Taylor and Zwicker provide in-depth mathematical theory of a kind not often found in political science. Their primary audience is game theorists, by which they do not mean economists. *Simple Games* is itself proof that there is great subtlety and complexity hidden in this straightforward model. But whether these mathematical results can ever be adapted to produce practical group decision processes, embodying principles appropriate to real-world institutions, is another question, one that Felsenthal and Machover, with *The Measurement of Voting Power*, help us answer.

Thucydides' Theory of International Relations: A Lasting Possession. Edited by Lowell S. Gustafson. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2000. 262p. $55.00 cloth, $24.95 paper.

Robert C. Bartlett, *Emory University*

Too often edited volumes are a farrago of barely related essays that amount to the academic equivalent of the proverbial camel: a horse built by committee. Lowell S. Gustafson is to be commended for compiling a coherent collection of essays that are united not only by their common conviction that Thucydides' great work does indeed possess a "theory of international relations" but also by their common desire to contrast this theory with current trends in the discipline. According to the contributors, Thucydides is not the father of "realism" or its variants because his understanding of international politics is essentially moral: Every approach to international politics that studies power to the neglect of justice, necessity to the neglect of freedom, will prove to be an inadequate tool with which to understand the political deeds of human beings. However much we may be impinged upon by necessity, we remain fundamentally free, and however much we may seek brute power, we nonetheless also strive to be just.

The book is divided into four sections ("Thucydides as Theorist of International Relations"; "International Politics and the Regime"; "Varieties and Refinements of Realism"; and "Ethics of International Relations"), and each contains helpful contributions. Laurie M. Johnson Bagby's excellent overview of the "fathers of international relations" culminates in the programmatic suggestion that Thucydides' work supplies a model for a political science that is genuinely scientific precisely because it is thoroughly political ("normative"). In part 2, W. Daniel Garst persuasively argues that neorealism yields "an overly simple and misleading account of the behavior and interaction of states" (p. 84) because it neglects the domestic sources of international conduct; by drawing attention to the care with which Thucydides details those domestic sources, Garst demonstrates that the neorealist reading distorts or neglects Thucydides' complexity. Jack Riley, in his sweeping account of Athenian imperialism, especially in its tension with the demands of sound domestic politics, makes the provocative argument in part 3 that "human reason and statesmanship" (p. 150), guided above all by a certain moderation, may yet succeed in doing what the Athenians only came close to doing: combining freedom and empire.

Yet, as important as it is to show the inadequacy of a realism that issues in either "an overly simple . . . account . . . of states" (p. 84) or a "superficial" reading of Thucydides (p. 78), we run the risk of misconstruing Thucydides' profound understanding of states if from the beginning we apply only our own concerns or categories to his work. Thucydides chronicled the Peloponnesian War because he believed it revealed something true about "the human way" or "human nature" (*History of the Peloponnesian War* I.22.4 as well as III.82.2 and 84.2); by his own account he sought to understand the necessities at work in human nature, especially with respect to those claims that most presuppose our freedom from necessity, the claims of justice.

It is not quite accurate to suggest, then, that "what most interests Thucydides . . . is the question of how this distribution of power [in fifth-century Greece] came about, particularly why Athens rather than Sparta acquired an empire" (p. 69). Indeed, several contributors put questions to Thucydides that are not his own, and it is not surprising that they prove dissatisfied with his answers to them. Thucydides is said to be burdened by a "limited methodology" (p. 62; also p. 233) and "appears unable to provide a definitive diagnosis [of Athens], let alone a prescription for a cure" (p. 214); Plato himself is made to say that Thucydides "cannot teach us anything" (p. 61). The ground of this last claim appears to be the assertion—as unsubstantiated as it is surprising—that Thucydides is not a philosopher but an historian (p. 61; also p. 180). Unlike Herodotus, Thucydides never speaks of "history," although he does speak repeatedly of "nature."

