

der to fully understand the development of ship technology in the Eastern Mediterranean, one certainly has to take under consideration not only the growth and technological development of the Ottoman Navy, but also those of the deep-sea-going Ottoman merchant fleet, as well as the seafaring human resources and general seafaring know-how of the Ottoman Empire.

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Hannes Grandits, Nathalie Clayer, and Robert Pichler, eds. *Conflicting Loyalties in the Balkans: The Great Powers, the Ottoman Empire and Nation-Building*. London: I.B. Tauris, 2011, xiv + 350 pages.

With a little generalization, one can claim that there are three major shortcomings in modern Balkan historiography: The first—part of a global problem—a tendency to swing between two extremes of socio-economic and cultural bias by opting for either a class-based analysis or an identity-politics paradigm. The second failure can be described as a lack of synthesis between the achievements of the ever growing blocs of Ottoman studies and Balkan studies. While these two shortcomings can be observed both in the historiography of each country of the region and more generally in Western historiography, the third one is more often and clearly observed in the Turkish historiography on the history of a country, people or sub-region of the Balkans focusing only on the period under Ottoman rule. Territories (countries) tend to disappear in the historiography in the period after their separation (“independence”) from the Ottoman Empire. This problem can be observed in the historiographies of the Balkan countries, on the other hand, as a lack of interest in the Ottoman Empire after the partition, even though the legacy of the Empire was so vital in those new nation states of the nineteenth-century that each of them can be regarded as a “mini-Ottoman state.”¹

It is a great challenge to cope with these shortcomings through individual effort. It might be more feasible, as is the case in studies of the multi-ethnic Ottoman Empire² and comparative studies of the late

1 For a general discussion of the Balkan historiography see: Fikret Adanır and Suraiya Faroqhi, *The Ottomans and the Balkans: A Discussion of Historiography* (Leiden: Brill, 2002).

2 For a remarkable attempt in the Ottoman case, see Karen Barkey, *Empire of Difference: The Ottomans*

modern empires,³ to deal with these problems through team work in the framework of multidisciplinary research programs, workshops and/or edited volumes. Imperative to the success of such studies would be a multi-dimensional and revisionist approach.

The book reviewed here—a collection of essays originating from a Graz workshop—daringly takes on the challenge of coping with these weaknesses. In their introduction, the editors of the book underline most of the above-mentioned problems, and seek to contribute to their clarification; effectively summarizing the thematic, empirical, and theoretical framework and aims of the volume. The volume contains ten papers organized under four headings: “Janus-faced Europeanization,” “Ambiguous Actors, Conflicting Strategies,” “Refrained Loyalties,” and “Elite Projects, Divergent Realities.” As is to be expected of a book on the theme of collective identities, the thematic boundaries of its articles are so fluid and overlapping that dividing the book into four parts seems to be rather tentatively imposed, though understandable as there is hardly any possibility of taxonomy according to temporal or geographical boundaries.

The first section of the book on “Janus-faced Europeanization” deals with the formation of associations and their role in the nation building process in Greece and the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century. Its first article (and the longest in the book) is Malte Fuhrmann’s very informative and daring essay based on empirical data and theoretical discussion. Fuhrmann starts with brief descriptions of three anecdotes from the years 1904, 1910, and 1913 about a German “vagrant,” a separated couple that are citizens of Austria-Hungary, and “two well-known pimps of Austrian nationality,” respectively (p. 15-16). The author effectively uses these anecdotes to discuss the ambiguous relations between European and Ottoman actors in the following separate sections on vagrants/drifters, pimps and prostitutes, and Bosnian Muslims. In general, Fuhrmann questions the widespread representation of a “superior Europe” in the historiography through the study of marginal groups that, at the beginning of the twentieth century, “arranged themselves to a life in-between the European and the Ottoman.” Alternatively, he offers a broader and more inclusive sense of “Europe” in the discussions on

in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). See also Kemal H. Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman State* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); William W. Haddad and William Ochsenwald, eds., *Nationalism in a non-National State: The Dissolution of the Ottoman Empire* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1977).

