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When the Army Got Progressive: The Civil Affairs Training School at Stanford University, 1943–1945

Benjamin Justice

They sat in the Cubberley Education Lecture Hall to hear visiting experts. More often they could be found meeting in reduced-size classes, or working on small-group activities. They usually took notes; sometimes they took field trips. They memorized lists and sat for exams, but they also watched films and acted out scenarios. Rather than take regular courses in the disciplines, they studied an integrated curriculum referred to as "Area Relationships." Some faculty collaborated, team taught, and drew on students' prior knowledge. Even some administrators joined in the role-playing for the big culminating activity. The head of the program explained the reason for such a break from the traditional Stanford experience: "Special effort must be made to supply the student with points of view and methods of procedure which will enable him most quickly and most surely to survey a situation, analyze a problem, and formulate a solution."[1]

This situation could well describe the kind of education espoused by the Stanford Teacher Education Program. Minus the references to Stanford, these pedagogical behaviors could describe a "progressive" classroom anywhere in the United States in the second half of the twentieth century.[2] Yet this was not the product of a maverick social studies teacher, a school of education, a public or private high school, or

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Benjamin Justice, Rutgers, Assistant Professor of Education, Graduate School of Education, New Brunswick, New Jersey.

[1]Stanford University. (1943). Civil Affairs Training School. "Directives Concerning Case Problems." United States, CATS collection, Hoover Archives, Stanford University, box 7, folder 3.

[2]For a baseline definition of "progressive" pedagogy, I refer readers to the seven "Principles of Progressive Education," which graced the inside covers of early volumes of the journal, *Progressive Education*. Those relevant to this discussion included: (2) "Interest, the Motive of All Work," (3) "The Teacher as a Guide, not a Task Master," (4) "Scientific Study of Pupil Development," and (7) "The Progressive School a Leader in Educational Movements." To this I add the problem-solving orientation of Social Studies in the early twentieth century.

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any institution within the American educational establishment. The program, called the Civil Affairs Training School (CATS), was designed by and operated by contract for the U.S. Department of War. The students were officers recruited for their exceptional experiences in civilian life—lawyers, engineers, journalists, businessmen, teachers, and police. The military sent them to Stanford (and a handful of elite universities like it) to learn how to run the governments of Europe and the Far East after an eventual Allied victory over Japan and Germany. They were studying to save the world.

Many scholars have explored the complex meanings of the transformation of American higher education during the Second World War. These studies have focused on various tensions: between the social function of universities as elite playgrounds before the war to public service institutions after it; between academic freedom and military contracts; and between service men and women and the more traditional collegiate student bodies and cultures, to name a few.[3] As the description above suggests, however, there was another important transformation that occurred at this time: a new-found emphasis on progressive pedagogy and curriculum design. Universities had been moving slowly in such directions for decades, particularly in the fields of education, area studies, and linguistics; but their efforts were sporadic and limited. Likewise, Army officer training reflected uneven traditions, from a hallowed nineteenth-century pedagogy and curriculum at West Point to a more problems-based approach emerging at the Army War College in the early twentieth century. The CATS programs at Stanford and elsewhere pushed these reforms even further, and did so for reasons quite distinct from those that motivated the progressive educational elite. The end result was yet another tension—between ends and means—and it was one that neither higher education nor the military could fully overcome.

Both the timing and the origins of the CATS program seem unlikely. Scholars of progressive educational reform traditionally point to a small cadre of progressive insiders leading a "troubled crusade" in K-12 public education during the twentieth century which, depending on who you read, either transformed the politics and management of schools, transformed the curriculum, dumbed it down, or led to minor changes, at best, in how teachers actually taught.[4]

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[3]John R. Thelin, *A History of American Higher Education* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 2004), 257–59.

[4]David B. Tyack, *The One Best System: A History of American Urban Education* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974); Lawrence Cremin, *The Transformation of the School: Progressivism in American Education, 1876–1957* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1961); Diane Ravitch, *The Troubled Crusade: American Education: 1945–1980* (New York:

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Historians of twentieth-century social education in particular have linked similar reforms in pedagogy and curriculum to the political left. For example Ravitch argues that "virtually every prominent progressive in the 1930s agreed that the traditional academic curriculum reflected the failed capitalist economic order and that a radical change in the social order required equally sweeping changes in the schools."[5] In a similar vein, Saxe attributes the rise of the field of "Social Studies" to a group of insurgents who attempted to "utilize education for the promotion of social welfare" in the 1910s.[6] More generally, historians argue, whether inspired by Dewey's theories of growth, Harold Rugg's problematized democracy, or Rachel Dubois's calls for intercultural understanding, liberal humanitarians during the 1920s and 1930s sought to enact more student-friendly pedagogical methods and an integrated curriculum to promulgate a socially critical agenda. By the 1940s, conservative business and veterans' groups launched a counterattack that dampened, and would eventually extinguish, progressive efforts in the schools.[7]

That Herbert Hoover's Stanford should join the Army in devising a strongly progressive training program at precisely the same time complicates the story of progressive educational reform in American education generally, and it exposes a significant tension within higher education reform during the war years. From its creation in 1943 to the final graduation in 1945, the CATS program at Stanford evolved in response to the interaction of directives from the military, the demands of students, and constant tinkering by administrators and instructors. With minimal involvement from the progressive educational establishment (at Stanford or elsewhere), the CATS program developed practices that strongly resembled the "progressive" pedagogy and curriculum. Rather than demonstrate the long reach of the American progressive educational establishment into a new context, or the steady demise of the progressive education during the 1940s, however, the CATS program suggests a convergent evolution. Adaptation to similar environmental demands favored similar characteristics in two very different animals.

Basic Books, 1983) and *Left Back: A Century of Battles Over School Reform* (New York: Simon and Schuster. 2000); Larry Cuban, *How Teachers Taught: Constancy and Change in America's Classrooms, 1890–1980* (New York: Longman, 1984).

[5]Ravitch, *Left Back*, 218.

[6]David Warren Saxe, *Social Studies in Schools: A History of the Early Years* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1991), 3.

[7]Ronald Evans, *The Social Studies Wars: What Should We Teach the Children?* (New York: Teachers College Press, 2004); Stephen J. Thornton, *Teaching Social Studies That Matters: Curriculum for Active Learning* (New York: Teachers College Press, 2005); Jonathan Zimmerman, *Whose America: Culture Wars in the Public Schools* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005).

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With war raging across the globe, and all aspects of American society mobilizing at home, the American military found the need to instill in officers many of the same attributes that progressive educators had been advocating for decades—the ability to apply knowledge (and not simply retain it for a test), to think creatively, to work in teams, and to make connections across a variety of disciplines. The architects of the CATS program drew on examples from home and abroad, from civilian education and Army tradition. As leaders of the Army program discovered, however, means could not be easily separated from ends. At times, the cultures of the two establishments clashed. At other times they threatened to influence each other, much to the chagrin of the established powers of both.

The Context: Progressive Educational Reform in the Early Twentieth Century

Historians point to a variety of groups and movements pressing for reform to the curriculum and methods of American educational institutions during first half of the twentieth century.[8] These changes took place across all types of educational institutions, from public schools to prisons, settlement houses to elite research universities. The best-known, and most studied efforts at progressive educational reform (and those that most shaped the public perception and politics of "progressive education") came in K-12 public education. During the early twentieth century, educational reformers focused primarily on several related but distinctive, and at times contradictory efforts: a social efficiency movement aiming to make school organization and management more scientific; a pedagogy reform movement led by John Dewey and other critics of traditional rote memorization and recitation; and a social meliorist group who sought to use mass education to address problems in American society (including a radical wing referred to as "social reconstructionists," who hoped to use schools as levers for fundamental changes to capitalist society).[9] Leading academic and educational associations organized committees and issued reports; universities established schools of education and experimental K-12

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[8]Herbert Kliebard, *Changing Course: American Curriculum Reform in the 20th Century* (New York: Teacher's College Press, 2002); Tyack, *One Best System*.

[9]Kliebard, *Changing Course*, 3–4. On nineteenth century antecedents, see William J. Reese, "Origins of Progressive Education," *History of Education Quarterly* 41:1 (2001). David Labaree provides a wonderfully succinct account of the history of progressive reform in *The Trouble with Ed Schools* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004), 143–54.