To begin to grapple with Thucydides the student of nature, the philosopher, one must set forth the correct premises and full implications of the "Athenian thesis." In its most consistent form, it calls into question the very existence of justice because it denies the prerequisite, what might be called the freedom of the will. Cities, like the individuals who make them up, are finally in the grip of a certain compulsion. To say, then, that the principle of Athenian foreign policy is that "the strong rule the weak regardless of justice" (p. 167) may not yet be to grasp fully its radical character: One cannot regard what does not exist.

Moreover, to speak of "the flaws of human nature" (p. 207) or of politics as "tragic" (pp. 22, 43, 138, 150, 152, 154, 163, 166, 171, 172, 233, 243) is not only to expect man and world to be fundamentally other than what they are but also to judge them in the light of this expectation. Does Thucydides himself, who never speaks of "tragedy," hold such an expectation? Although the present volume consistently deplores "realistic" arguments from necessity, often doing so in vivid language (e.g., "pathological thinking," p. 217), to deplore a position or its consequences is not yet to refute it. The greatest contribution of the book is to remind students of Thucydides how difficult that task is and how much depends upon it.

Thucydides' own view of justice and its fate in the world is admittedly controversial, but for that very reason it must remain an open question whether he "judges politics" by means of a "moral compass" (p. 154). In his "icily controlled prose" (p. 233), it is surely hard to see that he was "overwhelmed" or even "appalled" by the "tragedy" (pp. 233, 43) he witnessed. Could it be that in helping us to recover the forgotten ground of his remarkable equanimity, by compelling us to reflect on the central question he insists we see, Thucydides' account of the Peloponnesian War may prove to be for us, too, a "lasting possession"?

Poisoning the Minds of the Lower Orders. By Don Herzog. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998. 559p. $29.95.

Ian Harris, *University of Leicester*

Readers of Don Herzog's earlier volumes, *Happy Slaves* (1989) and *Without Foundations* (1985), will know that they should expect a bracing time when they open his books. They will not be disappointed. This is, without a doubt, a book

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055401262029 Published online by Cambridge University Press

buoyant in tone and in content. It marks a new departure in the author's manner of writing, displays a wide historical learning, and shows a striking lack of cant in its attitude toward political thought.

Herzog has written a book about conservatism and democracy, or more precisely about the conservative thought he finds in England of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. He complains of the balkanization of learning, in which people write for a limited circle of those who share their views, and part of the point of the book is to pursue another method. Herzog writes from a point of view he describes as that of an "unreconstructed liberal," who hopes "to strike a modest blow for the rationality of free speech by scrutinizing conservative ideas" (p. ix).

The structure of the book is tripartite. The first part, "Enlightenment," which contrasts conservatism and enlightenment, suggests that British conservatives thought that the minds of the lower orders were being poisoned by the spread of democratic ideas. Its conclusion is altogether more subtle, which is that the conflict was over epistemic authority. The second part, "Contempt," devotes less time to exploring that thought than to unpleasant aspects of the social hierarchy that was then at stake. Herzog suggests there is much here that should disquiet conservatives ("I mean the real ones, the ones with the infamous social agenda" [p. xiii]) and democrats (p. xiii) alike. The third part, "Standing," looks at what it was like to be regarded as a social inferior in Georgian Britain, in the interests of getting away from abstract treatments of equality in order to see what the receiving end of inequality was like.

This is a vigorous book. The author's independence of thrust, his energy of research, and his engaging style are admirable. I feel, at the same time, that there is a subtle, slim book trying to get out of this direct, large one, and that the two would complement each other. Take the case of Burke. He assumes a new appearance in these pages against the canvas of his society, but Burke was also a resourceful figure. He appears here, not least, as one spokesman for anti-Semitism among many (pp. 311, 319, 516–7). There can be no doubt that there were rashes of anti-Semitism in British society in this period, and indeed later. But Burke is not obviously its spokesman as much as someone who alluded to the beliefs he knew around him, as all politicians do, then as now. His disparaging references to Jews sometimes touched on opposition to Christianity, sometimes on finance, and sometimes on straightforward criminality: These cannot have been exclusively Jewish traits in Burke's mind. They are coupled with references to "very respectable persons of the Jewish nation" and to their "antient religion." They are complemented not only with public concern for an individual, Samuel Cohen, but also with the view that Jews are "the people, whom of all others it ought to be the care and wish of humane nations to protect" (pp. 516–7). In short, there is the broad canvas so vigorously colored by Herzog, but also there are subtle tones yet to be painted into the picture.