3 Karen Barkey and Mark von Hagen, eds., *After Empire: Multiethnic Societies and Nation-Building - The Soviet Union and the Russian, Ottoman, and Habsburg Empires* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997).

Europeanness and Europeanization, encompassing hitherto neglected marginal groups “that crossed the theoretically so impressive boundary” between center (Europe) and periphery (Ottoman Empire). Fuhrmann’s essay is very enjoyable to read, and offers challenging statements based on solid data from the archives (mainly HHStA) and secondary literature. One of the unfortunate (technical/editorial) problems of this essay is the confusion in the endnotes. Finally, at the risk of overloading an otherwise rich text, the essay would have benefited from a discussion of the perception of Europe and/or Europeanness among the Ottoman intellectuals to be found in the contemporary periodicals and books, or at least through the use of the secondary literature.

Bernard Lory’s article is on the Orthodox Christian educational networks within a more general context of school propaganda in Ottoman Macedonian Bitola (*Manastir*) from the 1860s to 1912. It offers detailed information and observations regarding the history of education in the region. While the article is not particularly well organized, making it difficult to read, Lory manages to convey the dual role of the educational efforts in Macedonia: Europeanization (civilization) and nation building among the young (Greek, Serbian, Aromanian and other) “freedom fighters” in the guerrilla bands. With a clear anti-nationalist attitude, the author emphasizes the “destructive” quality of this development (hence “schools for the destruction of society”) through a discussion of the role of the modern schools as the “greenhouses for nationalism,” their teachers as “professional propagandists,” and the students as members of the resistance. He coins the term “a school of crime” to encapsulate these (p. 62). In this rather short essay, Lory does not abstain from general and controversial statements about his subject, sometimes made without references, or from occasionally over-long quotations (pp. 57-58 and pp. 60-61). After underlining the fact that “the great majority of Bitola’s youth was educated with a view to life not in the Ottoman Empire, but in a strange relationship with a far-off ‘homeland’ centred in Athens, Sofia, or Belgrade,” Lory asks the following rather provocative question: “Did this essentially patriotic education, which was xenophobic vis-a-vis its neighbours and disloyal to the state, at least provide an opening to the outside world, a form of access to universal culture?” His own answer is bold: “... with the plethora of schools, the Bitola of the Hamidian period produced hardly any learned scholars or people of letters” (p. 59). One would agree with Lory if only he also questioned the existing inter-communal relations of the time, the authoritarian regime and, more importantly, put this discussion in the broader context of the nation-building process as an (inevitable) constituent of the modernization process.

In the last article of this section, Ioannis Zelepos offers a brief and well-told history of civil society, which is a good combination of descriptive history and theoretical discussion. Religious, cultural, and national associations with their “great heterogeneity” are discussed over a long period (1830-1922) and in a regional context. Zelepos especially underlines the influence of emerging Bulgarian nationalism—a new obstacle to Greek irredentism—in the growth of nationalism among the Greek associations. Zelepos devotes three separate sections to “religious,” “cultural,” and “national associations” and concludes with a discussions of the relation between the weakness of the Greek nation-state and the characteristics of the associations with a reference to Alexis de Tocqueville’s statement about “the role of associations as a substantial motor of social and cultural progress in the United States of America” (p. 82): The essay ends with an emphasis on the shift in the history of these associations: A shift “from a “structural distance” to the State (in a socio-ideological sense)” and towards the “acceptance of its prerogatives and integration with its institutional networks” (p. 84).