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public schools; big-city districts attempted to reorient their curricula, and small, elite private schools offered progressive alternatives to traditional learning.[10]

Historians typically associate both the pedagogical progressive and social meliorist movements with the political left—especially that element of the meliorists known as the social reconstructionists. (Scholars disagree on the extent to which this intellectual leadership reflected widespread consensus among professional educators, and the degree to which classroom teachers actually implemented the reforms.)[11] Ravitch attributes several specific pedagogical and curricular reforms in the 1920s and 1930s to elite left-wing progressive reformers. These included the activity method, which encouraged students to learn in active situations related to their interest, the project method, which organized learning around the solution of real problems in society (and was very popular in the Soviet Union during the early 1930s), and the integrated curriculum, which sought to abolish the traditional, atomized assortment of traditional academic subjects.[12] Although each had antecedents in the nineteenth century, nevertheless these reforms excited much talk among prominent educators and resulted in widespread changes to official school curriculum guides, discussion in educational periodicals, and enthusiasm among the vanguard of progressive education experts at Teachers College and elsewhere. Implementation in actual classrooms, on the other hand, seems to have been uneven and incremental at best.[13]

The Great Depression mobilized concern over meliorating social problems across all sectors of society, and brought radical voices more into the mainstream school-reform conversation. In 1932, Teachers College Professor George Counts asked famously "Dare the School Build a New Social Order?" and urged his audience to "transform or destroy all conventions, institutions, and special groups inimical to the underlying principles of democracy."[14] A year later, Teachers College

[10]Chara Haeussler Bohan, "Early Vanguards of Progressive Education: The Committee of Ten, The Committee of Seven and Social Education," in *Social Education in the Twentieth Century: Curriculum and Context for Citizenship*, ed. Christine Woyshner, Joseph Watras, and Margaret Smith Crocco (New York: Peter Lang, 2004), 1–19. Kliebard, *Changing Course*; Daniel Tanner and Laurel Tanner, *History of the School Curriculum* (New York: MacMillan, 1990).

[11]For example, see the different interpretations of Ravitch, *Left Back*; David Angus, and Jeffrey Mirel, *The Failed Promise of the American High School, 1890–1995* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1999); Cuban, *How Teachers Taught*; Kliebard, *Changing Course*; Tyack, *The One Best System*.

[12]Ravitch, *Left Back*, 238–83.

[13]Cuban, *How Teachers Taught*.

[14]George S. Counts, *Dare the Schools build a New Social Order?* (New York: The John Day Company, 1932), 37.

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Professor William Kilpatrick published *The Educational Frontier* and advocated abandoning the "compartmentalized" school curriculum and fostering a more collectivist ethos.[15] During the 1920s, Harold Rugg promoted a high school course called "Problems of Democracy," which sought to break down the distinctions between disciplines and focus on an active, problem-solving curriculum to foster good citizenship. He also designed a Social Studies textbook series along similar lines. These texts and teacher manuals emphasized active learning, abstract understanding and experience (not just the memorization of facts), the acknowledgment of social problems, and an interdisciplinary approach to knowledge. Although sometimes racist in their depiction of African Americans, they addressed such issues as pollution, conservation, the ill effects of industrialism, and corporate greed.[16] In the context of the 1930s, sales skyrocketed, making the books among the best-selling in American history.[17]

World War II pushed leading progressive educators, including social reconstructionists, to modify their language. Writers in the reconstructionist journal *Frontiers of Democracy* increasingly positioned progressive, social education as uniquely suited to promote the defense of democracy in the United States and in the world, while explicitly rejecting fascism *and* communism.[18] At the same time, social meliorist and pedagogical progressive approaches to education, particularly Rugg's textbook series, came under attack from a range of conservative groups, including the Hearst Press and the American Legion.[19] Some school districts banned the books—many more simply did not renew orders. From 1938 to 1944, sales of the Rugg series decreased 90 percent.[20] Historians do not agree on the immediate effect or significance of this backlash: Ravitch argues that left-wing progressivism

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[15]William Kilpatrick, *The Educational Frontier* (New York: The Century Company, 1933).

[16]Andra Makler, "'Problems of Democracy' and the Social Studies Curriculum During the Long Armistice" in *Social Education in the Twentieth Century: Curriculum and Context for Citizenship*, ed. Christine Woyshner, Joseph Watras, and Margaret Smith Crocco (New York: Peter Lang, 2004), 20–41. See also Kliebard's analysis of Rugg's interpretation of World War I in *Changing Course*.

[17]Andra Makler, "'Problems of Democracy' and the Social Studies Curriculum"; Murry Robert Nelson, "Building a Science of Society: The Social Studies and Harold Rugg" (PhD dissertation, Stanford University, 1975); Evans, *The Social Studies Wars*, 46–69; Kliebard, *Changing Course*, 61–75.

[18]For examples of this shift in thinking, see Progressive Education Association, *Frontiers of Democracy* 6, no. 49 (December 1939): 68–69; *Frontiers of Democracy* 9, no. 71 (October 1942); *Frontiers of Democracy* 9, no. 73 (December) 1942.

[19]Robinson, Donald W. "Patriotism and Economic Control: The Censure of Harold Rugg"(EdD dissertation New Brunswick, NJ: Graduate School of Education, Rutgers University, 1983); Zimmerman, *Whose America*.

[20]Zimmerman, *Whose America*, 79.

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remained "the reigning ideology of American education" in 1945, while Evans argues that the K-12 curriculum controversy of the early 1940s "cast a pall over experimentation," and "cast an ideological shadow over reconstructionist and issues-oriented approaches."[21]

Universities experienced the similar progressive impulses in the early twentieth century, though changes tended toward add-ons and rhetoric, and much less toward fundamental reforms in curriculum and pedagogy. Between the Spanish American and First World Wars, for example, Frederick Rudolph argues that college and university leaders re-engaged the idea of service, promoting public lectures and extension programs, while student organizations such as honor societies, sports teams, service groups, student governments, and YMCAs reinvigorated campus life outside the classroom in loose alignment with the goals of progressivism. The Great Depression, Rudolph argues, "delivered the American colleges and universities over to this Dewey-like point of view." But even then, reformers had great difficulty implementing their ideas and overcoming institutional intransigence; such experiments occurred only at a few, isolated schools.[22]

One notable movement attempted to fundamentally reorient higher education by breaking down disciplinary boundaries. As with many progressive reforms, interdisciplinary studies had diverse roots.[23] Traditionally, classical language professors preferred an "area study" approach to language instruction, and by the eve of World Wear II, this practice had spread to other languages as well.[24] More broadly, the same intellectual forces that drove progressivism in the 1910s and 1920s—scientific method, research specialization, professionalism—resulted in a tug of war between increasingly specialized university faculty with narrow research agendas and a counter movement to create a core, liberal arts curriculum to turn students into well-rounded, effective citizens. Julie Klein argues that in some cases integrated and interdisciplinary studies grew naturally from the research itself (as some researchers borrowed each others methods or coordinated studies to target specific social problems), as well as from the calls of leading educationists.[25] The latter movement largely failed, however, argues

[21]Ravitch, *Left Back*, 322; Evans, *The Social Studies Wars*, 70.

[22]Frederick Rudolph, *The American College and University: A History* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1990), 359–71, 469, 475.

[23]Julie Thompson Klein, *Interdisciplinarity: History, Theory, and Practice* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1990), 24–26.

[24]Marshall K. Powers, "Area Studies," *The Journal of American Higher Education* 26, no. 2 (February 1955): 82–113.

[25]For another example of attempts at interdisciplinarity, see the story of the SRC in Donald Fisher, *Fundamental Development of the Social Sciences: Rockefeller Philanthorpy and the United States Social Science Research Council* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,

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Earnest Boyer, because of Depression-era retrenchment and continued faculty specialization.[26] By the late 1930s, a small area studies movement included scattered attempts to integrate curricula in a variety of fields.[27]

There was not an equivalent, explicitly "progressive" reform movement in military education during the early twentieth century. Nevertheless, some military educational leaders were aware of broader changes in American colleges and universities and exhibited a similar thrust toward applying science, efficiency, and pragmatism to curricular and pedagogical reform.[28] They also drew on European, especially German, models of officer education in a broader attempt to create a modern science of war. And as with public schools and higher education, these reform efforts penetrated Army institutions unevenly.[29]

West Point resisted. Founded in 1802, the United States Military Academy maintained nineteenth-century pedagogical traditions throughout the first half of the twentieth century, including the World War II era. The academic core of the academy was the Thayer system, which emphasized honor, discipline, and (traditional) academic excellence, especially in the area of engineering. West Point required students to give daily, graded recitations in traditional academic subjects and ranked them accordingly. The Thayer system rested on the theory of transference—that the skills developed in rigorous application of the mind to one set of intellectual exercises would transfer to other tasks.[30] In terms of language instruction, West point offered a narrow, traditional emphasis on written language and

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1993), 5. More generally see Kenton W. Worchester, *Social Science Research Council, 1923–1998* (New York: Social Science Research Council, 2001). Accessed 22 July 2009 from the SSRC website http://www.ssrc.org/publications/view/1F20C6E1-565F-DE11-BD80-001CC477EC70/.

[26]Klein, *Interdisciplinarity*, 19–24; Ernest L. Boyer, "The Quest for Common Learning," in *Common Learning: A Carnegie Colloquium on General Education* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, 1981), 4.

[27]Klein, *Interdisciplinarity*, 26–28.

[28]Timothy K. Nenninger, *The Leavenworth Schools and the Old Army: Education, Professionalism, and the Officer Corps of the United States Army, 1881–1918* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1978), 7.

[29]Martin van Creveld, *The Training of Military Officers: From Military Professionalism to Irrelevance* (New York: The Free Press, 1990), 57–65.

