

G. MANGANARO, *PACE E GUERRA NELLA SICILIA TARDO-ELLENISTICA E ROMANA (215 A.C.–14 D.C.): RICERCHE STORICHE E NUMISMATICHE* (Nomismata 7). Bonn: Habelt Verlag, 2012. Pp. 170, 41 pls. ISBN 9783774937710. €39.00.

The world of Hellenistic Sicilian numismatics is becoming increasingly well-known. The publication in 2009 of Puglisi's compilation of coin finds across the island from Dionysius down to the end of the first century B.C. has certainly helped in this regard, albeit with a stronger focus on the earlier, rather than the later period. With Frey-Kupper's study of the Ietas coinage recently published, the murky world of late Hellenistic Sicilian numismatics is becoming somewhat clearer. Manganaro's new study of a series of coin hoards from 215 B.C. to A.D. 14 is, therefore, a welcome addition to a growing field of study, notwithstanding some notable caveats.

M. presents eighty-one hoards from seven periods of Sicily's numismatic history — titled *Fascia monetale* — set into the context of their surrounding history. These subdivisions follow the major social, political and military upheavals. The second chapter, 'Dalla battaglia del Trasimeno a Claudio Marcello e Valerio Levino (217–207 a.C.)', presents the *Prima Fascia monetale*, and is by far the longest chapter. It also includes the majority of the hoards considered, forty-eight in total. Each following *Fascia* follows a different historical period: 'I sessantacinque anni di prosperità «turbata» della Sicilia'; 'La rivolta antiromana della schiavo Eunous-Re Antioco'; 'Incursioni servili nel 118–100 a.C. e la rivolta di Salvio-Tryphon e di Athenion'; 'La Sicilia dal 90 al 46 a.C.'; the oddly titled 'Il Bellum Servile di Sesto Pompeo'; and finally 'Tra Antonio e Augusto'. While some of the hoards discussed are provided with clear descriptions of their contents, throughout the volume several suffer from very limited analysis or presentation of their contents. The monograph assumes a prior familiarity with *IGCH*, *RRCH*, or other publication of the hoards, and this does not always aid comprehension. The plates provided are generally of excellent quality, although the map on p. 119 seems to be rather incomplete.

Besides any specific points that can be made about the presentation of the hoards or the difficulty of finding specific reasons for their burial, some more serious points can be made. The first regards the periodization chosen. M.'s choice of historical periods is not unexpected, but the alignment of the *Fascia monetale* so closely with historical events provides some odd moments. A few examples will suffice. On p. 48 it is suggested that the hoards comprising the second *Fascia* during the first half of the second century B.C. were left because of looting by slave gangs, connected on p. 50 to the revolt under Eunus in the 130s. It seems problematic to argue this for hoards, such as XLIX in M.'s collection (*RRCH*, 124), that seem to be datable to the 150s. The third *Fascia* is placed during the revolts under Eunus in 136–131 B.C., but this only allows for two hoards in the phase, both only loosely, if at all, attributable to that event. The suggestion on p. 59 that a hoard from Syracuse which M. dates to after 136 B.C. could argue for rebel incursions against Syracuse in 138–136 B.C. is not convincing. It seems to this reviewer that placing hoard evidence into these kinds of divisions presupposes a link between hoard burial/non-recovery and major social, political or military events. It is not clear more generally that archaeological finds can relate so directly to historical events (as perceived through literary or epigraphic sources), or that the interpretation of archaeological finds should be driven from the historical perspective in the first place.

The second point regards the choice of material for study. A focus on coin hoards, as opposed to finds from a broader range of contexts, gives considerable prominence to Roman coinage throughout the volume. In those sites that are excavated well enough to give a good indication of the overall finds there, such as Morgantina and Ietas, Roman coinage does not appear to account for more than 20 per cent of the total finds. The important rôle played by coinage in defining civic identity, as well as the specific rôle it played in Sicily *vis-à-vis* Romano-Sicilian relations requires much more attention than it has received to date. By focusing so much on hoards and silver coinage, M. cannot address this important topic. In addition, the impossibility of defining exactly why some hoards were abandoned, or by whom they were buried, makes it very hard to make any authoritative statement about what these hoards can tell us about Sicily in this period at all.