The second part of the book is entitled “ambiguous actors, conflicting strategies.” Its first article, by one of the editors, Clayer, is on the role of confessional identities within the complicated map of conflicting and overlapping (traditional and modern) collective identities in Kosovo at the beginning of twentieth century. This is one of the most compelling essays in the book. It starts with four different contemporary accounts of the same local conflict that took place in the area of Gjakova and Prizren (in today’s Kosovo) in 1907-08. These diverse accounts (from the famous British travel writer Edith Durham, the Italian consul Galanti in Skopje, the Ottoman officer Süleyman Külçe and the Austro-Hungarian vice-consul Proschaska in Prizren) all relate the same event, though with some differences and foci on different local, regional, and global actors. Through these “four eyes on the same event” (p. 92) Clayer vividly depicts the complexity and ambivalence of the question of collective identities in the Kosovo of the late Ottoman Empire, while focusing on the construction and/or consolidation of confessional identities (“confessionalisation”) in a rather multi-layered manner.

The next article of the second part, by another editor of the book, Grandits, is on the “Herzegovinian revolt” of the mid-1870s, and depicts the dynamics of the violence that contributed to the rapid polarization among different confessions of the region. The author shows that the emergence and sudden rise of violence was actually due to the strategic plans of some local leaders aiming at a spiral of violence and counter-violence in order to prove that the existing political (Ottoman) rule

was not functioning, or, at least, was not effective enough. According to Grandits, some elite actors with certain “political interests” expected that, in this rather violent process, the current configuration of loyalties and identifications would change and, most importantly, the room for ambivalence, hybridity, and ambiguity would be narrowed so that the hostility towards the Ottoman authorities would sharpen. On the other hand, the majority of the population in the region and the Ottoman representatives were mostly concerned rather about the negative consequences of the violence and destabilization of the status quo. It is interesting to see that ordinary people taking part in the revolt were actually worried about the escalation of the violence and the emergence of a chaotic state, and were looking forward to reaching a peaceful settlement as soon as possible. This did not, however, change the fact that the increasing polarisation led to the weakening of heterogeneity and multiplicity in the region and contributed to the process of homogenization that the modern nationalist leaders wished for.

The third and last article of the second part is a very good and rather rare example of combined usage of profound knowledge of both Ottoman and Bulgarian histories and historiographies. Based on some Ottoman and mainly Bulgarian sources, Vezenkov here revisits the Bulgarian revolutionary movements of the 1860s and 1870s, starting with a close-up description of “one of the most popular cases”; the trial of Vassil Levsky (1837-73). Levsky was the leader of the Bulgarian revolutionary organization, and had been captured after the robbery of a large sum of money from an Ottoman postal carriage. Vezenkov focuses on the sessions of the Ottoman investigation commission, four members of which were Bulgarian, and emphasizes the participation of the Bulgarians in the Ottoman administration (local councils and mixed courts) to discuss the complicated and hitherto neglected—and today for many people also controversial—reality of simultaneously being Bulgarian, Orthodox Christian, and “Ottoman.” The complex relations between the local Bulgarian notables and the Ottoman authorities were usually pragmatic on both sides, focusing on the pursuit of smart strategies for certain (individual or collective) interests at the economic, social and political level. Vezenkov shows that, apart from a small elite group involved in the revolutionary nationalistic committees and uprisings, the majority of the local notables (and ordinary people) usually displayed a more complex attitude. The general lack of interest in revolutionary nationalistic movements might be the reason for the failure of the revolutionary organizations to trigger a general “national” uprising, in spite of the expectations of the revolutionary groups. Regarding the formation

of the Bulgarian nation-state after a series of local uprisings in the mid 1870s, one might conclude that it was the tactic of polarization through violence that once again proved effective. One should not forget, however, that the brutal and rather easy suppression of these local uprisings by the Ottoman state did not lead to a “national uprising,” and that the creation of a Bulgarian nation-state only became possible after Ottoman failure in the Russian-Ottoman War of 1877-78.