[30]Joseph Ellis and Robert Moore, *School for Soldiers: West Point and the Profession of Arms* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), 30–37. Herbert Y. Schandler, "Sylvanus Thayer," in *Professional Military Education in the United States: A Historical Dictionary*, ed. William E. Simons (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2000), 310–11; Samuel Watson, "Developing 'Republican Machines': West Point and the Struggle to Render the Officer Corps Safe for America, 1802–33," in *Thomas Jefferson's Military Academy: Founding West Point*, ed. Robert M.S. McDonald (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2004), 154–81.

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grammar (which would be useful in academic translation), and eschewed variety and spoken fluency that could be used in the field. West Point did not change this policy until 1947.[31]

Other officer-education institutions saw gradual growth and reform that paralleled progressive reforms across government and society. Generally speaking, the revolution in management and professionalization that swept American industrial society in the late nineteenth century lead to increasing standards and formal training programs for officers. Reforms crept slowly during the decades after the Civil War, however, until military leaders found the services thoroughly unprepared for the sudden demands of the Spanish-American War. Change came like a slap.[32] President Roosevelt and his Secretary of War, Elihu Root, launched an assault on the relatively haphazard and (by European standards, outmoded) traditions of military organization and officer education.[33]

Root, a former corporate lawyer and civilian, focused on organization and management, and his push for reform started a cycle of changes across the military that were exacerbated by America's participation in World War I. Root's overall vision was to eliminate the traditions of completely separate education for each branch, and instead to create a four-tiered system of officer education to forge a centralized, streamlined, and efficient military. At the lowest level, each post would provide basic courses in various fields. Above these, special service schools would provide training in areas like medicine, artillery, etc. Leavenworth would become a general service and staff college for all officers. At the top of this vision sat the U.S. Army War College, which would serve the most distinguished graduates of Leavenworth and would prepare a General Staff Corps for the War Department, charged with supervising all branches of the military, to research questions of efficiency and preparation, and to make plans for national defense and war.[34]

Root's reforms led to significant changes across the military, though not to the degree he had hoped. At Leavenworth, reformers increased admissions standards, brought in officers with a larger variety

[31] Patricia B. Genung, "Teaching Foreign Languages at West Point," in *West Point: Two Centuries and Beyond*, ed. Lance Betros (Abilene, TX: McWhiney Foundation Press, 2004), 507–32.

[32] Nenninger, *The Leavenworth Schools*, 34–50; Judith Hicks Stiehm, *The U.S. Army War College: Military Education in a Democracy* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2002), 25–27; Van Creveld, *The Training of Military Officers*, 60.

[33] Ibid., 57–61; Harry P. Ball, *Of Responsible Command: A History of the U.S. Army War College* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: The Alumni Association of the United States Army War College, 1983), 21–40.

[34] Ball, *Of Responsible Command*, 59–82.

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of specialties, reduced the program to one year (expanded to two years from 1927 to 1936), and focused on subjects that were common to the Army as a whole, not just a particular branch. The curriculum engaged two major areas: preparation for war and the conduct of war. The former was largely academic and didactic. The latter focused on war gaming—that is, preparing plans for hypothetical wars, and included paper work and fieldwork. The curriculum, and its delivery retained its nineteenth-century traditions, however. There was no focus on the economic, social, or political context of war, or the people and societies with whom the United States might make war. Despite decades of reforms, during the 1930s the "Leavenworth mind" was still synonymous with rote learning, recounts historian Martin van Creveld, and the curriculum was said to produce "mental indigestion."[35]

Root achieved his most successful educational reform with the creation of the U.S. Army War College. At first, the college served as a collegium—a place where colleagues work together through mutual study to solve problems. Permanent and student officers worked together in small "committees," each focusing on a particular geographic area. To aid them, the college invited guest lecturers. The essential thrust of the seven-month (later changed to a full year) course was planning and problem solving, the application of knowledge, not the imparting of it.[36] Groups presented their solutions to the college as a whole.[37] College President Tasker Bliss also assigned problems to individual students on subjects such as changing weapons technology, recruitment issues, and railroad management. Later leaders modified this curriculum, adding battlefield studies and map exercises, for example.[38]

In 1907, pressing demand for officers caused by America's growing global empire led the Army to abandon the collegium model in favor of explicit officer training. Nevertheless, much of the problem-solving orientation of the original design endured. By the mid-1930s, the War College curriculum consisted of the same divide as Leavenworth: preparation for war and conduct of war. Committees consisted entirely of students, with the task of solving specific problems by gathering information from lectures and research. In addition, groups

[35]Van Creveld, *The Training of Military Officers*, 61 (see endnote 59); Nenninger, *The Leavenworth Schools*, 53–79.

[36]Edgar F. Raines, Jr., "Tasker H. Bliss," in *Professional Military Education in the United States: A Historical Dictionary*, ed. William E. Simons (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2000), 78–82; Ball, *Of Responsible Command*, 88–93.

[37]Ibid., 95.

[38]Ibid., 100–1.

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engaged in mapping exercises and a course called "Analytical Studies" which included comparative examinations of historical examples.[39]

The Origin and Development of the CATP

What the War Department wanted at the start of World War II (through the Military Government Division of the Office of the Provost Marshal General [PMGO]), was something new: to build a corps of expertly trained officers to assist in the potentially massive duties of military government if and when the United States defeated the Axis powers. In retrospect, the policy seems obvious—even prescient. At the time it was incoherent and ad hoc, evolving rapidly in relation to the creation of other military programs.[40] Despite its development outside of the educational establishment, however, the civil affairs program that the Army developed at Stanford and elsewhere was oddly, and strikingly, progressive.

Traditionally, military and political leaders in the United States assumed that civil governance was not the proper function of the Army. Nevertheless the United States military had nearly a century of military government experience, from the government of Mexican civilians during the Mexican-American War to the invasion of the Philippines. This experience ranged, in the words of one historian, "from inadequate to near-disastrous."[41] In response to the inept and inadequate handling of the military administration of post-World War I Germany, however, Colonel Irwin Hunt wrote a major report that challenged the traditional avoidance of responsibility for civil administration. Hunt called for the military to train specialists in civil affairs, including teaching them the language and background of the regions they would administer.[42] With the large-scale demobilization and swing toward isolationism in the 1920s, however, the report made little impact.

With the outbreak of hostilities in the late 1930s, however, the Army War College revisited the *Hunt Report* and began to consider a more coherent approach to military governance in occupied territories.[43] Building on the *Hunt Report*, The Judge Advocate General's Office wrote a 1940 pamphlet FM27-5, *Military Government*, to make

[39]Ibid., 226–29.

[40]Louis E. Keefer, *Scholars in Foxholes: The Story of the Army Specialized Training Program in World War II* (London: McFarland, 1988).

[41] Earl F. Ziemke, "Civil Affairs Reaches Thirty," *Military Affairs* 36, no. 4 (December 1972): 130–33.

[42]Irwin Hunt, *American Military Government in Occupied Germany* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1920).

[43]Ziemke, "Civil Affairs," 131; Joseph P. Harris, "Selection and Training of Civil Affairs Officers," *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 7, no. 4 (Winter 1943): 694–706.

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the first-ever official statement of the "purposes, policies, and procedures," of U.S. military government during an occupation. Despite some objections within the military, in September of 1941 the Judge Advocate General, Major General Allen W. Gullion, and Brigadier General Wade H. Haislip recommended creating a civil affairs training program. This plan soon grew to include an entire School of Military Government, located at the University of Virginia at Charlotte. After Pearl Harbor, the declaration of martial law in Hawai'i and plans to intern a large number of Japanese civilians increased the need for specialists in civil affairs.[44]

To conceptualize and oversee civil affairs or "military government" programs (some used the terms synonymously, some drew sharp distinctions between them), General Guillion turned not to an educational specialist, but to lawyer named Jesse Miller who had been working as a pro-bono advisor to the Judge Advocate's Office, and soon put Colonel Miller at the head of a new Military Government Division. Miller borrowed an administrative analyst from the Bureau of Budget named Charles Hyneman to help him interact with the academic world. (In his civilian life, Hyneman had been a political scientist at Louisiana State University.)[45] Miller made Hyneman the Chief of the Training Branch of the Military Government Division of the PMGO, meaning that he was the official liaison between the Miller's office and the universities.[46]

Colonel Miller had to educate three groups of people. First, he needed to design the program for the school of military government at Charlotte, which would train the high-ranking headquarters administrators of future military governments. This program focused, in Miller's vision, on the field of laws, regulations, and procedures in military government, with secondary consideration for knowledge of the occupied area.[47] Second, the Army would require military police training and low-level non-commissioned officers for work in occupied areas. For this group, Miller's office folded its needs into the newly created, nation-wide ASTP program, which already planned to offer college courses to civilians and military personnel in a variety of fields.[48]

[44]Ibid., 131.

[45]A brief biography comes from "Guide to the Charles S. Hyneman Papers," Indiana University Archives. It is available online at http://www.letrs.indiana.edu. Information accessed and downloaded by the author on 20 July 2006.

