Japan must uphold peace as a supreme value, and post-war Japan must lead by example to create a new world in which nations not only refrained from using arms but also relinquished their weapons altogether.[36] Led by the JSP, this group supported the policies of pacifism, unarmed neutrality, and the abolition of the US–Japan Security Treaty.[37]

The second element is the decision-making structure related to Japan's security policymaking. Actors alone are unable to implement their vision without an institutional structure that facilitates the realization of their vision/interests. In examining the characteristics of the decision-making structure, the analysis focuses on four areas. First, it is the role of the bureaucracy, which has a dominant role in Japan's security policymaking process.[38] Here, the type of ministries involved (or excluded), the extent of their influence over the formulation of Japanese security interests and policy are analyzed. Second, the role of the prime minister is examined. This determines the extent of influence the prime minister exercised over the policymaking process in determining the security interests and preferred policy option for Japan. Third, the kind of influence (or the lack thereof) that the JDA/MOD exercised over the security policymaking process is also explored. Finally, the decision-making process itself is analyzed, specifically highlighting whether it was rigid/immobilist or flexible in relation to the implementation of an activist security policy.

The final element is the influence of the US in shaping Japanese security interests and policy in relation to Japan's involvement in external security affairs. The US played a critical role as an occupying authority following the end of World War II to lay the foundation of Japan's post-war security policy. The US–Japan Mutual Security Treaty (signed in 1951 and revised in 1960) offered Japan a security guarantee in exchange for US military bases in Japan. Japan's weak position resulted in an asymmetric bilateral relationship in terms of the responsibilities, roles and power; and, in turn, the US

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[35] Samuels, *Securing Japan*, 30; Boyd and Samuels, 'Nine Lives?', 3.

[36] Hook, G.D. (1996), *Militarization and Demilitarization in Contemporary Japan*, London: Routledge, pp. 27–37; Samuels, *Securing Japan*, 30; Boyd and Samuels, 'Nine lives?', 19; Pyle, *The Japanese Question*, 44–5.

[37] Inoguchi and Bacon, 'Japan's emerging role as a global ordinary power', 2; Hook (1996), *Militarization and Demilitarization in Contemporary Japan*, 27–37; Samuels, *Securing Japan*, 30; Boyd and Samuels, 'Nine lives?', 2005, 19; Pyle, *The Japanese Question*, 44–5. As will be discussed later, the views of the revisionists and the progressives evolved during the later years of the Cold War and the post-Cold War.

[38] Campbell J.C. (1989), 'Democracy and bureaucracy in Japan', in T. Ishida and E. Krauss (eds.), *Democracy in Japan*, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 1989; Rix A. *et al.* (1988), 'Bureaucracy and political change in Japan', in J. A. A. Stockwin (ed.), *Dynamic and Immobilist Politics in Japan*, Basingstoke: Macmillan Press; Fukui H. (1977), 'Policy-making in the Japanese foreign ministry', in R. A. Scalapino (ed.), *The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press 1977); Baerwald, H.H. (1977), 'The Diet and foreign policy', in Scalapino (ed.) *The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan*.

pressure became a critical element in shaping Japanese security policy.[39] Hellman wrote '[b]eyond the US alliance, there has been virtually no strategic policy regarding external threats or regional conflict'.[40] Inoguchi and Jain utilized the concept 'karaoke diplomacy' to capture the unique influence of the US on Japanese security policy.[41] This concept infers that Japan's eventual policy choice reflects compliance with US directives, albeit Tokyo has some leeway in deciding with whom, when, where, what, or how it will engage internationally.[42] The US element continues to be important in shaping Japanese post-Cold War security policy. [43] However, the role of the US has evolved, especially in terms of reduced pressure against Japan to pursue an activist security policy. This reduced pressure reveals the changing normative framework that shapes the outcome of Japanese security policy.

Identity–regime interaction

The identity–regime interaction illustrated here is two-fold. On the one hand, it shows how identities exist within the institutional framework to support a particular vision of security policy, and, on the other hand, how the dominant identities shape the composition and the organization of the elements within an institutional context. The identity–regime interaction results in an overarching normative framework that sets the parameters in all aspects of the security policymaking process, such as identifying the security interests, determining the desirable and undesirable behaviors, and shaping the outcome of policy.[44] This is a two-way interaction where the identity

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[39] Miyashita A. (1999), '*Gaiatsu* and Japan's foreign aid: rethinking the reactive-proactive debate', *International Studies Quarterly*, 43: 695–732.

[40] Hellman D.C. (1977), 'Japanese security and postwar Japanese foreign policy', in R.A. Scalapino (ed.), *The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, p. 329.

[41] Inoguchi T. and Jain P. (eds.) (2000), *Japanese Foreign Policy Today: A Reader*, New York: Palgrave.

[42] Ibid, xv. It is important to note that Japanese prime ministers, members of the LDP, and the bureaucracy were not only supportive of the close bilateral security relationship but also welcome US pressure at times, as this allowed them to avoid domestic responsibilities in implementing controversial policies by citing the breakdown of the US–Japan relationship as a potential consequence (Angel R.C. (1988/9), 'Prime Ministerial leadership in Japan: recent changes in personal style and administrative organization', *Pacific Affairs*, 61(4): 588).