The book's third part on “Refrained Loyalties” is devoted to two very original essays on two unconventional “we-groups” of the late Ottoman Empire. Eyal Ginio manages to portray the case of the Ottoman Jews very elaborately by focusing on their military service in the Ottoman Empire and especially their “mobilization” during the Balkan Wars (1912-13). Eva Anne Frantz, on the other hand, deals with the complicated issue of conflicting and overlapping loyalties among the members of a rather unknown group in Kosovo—the *Fandi*—between 1870 and 1890. Relying on intensive use of contemporary publications and exhaustive use of the secondary literature, Ginio discusses the question of collective identity among the late Ottoman Jews (an *infra-national* we-group) in the context of the İstanbul Jews' reaction to the official policy of Ottomanism. As such, the article deals with state policy towards the construction of the *supra-national* Ottoman identity, and discusses military service in the context of the Balkan wars as one such project for achieving this. One of the many achievements in this article is the distinction of among different non-Muslim groups and the awareness of the “competition” among them. Ginio also depicts very well the self-perception of the educated Jewish elite as champions of scientific progress and representatives of Western “civilization,” while showing the role of the Balkan Wars both as the peak of Jewish Ottomanism and the starting point of the failure of Ottomanist efforts.

Frantz's essay similarly focuses on the position and attitude of an *infra-national* non-Muslim we-group: the Catholic Albanian warriors of Fandi in Kosovo, who had migrated to the region from their original mountain area of Mirdite in today's northern Albania. Frantz bases her detailed and excellent analysis mainly on Austro-Hungarian consular reports from Prizren and Skopje (*Üsküp* in Turkish) and “... focuses on questions of collective identity and aims at shedding light on a period of time which constitutes a phase of transformation in Balkan history” (p. 183). Frantz achieves this aim by discussing the developments between 1870 and 1890 and putting the discussion in the broader context of the position of the (Muslim and non-Muslim) peoples of Kosovo vis-a-vis the reforms of the Ottoman state, i.e., vis-a-vis the top-down modern-

ization process. Frantz depicts the strong (sometimes violent) resistance among the Fandi as rather a non-ethnic and non-political movement emerging initially against the imposition of new taxes and mainly for the preservation of their traditional status in the present socio-economic and political structure. Frantz's conclusion reflects, in accordance with Clayer, the general message of the whole volume very well:

The case of Fandi illustrates the existence of a diversity of multi-layered identity options in late-Ottoman Kosovo before the ethnicizing and nationalization of the population groups in the region, which dominate our conception of Kosovo today. While today ethno-national categories prevail, we nevertheless also find a diversity of multilayered identity options (p. 200).

Although the last part in the book is titled "Elite Projects, Divergent Realities," only the first article by Natasa Miskovic, whose name and short biography have unfortunately been left out of the notes on contributors section, is about the notables of Serbia. Like Vezenkov, Miskovic discusses the role of the elite. She focuses on the "third phase" of the "Serbian turn to nationalism and the process of disintegration of Ottoman society" which "extends from the Russo-Ottoman War until World War I." The first phase of this process (1800-39) was, according to the author, characterized by "rebellion and autonomy," whereas the second phase (1840-68) is labeled "separation and reckoning" (p. 206-207). Miskovic very clearly demonstrates the differences and rivalries among the intellectuals, administrative elite and politicians in this process. As in all Balkan nation-states, these elite groups took over the "mission" of (continuous) construction and consolidation of the nation as a "family" and transformation of it into a wished-for exemplary membership of the modern (civilized) world. It is striking to see the negative reaction of peasants and the poor in towns to this elite politics that neglected the problems of the ordinary people and even deprived them of political rights when "the de facto Austrian colonisation of the 1880s and 1890s further enforced Serbia's orientation towards Christian Europe" (p. 223). The "unhappy end" or failure in the Serbian case resonates with what Vezenkov describes of the Bulgarian case in the same book.