[46] Charles Hyneman, "The Army's Civil Affairs Training Program," *American Political Science Review* 38, no. 2 (April 1944): 342–53; Charles Hyneman, "The Wartime Area and Language Courses," *American Association of University Professors Bulletin* 31, no. 3 (Autumn 1945): 434–47.

[47]Harris, "Selection and Training."

[48]Hyneman, "Wartime Area and Language Courses," 435; Keefer, *Scholars in Foxholes*, 48; V. R. Cardozier, *Colleges and Universities in World War II* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993).

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Finally, Miller needed to develop a program that would educate middle-level, specialized staff to work under the top military administrators. The new program would be known as the Civil Affairs Training Program (CATP), with individual sites at select universities referred to as CATS.[49]

Participants at the time and later historians differ slightly in their account of the origins of Miller's designs, but most agree on what were the significant influences. The first came from abroad. The British military had been operating military governments in the field since 1940, and had organized special courses and a full-fledged program in civil affairs. These programs emphasized expertise in specialized functions of civil affairs—especially police and firefighting—and offered in-depth study of the society and culture of a particular region to which the officers might be assigned. Most instruction was in the form of lecture, with weekly field trips to inspect facilities, such as a hospital or police station. At the end of the full civil affairs program, students completed a simulated experience called CASCADE, which created a series of crisis scenarios, communicated through written messages to and from headquarters.[50]

Miller modeled his programs on the British example, on recommendations of the *Hunt Report*, the Judge Advocate's *Military Government*, the Army War College, and his own imagination. He designed the Civil Affairs Training Programs at Stanford and elsewhere in the context of developing their sister programs: the School of Military Government at Charlotte, and the ASTP. First, Miller designed the four-month course for Charlotte. Officer-students at Charlotte in 1942 studied army organization and staff functions, international law, military government, public administration, and liaison with civilians. Officer-students also studied, to a lesser extent, "political-military backgrounds," which focused on the "strategic, geographic, economic, social and psychological factors" present in Axis-controlled areas—probably an inspiration from the British programs and *Hunt Report* alike.[51] The program for training military police and low-level specialists that Miller folded into the ASTP contained two elements that had a profound influence on the subsequent design of the CATP: language and area studies. Miller and Hyneman drew up the curriculum

[49]Harris, "Selection and Training"; Hyneman, "The Army's Civil Affairs Training Program"; Robert John Matthew, *Language and Area Studies in the Armed Services: Their Future Significance* (Washington, DC: American Council on Education, 1947), 75.

[50]"Memorandum to: The Commandant Subject: Report on the British Civil Affairs School," 2 June 1943, box 13–14, CATS collection; Ziemke, "Civil Affairs;" John F. Embree, "American Military Government," in *Social Structure: Studies presented to A. R. Radcliffe-Brown*, ed. Meyer Fortes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949), 207–25, 210.

[51]Hyneman, "The Army's Civil Affairs Training Program."

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to be inserted in ASTP, including basic courses in military police administration, language training, and area studies. Miller and Hyneman played almost no role in developing the language program. Instead, they contacted the Secretary of the American Council of Learned Societies (ACLS), which had recently developed an Intensive Language Program for American colleges and universities with grants from the Rockefeller Foundation.[52] For area study (later called "area relationships"), Miller and Hyneman sketched out what they wanted and then hired University of Wisconsin political science professor Harold W. Stoke to organize a standard curriculum.[53]

The final design of the CATP stitched together these three components: intensive language study, area study, and the problems of military government. None had come directly from the progressive educational establishment. The ACLS Intensive Language Program grew out of methods developed by linguists studying Native American languages in the 1910s.

Most indigenous languages did not have alphabets, literature, or (in many cases) large populations of native speakers. Linguists such as Franz Boas found traditional methods for learning these languages inadequate. According to these linguistic scientists, traditional language instruction focused too much on writing and not enough on speaking; it applied abstract rules of grammar that did not reflect how people actually used language, it did not expose students to native speakers and gave students far too little time on task.[54] Instead, ACLS program students met in large lectures with linguistics experts to learn "phonetic analysis and transcription," including the basic patterns of the language and some traditional grammar. Students then broke into small sections led by native speakers or "informants," who would emphasize conversation and drill. In some sense, the informant became the textbook from which students, armed with the linguist's tools, could study.[55] The ACLS

[52]Paul F. Angiolillo, *Armed Forces' Foreign Language Teaching: Critical Evaluation and Implications* (New York: S. F. Vanni, 1947), 23.

[53]Hyneman, "The Army's Civil Affairs Training Program"; Hyneman, "The Wartime Area and Language Courses"; Matthew, "Language and Area Studies"; Ziemke, "Civil Affairs."

[54]Angiolillo, *Armed Forces' Foreign Language Teaching*, 17–42; Leonard Bloomfield, *Language* (New York: Holt and Company, 1933); Leonard Bloomfield, *Guide for the Practical Study of Foreign Languages* (Baltimore: Linguistic Society of America, 1942); Robert A. Hall, "Progress and Reaction in Modern Language Teaching," *American Association of University Professors Bulletin* 31, no. 2 (Summer 1945): 220–30; Mario A. Pei, "A Modern Language Teacher Replies," *American Association of University Professors Bulletin* 31, no. 3 (Autumn 1945): 409–17.

[55] John S. Diekhoff, "The Army Mission and the Method of Army Language Teaching," *American Association of University Professors Bulletin* 31, no. 4 (Winter 1945): 606–20; Hall, "Progress and Reaction"; Pei, "A Modern Language Teacher Replies."

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skirted the most popular modern languages already taught in high schools, colleges, and universities—French, German, Spanish, Italian—and focused instead on twenty-five little-studied languages that might be useful in the war effort, such as Chinese, Japanese, Malay, Arabic, and Haussa.[56] Before being officially tapped for the ASTP and CATP programs, the ACLS Intensive Language Program had already spread to eighteen colleges and universities.[57]

Despite the charge by critics that the best parts of the Intensive Language Program were old wine in new bottles, Miller picked it as a model for the Army programs. The military did not necessarily endorse the linguistic science method, but appreciated the program's emphasis on practical, spoken language, on large amounts of contact time, on small classes, the possibility of teaching a huge variety of languages, and the reliance on staff who needed no formal training.[58] Language instruction in this form cost approximately twice as much as a traditional college class, but paid off many times more than that in contact time and practical application.[59] By March of 1943, the Intensive Language Program had become an integral part of the plan for the CATP, and Miller and Hyneman were consulting with university faculty representatives about how to integrate language instruction effectively into the area study curriculum.[60]

Miller's office played a more direct role in developing the Area Relationships curriculum. Miller and Hyneman developed basic area overviews for the School of Military Government at Charlotte, modifying and expanding these for the ATSP, and finally tailoring them to the CATP. The idea came from civil affairs training in Britain (and not, as an enthusiastic study by the American Council on Education claimed, from the creation of area study programs at a few colleges and universities).[61] Miller then hired University of Wisconsin political scientist Harold Stoke to help coordinate a committee of scholars to

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[56]Angiolillo, *Armed Forces' Foreign Language Teaching*, 24.

[57]Hyneman, "The Wartime Area and Language Courses," 437.

[58]Pei, "A Modern Language Teacher Replies"; Deikhoff, "The Army Mission and the Method."

[59] A.E. Sokol, "The Army Language Program," *The Journal of Higher Education* 17, no. 1 (January 1946): 9–16; Deikhoff, "The Army Mission and the Method." Originally, the military did not consider language instruction to be a necessary part of the Civil Affairs Training Program. See Paul Hanna, "Possible curriculum for 'military administration of reoccupation' school." 19 December 1942. CATS collection, box 31–32.

[60]"Conference: Training of Officer Candidates Called by the Military Government Division, OPMG," CATS collection box 27–23.

[61]Robert John Matthew, *Language and Area Studies in the Armed Services: Their Future Significance* (Washington, DC: American Council on Education, 1947), xiii; Ziemke, "Civil Affairs."

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write a curriculum blueprint for all specific areas of study.[62] The resulting plan organized the study of a given area into general, multidisciplinary categories: Place, People, How They Make a Living, How They are Governed, How Do They Live, and Historical Background & Contemporary World Affairs. Within these categories, students would learn everything from a nation's currency, climate, and culture, to its legal system, political parties, and recent history. In terms of pedagogy, teachers were to employ lectures, supervised project work, discussions and other assignments.[63]

The need for practical application of area study and language led to the third component of the CATP—the "problems of military government" curriculum. Miller first developed the idea for problems-based instruction at Charlotte. A 1942 outline of the Charlotte curriculum described the method of instruction:

1. Lectures with discussions.
2. Lecture conferences with individual analyses of hypothetical problems.
3. Committee work. Preparation of proclamations, ordinances, general orders, etc.; organization and operation of military government under various contingencies; group problem solutions including plans for the civil administration of specific areas with presentations to the class and criticisms by class and faculty.
4. Individual research and study.[64]

Simulations of the demands of the field required students to work in groups as well as individually. Recognition of the potential expertise and prior knowledge of students, as well as a genuine concern for their understanding, necessarily encouraged discussion within the lecture format. In addition to an explicit "problems" curriculum, each CATS was responsible for creating problems assignments in area studies, (later, in language instruction, too), and for use as culminating activities.[65]

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[62]Hyneman "The Wartime Area and Language Courses," 438; "Biography." Harold W. Stoke Papers. University of New Hampshire Archives. Available online at http://www.izaak.unh.edu/archives/holdings/ua2/1-8.shtml. Accessed and downloaded by author on 20 July 2006; Cardozier, *Colleges and Universities in World War II*, 32.