[43] To be sure, there are other external factors apart from US pressure, such as China's strategic rise and North Korea's belligerency, that arguably impact the security policy debates in post-Cold War Japan. However, the focus of this paper is on domestic politics. The US pressure is included due to its strong institutional presence and influence since the onset of the post-war period stemming from the US–Japan security treaty.

[44] This normative structure has been described in the literature as organizational or institutional culture. Legro defines this as "collectively held assumptions, ideas, and beliefs that prescribe how a group should adapt to its external environment and manage its internal structure" (Legro J. (1996), 'Culture and preferences in the international cooperation two-step', *American Political Science Review*, 90(1): 121). It has also been referred to as an 'episteme' – defined by Legro, as a 'collectively held belief characterizing a particular group about the appropriate or effective corporate behaviour' (Legro J. (2000), 'Whence American internationalism', *International Organization*, 54(2): 255). Whatever the appropriate reference, the important point to note is the normative element that results in an overarching ideational structure in influencing the dominant interests and preferred security behavior within the regime. Also see Kier

and the institutional context shape/influence each other. This interaction can be stable as long as the policymaking elite achieve the desired security objectives and opposing forces are weak or suppressed. This stability in the identity–regime interaction is sustained by, according to Lieberman, the regularity in the way power is distributed in the security policymaking regime, the type of interests/preferences that are dominant and the outcome of security policy.[45] Thies says that when a particular identity–institution arrangement is dominant, it is difficult to change, as there is a certain sense of regularity. This arrangement shapes and constrains the behavior of the agents. More importantly, the agents that benefit the most from this arrangement perpetuate this arrangement.[46] However, change does take place when a particular identity–regime arrangement does not meet desired interests/preferences and the opposing forces become stronger.

In illustrating the resultant normative structure based on the identity–regime interaction, this paper shows how the dominant security identity was supported within the an institutional structure by using three key elements of the Japanese security policymaking regime – agents/actors involved or marginalized in the security policymaking process, the decision-making process that produces security policy, and the role of the US. These elements are compared in both sets of identities to show change in the dominant security identity. For the peace-state security identity, the civilian bureaucracy and politicians who supported an economics-first policy and low involvement in external military-strategic affairs controlled the policymaking process. This left little or no room for those actors that supported an activist security policy in the policymaking process. Any attempt to break from the self-defense focus was hampered by a decision-making structure that was characterized as immobilist and institutionally rigid. However, this impasse was usually broken only after intense pressure from the US. For the international-state identity, politicians and bureaucrats that supported an activist security role began to dominate the regime. The former immobilist or rigid security policymaking process was replaced by increased activity within the Japanese security policymaking elite in setting security policy interests, managing the decision-making process, and also actively devising means, within the domestic social and legal constraints, to contribute to the peace and stability of the external security environment. This resulted in reduced US pressure on Japan's security policymaking process. This is elaborated in the following two sections.

Peace-state identity: minimalist policy

During the Cold War, Japan's minimalist security policy was a product of the dominance of the peace-state identity within the security policymaking regime. In

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E.K. (1995), 'Culture and military doctrine: France between the wars', *International Security*, 19(4): 65–93, and Drezner D.W. (2000), 'Ideas, bureaucratic politics, and the crafting of foreign policy', *American Journal of Political Science*, 44(4): 733–49.

[45] Lieberman, 'Ideas, institutions, and political order: explaining political change', 699.

[46] Thies, C.G. (2001), 'A historical institutionalist approach to the Uruguay Round agricultural negotiation,' *Comparative Political Studies*, 34(4): 405.

terms of actors, the mainstream conservatives dominated the security policymaking process. Their preferred vision for Japan was to strengthen the principles that defined Japan's external security role predominantly in economic terms with a low profile in external military-strategic affairs. Relying on Article 9 and a range of other constraints, they deflected repeated pressure from both the US and revisionist politicians for Japan to participate in military missions that were beyond Japan's national territory, as well as any attempt to expand Japan's role in external affairs outside the confines of economics.[47] Through astute leadership, Yoshida and his followers were able to forge a consensus between all three main groups within the Japanese political system around the Yoshida Doctrine to serve as the foundation of Japanese security policy. From the revisionist politicians, support for the existence of the US–Japan Security Treaty was attained, and from the JSP-led progressives, support for Article 9. This consensus benefitted mainly the mainstream conservatives and progressives in maintaining their dominance in the political system during the Cold War, while marginalizing the revisionist politicians who were critical of the minimalist security policy.[48]

To support the preferred vision of a minimalist security policy, the mainstream conservatives were supported by a unique decision-making structure. First, the Yoshida School politicians received support from the dominant bureaucracy, namely from MOFA and the economics-based ministries, MITI and MOF. Major policy decisions on defense were made based on the consensus gained through an inter-ministerial coordination arrangement at the National Defense Council (restructured as the Security Office in 1986) located in the Cabinet Secretariat tasked to review major defense policy decisions before seeking final approval from the Cabinet.[49] The dominance of civilian officials from the economics-based ministries ensured that the discussions here routinely supported, both formally and informally, a consensus that favored economic and political issues over defense and security ones.[50] For discussions on national security issues, such as those related to the defense build-up, the National Defense Council, the Yoshida School politicians and like-minded bureaucrats repeatedly pushed limited security policy objectives. Even when policies that expanded Japanese security policy were passed (such as, with the passage of the 1976 NDPO), the objective of the officials from MOFA and the economics-based ministries was not to support the SDF's expanded external security role, but to further extend civilian control over areas of security policymaking that were informally controlled by the US and Japanese militaries.[51]

47 Boyd and Samuels, 'Nine lives?', 26

48 Kohno M. (2007), 'The domestic foundations of Japan's international contribution', in T.U. Berger, M.M. Mochizuki, and J. Tsuchiyama (eds.), *Japan in International Politics: The Policies of an Adaptive State*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 32.