If one adopts an historical method of writing about political thought, then one is obliged, for part of the time at least, to adopt the manner of an historian. Herzog certainly does this, in that his erudition is as striking as it is painstaking. Yet, there is another portion of time he needs to give to his material. He needs to ask this question: Did these people think thus because they were conservatives, or because they were people of their time? This question is not posed here, and we cannot exclude the possibility that the latter is the more important point. It would not be difficult to show—Arthur Hertzberg has shown (*The French Enlightenment and the Jews*, 1968)—that nastiness about Jews, explicit or implicit, was a feature of much enlightened thought in the eighteenth century. It is otiose nowadays to observe that Thomas Jefferson was a slaveowner, among other things. In a like way it requires little emphasis that in the mind of the eighteenth century the Rights of Man were just that—women were excluded from the franchise in revolutionary France. This sort of point is adumbrated by Herzog when he discusses Cobbett, but it remains less developed than it might be.

Indeed, this is a point of general reflective relevance. There are in every society crucial indicators of general opinion—turns of phrase, habits of manner, single words—that are consensual or leading features. Anyone with a political or social axe to grind will try to appropriate these for their own. One need only spell "democracy" and "liberty" to be reminded of the contested meaning this produces. So it was here. If "improvement" denoted that intellectual progress would sweep away aristocracy, church, and perhaps monarchy, it also meant that these very institutions might be the preconditions of progress. If "reform" meant widening the franchise in order to curtail aristocratic influence, it also meant reduction of royal power for the benefit of the aristocracy. If "equality" meant a redistribution of private property, it also meant that all conditions were supposed to be equally happy. The point does not need to be elaborated in general, but it needs to be elaborated here. A text entitled "Influencing the Minds of the Lower Orders (Among Others)" would be broader and more nuanced. But it would be wrong to be critical. Indeed, that we have been given much here makes us ask for more.

Plato's Democratic Entanglements: Athenian Politics and the Practice of Philosophy. By S. Sara Monoson. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000. 252p. $39.50.

Larry Arnhart, *Northern Illinois University*

Sara Monoson challenges the common view of Plato as a strong opponent of democracy. Although she acknowledges his severe criticisms of democracy, she argues that his response to Athenian democracy shows ambivalence rather than complete hostility. Not only does Plato offer some qualified endorsements of democratic politics, she contends, but also he presents the practice of the philosophic life as rooted in Athenian democratic culture. Karl Popper's critique of Plato as a proto-totalitarian enemy of the "open society" is not as influential as it once was, but the assumption that Plato and Platonic philosophy are incompatible with democracy persists. Monoson wants to overturn that view and thus convince modern democratic readers that they may have something to learn from Plato.

In part 1 Monoson studies four elements of Athenian democratic life. The first is the story of Harmodius and Aristogeiton as an Athenian myth that celebrates the unity of the city in opposing tyranny. The second is the idea of the citizen as a "frank speaker" (*parrhesiastes*) who will contribute to free democratic debate in the pursuit of what is true and right. The third is the idea of the citizen as a lover of the city, particularly as developed in Pericles' funeral oration. The final element is the idea of the citizen as a theater-goer who experiences the ritual unity of the city and reflects on critical moral and political issues through the theatrical festivals at Athens.

In part 2 Monoson shows how Plato uses these four traditions of Athenian democracy in presenting his view of politics and philosophy. He appropriates the tradition of the tyrant-slayers Harmodius and Aristogeiton by presenting the philosopher as the best opponent of tyranny. He appropriates

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055401262029 Published online by Cambridge University Press