[63]Matthew *Language and Area Studies*, 58–60, 77–78.

[64]War Department School of Military Government, Charlotte, Virginia. "Second Course, September–December, 1942, Outline of Curriculum," CATS collection box 57–64.

[65]Memorandum for Directors, Associate Directors, and Language Directors, CATS. Subject: Use of Field Office Problems in Language Instruction. CATS collection box 2, folder 2; Hyneman "The Wartime Area and Language Courses," 444; Ziemke, "Civil Affairs," 132.

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Implementation at Stanford

As did major universities across the nation, Stanford University attached itself to the purse and purposes of the War Department when the United States mobilized for World War II.[66] Stanford was well poised to do so. During the 1930s, decreasing enrollments and increasing reliance on tuition had led the university to lower academic and admissions standards, but also spurred the administration to launch an aggressive campaign to win large private contracts.[67] Initially this effort failed, but the attack on Pearl Harbor presented what would become the solution to Stanford's woes. Even if America's entry into the war threatened to erode enrollment and hasten the defection of faculty, it promised huge government contracts for training and research. Stanford's administration, already aggressively chasing private contracts, attempted to reorganize the university to align it with the needs of the military.[68]

Within months, Education professor Paul Hanna joined University Secretary Paul Davis in convincing the Stanford administration to woo the military. Hanna played the leading role in his capacity as Director of University Services. President Ray Lyman Wilbur, and the most powerful trustee, Herbert Hoover, had staunchly resisted working with the federal government in the 1930s; nevertheless the lure of contractual work appealed to their business orientation and seemed to shield the university from too much intrusion. Hanna and Davis set up shop in Washington and eagerly sought personal connections and formed networks.[69] From 1942 to 1945, their efforts profoundly altered the university. Defense-related contracts brought in over half a million dollars.[70] Even more significant were training programs, which brought money *and* students. By contract with the U.S. Office of Education in 1942, Stanford offered fifty-four classes as part of the nationwide Engineering, Science, and Management War Training (ESMWT) program. This program offered courses to students in

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[66]Thelin, *A History of American Higher Education*; Laurence R. Vesey, *The Emergence of the American University* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965); Rebecca Lowen, *Creating the Cold War University: The Transformation of Stanford* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); Charles Dorn, "Promoting the 'Public Welfare' in Wartime: Stanford University during World War I," *American Journal of Education* 112, no. 1 (November 2005): 103–28.

[67]Thelin *A History of American Higher Education*, 243–45.

[68]Lowen, *Creating the Cold War University*, 70; Dorn, "Promoting the 'Public Welfare,'" 106–7.

[69]Lowen *Creating the Cold War University*, 56–57; Jared Stallones, *Paul Robert Hannah: A Life of Expanding Communities* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institute Press, 2002), 92–100.

[70]Stuart W. Leslie, The Cold War and American Science: The Military-Industrial Academic Complex at MITand Stanford (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 1–13; Lowen, *Creating the Cold War University*, 57.

defense-related fields, and included several courses designed specifically for women.[71] By contract with the U.S. Army, the university offered courses for enlisted men in the Army Specialized Training Program (ASTP), which would eventually bring a total of nearly 12,000 military personnel to campus during the war.[72]

The letter that Stanford Chancellor Ray Wilbur received from Paul Hanna in December of 1942 dated one day after the War Department announced the ASTP, then, may have been a surprise, but it was a welcomed one. A representative from the War Department had met with Hanna and Davis in Washington seeking a proposal for another special training program for "personnel who will have charge of the Military Administration of Reoccupation" in East Asia and Europe. The military was seeking as many as a dozen universities to offer 2,500 officers special training in various aspects of civil affairs, such as public health, education, and transportation, combined with the study of the social, political, economic, and ideological institutions of the regions in question. Hanna wanted course materials, names of faculty, and a prospectus each for a German program and a Japanese one, and he wanted them quick. "We realize that Christmas holidays may make it very difficult to get this material to us promptly," he wrote, "but we need it very soon if we are to be effective in presenting Stanford's distinctive claim."[73] By March a committee of faculty and administrators (without Hanna) had drafted a proposal, and the university was sending a team of representatives (including Hanna) to a Chicago conference of representatives from the ten universities making proposals. The bid was successful.[74]

Paul Hanna's position at the forefront of Stanford's efforts would suggest that he played a lead role in shaping the military programs at the University, especially considering his credentials as a leading meliorist-oriented, progressive educator. Indeed, Hanna himself won a consulting contract in 1942 to design schools for Japanese-American children whom the federal government incarcerated in internment camps. Hanna's Stanford courses were problems-based and disciplinarily integrated. Hanna even hoped to reorganize the entire university around a "regional University" model that emphasized problems-based curriculum relevant to

[71]Dorn, "Promoting the Public Welfare,'" 108.

[72]Leslie, *The Cold War and American Science*, 1–13; Lowen, *Creating the Cold War University*, 57; Dorn, "Promoting the 'Public Welfare' in Wartime," 108, 111–12; Cardozier, *Colleges and Universities in World War II*, 37–44.

[73]Hanna, Paul R. Memorandum to Chancellor Ray Lyman Wilbur, 19 December 1942, CATS collection 31–32, Hoover Institute Archives, Stanford University.

[74]Memorandum by Paul Hanna dated 10 March 1943, and "Proposed School of Military Government at Stanford University," Revised 3/10/44, box 27–33 CATS collection.

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the region as well as the war effort.[75] But it was in his capacity as administrator, and not educationist, that Hanna connected Stanford to the American military. The Civil Affairs Training Program arrived at the University's doorstep with a vision and program outline already in place.[76]

From August 1943 to August 1945 Stanford implemented the CATP curriculum in two successive one-year programs on Europe and the Far East, each consisting of three terms.[77] The programs followed the curriculum guide developed by Miller's office, but contained modifications and additions by the program directors and faculty, including an elaborate culminating activity. If the military's design promoted many pedagogically progressive features, the implementation of the curriculum—especially with the intense scrutiny on teaching for understanding, practical application, and responding to the needs of the officer-students—only served to reinforce them.

From the beginning, the military found it difficult to recruit for the CATP. In Britain, the military drew from the ranks of colonial administrators for its civil affairs training, getting officers used to governing in a foreign context. The American military had no equivalent population, and turned instead to officers from "business, industry law, the regular army, and the other professions."[78] These officers had to score high on intelligence tests and demonstrate proficiency in a second language. The military then recruited and classified them by their functional expertise or training, and tried to assemble balanced cohorts for each school. The Stanford CATS in the spring of 1945 included, for example, an aide to the Commissioner of the NYPD, a cannery owner, the Executive Secretary of the Free Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen, a professor of Physical Education from Humbolt State College, an FBI operative, and a PR man for a power company. The cohort included several Canadians and a few WACs (Women's Air Corps).[79]

The daily and weekly schedule of the Stanford CATS met the mandates of the military. From 8 a.m. to noon, six days per week, officer-students met for language instruction. They did not spend the entire time in one class, however, but rotated among large group lectures with

[75]Thomas James, *Exile Within: The Schooling of Japanese Americans, 1942–1945* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1987); Stallones, *Paul Robert Hannah*, 63–68; Dorn, "Promoting the 'Public Welfare' in Wartime," 107.

[76]There is no evidence of Hanna's involvement in designing or overseeing the program at Stanford in either the CATS papers or the Hanna papers kept at the Hoover Library at Stanford University.

[77]Ten universities won Civil Affairs Training Schools: Yale, Harvard, Michigan, Chicago, Boston, Pittsburgh, Wisconsin, Northwestern, Western Reserve (now Case Western Reserve), and Stanford. See Harris, "Selection and Training," 697.

[78]Harris, "Selection and Training," 701.

[79]CATS collection, boxes 21–25.

