The role played by the new participatory institutions in reinforcing or weakening executive and legislative local powers, and the combination of participatory practices in clientelistic environments, also deserve more study. Moreover, it must be borne in mind that the participatory processes described in this book are relatively weak in empowering the people, are limited in scope to local matters, and often have only an advisory function anyway. As recent street protests have shown, these processes have only limited capacity to address citizens' grievances.

As inspiring books normally do, *Activating Democracy in Brazil* offers new insights and raises new questions. It also offers directions on how to reinforce democracy through participation. Its framework should pave the way for cross-regional and country comparisons.

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Graham Denyer Willis, *The Killing Consensus: Police, Organized Crime, and the Regulation of Life and Death in Urban Brazil*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014. Tables, figures, notes, bibliography, index, 216 pp.; hardcover $70, paperback $29.95, ebook $29.95.

Although numerous studies about police from either institutional or civilian perspectives exist in the literature, few researchers have taken seriously the perspectives of police officers themselves. The ones in uniform who patrol the streets, respond to emergencies, carry guns, and (in some cases) use them frequently. Such studies are rare, observes Graham Denyer Willis, and even more so for police in the Global South. Enter Denyer Willis's new book. Through a nuanced ethnography of the Civil Police (*Polícia Civil*) in the city of São Paulo—including analysis of the roles played by organized crime—Denyer Willis provides startling insight into everyday urban governance in Brazil's largest city. The book is tightly written, the analysis interdisciplinary, and the questions raised by the author have profound implications for a host of academic fields (criminology, urban studies, sociology, urban anthropology, geography, and so on).

At the base of Denyer Willis's findings is a chilling argument about sovereignty in São Paulo: today there is no monopoly on violence in the city; it is shared between the state and São Paulo's largest organized crime syndicate, the Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC). What enables this "killing consensus" is a more or less expendable population of *bandidos*—those written off as "criminal," and among whom homicides are "normal." Denyer Willis's research shows how the extermination of this population is enabled not only by investigatory protocol but also by broader feelings of indifference. For police and Brazilian civil society more generally, *bandidos* are better dead than alive. Their deaths draw little attention, and their murders are barely investigated. Whether killed by police or other *bandidos*, their executions, if not lauded, are at the very least accepted.

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On the one hand, this helps to explain the frequent instances of homicide in São Paulo, and why these homicides have become routine. Yet on the other, as Denyer Willis notes, it raises serious questions about why homicide rates have, in fact, dropped enormously since the start of the twenty-first century. In 1999, São Paulo's homicide rate was an astonishing 63 per 100,000 residents, yet by 2010 it had plummeted to around 17 per 100,000 (52). Many experts attribute this reduction to institutional and public policy changes, focusing particularly on stricter law enforcement strategies and a more robust criminal justice system. But as Denyer Willis notes, a small collection of academic researchers in São Paulo—drawing mostly on qualitative and ethnographic research methods—have raised serious doubts about this explanation.

Instead of state intervention, their research highlights the rather counterintuitive role of the PCC in falling homicide rates. As Denyer Willis explains, the PCC has become the principal governing authority in São Paulo's urban periphery, holding sway over entire communities and establishing (pseudo)sovereign authority over life and death. Put very bluntly, excessive crime and homicide are bad for PCC business, and therefore PCC leaders regulate both in order to maximize profit accumulation. It is not so much the state that has reduced murders in São Paulo, but rather organized crime.

So why has the state, and the police more specifically, allowed for a shared monopoly on violence? In the first instance, argues Denyer Willis, it relates to perceptions of *bandidos* and the way this population has become killable. Those who turn up dead are usually categorized as *bandidos* and thus deserving of their fate in the eyes of police and the general public. Moreover, with falling crime and homicide rates over the past several years, the police have benefited rather perversely from the PCC's presence. Yet as Denyer Willis shows, there is more to the "killing consensus" between police and the PCC than just reduced crime and "normal homicides." Police officers themselves live in tremendous danger, many of them in communities governed by the PCC and almost all of them at pains to keep secret their identity as police officers. The shared monopoly on violence is thus also facilitated by fear, as police officers are wary of upsetting whatever balance might exist and of retaliation from the PCC should they overstep their shared sovereignty boundaries (e.g., recklessly killing a PCC member). Denyer Willis's research highlights the difficulties of police work in Brazil, and even more so the precarious lives police lead both in and out of uniform.

The book is highly engaging, and impressive analysis and empirical detail are packed into only 156 pages of text. Part 1 outlines Denyer Willis's argument about São Paulo's shared monopoly on violence, showing the everyday realities police officers face along with institutional and organizational attributes that contribute to, among other problems, corruption and police violence. The author makes several interesting critiques of sovereignty and theoretical frameworks borrowed from other contexts, showing how Brazilian police problems do not fit neatly into heuristic categories developed in the Global North.

