from decolonization, in Africa in particular in the early 1960s, but that were associated with active nationalist movements. I have trouble seeing them as equivalent to the secession of Croatia from Yugoslavia or Kosovo from Serbia. Be that as it may, the book is based on a truly heroic effort to collect and model appropriate data in testing a set of hypotheses about the relative significance of external recognition, specifically that of the Great Powers (defined as the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China) in turning de facto states into de jure ones.

The seven chapters follow a clear and logical path. After an introductory chapter laying out the main claims and the organization of the book, the second surveys the existing literature about state emergence and finds that the role of internal control and legitimacy far outweighs consideration of external recognition (particularly by the Great Powers) in most accounts. The key assertion is that "[e]xternal legitimacy is the ultimate arbiter of state emergence" (p. 12).

A third chapter lays out the design and methods used in the subsequent three chapters and presents some detailed hypotheses about various potential domestic and system-level determinants of state emergence. Chapter 4 examines both the domestic hypotheses, such as whether federal systems or ethnic subunits are more likely to generate externally recognized secessionist states, and the preferred external recognition hypotheses including nuanced ones about the motivations of different Great Powers in extending recognition to de facto states. Using Cox proportional hazards regression models for the Great Powers as a group and individually, one major finding is that coordination between Great Powers in extending recognition has the largest overall impact on the likelihood of recognition. Different Great Powers also indicate different patterns of recognition over time because of the power of precedent for their own potential secessionist predicaments with, for example, the "probability of the United Kingdom's and China's recognition . . . significantly decreased in times of domestic vulnerability" (p. 76). Chapters 5 and 6 use sets of studies from the former Yugoslavia—Slovenia, Croatia, and Kosovo—and Soviet Union/Russia—Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan, and Chechnya in Russia—to investigate the relative role of external recognition by Great Powers, with Slovenia and Croatia illustrating the importance of collective agreement and the others illustrating the vagaries of either no external recognition (Nagorno-Karabakh and Chechnya) or one-sided recognition (the United States, UK, and France with Kosovo and Russia with Abkhazia and South Ossetia).

A final chapter summarizes the main findings and strongly suggests that too much writing on civil war and secessionism misses or understates the role of external recognition, as does the practice of conflict prevention and resolution.

There are a number of real strengths to the book. One is that its global empiricism pushes away from the retelling of tales about supposedly prototypical European cases that still dominate so much discussion of the origins of statehood. Another is the thorough critical review of the established literature and its relative neglect of the role of external recognition. Finally, the combination of large-n quantitative analysis with the more in-depth historical narratives provided for the former Yugoslavia and Soviet Union/Russia provides a powerful way of steering the discussion between the poles of thin but useful pointers and thick but potentially idiographic detail. These are important contributions. The quality of the exposition in places, particularly of the tables in Chapters 5 and 6, does leave something to be desired. An entire column of data (on war deaths) is missing from Table 5.3, all of the tables in Chapter 5 have thoroughly jumbled footnotes, and in Table 6.1 an important percentage, that of Abkhazians in Abkhazia, is listed under Armenians.

I do see a number of theoretical problems with the book overall and in its detail. The entire role of the Great Powers as arbiters of the "system," yet as presumably equal partners in it, remains outside the book's framing of recognition by the Great Powers as crucial to other states' emergence. Where did they come from and why them? The whole emphasis on juridical rights (de jure) against the empirical capacities of internal sovereignty (de facto) is also a very recent emphasis in international law, dating back at the earliest to the late nineteenth century and more specifically to the arguments of that great political scientist Woodrow Wilson at the end of the World War I and thus problematic in terms of the *longue durée* of statehood *tout court* (see, for example, Nina Caspersen, *Unrecognized States: The Struggle for Sovereignty in the Modern International System*, 2012). The Westphalian origin myth haunts this book throughout. Finally, is the struggle for recognition ever *really* over for any state? It is not just a "formation" problem. Arguably, even the Great Powers need to constantly invoke threats to their existence to mobilize internal and external allies alike. But recognition/legitimacy, as the act of secession itself attests to, is never simply inside or outside or finished once some Great Powers are on your side.

The Question of Intervention: John Stuart Mill and the Responsibility to Protect. By Michael W. Doyle. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015. 288p. $40.00.
doi:10.1017/S153759271500417X

— Luke Glanville, *Australian National University*

This book makes an important contribution to a growing body of literature that turns to history in order to derive insights into present-day dilemmas about intervention, and particularly intervention aimed at protecting vulnerable people from atrocities. Michael Doyle, who has written

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several influential works exploring the usefulness of particular historical ideas and practices for today's world, takes as his starting point J. S. Mill's classic 1859 essay, "A Few Words on Non-Intervention," which, he says, is "the genuine *locus classicus* of the modern debate" (p. xi).