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the main instructor, small-group meetings of five to ten students with an informant, and mandatory study periods. The European program grouped students by ability. Instruction varied from instructor to instructor, and much depended on the particular informant who led the daily small-group sessions. One informant in the French program recalled integrating the problems curriculum into his lessons, requiring his small section of five students to act out practical scenarios playing such roles as "mayor," and "director of public works."[80] An observer of another informant, however, estimated that he spent two-thirds of the time talking himself, not letting the officer-students get enough practice.[81] Staffing problems plagued the first term of Stanford's Far East language program. While *Nisei* (American-born Japanese) informants awaited security clearance, Korean and Anglo teachers ran sections. When the *Nesei* informants trickled into the program, they ended up in classrooms mid-term, without any formal training in the Intensive Language Program. Nevertheless, "most" of the *Nisei* informants in the Far Eastern program, the director reported, adjusted well.[82]

After an hour for lunch, students typically spent weekday afternoons studying area relationships and special problems in military government, watching an occasional evening film, performing mandatory physical exercise, and completing periodic military training drills, including weekend trips. Area classes met for nearly two hours, with a ten-minute break. Over time, however, the way in which the Stanford CATS covered these various parts of Miller's curriculum plan changed. The historical emphasis diminished; some specific topics, such as "Special Courts in Germany" disappeared altogether either because faculty or students did not find them useful or because, in other cases, the program could not find qualified instructors. The first term, beginning in August, 1943, had three distinct areas of study: Germany and Western Europe, Central Europe (without Germany), and the Balkans. The remaining terms, however, covered a common curriculum, and the directors organized small study groups to allow officer-students the chance to review information together before exams.[83]

[80]Pfc. Gustave Mathieu, "French Language Instruction of Officers Attending CATS at Stanford University," 18 March 1944, CATS collection, box 36 folder 5.

[81]Charles Hyneman. "Some Observations on the CATS, Stanford University, Inspected October 18th, 19th, 20th 1943," CATS collection, box 28 folder 8.

[82]H.H. Fisher, "Comments on the Course," [fall] 1944, CATS collection, box 36, folder 4; H.H. Fisher to Donald Tresidder, "Final Report of the Far Eastern program carried on in the Civil Affairs Training School," 14 September 1945, CATS collection, box 36, folder 5.

[83]H.H. Fisher to Donald Tresidder, "Final Report of the Far Eastern program carried on in the Civil Affairs Training School," 14 September 1945, CATS collection, box 36, folder 5, 10–11.

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Although area relationships instructors relied initially on traditional lectures, over time they and the administration modified these or developed alternatives in response to student complaints.[84] During the first term in particular, the newness of the area relationships course, combined with its lack of a central text, led to problematic syllabi and a disjointed experience as students tried to piece together understandings from seemingly unrelated lectures and readings. The final report for the first year of the Stanford CATS announced the modifications that faculty and administration made to their lectures as if they were new discoveries: summarizing main points, allowing time for questions and answers, and using a well-organized syllabus with clear objectives, lists of readings, main points, and special notes.[85] Aside from improving lectures, directors and faculty organized a "field studies" component—common at other CATS programs too—which took students off campus to inspect local civilian facilities. They developed the "Stanford Panel," an unusual application of the instructor/informant methodology of the Intensive Language Program. The panel consisted of an expert or experts, called informants, and an "inquisitor" who knew "how to extract the information from the informants, how to relate it to the American experience of the officer students and, if necessary, how to translate it into technical terms or expressions, and an opportunity for questions from the house." Not only was this a good way to transmit an expert's knowledge, the Stanford CATS director reported, but it also protected the minds of officers by controlling and filtering information. It was a "good method of keeping a man with foreign area knowledge from "propagandizing" one particular view."[86]

The third piece of the curriculum, problems of military government, required students to integrate and apply their academic training, and represented the most pedagogically progressive of the program's components. The Stanford CATS grouped officer students into sections of eight to ten students with diverse areas of expertise, including one section leader, usually the highest-ranking officer in the group. The problems that students encountered in the third term of the European program, for example, included four increasingly elaborate scenarios involving the changing governments, food shortages, natural and humanitarian crises, and political intrigue in various regions of Europe. For each situation, individual officer-students were required to prepare written and oral solutions.[87]

[84]"Civil Affairs Training Program Explanatory Notes to Accompany Curricula," 5 January 1944, box 27, folder 2.

[85]Ibid., 15–16.

[86]Ibid., 13.

[87]Directives Concerning Case Problems, CATS collection, box 7, folder 3; H.H. Fisher to Donald Tresidder, "Report on the Civil Affairs Training School," 15 April 1944, CATS collection, box 25, folder 2.

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The Far Eastern CATS did not offer problems as a separate course for the first two terms because administrators thought that officer-students could use more time for military government and area relationships. The administration regretted it. The director reported that "it was felt that such problems were essential to provide the officer students with sufficient purpose so that they would devote themselves intelligently to area study." The program offered only one of the planned problems for the third term, however, as the time required by of the rest of the course was too great. Nevertheless, the Far East program made an effort to incorporate practical problems of civil affairs into existing aspects of the curriculum for both CATS programs, from the small discussion groups in the language program to the exam questions for area studies. During the second half of terms I and II of the Far East Program, the administration grouped students by specialty to prepare written reports for the reference of others not well-versed in their area. Even if a separate "problems" course did not take hold in the Far East program, the idea of using a problems-based approach still played a role in the curriculum.[88]

The administration considered the culminating activity, the Civil Affairs Training School Actual Demonstration Exercise (CATSADE), to be its finest innovation, although it was modeled on a similar exercise at the British program. CATSADE attempted to simulate the actual conditions of a civil affairs office in a foreign country over the course of a day (in the European CATS) and two days (in the case of the Far Eastern CATS). Students were grouped into specialty areas and assigned a table, which would serve as their office, while core faculty set up a headquarters. Faculty, staff, and even some *Nisei* soldiers recruited from Fort Ord, played assigned roles as townspeople, public officials, messengers, translators, and military personnel. Students were given the background situation in advance. The settings were, respectively, the city of Koln (in the Rhine Province) and the city of Nagasaki. Beginning at 8 a.m., messages shot out from headquarters to the various desks, reporting an escalating number of problems: in Kohn, families of refugees are requesting their return, a shortage of bakers has led to a bread crisis, and the Vicar-General wants to restart a Catholic youth organization and publish a Catholic newspaper; on the outskirts of Nagasaki, peasants are abandoning their farms in protest of land-rent policies, children are running wild because the schools have been bombed, and some bad canned fish is going around. Student-officers

[88]H.H. Fisher to Donald Tresidder, "Final Report of the Far Eastern program carried on in the Civil Affairs Training School," 14 September 1945, CATS collection, box 36, folder 5, 11–13.

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followed up with characters involved in the situation, made evaluations, and issued statements or directives, all according to procedure. At the end of the session, faculty and officer-students debriefed.[89]

What did officer students think of the Stanford CATS? Periodic student-officer meetings and a suggestion box gave participants the opportunity to express their views. Even considering the obvious constraints of using these complaints as evidence—given their filtration through administrative channels—existing reports on student feedback suggest that students were generally happy with the program. CATS participants' most extensive complaints concerned living conditions and campus life. In terms of the content of the courses, they complained of redundant lectures, inadequate course materials, and poor instructors. Officer-students in the European CATS suggested that special one-hour discussions on "the preservation of arts and monuments" and "censorship" be canceled and their basic points be conveyed elsewhere. A few, probably older, officer-students requested that physical training be made more age-appropriate. Most students did not comment on pedagogy. The few who did wrote that some lectures and panels of experts made them "go to sleep." They asked that these classes "be split up in small groups and the instruction be carried on in seminars." Some officer-students also wanted the course to be more practical. In area relations they wanted less focus on the "social nicety of life in Japan while real problems facing the CAOs did not receive enough time."[90] Echoing the lament of the Director's final report, the Japanese program students expressed frustration at the lack of a stronger problems-based focus. In an interview some sixty years later, one participant vividly remembered the applied aspects of the program and felt that her training had been excellent.[91]

Internal evaluations by the Director, H.H. Fisher, and formal inspections by Hyneman lauded the program in general terms. Despite some minor problems, Hyneman called the first course in 1943 "very much a success." He explained, "The morale among the officers was very high. The men who direct the training are interested and enthusiastic. All the faculty are deeply concerned about the needs of

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[89]Ibid.; "Civil Affairs Training School At Stanford University, Memorandum by Lieutenant Lester Goodman U.S.N.R., 25 February 1944, CATS collection, box 25-31; "Report on CATSADE, CATS collection, box 11, folder 1.

[90]"Suggestions made by officers of Class III in group meetings held 28 June 1945," CATS collection, box 26, folder 2; "Memorandum for Mr. H.H. Fisher. Subject: Suggestions for the Improvement of the CATS," 2 November 1944, CATS collection, box 36, folder 4.

[91]Interview with Alba [Martinelli] Thompson, conducted 25 April 2006 at 1 p.m. at her home in Plymouth, Massachusetts. In possession of author.

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the officers and work overtime in order to meet those needs."[92] Subsequent evaluations by the Director, H.H. Fisher, continued to make positive, upbeat pronouncements. According to the writings of those who ran it, the CATS program was a success.