49 Berger, *Cultures of Anti-militarism*, 50.

50 Katzenstein, *The Culture of National Security*, 106; Katzenstein and Okawara, 'Japan's national security', 93.

51 Berger, *Cultures of Anti-militarism*, 104. The SDF saw a widened role in security policymaking in the mid-1970s and early 1980s. This was due to its superior technical knowledge in military matters and its close links with the US military gained through consultations and negotiations on building greater

As would be expected, there were attempts to break the bureaucracy's dominance over security policymaking process especially from the mid-1970s. These were motivated by revisionist politicians who aimed to increase their influence over the security policymaking process and shift the focus of Japan's security policy away from the minimalist characterization. One such attempt was the formation of the defense *zoku* (tribe) in the early 1980s, an extra-parliamentary group comprising of politicians from the ruling party who were experts in defense matters. It was a way to strengthen cooperation between the bureaucrats and LDP politicians. However, this new arrangement did not work. Both the Yoshida School politicians and the MOFA, MITI, and MOF bureaucrats relied on each other to sustain the consensus on pursuing a minimalist policy.[52] This consensus was backed by the Cabinet Legislation Bureau (CLB) – an important organization within the bureaucracy that was legally responsible for the official interpretations of Article 9 and other legal issues related to Japan's security policy.[53] The CLB played an influential role in limiting an overseas security role for the SDF on legal grounds. Even the Cabinet was ineffective in proposing new ideas that challenged the minimalist version of security policy, becoming essentially a 'rubber-stamping' institution that supported the consensus reached at the National Defense Council between the LDP and the dominant ministries.[54]

Second, the dominance of the peace-state security identity resulted in the marginalization of the JDA and SDF officers within the security policymaking regime, as their vision went against the minimalist version of Japanese security policy. Due to the mistrust of the military within Japanese state and society, the military's role was kept 'quasi-legitimate' or denied an independent position within the security policymaking regime.[55] Its main task was centered on self-/national defense, that is, defending Japan

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cooperation in defence matters, joint studies, and joint military exercises. The Japanese military became an important focus of US demands, requests, and expectations of Japan's defence roles and missions that occurred more behind the scenes of the security policymaking process (Katahara E. (2001), 'Japan: from containment to normalization', in M. Alagappa (ed.), *Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia*, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 77, 79.

[52] George M.A. (2003), 'Japan's 'Un-Westminster' system: impediments to reform in a crisis economy', *Government and Opposition*, 38(1): 73–91; Katahara, 'Japan: from containment to normalization', 77.

[53] Samuels, *Securing Japan*, 49. The CLB provided legal advice on all critical aspects of Japanese security policy, including the SDF's constitutionality and its limitations, interpretations of collective self-defence operations, SDF's overseas deployment and the definition of the use of force. During the Cold War, the CLB was made up of officials from the various civilian ministries but no defence agency official was assigned to the bureau. All proposed legislation, speeches and regulations were vetted by the officials at the CLB. The interpretations of the CLB became the official interpretations adopted by the politicians and bureaucracy. Yoshida and his followers relied on the CLB's interpretations to deflect pressure from the US and those within Japan that pushed for an expanded security role in external security affairs. This facilitated the maintenance of a narrow security policy as captured by the peace-state identity conception (See Samuels, *Securing Japan*, pp. 49–52). Also see Samuels, R.J. (2004), 'Politics, security policy, and Japan's Cabinet Legislation Bureau: who elected these guys, anyway?', JPRI Working Article No. 99, http://www.jpri.org/publications/workingarticles/wp99.html (accessed 29 February 2012).

[54] Estévez-Abe M. (2006), 'Japan's shift toward a Westminster system', *Asian Survey*, 46(4): 632–51.

[55] Berger, *Cultures of Anti-militarism*, 83.

from physical attacks.[56] The JDA held a subordinate status within the bureaucracy, as it was an agency rather than a ministry, led by a director-general (or a minister of state), rather than a minister.[57] Moreover, the JDA was subject to strict civilian control. The director-general was required to be a civilian who would usually be assisted by two civilian vice-ministers. The highest-ranking SDF officers, namely the chief of staff of the Ground SDF (GSDF), Maritime SDF (MSDF), and Air SDF (ASDF), were also subject to civilian supervision. The influence of MOF, MOFA, and MITI penetrated the top, middle, and lower levels of the JDA's organizational structure. The JDA's budget was controlled by MOF through the appointment of an official as JDA's administrative vice-minister. An official from MOFA occupied the Policy Office, an official from MITI controlled the Equipment Bureau, and senior officials from other ministries were brought in to reinforce the civilian control in the JDA.[58] Not only was the civilian penetration within the JDA extensive, but JDA officials were also seconded to other ministries to expose military officials to the work and ethics surrounding non-military issues.[59]