In some ways, this monograph feels like a missed opportunity. M., one of the leading scholars of Sicily and well versed in epigraphy, numismatics and literature, is well placed to offer an integration of the numismatic evidence with the other scattered remains of Sicily's history in a way that offers compelling insights into how these sets of evidence can interact. In numismatics, the bronze

coinages of Sicily appear to be the area most in need of work, and it is a disappointment that so little space was given to their study in this work. Even so, this monograph will be of benefit to readers in the contextualization of hoard finds within their surrounding history. M.'s use of epigraphic texts to broaden the historical discussions is especially welcome, not least because this is another important avenue for exploring Sicily in this period.

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A. ALLÉLY, *LA DÉCLARATION D'HOSTIS SOUS LA RÉPUBLIQUE ROMAINE*. Bordeaux: Ausonius, 2012. Pp. 320. ISBN 9782356130761. €25.00.

The possibility of declaring someone a *hostis* (enemy) of the Roman state was available for a relatively short period of time, with attested cases from 88 to 40 B.C. Nevertheless, it was an important weapon in the civil wars of the period. This book is the first monograph dedicated to this concept, and therefore in itself a useful contribution to our knowledge of the late Republic. Furthermore, Allély's book gives a clear analysis of the legal and political aspects of the *hostis*-declaration. She starts out by investigating the origins of the concept. The Gracchan period had seen an important innovation in Roman politics, the *senatus consultum ultimum* (SCU). This, however, had no legal consequences for individuals who posed a threat to the state, and the possibility of declaring them *hostis* was therefore necessary to exclude them legally. Sulla was the first to use the *hostis*-declaration against Marius and his supporters in 88 B.C.; usually, the official declaration was made by the Senate, with confirmation from the *comitia tributa*. The connection between the issuing of the SCU and the *hostis*-declaration remained close: in about half the attested cases, both decisions were made together, as table 2 (151) demonstrates.

A. traces in chs 1–3 the various *hostis*-declarations throughout the first century B.C., including those against Sulla in 87 B.C., Lepidus in 77 B.C., Catiline in 63 B.C., Caesar in 49 B.C., Milo in 48 B.C., Antony, Lepidus and Dolabella in 43 B.C., Octavian and L. Antonius in 41 B.C., and Salvidienus Rufus in 40 B.C. The last case was an anomaly, since Rufus was accused of treason, rather than of bringing armed force against the state; probably Octavian used Rufus as a warning to others not to betray him. After this, the *hostis*-declaration was no longer used. Octavian presented the war against Antony and Cleopatra simply as a foreign war, which better served his purpose of 'restoring the Republic'. As ch. 3 discusses, the late 40s B.C. saw the 'banalisation' of the *hostis*-declaration: not only rebellious individuals, but their whole armies were declared enemies of the state. This clearly acknowledged the growing importance of the army in politics of the period: if it was the support of the armies that made warlords victorious, then the soldiers should also suffer the consequences of supporting someone who tried to attack the Roman state.

Ch. 4 discusses the 'view from the side of the *hostes*'. Being declared an enemy of the state had important legal consequences: the loss of citizenship, which brought with it the loss of magistracies, priesthoods and military commands, as well as the confiscation of property and the destruction of one's house, as a symbol of the end of one's *gens*. There was no automatic death sentence attached to the declaration, but anyone who killed an enemy of the state would not be punished. This meant that people with ambitions in politics, such as Sulla and Caesar, were no longer legitimate commanders and politicians when they were declared *hostis*. Sulla, who was in the East in 87 B.C., simply ignored the declaration and continued to behave as a legitimate proconsul; when he returned to Rome with his army, the Senate was quick to withdraw the *hostis*-declaration and ratify his acts in the East. In any case, especially in the 40s, the situation changed so quickly that in most cases not all the measures could be carried out, and many *hostes* did not lose their property. They usually retained their commands, because these provided the best possibility of military victory, which (in turn) allowed them to have the declaration withdrawn, as Sulla had done. Caesar similarly retained his army, marched on Rome and had the *hostis*-declaration annulled by the Senate. Since many *hostes* did not lose their property, they could easily be reintegrated into social and political life; furthermore, since a *hostis*-declaration did not apply to children (contrary to a proscription), the children of former *hostes* could also easily take up a political career — making the Lepidi the only father-son duo to both be declared *hostes*.