What readers primarily will take away from Mayhew's account, however, is that Congress has demonstrated leadership to help the country manage history's challenges. That, and his affection for the institution that has been the subject of his scholarly life, stand out clearly in this book.

COMPARATIVE POLITICS

Party Systems in Latin America: Institutionalization, Decay, and Collapse. Edited by Scott Mainwaring. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018. 522p. $120.00 cloth, $39.99 paper.
doi:10.1017/S1537592718003602

— Raúl L. Madrid, *University of Texas at Austin*

Almost 25 years ago, Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully published an edited volume, *Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America* (1995), that developed the concept of party system institutionalization and helped set the agenda for a wave of research on political parties in Latin America and beyond. Mainwaring's latest edited volume, *Party Systems in Latin America: Institutionalization, Decay, and Collapse,* takes up where the previous work left off, surveying developments in Latin American party systems over the last few decades.

The new volume is much more than an update—it covers a great deal of new ground and makes a significant conceptual and empirical contribution to the literature on political parties. In the Introduction and the first two chapters, Mainwaring reconceptualizes party system institutionalization and uses the new concept to measure changes in it in the entire region since 1990. (Chapter 1 was coauthored with Fernando Bizzarro and Ana Petrova.) In Chapter 3, Mainwaring explores party system institutionalization's consequences for democracy, and in Chapter 4, he and Bizzarro examine the factors that are correlated with party system institutionalization in the region. Chapters 5–11 consist of detailed case studies of party system stability and change in seven Latin American countries (Chile, Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Argentina, Venezuela, and Peru), all of which were written by a distinguished group of U.S. and Latin American scholars. Chapters 12–15 consist of comparative analyses. Noam Lupu analyzes how the undermining of party brands contributed to partisan erosion and party breakdown in Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile in Chapter 12. Jason Seawright uses machine learning to examine party systems' roots in society in Chapter 13, and Gustavo A. Flores-Macías explores the impact of party system institutionalization on economic policymaking and performance in Chapter 14. Finally, in Chapter 15, Allen Hicken and Rachel Beatty Riedl compare party systems in Latin America to those in Africa and Southeast Asia.

The most important contribution of the volume is the reconceptualization of party system institutionalization, which will, no doubt, be incorporated by future scholarship on this topic. In their 1995 volume, Mainwaring and Scully conceived party system institutionalization as having four dimensions: 1) the stability of interparty competition; 2) the strength of the parties' roots in society; 3) the popular legitimacy of parties and elections; and 4) the solidity of party organizations. In this volume, however, Mainwaring and his collaborators (p. 17) dispense with the latter three dimensions on the grounds that they facilitate party system institutionalization but do not define it. The stability of interparty competition, they argue convincingly, represents the core of party system institutionalization. In highly institutionalized party systems, the main parties are stable, as are their vote shares, and their linkages to voters (p. 21). This reconceptualization focuses and simplifies the concept, and makes it easier to measure.

Another important contribution is with respect to measurement. In Chapter 3, Mainwaring identifies 13 indicators that can be used to measure party system institutionalization, and employs them to assess changes in party system institutionalization in all Latin American countries except Cuba. These indicators measure not only the stability in aggregate patterns of interparty competition but also the durability of the main contenders and the ideological stability of parties in the legislature. He uses these indicators to measure party system institutionalization in both presidential and legislative elections and with respect to different time periods. The measures yield similar trends and patterns of variance in most cases, and many of the results will come as no surprise to scholars of Latin American parties and elections. Although many scholars will not find it necessary to use all 13 indicators that Mainwaring has employed here, the indicators provide a useful range of measures that scholars can choose from to suit their own purposes. Moreover, Mainwaring has provided a great service by making this valuable data set available in an online appendix.

The third contribution is empirical. The volume significantly advances our understanding of the evolution of party systems in the region. Chapters 5–12 provide persuasive explanations for the consolidation, stasis, or decline of party system institutionalization in eight Latin American countries. They carefully show why and how party systems evolved during this period, and they discuss some of the consequences of these changes.