Third, the weak position of the Japanese prime minister in providing leadership and new policy direction also contributed to sustained dominance of the peace-state security identity and its related vision. Although the post-war Constitution legally grants the prime minister control of the SDF and 'relative freedom in foreign affairs', this function was limited.[60] First, the prime minister and other politicians were unable to challenge the bureaucracy's dominance in security policymaking due to the low presence of political appointees within the ministries. Second, the prime minister was unable to gain support from politicians within his own party for new policy ideas that went beyond the consensus, even from the defense *zoku*. The *zoku* usually consisted of members from various factions within the LDP and they could not be seen to be too close to the prime minister.[61] Finally, it was understood that the prime minister's role was to build consensus over a wide range of groups in politics, business, and bureaucracy before making a security policy decision. A role that was more policy-oriented and aggressive in nature was viewed with suspicion; hence limiting the leadership role of the prime minister.[62] The weakness of the prime minister's position explains Nakasone's inability to push for an active security policy agenda during his tenure. To weaken the institutional structure that supported the peace-state identity-based consensus, he introduced a set of administrative reforms to gain greater control of the policymaking process by introducing a top-down (presidential)

[56] Katzenstein P.J. (1996), *Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 104.

[57] Oros, *Normalizing Japan*, 61; Samuels, *Securing Japan*, 52.

[58] Samuels, *Securing Japan*, 52–53.

[59] Katzenstein and Okawara, 'Japan's national security', 95–7; Hughes, *Japan's Remilitarisation*, 55.

[60] Shinoda, *Koizumi Diplomacy*, 19, 25.

[61] Katzenstein and Okawara, 'Japan's national security', 93.

[62] Hosoya C. (1974), 'Characteristics of the foreign policy decision-making system in Japan', *World Politics*, 26(3): 368; Also see Angel, 'Prime Ministerial leadership in Japan'.

style.[63] Nakasone formed the Security Council and reorganized the Cabinet Secretariat to strengthen coordination between various ministries/agencies during domestic or international crises, and, at the same time, bypass the bureaucracy.[64] Nakasone's efforts failed nonetheless. His efforts were blocked by an institutional arrangement that was dominated by the interests of the mainstream conservatives and dominant bureaucracy, particularly the economic ministries.[65]

The US applied constant pressure on Japan, implicitly and explicitly, to challenge the consensus based on the peace-state security policy. Whilst there were instances of successful initiatives that expanded Japanese security policy, these were characterized as 'too little, too late' due to the rigid/immobilist nature of the security policymaking process, and failed to alter Japan's minimalist security policy defined by the peace-state security identity. The 'institutionalized inertia'[66] resulted in Japan becoming reactive to the international environment and external pressure from the US.[67] In this context, the US pressure became an important factor influencing Japanese security policy practice. This was especially so towards any initiative that went beyond the 'normal' defined by self-defense and low involvement in external military-strategic affairs.[68] The US objectives were to ease Japan's reliance on the economics-first policy, strengthening its defense capabilities, and urging Japan to assume regional/international responsibilities as a member of the Western Alliance.[69]

The pressure became especially visible from the late 1960s and 1970s when Cold War tensions intensified and Japan emerged as the second most powerful economy in the world. One area was the crafting of a regional defense role for the SDF – a goal outlined in the Guidelines for the Japan–US Defense Cooperation signed in November 1978.[70] The guidelines were intended to expand Japan's military participation in the

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[63] See Shinoda, *Koizumi Diplomacy*; Angel, 'Prime Ministerial leadership in Japan'.

[64] Examples include: Nakasone's use of personal advisors to circumvent the bureaucracy to strengthen Japan's relations with South Korea in 1983, which led to his successful visit to South Korea in January 1983; Nakasone's show of direct support to the US missile deployment in Europe during the Williamsburg Summit in January 1983; the revision of the 1967 three principles of arms exports to allow the export of military technology to the US; and strengthening the authority of the Prime Minister's Official Residence (Kantei) for crises management (Shinoda, *Koizumi Diplomacy*, 28–37).

[65] Katzenstein and Okawara, 'Japan's national security', 93–5. An example to illustrate this constraint was the finance and foreign affairs ministries and even the defence agency assigning lower ranking officials (instead of the administrative vice-ministers) to serve at the Cabinet Secretariat. This allowed the ministries to retain influence over these officials and weakened the role of the Cabinet Secretariat (Angel, 'Prime Ministerial leadership in Japan', 599–600).

[66] Grimes W. (2003), 'Institutionalized inertia: Japanese foreign policy in the Post-Cold War', in G. J. Ikenberry and M. Mastanduno (eds.), *International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific*, New York: Columbia University Press.

[67] On Japan as a 'reactive' state, see Calder K.E. (1988), 'Japanese foreign economic policy formation: explaining the reactive state', *World Politics*, 40(4): 517–41.

[68] Hellman, 'Japanese security and postwar Japanese foreign policy', 332.

[69] Okawara Y. (1990), *To Avoid Isolation: An Ambassador's View of US/Japanese Relations*, Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, p. 121.