Part 2 examines homicide in São Paulo, exploring root causes for falling homicide rates over the past several years, yet also considering the ways "normal homi-

cides" continue to persist. Here Denyer Willis unpacks his "killing consensus" argument, showing how police and the PCC work "in mutually beneficial and symbiotic ways" (94). Such an accord, however, is inevitably fragile, and when hostilities erupt between the two sides, the consequences can be disastrous for public security in São Paulo. Such moments are especially terrifying for police officers—and presumably also for PCC members—as they frequently become targets for revenge killings. Such a context, notes Denyer Willis, makes it seem impossible to eradicate organized crime in São Paulo, if not elsewhere in Brazil.

The third and final part of the book addresses frustrations that police confront, including institutional and organizational protocols that prevent them from speaking out against the difficulties they face. Denyer Willis is careful here not to sympathize completely with police—for example, excusing cases of police violence—but his perspective and analysis of everyday police life in São Paulo are useful for understanding why public security remains problematic in countries like Brazil. He raises provocative questions about democracy and human rights in the Global South and further explores issues of sovereignty and nonexclusive monopolies on violence in contemporary society.

All told, the book provides a welcome addition to studies of urban governance and policing, and engages closely with existing research on public security in Brazil and the Global South (scholars like Arias, Davis, Feltran, Pereira, Rodgers, Rolnik, to name only a few). It paints a vivid picture of São Paulo's violent urban landscape, using field notes and interview transcripts to convey the brutality of life in the city's periphery. Perhaps implicit here is Denyer Willis's own critique of cities like São Paulo, where people have grown so numb to life and death that even homicide becomes banal, much like the semifictional city of Santa Teresa in Roberto Bolaño's *2666*.

It is probably a testament to this work that it leaves the reader wanting more in some instances. For example, deeper analysis by the author into processes that produce an expendable *bandido* population would help to further explain São Paulo's "killing consensus." Denyer Willis notes the important discursive divide between "workers" and "criminals" and how the latter are perceived as undeserving of basic citizenship rights. Yet even more could be done here to explain how a particular segment of the population becomes "othered," constructed as evil, and ultimately made killable. Likewise, power relations and constructions of masculinity are also key to understanding police violence and troubling relationships between cops, citizens, and *bandidos*. The book is careful to scrutinize institutional networks that shape police practice, yet further attention could also be paid to additional power structures at work in this context (e.g., gender, class, race).

Such critiques, however, are somewhat unfair, as they would send the work in new directions and require additional chapters. A punchy argument and concise analysis are two of this book's main strengths. Add to this a wealth of empirical detail and insightful theoretical engagement, and *The Killing Consensus* makes a valuable contribution to studies of public security, policing, violence, and urban

governance in the Global South. Multidisciplinary in approach, Denyer Willis's work is sure to appeal to scholars across the social sciences.

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Morris Morley and Chris McGillion, *Reagan and Pinochet: The Struggle over U.S. Policy Toward Chile*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015. Abbreviations, acronyms, bibliography, index, 354 pp.; hardcover $95, paperback $34.99, ebook $28.

In 1981, officials of the Reagan administration imposed their stamp mere minutes after the new president took office. Carter administration officials needed to exit or—they were warned—be escorted out by the police. Latin America policy was to receive a makeover, with human rights downplayed and anticommunist allies rewarded. For Augusto Pinochet's military government in Chile, this was cause for celebration. *Reagan and Pinochet* documents the debate within the Reagan administration about what direction Chile policy should follow.

In fact, the honeymoon with the dictatorship was short-lived. The dominance of ideologues like Alexander Haig and Jeane Kirkpatrick faded within a few years. George Shultz's entrance as secretary of state signaled a substantive shift from ideology toward pragmatism. The Reagan administration—if not necessarily always Ronald Reagan himself—had ideological affinity with the Pinochet dictatorship but worked to distance itself and encourage a transition.

This narrative is not entirely new, as most accounts of U.S.-Chilean relations have at least noted it. Morley and McGillion take a significant step forward by virtue of their careful exploration of declassified documents and more than 30 interviews with key policymakers across an array of U.S. government offices, as well as the Chilean opposition of the time.

The book makes two main contributions. First, it explains why U.S. policy toward Chile evolved in ways that were not obvious when Reagan first took office, and how that evolution was shaped by internal administration schisms. Second, it explores the difficulties and frustrations U.S. policymakers had in influencing events in Chile.

A good measure of the policy occurred because conservatives feared that the moderate Chilean opposition might make common cause with the left, perhaps even the radical left, in response to repression. Yes, there was considerable and often vocal U.S. congressional opposition to the dictatorship, but the Reagan administration was focused almost exclusively on avoiding a repeat of the Philippines, where, in 1986, longtime U.S. ally Ferdinand Marcos's intransigence empowered the opposition, led to his ouster, and prevented any negotiated transition. White House officials had visions of the Chilean Communist Party taking an active role and derailing an orderly, pro-U.S., pro–free market transition.

As protests in Chile expanded in the midst of economic contraction in the 1980s, Reagan administration concerns increased as well. Morris and McGillion