Doyle follows Mill in arguing that our judgments about whether or not to intervene, and how an intervention should be conducted, should be guided in large part by consideration of the consequences. What matters most is whether the proposed intervention will do more good than harm. However, he contests Mill's conclusions at several points and seeks to outline what he thinks are better standards for deciding on matters of intervention. He tends to challenge Mill on the grounds that his interpretation of particular historical examples was flawed or that the particular problems that we are confronted with today require different solutions, not that his ethical reasoning was problematic.

A key contribution that Mill made in his essay, Doyle claims, was to suggest practical ways to balance three contradictory principles: the cosmopolitan commitment to protect basic human dignity and welfare, the communitarian commitment to respect national self-determination, and the necessity of ensuring national security. These three principles are each morally valuable, and we need to take account of them when thinking through questions of intervention, Doyle says. He begins to do so by elucidating the reasons for valuing the principle of nonintervention (Chapter 1). This includes a fascinating analysis of the low success rates and counterproductive effects of various kinds of interventions over the last two centuries. Nevertheless, drawing on Mill, he then explains how it is sometimes justifiable to "override" this principle of nonintervention for reasons of national security or to protect fellow humans against mass atrocities (Chapter 2), and also how it can be justifiable to "disregard" the principle when the idea of self-determination underpinning it no longer fits the case, either in cases of legitimate secession or illegitimate foreign intervention (Chapter 3).

Then in Chapter 4, Doyle offers a cautious defense of the "Responsibility to Protect" (RtoP) concept that has emerged in recent years, which, he suggests, provides a useful "substantive license" for interventions that are necessary for the prevention of mass atrocities but also a valuable "procedural leash" on states that would seek to undertake unilateral and abusive interventions (p. 139). This chapter features a particularly insightful analysis of the 2011 Libyan intervention and the difficulties of postconflict insecurity and chaos that now confront the Libyan people, but it also repeatedly features what I think is a problematic claim that the RtoP concept somehow contradicts established international law on the use of force. The fifth and final chapter explores the ethics of postbellum peacebuilding, considering the rights and duties of both the interveners and the intervened.

One aspect of the author's argument that I suspect will trouble some readers is his treatment of Mill's infamous, though fairly conventional, justification for benign intervention and imperial rule over non-European peoples. Doyle concedes that Mill's argument is "problematic" and "Orientalist." However, rather than engaging closely with these ethical concerns, he simply claims that "Mill's argument for trusteeship begins to address one serious gap in strategies of humanitarian assistance," which is the question of how to help failed states that require postbellum rebuilding (p. 107). The "modern answer," he says, is "multilateral peacebuilding," which is "an occupation that is designed to promote human rights and local self-determination" and which avoids the dangers of imperialism. Doyle makes surprisingly little effort to grapple with the prejudices underpinning Mill's suggestion that non-European peoples should be subject to different rules of intervention and occupation than Europeans. Nor does he wrestle with the argument made by numerous scholars that similar or different prejudices might be at play in practices of intervention and postbellum peacebuilding today.

One other minor quibble: While it is usually poor form to critique an author for choosing to write about one thing rather than another, I tend to think that with much of *The Question of Intervention* focused on RtoP, Doyle missed an important opportunity to say something about the idea at the heart of RtoP; that the states comprising the international community should understand that they have not merely a discretionary right to work collectively to protect populations but also a responsibility to do so. While this is an issue that has exercised the minds of other students of Mill, such as Michael Walzer, Doyle declares at the outset that he will "focus on when intervention is permissible, not necessarily when it is desirable from the point of view of the intervener" (p. 6). The need to move beyond debates about the permissibility or right of humanitarian intervention and to encourage states to reinterpret their conception of what is desirable and to generate the political will to save strangers was precisely what motivated the development of the concept of the RtoP. The case study used by Doyle to explore the question of the permissibility of humanitarian intervention is the 1994 Rwandan genocide. But, as many commentators have noted, the failure of the international community to prevent or stop this genocide was produced not by concerns over whether there existed a *right* to intervene so much as by an unwillingness of states to take up the burden of *responsibility* to do so. As important as the question of permissibility is, an answer in favor of intervention provides little succor to victims of atrocities if no states are willing to act.