Nevertheless, *Party Systems in Latin America* is more of a conceptual and empirical contribution than a theoretical one. Many of the theoretical arguments in the volume have been made previously by the authors in other venues. For example, Chapters 3, 12 and 14 are all well done and largely convincing, but they draw extensively on

arguments their authors have made in other books and articles. In addition, much of the volume is less concerned with developing general theories than it is with providing detailed descriptions of and explanations for the evolution of party systems in particular countries over time.

Causal inference is also an issue throughout the work, in part because it is very difficult to disentangle party system institutionalization from its purported causes and consequences. For example, it is hard to know whether greater party system institutionalization strengthens democracy or greater democracy strengthens party system institutionalization. Similarly, party system institutionalization may contribute to better economic performance, but better economic performance may also enhance party system institutionalization. In both of these instances, there are reasons to suspect reciprocal causation, as well as the existence of other unmeasured variables that shape party system institutionalization, democracy, and economic performance. Some of the chapters readily acknowledge these problems. In Chapter 4, which explores the correlates of party system institutionalization through quantitative analyses of 18 Latin American countries, the authors note the problem of endogeneity and caution that "the results are correlational, and limits to causal inference remain" (p. 130). Similarly, in Chapter 13, which examines the relationship between citizen attachments and party system institutionalization, Seawright warns that "the nature of the connection as causal, reverse-causal, spurious, etc., cannot be sorted out via the kind of descriptive analysis used here" (p. 396).

Finally, the volume might have benefited from a concluding chapter that summarized its findings, discussed their implications, and set out an agenda for future research. The final chapter, which compares party system institutionalization in Latin America to Africa and Southeast Asia, performs some of those tasks, but not as comprehensively as a concluding chapter might have done.

These shortcomings, however, do not negate the many strengths of *Party Systems in Latin America.* The volume represents an important empirical and conceptual contribution that will shape future research on party systems in Latin America and around the world.

Political Corruption and Scandals in Japan. By Matthew M. Carlson and Steven R. Reed. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2018. 204p. $39.95 cloth.
doi:10.1017/S1537592718003730

— Leonard Schoppa, *University of Virginia*

"Scandals" are not commonly the topic of books in political science. While there are certainly numerous works that have measured or compared levels of "political corruption" or "clientelism" across polities or across time, most scholars have been wary of tackling the more salacious and seemingly more slippery category of scandals.

Matthew Carlson and Steven Reed are therefore to be commended for taking on the challenge of analyzing the role that scandals play in democratic societies. By systematically analyzing all of the major scandals that have received national media attention in Japan between 1950 and 2016, they advance a convincing argument that we need to pay attention to scandals in order to understand the ebbs and flows of political corruption in democratic political systems everywhere.

The authors begin by carefully situating their definition of political corruption in the ample literature on this topic, arguing that a broad category of actions that "pervert the course of democratic politics" (p. 6) best captures the universe of corrupt acts. They fault some of the leading cross-national measures of corruption, such as those compiled by Transparency International, for focusing too narrowly on behaviors that are experienced by individuals (such as being expected to pay a bribe to public officials to receive government services). Bribery of this type is certainly one activity that perverts the course of democratic politics, but such measures ignore the wholesale purchase of public policy by special-interest groups that make campaign contributions to politicians, which certainly perverts the way democracy works in many systems.

Carlson and Reed argue that the case of Japan highlights the insufficiency of narrow definitions of corruption. Japan scores low (one of the least corrupt) on measures such as those compiled by Transparency International, in part because few Japanese experience requests for handouts from government officials. But most experts have long considered Japanese politics to be among those more heavily infected with corruption because scandals frequently highlight cases in which politicians offer policy favors in exchange for money.

The authors' commonsense definition of corruption helps us appreciate the first way in which scandals help us better understand corruption. They help us see the full range of what is regarded as corrupt by the public in a given place and time. Scandals are behaviors that are covered in the national media *because* they concern the public. When revelations in the media prompt candidates to resign or lose elections, or when they cause political parties to lose seats, we have further evidence that the behaviors revealed are regarded as perversions of democracy by the public. Some of these scandals involve criminal acts of bribery or violations of campaign laws, but sometimes the behaviors revealed are not technically illegal. When politicians respond to scandals by tightening laws to cover these behaviors, that is further evidence that the public sees the acts as corrupt.

To their credit, Carlson and Reed are not so naive as to think that a simple count of scandals gives us a full