The last article by Galia Valtchinova deals with Hellenism among the ordinary people and their economic and social life in the small towns of Melnik and Stanimaka (both in today's Bulgaria). Valtchinova shows the close links between, on the one hand, professional engagements—the status of migrants and non-emigrants and the status of peasants and town people—and national identifications on the other. Through a comparative analysis of the "model of urban and socio-economic Helle-

nism" (as an Ottoman product) in Melnik and Stanimaka, and through an emphasis on "the symbolic work of nationalism" (expression of competing claims in a religious language) and on the role of the local dynamics in the question of identity politics and loyalty, Valtchinova reaches the conclusion that:

the comparison of Melnik and Stanimaka clearly shows a difference in the effectiveness of symbolic mediation and religious response. In Stanimaka, despite the highly sophisticated forms of religious mobilization on both sides, symbolic mediation through Virgin / *Theotokos* did finally succeed in taming nationalist passions and pacifying the local society. [...] In Melnik, where Greek supremacy in economic, religious and cultural matters lasted almost until 1912, while the countryside remained at the mercy of nationalist fighters, the abyss could not be bridged (p. 250).

Finally, with its introductory chapter and ten papers on different cases, this book certainly offers an alternative exemplar in Balkan historiography through its holistic (i.e., multidisciplinary and regional-global) view and its revisionist approach towards the study of collective identities within the broader context of modernization processes, both in the Ottoman and post-Ottoman long-nineteenth-century Balkans. The book succeeds in discussing not only the contemporary (ethnic and non-ethnic) collective identities, but also the political projects of the period—whether accomplished or not—seeking to construct modern collective identities. Existing collective identities and projects for the construction of new ones in the nineteenth-century Balkans were not only *conflicting*, but also very often *overlapping* or *intermingled*. Although this fact is emphasized in many of these articles, it is not indicated in the title and is neither conceptualized nor sufficiently discussed. Focusing on the life story of one of the nation-builders in the Ottoman Balkans could be a good means of discussing of this dimension of the identity question, though such case studies are unfortunately missing in this collection.

The editors of this book undertook the difficult task of bringing scholars from different disciplines and countries together to discuss a complicated and controversial issue, and took up the challenge of offering a broad, multidisciplinary, and multidimensional study of different cases in the framework of conflicting and overlapping collective identities in the modern Balkans. With essays by experts on a wide variety of issues and covering almost all of the Balkans (only cases on Romania and Montenegro are missing), this book provides very valuable reading

material for postgraduate studies on Balkan history. Trying to discuss the local developments and actors always within the regional (Ottoman and Balkan) and global ("Great Powers") context, the book remains loyal to the promise of its title and subtitle.

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Amit Bein. *Ottoman Ulema, Turkish Republic: Agents of Change and Guardians of Tradition*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011, 224 pages.

In the last decade there has been a flurry of revisionist scholarship examining the work and lives of late Ottoman Muslim scholars, Sufi sheikhs and that then newly-emergent type, the devout intellectual (only later in the 20th century would they come to be known as "Islamists"). Much of this work has been written in Turkish, by Turkish scholars, but in recent years an increasing amount has appeared in English. There are several things that are notable about this scholarship. The first is that it is based on careful perusal of sources, including late Ottoman-era writings by the figures in question, consular reports contained in archives, and the memoirs of such figures, some of which have only recently been published. Another notable feature is that this work has until fairly recently generally been undertaken by scholars who could themselves be described as "devout" Muslims, or even as close to Islamist circles. A third important feature is that it offers a crucial corrective to simplistic accounts or understandings of such figures, their worldviews and lifestyles, as well as of their political outlooks. When examined carefully, few of the stereotypes propounded about these figures in the twentieth century by either latter-day Kemalists or Islamists turn out to be particularly accurate. The fact is that such figures represented an exceptionally wide range of views and sympathies on the social, political and economic problems of their day; some were opposed to dramatic reform, some strongly supported it, and many were somewhere in the middle.

Bein's *Ottoman Ulema, Turkish Republic* very ably builds on this now established body of work. Bein's study can be read as a history of the late Ottoman and early Republican period for its own sake, but the real in-