Clash of Cultures

The presence of the CATS at Stanford led to clashes between the cultures of the educational and military establishments. Whether it was the life of the student or the progressive qualities of the instruction, participation in CATS seems to have had a corrosive effect on the traditional discipline and decorum of the student-officers. A professor from the Chicago Far East CATS program recalled that "it was difficult at first for such mature men to adjust themselves to a beginner status ... Frequently there took place a kind of reversion to schoolboy psychology: note passing, glee if an instructor canceled a class, a disinclination to ask questions at the end of an hour."[93] Stanford CATS Director H.H. Fisher observed that, while officer-students were, generally speaking, "deeply interested in their work," there were some who "do not make full use of their study time," especially for foreign languages. "It is doubtful whether this latter group will finish the course with sufficient knowledge ... to do them much good."[94] Likewise, the Executive of the Military Government Division sent a blistering memorandum to the liaison officers at the CATS programs across the country, complaining that "This office has received from various sources complaints to the effect that officers in CATS do not maintain proper military bearing and appearance, and are lax in respect to military courtesy."[95]

The process of recruiting officer-students for the CATS program emphasized expertise and success outside of the academic world, and high intelligence scores, but it did not necessarily select for good students. (The typical participant ranged in age from 35 to 50 and made a comfortable annual income of $3,550–$4,500).[96] A 1944

[92]Charles Hyneman. "Some Observations on the CATS, Stanford University, Inspected October 18th, 19th, 20th 1943," CATS collection, box 28, folder 8; H.H. Fisher, "Comments on the Course," [fall] 1944, CATS collection, Box 36, folder 4. See also, H.H. Fisher to Donald Tresidder, "Final Report of the Far Eastern program carried on in the Civil Affairs Training School," 14 September 1945, CATS collection, box 36, folder 5.

[93]Embree, "American Military Government," 212.

[94]H.H. Fisher, "Comments on the Course," [fall] 1944, CATS collection, box 36, folder 4.

[95]Major H.E. Robinson, "Military Courtesy and Discipline," Memorandum to all CATS program directors, 5 January 1944, CATS collection, box 27, folder 2.

[96]Vernon O'Reilly, "Hoover Library Helps Students Training to Rule Japs," *The San Francisco News*, 31 January 1945, Newspaper Clipping from CATS collection, box 13,

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curriculum guide for the European CATS teachers drew a carefully worded distinction between poor students and good ones, the "blueprint reader" and the "book reader," and urged instructors to keep their lectures at a level that the former could understand and appreciate.[97]

The military's need for secrecy, intellectual uniformity, and national security posed problems for the intellectual culture of the university, which emphasized openness and the free flow of information.[98] ASTP and CATS students could not take classes with civilians or students outside their program, and were forbidden to discuss their classes in public.[99] An interdepartmental memo from Stanford CATS administrators in 1943 warned the University administration not to discuss the size or nature of the program with the press—the PMGO and CATS would release information at their discretion.[100] An obvious tension also existed between the academic emphasis on interpretation and causation and the military's need for clear purposes and unquestioning obedience to official policies. In the area studies courses, Miller's office discouraged CATS faculty from offering historical "interpretations," but sticking as much as possible to facts. Certainly they should not offer interpretations that deviated from the U.S. government's own needs. A directive to ASTP faculty, for example, urged "avoiding the tendency on the one hand of belittling the importance of America's part in the world drama and avoiding, on the other hand, the tendency to gloss over the Nation's failures and shortcomings."[101]

The Army even policed the terminology used to describe the programs. In May 1943, Paul Hanna relayed the concerns of General Beukema to Stanford Chancellor Ray Lyman Wilbur on the subject: the "Importance of the name of our training unit for Foreign Area and Language." The memo referred directly to the ASTP program, but applied to the Stanford CATS as well. "Some of the ambassadors in

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folder 7. For the age range, see Hyneman "The Army's Civil Affairs Training Program," 344.

[97]"Civil Affairs Training Program, Curriculum: Central and Western Europe," 5 January 1944, CATS collection, box 27, folder 2.

[98]One of the primary concerns that University faculty across the nation expressed after Pearl Harbor, even as they embraced aiding the government in the war effort, was that the mistakes of World War I not be repeated—especially the violations of academic freedom, red-baiting, and intense xenophobia. See George F. Zook, "How the Colleges Went to War," *Annals of the American Academy of Political Science* 231 (January 1944): 1–7; Cardozier, *Colleges and Universities in World War II*, 4–6; Keefer, *Scholars in Foxholes*, 16–17; Carol S. Gruber, *Mars and Minerva: World War One and the Uses of Higher Learning in America* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1975).

[99]Cardozier, *Colleges and Universities in World War II*, 25.

[100]CATS collection, box 13, folder 7.

[101]As cited in Keefer, *Scholars in Foxholes*, 49.

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Washington, namely the Turkish, the Dutch, etc., are objecting strenuously to the fact that the United States Army is training military governors with a curriculum including their language and their area characteristics. They raise the question as to whether our Armies intend to occupy and govern Turkey and Dutch possessions." The General told Hanna that Stanford must avoid any reference to "military government" or "occupied territory" in correspondence, written materials, signs on doors, in lectures, or even conversations.[102]

Nowhere was the clash of the military and educational worlds more apparent than on the subject of the Japanese. On a practical level, finding language informants for the Japanese courses proved to be a difficult negotiation for Stanford. While all universities struggled with staffing problems, Stanford's Far East program contended with a unique one: recruiting native speakers in a state where nearly all had been rounded up and incarcerated in camps. Miller's office sent advertisements to the camps seeking *Nisei* who could get proper security clearance and who had not lost their taste for aiding the same military agency that had imprisoned them. Many applied, and despite some problems, Stanford managed to staff its program before the end of the first term.[103]

More challenging, however, was the problem of racism. In contemporary publications such as *Progressive Education* and the *AAUP Bulletin*, educators and academics lauded foreign languages and social studies as forces for tolerance and mutual understanding. The military had different ends in mind. While the educational establishment—at least, in its more progressive corners—sought to curb racial hostility, military propaganda was busy harnessing it with now infamous depictions of buck-toothed, sub-human Japanese buffoons. The same racism and mistrust that led directly to the internment of Japanese Americans on the West Coast boiled within the military establishment. General Guillion (Miller's superior), was also a strong proponent of relocation.[104]

The academic emphasis on understanding the Japanese as rational human beings challenged the simplistic notions of many officer-students that the enemy was racially inferior, inhuman, or simply evil.

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[102]Paul R. Hanna, "Memorandum to Chancellor Ray Lyman Wilbur, Subject: Importance of the name of our training unit for Foreign Area and Language," 27 May 1943, CATS collection, box 27, folder 3.

[103]The CATS collection contains personnel files and correspondence regarding Nisei instructors, See boxes 18–20. For an explanation of the recruiting process, see H.H. Fisher to Donald Tresidder. "Final Report of the Far Eastern program carried on in the Civil Affairs Training School," 14 September 1945, CATS collection, box 36, folder 5.

[104]Geoffrey S. Smith, "Racial Nativism and Origins of Japanese American Relocation," in *Japanese Americans, from Relocation to Redress*, ed. Roger Daniels, Sandra Taylor, and Harry Kitano (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1986), 79–85.

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John Embree, a Yale Professor who worked at the University of Chicago Far Eastern CATS explained the problem this way: "Descriptions of the social context for individual behavior, which gave to individual Japanese actions a meaning, were interpreted as providing alibis for the Japanese." The ensuing cognitive dissonance led to outbursts and posturing. "A few officers who felt a little self-conscious about being Civil Affairs officers," Embree reported, "felt it necessary to exhibit their patriotism and courage by adopting bellicose attitudes in regard to Japanese civilians —advocating a 'treat 'em rough and tell 'em nothing' policy."[105]

From an academic standpoint, such attitudes did not bode well for complex understandings of culture and society. Some university directors inquired whether, "a student officer, who has a distinct hatred for the Japanese could do a good job in military government in occupied areas." In May 1945, General Guillion's office issued a memorandum to all CATS programs in reply. The answer, in short, was yes. "In fact," the memo declared, "it is quite natural that our officers should have little affection for the Japanese, who plunged us into this war." The memo insisted that the United States military distinguished between civilians and military personnel, and that the officers in CATS could do their duty even if they despised the people they ruled. Understanding was not empathetic, but strategic. "This branch has consistently taken the position that co-operation will not come from the Japanese voluntarily, but co-operation from civilians will be obtained from a fear of the consequences if they refuse to do so." Knowledge of the people being ruled was "essential to that the military government officer will not be making mistakes which result in combat forces being used to quell disorders."[106]

At Stanford, the Far East CATS program attempted to counter the overheated prejudices of the war by rationalizing and humanizing Japanese behavior while dispelling racism. In the fall of 1944, officer-students read an eleven-page introduction to Japan entitled "The Japanese People," which focused on the cultural and racial characteristics of Japanese society. "It is no easy matter to document and interpret the character and behavior of a people so different from ourselves ... to enter imaginatively into their universe of reference," wrote the author, F.M. Keesing. "It is complicated by much naive thinking current in our own society and by the emotional tensions of war." While providing a basic overview of Japanese society and culture, the essay dismantled the notion of a distinct race. Were the Japanese a

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[105]Embree, "American Military Government."