[70] MOD, Japan, 'Guidelines for Japan–US Defence Cooperation', 27 November 1978, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/anpo/19781127.html.

bilateral relationship from operations confined to the Japanese national territory to operations designed for the provision of 'peace and stability throughout East Asia' (Article 6). It laid the foundation for greater cooperation between the US and Japanese militaries in the form of joint studies on sea-lanes of communication, joint operations, and inculcating greater interoperability between the two militaries. While this was a significant achievement, the defense guidelines did not steer Japan away from the peace-state identity-based minimalist security policy. According to Green and Murata (1998), the defense guidelines were passed to preclude a breakdown of the consensus within the LDP on defense issues regarding the continuation of a credible US defense commitment to Japan threatened by the US withdrawal from Vietnam in 1975.[71]

International-state identity: activist policy

The identity–regime arrangement that supported the peace-state identity unraveled in the post-Cold War period. Both the mainstream conservatives and the JSP/SDPJ-progressives – defenders of the minimalist security policy – collapsed. Prominent LDP mainstream conservatives, such as Miyazawa Kiichi, Gotōda Masaharu, Kaifu Toshiki, Katō Koichi, Kōno Yohei, Koga Makoto, and Nonaka Hiromu experienced either a severe reduction of influence within the ruling party and over the security policymaking process or departed from the political scene altogether.[72] They were replaced by revisionist politicians who were supporters of raising Japan's profile in external security affairs through the widening use of use of the SDF as a tool of security policy. Their dominance over the security policy objectives and formulation was reflected in the accession to power of Prime Ministers Hashimoto Ryūtarō, Mori Yoshirō, Koizumi Junichirō, Abe Shinzō, and Aso Taro during the period under study. The JSP/SDPJ lost its position as the main opposition party within the Japanese political system following the party's shift from its core principles discussed above, forming a coalition government with the LDP in 1994. It was replaced by the DPJ as the main opposition party in Japan, which had a security policy posture that was more similar to the LDP than the JSP/SDPJ.[73] Though there were differences (in the means and specific conditions of Japan's security role expansion), the policy of strengthening Japan's military contribution to external affairs was common to both parties. The change in the actors dominating the security policymaking regime not only removed the strong 'psychological and political obstacles', but facilitated an introduction of a new vision within the regime for an expanded security policy that entailed a more advanced SDF role in external military-strategic affairs.[74]

[71] Green, M.J. and Murata, K. (1998), 'The 1978 Guidelines for the US–Japan Defence Cooperation Process and the historical impact', George Washington University Working Paper No. 17, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/japan/GreenMurataWP.htm (accessed 25 November 2009), p. 2.

[72] Boyd and Samuels, 'Nine lives?', 27–41.

[73] Pekkanen R. and Krauss E.S. (2005), 'Japan's "Coalition of the Willing" on security policies', *Orbis*, 49(3): 437

[74] Kohno, 'The domestic foundations of Japan's international contribution', 40.

The decision-making structure underwent significant change to facilitate the realization of the vision pushed by revisionist politicians. This was mainly through the institutional and administrative reforms initiated by former Prime Minister Hashimoto during the period 1996–2001. There were two main objectives of these reforms. The first was to shift the locus of power in the policymaking process from the bureaucracy to the politicians.[75] The bureaucracy experienced a reduction in the number of ministries and agencies from 20 to 14, and restrictions were imposed on the bureaucrats' participation in the security policymaking process, such as testifying in parliament on behalf of the politicians. Moreover, the presence and influence of politicians in the bureaucracy widened through an increase in political appointees at the junior or deputy minister and parliamentary secretary levels within the ministries.[76] This diluted the power of the bureaucracy over the security policymaking process.

The second objective was the centralization of the policymaking process around the prime minister and Cabinet. This took place through the expansion of the support structure and functions of the Cabinet Secretariat (*Naikaku Kanbō*), Cabinet Office (*Naikaku-fu*), and Prime Minister's Official Residence (*Kantei*). Rather than the bureaucracy, this resulted in the Cabinet Secretariat, Cabinet Office, and *Kantei* taking charge of the coordinating role over ministries and agencies in the policymaking process, as well as in initiating and drafting policy initiatives.[77] The centralization strengthened the position of the prime minister in exercising greater central leadership over the initiation and coordination of government policy.[78] This coordinating role allowed the *Kantei* and the prime minister to overcome the conflicting interests of the dominant ministries by adopting a top-down approach in the policymaking process – referred to as the presidentialization of the office of the Japanese prime minister.[79] Rather than a security policy being dominated by interests of selected ministries, the centralization resulted in security policy debates being shaped by national interests.[80] New appointments made to the Cabinet Secretariat and *Kantei* broke away from the traditional practice of relying on transfers from the powerful ministries, which resulted in the ministries, especially dominant ones, imposing their interests on the policymaking process. As these appointments were political, it gave the new officials greater influence over the policymaking process, especially in exercising coordination of ministries.[81]

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[75] Shinoda, *Koizumi Diplomacy*, 63.

[76] George, 'Japan's 'Un-Westminster' system', 89; Estévez-Abe, 'Japan's shift toward a Westminster system', 645.

[77] Boyd and Samuels, 'Nine lives?', 38; Calder K.E. (2009), *Pacific Alliance: Reviving US–Japan Relations*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 150.

[78] George, 'Japan's 'Un-Westminster' system', 87–89.