Those quibbles aside, this book makes an impressive contribution to the ongoing debate about the ethics of intervention. Doyle has yet again provided us with a valuable model for ways in which to carefully draw on the ideas

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of past thinkers and apply them to our own problems today, and his conclusions deserve a wide audience.

Aid Dependence in Cambodia: How Foreign Assistance Undermines Democracy. By Sophal Ear. New York: Columbia University Press, 2012. 208p. $60.00.
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— Sonja Grimm, *University of Konstanz, Germany*

In this book, Sophal Ear criticizes the negative impact of the foreign aid supplied by the international donor community since 1992 on Cambodia's postconflict development. According to Ear, dependency on foreign aid undermined the government's will to do good governance and taxation, breaking "the link between government accountability and popular elections" (p. 12): "It is by weakening accountability that foreign aid most harms governance, by increasing the incentive for corruption and diluting political will" (ibid.). As a consequence of such aid dependency, corruption rose to a high level.

Further negative consequences studied in the book are the rise of social and economic inequality despite economic growth in recent years (Chapter 2), the government's weak response to the Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) crisis ("bird flu") (Chapter 3), and the failure to build up civil society beyond elections (Chapter 4). Ear blames both the Cambodian government and donors for failing to overcome aid dependencies. Members of the government are accused of showing little political will to change the situation so as not to lose personal gains (p. 45). Donors are criticized for their "insufficient . . . attention to dysfunctional models of institutional development" (p. 48). When corruption or violation of the rule of law is observed, aid money is rarely suspended and corrupt acts go unprosecuted or unpunished (p. 47).

Aid Dependence in Cambodia is a very personal account of the country's postconflict development in a situation of aid dependency. The author, born Cambodian, moved to the United States from France as a Cambodian refugee at the age of 10. In the United States, Ear received training in economics and political science at the universities of Princeton and Berkeley. After finishing his doctorate, he lived three years in Cambodia working as a consultant for various development agencies and then became an assistant professor at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. This life story, presented in the first 15 of 160 text pages, shapes the analysis intensively, making it a personal, participatory, thick description of today's (fragile) Cambodian state in several policy fields.

From a political science point of view, however, critical distance and analytical rigor are missing. The author details neither his theoretical frame nor his methodological approach. As regards theory, some parts of the study refer to a substantial body of the aid effectiveness literature, but the author does not use this body to formulate a consistent theoretical frame that would guide the within-case studies. References to the peace- and statebuilding as well as the democratization and democracy-promotion or political economy literatures that appear to be relevant to the study of postconflict Cambodia are completely missing. Unfortunately, the book does not synthesize what has been written elsewhere on aid effectiveness or on Cambodia's postconflict transition. Consequently, its theoretical contribution to the current aid effectiveness debate cannot be identified.

As regards methodology, the research framework is likewise underdeveloped. The study does not provide a consistent account of the influence of the independent variable (aid dependence) on the dependent variable (governance quality) throughout the three within-case studies on economic growth in the garment, rice, and livestock sectors (Chapter 2), health management during the HPAI crisis (Chapter 3), and human rights activism (Chapter 4). In these chapters, intervening variables, such as weak institutional capacity, brain drain, weak accountability, corruption, and donor pressure, as identified in the beginning of the book (p. 18), are not traced in a systematic, comparative analysis in order to study their impact on governance quality. Sometimes, these variables are treated as factors influencing governance quality (as independent variables) and sometimes as factors affected by aid dependency (thereby turning them into further dependent variables), but most often, they are not discussed at all. Furthermore, the difference between "weakening institutional capacity" (one of the identified independent variables) and "quality of governance" (the dependent variable) remains blurred; in fact, the latter is equated with "weak governance" throughout the book.

Even more puzzling is the fact that Chapter 2 is not on aid dependence but on varieties of growth. In this chapter, which is based on an earlier study published elsewhere, Ear seeks to explain why there is growth in some sectors but not in others, yet he does not discuss the influence of aid dependency on these sectors at all. The chapter does not provide empirical evidence substantiating the book's argument that weak governance negatively influenced Cambodia's development as a consequence of severe aid dependence.

The book claims to be an important critical account of aid dependency in Cambodia's postconflict context, showing negative consequences, such as the persistence of weak governance, the rise of inequality, and the lack of progress in democratization. Whether this is particular for Cambodia or valid for the whole universe of postconflict societies cannot be decided on the basis of the book's claim, as the specific *postconflict* context is not systematically taken into account. Instead, the analysis reads in large part as the description of a static relationship of "donors" and "recipients" in a specifically Cambodian

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