[106]"Memorandum for Directors and Associate Directors, CATS: Subject: Attitude of Student Officers towards Japanese," SPMGW 352.11, 2 May 1945, CATS collection, box 36–42.

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distinct, morally and intellectually inferior people, separate from the rest of humanity? Keesing concluded with a resounding no. "The popular idea that the Japanese are a separate uniform "race" with certain given, biologically fixed traits not only of physique but also of capacity and temperament does not hold up ..."[107]

By the spring of 1945, Stanford's officer students received more pointed summaries of Japanese culture and politics that emphasized the military's own goal of smooth civil affairs administration. Absent was the academic need to complicate gross generalizations or to dispel racism. In a restricted document excerpted from the official *Civil Affairs Handbook* on Japan and John Embree's book, *The Japanese Nation*, students learned that "Individual differences Japanese are different, it is true ... But by and large there are certain generalizations that can be drawn concerning the Japanese people as a whole that will remain true in the great majority of cases." These cultural characteristics included, for example, "unity and solidarity, loyalty to persons above principles, national pride, fear of ridicule, kindness toward the 'in group' and hostility to outsiders and other races." Another document entitled, "Suggested Precautions for Military Government Officers," emphasized the vital importance of "saving face" in Japanese culture and discussed specific examples of how civil affairs officers should deal with this characteristic.[108]

The question of appropriate attitudes toward the people, languages, and cultures being studied in CATS exposed the fundamental difference in purposes between the democratic and humanitarian core of American education and the martial purposes of the military. Even before the Japanese programs opened, Colonel Joseph Harris, of the School of Military Government at Charlotte, summed up the problem in a 1943 article for *Public Opinion Quarterly*. "The first and primary purpose of military government is to advance the cause of our arms and to promote the military objectives." There was, he emphasized, a "secondary purpose and responsibility, under international law, to maintain law and order in the occupied area, to feed the starving, to protect the population against pestilence and disease, and, as far as military operations will permit, to aid the healing processes of economic rehabilitation." Nevertheless, the kinds of goals typically sought by educators were, at best, tangential. "Military and humanitarian considerations are not necessarily opposed to each other, though they

[107]F.M. Keesing, "The Japanese People," Class IV-40 Doc. 16, CATS collection, box 4-2.

[108]"Personal Characteristics and Outstanding Qualities of the Japanese," VI-142, Doc. 78, CATS collection, box 6, folder 1; "Suggested Precautions for Military Government Officers," VI-137, CATS collection, box 6, folder 1; Interview with Alba [Martinelli] Thompson.

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may be so at times; and at those times military necessity must be the prime consideration."[109]

Aftermath

The problems and possibilities raised by the CATS program were not lost on the higher education community, and the experience fit into the broader pattern of soul searching in American education after the war. Not only had training programs like CATP and ASTP profoundly altered the character of enrollments and student life, but fat military contracts reshaped the priorities, interests, and curricula of major universities. There was a near consensus among administrators, public officials, and policy makers that the university should become a "public service institution," meaning that it should respond to the demands of the broader society and not be an Ivory Tower guarding knowledge for its own sake alone. This was as true at Stanford as it was elsewhere.[110] The question, however, was what particular shape that vision would take, and what specific lessons American education could take from the war experience.

Several academics connected directly to the CATS program published optimistic assessments of its possibilities as a model for educational reform. Not surprisingly, Charles Hyneman saw his program as having vast potential for secondary and higher education. In his view, the results achieved by the language program were "miraculous," and due exclusively to the Intensive Language Program's methodology. Hyneman lauded other "innovations" as well, including team teaching, integrated curricula, field trips, and paying attention to the practical needs of the students.[111] Lawrence Thomas, the assistant director of the Stanford CATS, published an equally sanguine appraisal. He argued that two features of CATS and ASTP, the integrated curriculum and the problem-solving approach, helped students make sense of the typically disjointed curriculum and held faculty responsible for what the students actually learned. The project method encouraged students to ask questions and find answers; it led to the Stanford panel; and it led to practical, team assignments that gave students the chance to learn from each other. Organizing a peacetime liberal arts education around singular objectives was not as easy as it seemed, however, and Thomas struggled to find examples. He offered "how to enjoy fully the living one earns," and "the developing of effective

[109] Harris, "Selection and Training," 700.

[110] Lowen, *Creating the Cold War University*, 67; Dorn, "Promoting the 'Public Welfare' in Wartime."

[111] Hyneman, "The Wartime Area and Language Courses," 445.

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citizenship in a democracy, which means, in practice, increasing the interest and competence of the people in managing or supervising their collective affairs." But he did not elaborate.[112]

Harold W. Stoke, who had organized the Area Relationships curriculum, saw Thomas's dream as a nightmare. Observing the uses that totalitarian governments made of educational institutions, Stoke fretted that too narrow a focus for educational institutions and the increasing involvement of government in education could undermine the free traditions of both. Government support of higher education had the danger (and tendency) of leading to a reduction of educational purposes to serve nationalistic ends. While increasing enrollments had a healthy, democratizing effect on higher education, colleges and universities should not give in to the temptation to vulgarize or vocationalize their purposes.[113]

A.E. Sokol, who had coordinated the German language program for the Stanford CATS, shared Stoke's caution. Joining a chorus of language scholars, he challenged the miraculous results of the army language program's methods. He cited the highly selective admissions process, the frequent contact hours, the reduced expectations for reading, writing, and thinking in the language, the fact that many programs did not even implement all of the Army's methods, and, of course, the unique circumstances which compelled teachers and students alike to work hard. He did concede that one of the great strengths of the Army program was its ability to set straightforward goals and then mobilize materials and methods to meet them. Sokol did not side with Thomas and Hyneman that higher education should narrow its purposes for language training to a single function: colleges and students had, necessarily, many goals for learning languages. But language educators could benefit from clarifying what these goals were.[114]

The American Council on Education conducted the largest and most comprehensive assessment of higher education's response to the War. With grants from the Carnegie Corporation and the General Education Board, the Council published ten books on the subject, including a synthesis of the project entitled *Educational Lessons from Wartime Training*. This study shared the enthusiasm of many observers for the methods of the Army programs. Looking at all military training programs (not just CATS and ASTP) the study offered an idealized characterization of the instruction as "The GI Way," which included

[112] Lawrence G. Thomas, "Can the Social Sciences Learn from the Army Program?," *The Journal of Higher Education* 17, no. 1 (January 1946): 17–22.

[113] Harold W. Stoke, "The Future of Graduate Education," *The Journal of Higher Education* 18, no. 9 (December 1947): 473–477, 491.

[114] Sokol, "The Army Language Program."

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"knowledge stripped for action," "The end was always more important than the means to the end," "clear and specific objectives," "learning by doing," "constant supervision of learning and teaching," teaching aids, tracking, evaluation, and small class sizes.[115]

The study did not recommend this approach universally, however. "No one who is familiar with the intrinsic differences between the problems of military training and the problems of general education," the authors argued, "would suggest that civilian educators carry the concept of the concrete and limited objective to the extreme that it was carried by the armed services." Considering ASTP and CATS in particular, the study urged secondary schools and colleges to adopt integrated curricula, and hoped that schools would pay greater attention to students' comprehension and retention of foreign languages.[116]

Conclusion

As a case study in progressive educational reform during the 1940s, the CATS program at Stanford demonstrates that pedagogical progressivism was not solely the province, or product, of elite, left-wing educational crusaders. The American military conceived of and developed its program internally, with inspiration from wartime experience, foreign programs, and its own evolving needs. Moreover, the discovery and use of progressive educational techniques by that stereotypically "hard" and masculine social institution, the Army, complicates and challenges the persistent and vaguely gendered critique of progressive teaching methods as being frivolous, soft and overly nurturing.

The development of progressive techniques within the military differed from such development within mass and higher education. It was a case of means versus ends. A clear command structure and mission-oriented culture distinguished the military from other large, American educational institutions. While various military institutions exhibited their own forms of educational traditionalism (consider West Point, for example), the exigencies of a total war enabled the rapid deployment of innovative pedagogical techniques to a degree not usually possible across public schools or higher education. As the implementation demonstrates, however, the means and ends of progressive educational

[115] Alonzo Grace, *Educational Lessons from Wartime Training* (Washington, DC: American Council on Education, 1947), 247.

[116] Grace, *Educational Lessons*, 102, 108, 230; for an overview of the growth of Area Studies programs during the Cold War, see Louis Morton, "National Security and Area Studies: The Intellectual Response to the Cold War," *The Journal of Higher Education* 34, no. 3 (March 1963): 142–47.

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techniques cannot be separated entirely. The culture of free inquiry, of looking for complex connections across disciplines, of relying on the expertise and contribution of a marginalized Japanese population, disrupted the Army's authoritarian culture and the flow of official knowledge and prejudice. Freed from the encumbrances of democratic decision making, the Army was able to pursue its ends with teaching methods that were, ironically and at times inconveniently, well aligned with democratic ideals.

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