[79] Krauss E.S. and Nyblade B. (2005), '"Presidentialization" in Japan? The prime minister, media and election in Japan', *British Journal of Political Science*, 35: 357–68.

[80] Shinoda, *Koizumi Diplomacy*, 64,

[81] George, 'Japan's 'Un-Westminster' system', 88.

A critical consequence of the centralization of the policymaking structure resulted in a balance of power shift between ministries in the security policymaking regime. Rather than the economic ministries and MOFA being dominant, the JDA/MOD and the SDF officials became more involved and integrated in the policymaking process by defining or setting security policy objectives and promoting the vision of an expansionist security policy. One clear indication was the restructuring of the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) to the Two-plus-Two meeting in 1996. The restructuring led to the inclusion of the director-general/minister of the JDA/MOD along with foreign minister in the principal coordinating mechanism of the US–Japan alliance. This had an equalizing effect between the two ministries and raised the JDA/MOD's involvement in matters related to managing the most important bilateral relationship for Japanese security policy.[82] Outside of the US–Japan security relationship, JDA/MOD and SDF officers also became more involved in the security policymaking process, such as playing an advisory role to the Prime Minister, contributing to discussions on defense/security issues at the National Diet (a role that was banned by the 1952 National Safety Agency order), and participating as staff members in the Cabinet's National Security Affairs Office.[83] This elevated role in the policymaking process led to the upgrading of the JDA to a ministry in 2007 with its head holding a fully fledged ministerial position.[84]

Three examples illustrate how centralization in the policymaking process facilitated the realization of the vision/interests motivated by the international-state identity. The first was the early milestone that led to the incorporation of humanitarian and disaster relief activities into the SDF's mandate through the passage of the 1992 International Peace Cooperation Law (IPCL, also known as the Law Concerning Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKOs) and Other Operations). The members of the security policymaking elite were aware that MOFA's lead in drafting the IPCL was not conducive to the realization of their main objective of seeking authorization for SDF's deployment to UNPKOs. This resulted in the *Kantei* taking control, which facilitated centralized inter-ministerial coordination that led to the successful drafting and passage of the IPCL.[85] As Shinoda asserted, the IPCL would not have been passed without the Kantei's lead.[86] The second example was the updating of the US–Japan relationship in the mid-1990s. The Japanese leadership was aware that an update of the alliance required heightened bilateral defense cooperation despite Japan's domestic social and legal constraints. Following the Hashimoto–Clinton summit in 1996, the Japanese security policymaking elite pushed for the development of a regional role for the SDF alongside the US military. This led to the authorization of the SDF to assist the US military in rear-area roles during crises over a larger geographical

[82] Hughes, *Japan's Remilitarisation*, 55; Katahara, 'Japan: from containment to normalization', 82.
[83] Nagashima ,1998, cited in Katahara, 'Japan: from containment to normalization', 82.
[84] See Hughes, *Japan's Remilitarisation*, 53–65.
[85] Shinoda, *Koizumi Diplomacy*, 58–59.
[86] Ibid, 62.

area (Asia-Pacific).[87] The third example was Japan's involvement in the US-led global war on terror (GWOT). To avoid repeating the humiliation of the 1990–1 Persian Gulf Crisis when Japan's contribution was confined to large-scale economic support, the Japanese elite took the decisive step to gain authorization for the SDF's deployment to the US-led anti-terrorism missions. In formulating Japan's response to the GWOT, the *Kantei*, and not MOFA, once again took charge of devising Japan's quick and decisive response. This centralized arrangement bypassed the traditional consensus-seeking process of the LDP and the ministries. Koizumi expertly used the *Kantei* to push through the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law (ATSML) in 2001 that authorized the SDF's deployment to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), and subsequently the Iraqi Reconstruction Law in 2003 that authorized an SDF deployment for a humanitarian mission in Iraq (Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)) despite the ongoing conflict in Iraq.[88] Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary (CCS) Furukawa Teijiro said 'If the *Kantei* has not handled this issue [personnel contribution to OEF], we could not have done this quickly.'[89]

The vision supported by the international-state identity that became embedded in the security policymaking regime occurred in the context of reduced US pressure. As in the Cold War, Japan continued to push for the strengthening of the US–Japan alliance in the post-Cold War period. However, there was one difference – there was a severe reduction of the US pressure against Japan to expand the SDF's role in the maintenance of peace and stability.[90] Rather than an 'institutionalized inertia', the Japanese security policymaking elite displayed strong political will in its security policy practice both outside and within the US–Japan alliance. Outside of the alliance, the security policymaking elite crafted an international role that involved adopting Humanitarian and Disaster Relief (HADR) activities, including peacekeeping, and even responding to global challenges, such as North Korea's nuclear tests in 2006.[91]

Within the alliance, the security policymaking elite pushed for a bilateral relationship. This was based on building common strategic interests with the US, addressing the inherent nature of asymmetry in the alliance, maintaining a strong

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[87] *Japan Times*, 4 May 1996.

[88] Shinoda, *Koizumi Diplomacy*, 93–6.

[89] Ibid, 93. Parenthesis added.

[90] There were instances of Japan accommodating US pressure at the expense of its foreign policy objectives early in the post-Cold War period. Examples include Japan's rejection of membership in Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad's East Asia Economic Caucus (EAEC) proposal and its suspension of loan aid to Iran for a hydroelectric power in 1995 (Miyashita, '*Gaiatsu* and Japan's foreign aid', 703–4). However, it is important to note that the focus here is on US pressure in the area of Japan's contribution to external security affairs in military terms, which weakened over the course of the post-Cold War period.

[91] In response to North Korea's nuclear test in October 2006, Abe Shinzo, Koizumi's successor, adopted a quick response that included the imposition of sanctions against North Korea (a decision taken before even the United Nations Security Council's (UNSC's) resolution was passed), the closing of all Japanese ports to North Korean ships and cargo, and the ban of all visits by North Koreans to Japan (Hughes C.W. and Krauss E.S. (2007), 'Japan's new security agenda', *Survival*, 49(2): 164).

US–Japan security relationship, and reinforcing a strong US military presence in Asia. Japan's new role led to a shift in its traditional 'free-rider' or 'Japan as a follower' image to one of 'Japan as a reliable ally'.[92] Two examples from Japan's response to the GWOT reveal this. First, the Japanese security policymaking elite explained repeatedly that Japan's response was its own initiative and not triggered by US pressure.[93] This was best illustrated by Japan's response to the widely discussed 'show of flag' comment allegedly made by the US Deputy Secretary Richard Armitage to Japan's ambassador to the US, Yanai Shunji, during a meeting to urge Japan to contribute troops to the GWOT. In denying this comment, Koizumi said, 'We've received no such request. However, the important thing is not what the US asked us to do. It is what we can offer to combat terrorism.'[94] Emphasizing his willingness to support the US, Koizumi said, 'We support the US as an ally and plan to provide as much support as possible, while taking our *own* initiatives to exterminate terrorism.'[95] Second, Japan also manufactured *gaiatsu* (external pressure) to craft a security role that was useful to US military objectives during the GWOT.[96] The MSDF approached the commander of the US Navy to propose ways that Japan could assist the US military in escorting US battle fleets to the Indian Ocean and for intelligence-gathering missions. Due to opposition at home, the MSDF also approached the US Navy to 'pressure' Japan to dispatch the advanced air-defense Aegis destroyer and P-3C anti-submarine patrol aircraft to the Indian Ocean. The Japanese Diet's defense lobby group was also urged to lobby high-ranking officials in the US State Department and National Security Council to support a 'push' for Japan's active participation in OEF.[97]

Conclusion

This article attempts to incorporate an ideational perspective, collective identity, into the institutionalist approach utilized to explain Japan's security policy expansion in the post-Cold War period. This is important for two reasons. First, collective identity reveals the dominant vision entrenched in the institutional structure, which clarifies why a certain type of policy is produced and re-produced. Second, it also reveals the make-up of the institutional/organizational design supporting the particular identity, including the manner in which the elements are organized. The identity–institution interaction results in a normative framework within the institutional context that

[92] See INSS Special Report (2000), 'The United States and Japan: advancing towards a mature partnership', http://homepage2.nifty.com/moru/lib/nichibei-anpo/pdf/INSS%20Special%20Report.pdf (accessed 16 July 2012).

[93] Midford P. (2003) 'Japan's response to terror: dispatching the SDF to the Arabian Sea', *Asian Survey*, 43(2): 335–6.

[94] *Mainichi Daily News*, 18 September 2001.

[95] Emphasis added. *Nikkei Weekly*, 24 September 2001; Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), Japan, (2001) 'Policy Speech by Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro', 153rd Session of the Diet, 27 September, http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/pm/koizumi/state0927.html (accessed 28 March 2005).

[96] Midford, 'Japan's response to terror'.

[97] Ibid., 335–6.

shapes the outcome of a state's security policy. Two security identities for Japan were examined, the peace-state and international-state; and the institutions examined were the security policymaking regimes made up of the agents involved or marginalized, the decision-making structure, and the role of the US.

Japan's Cold War security policy was minimalist and prioritized Japan's economic objectives/interests. Instead of relying on the SDF, Japan's contribution to external affairs occurred mainly through the use of economics. This policy was an output of a normative framework within the security policymaking regime that was supported by the peace-state security identity. This arrangement was defined by the consensus between the Yoshida School politicians and civilian bureaucrats from the MOF, MITI, and MOFA. The decision-making structure repeatedly produced an economics-based security policy that was characterized by a weak internal dynamic towards implementing an expanded security policy. This was mainly due to the marginalization of revisionist politicians and defense officials, and the weak position of the prime minister in the security policy decision-making process. Any policy that hinted at an expanded security policy was hampered by the rigid or immoblist decision-making process in relation to the external security affairs, and came mostly from US pressure.

During the post-Cold War period, Japan practiced an activist security policy in which the SDF was mandated to contribute to regional and international security environment, both independently and alongside the US. Within the security policymaking regime, a normative framework supported by the international-state identity emerged within the regime. The revisionist politicians replaced the dominance of the Yoshida School adherents in the political scene and the security policymaking process. The decision-making structure was characterized by a strong internal dynamic in shaping Japan's security objectives, doctrines, and policies. This was due to the strengthened position and influence of the prime minister, Cabinet, and JDA/MOD's civilian and military officials over the security policymaking process. Instead of being influenced by US pressure, Japan devised its own means to bring about peace and stability in the regional and international security environment.

Two implications of the argument stand out. The first one is analytical. It is analytically feasible to study the institutionalization of collective identity in a narrower institutional context, such as the security policymaking regime. As it is possible to isolate the security identity from other types of identities that collectively form the national identity, this article illustrates that it is also possible to study the effects of the institutional context that supports the security identity. Additionally, each collective identity is supported by an institutional/organizational structure that is defined by unique features. Even though two or more collective identities may share common features, there are defining features that distinguish them.

The second implication is related to Japanese security policy practice. This article notes that it is important to incorporate the domestic structures to understand Japanese security policy expansion in the post-Cold War period. By capturing the shift through

the identity-regime interaction, it is clear that Japan has embraced internationalism in relation to its security policy vision, interests, and practice. Japanese leadership has shown the ability to implement security measures that are in tune with the emergent trends of the post-Cold War order. Japan's contribution to the external military-strategic affairs will continue to display less domestic inertia. In fact, the 'domestic inertia' towards a proactive security policy has reduced incrementally over the course of the post-Cold War period. A good example to illustrate this is a comparison between the speed at which the bills for both OEF and OIF and the IPCL were passed. According to one estimate, the total deliberation time for the ATSML in both houses was only 62 hours, whereas the IPCL took 179 hours.[98] Another estimate states that the ATSML took three weeks and 33 hours for the Diet to debate while the IPCL took nine months.[99] Instead, of traditional characterizations of 'reactive state' or 'too little, too late', contemporary Japanese security policymaking and practice has become more responsive, proactive, and internationalist in nature.

This responsiveness displayed by the Japanese central government towards incorporating greater internationalism does not only apply to the period under study in this paper, but beyond as well. The DPJ government (2009–2012) reinforced the internationalist vision within Japanese security policy through its proactive measures, such as the dispatch of troops to Haiti to conduct humanitarian work following a devastating earthquake in January 2010, the dispatch of SDF engineers to South Sudan (UNMISS) in January 2012, and the extension of the SDF deployment to UNDOF in the Golan Heights until September 2012.

The (second) Abe government (2012–) further reinforced the internationalist vision within Japanese security policy. This was underscored in the package of security bills passed by the Japanese Parliament in September 2015. One of the bills eased the restrictions on SDF operations overseas, including those related to conducting collective self-defense missions. While details on the collective self-defence missions are being worked out, the Abe government has started discussions to allow for the SDF to be deployed in South Sudan as part of the UNPKO to aid other countries' troops or UN staff when they are attacked.[100] Though Abe's intention to revise the post-war regime might lead some (Beijing and Seoul) to conclude that Japan is pursuing remilitarization, the position held here is that the changes still conform to the the principles of the international-state identity. Abe's security policy, known as the 'proactive contribution

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[98] Shinoda T. (2002), 'Japan's response to terrorism and the implications for the Taiwan Strait issue', *Japan–Taiwan Research Forum*, 22 January, http://taiwansecurity.org/TS/2002/JTRF-Shinoda-0102.htm (accessed 27 June 2005).

[99] Hughes, *Japan Re-emergence as a 'Normal' Military Power*, 15.

[100] 'SDF role in South Sudan to expand in May under new security laws', *The Japan Times*, 22 September 2015, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/09/22/national/politics-diplomacy/sdf-role-south-sudan-expand-may-new-security-laws/; 'Expanding SDF's role in South Sudan likely to wait until late 2016', *The Japan Times*, 22 October 2015, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/10/19/national/politics-diplomacy/expanding-sdfs-south-sudan-peacekeeping-role-likely-delayed-late-2016/#.V7-Vu650CC4.

to peace', is based on an internationalist outlook with a strong defensive approach.[101] This limited approach to security policy is also a result of three important factors – Japan's strong democratic identity, in which where citizens and various institutions within the political structure would be able to check political leaders that are guiding Japan towards an aggressive militarist policy; the resilient pacifism within Japanese society, which continues to influence Japanese security policy objectives and choices; and the continued robustness of the US–Japan alliance, which serves as an important check against any expansion in Japanese security policy that could destabilize the region.[102]

Finally, it is important to note that Japan's security policy expansion discussed above occurred in a limited way. Any expansion of Japanese security policy, either within or outside of the US–Japan alliance, has come with limits attached. The expansion does not signal an unraveling of the domestic constraints that are supported by a strong presence of pacifism within the Japanese state and society. Peace as a collective idea remains strong within post-Cold War Japan. However, the means towards achieving peace now include a more internationalist role in global security affairs – a development that has been embraced by both the Japanese state and society.

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[101] S. Abe, 'Peace and security in Asia, for evermore, Japan for the rule of law, Asia for the rule of law, and the rule of law for all of us', Keynote speech delivered at the 13th Asian Security Summit, Singapore, 30 May 2014, http://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/nsp/page4e_000086.html. Also see A.L. Oros (2015), 'International and domestic challenges to Japan's post-war security identity: "norm constructivism" and Japan's new "proactive pacifism"', *The Pacific Review*, 1(28): 139–60.

[102] Singh B. (2015), "The Development of Japanese Security Policy: A Long-term Defensive Strategy," *Asia Policy*, 19: 49–64.