lies, but it is pretty clear that this claim is robust nonetheless.)

The Held, Roger, and Nag edited book is one of literally dozens that show how the rise of developing countries has had a big impact on international cooperation. Across 12 chapters they look at how 12 developing countries have engaged with the international agenda on climate change. The book makes it clear that there is no single strategy emerging from these countries, which suggests that international cooperation efforts will need to be flexible enough to accommodate many diverse approaches—an important point for policy makers to heed as they work toward a 2015 deadline for a new international climate treaty. It is also clear that no country is dealing with the climate issue in isolation. Instead, each is approaching climate change in ways that intersect with other policy agendas, such as alleviation of poverty, reducing air pollution, or promoting energy security. That may help explain why the climate agenda is so fickle—it depends heavily on other goals of countries, which is true worldwide and not just across the developing world.

A strength of Held, Roger, and Nag is that it offers a compact summary. A weakness, for experts, is that each chapter is so short that it can offer little more. The vast majority of the edited book is about controlling emissions; only one chapter (on Mozambique) is about what a growing number of developing countries now think is the really urgent climate agenda: adaptation (the chapter on Egypt also has passing discussion of this theme). As with most edited books, the chapters don't quite hold together. There is an editors' introduction that points to some common themes, but no conclusion. Nonetheless, it is clear that these countries—especially the big emitters—are now vital players in the international diplomacy on climate change.

What's still unclear is how gridlock will unfold generally or in any specific area such as climate change or international trade. Hale, Held, and Young, in their concluding chapter, explore routes beyond gridlock, but none of those seem particularly likely to have much impact. Indeed, in addition to the four pathways that explain increasing gridlock, most key countries are rife with internal problems that will be distracting and make it hard for them to engage in reliable international cooperation. And if international cooperation falters then more unsolved international problems will have harmful domestic consequences, leading to still more gridlock. It is not a pretty picture. Hale, Held, and Young conclude that "something has to give if the global challenges described in this book are to be met" (p. 310). What that is remains unclear, and the most likely outcome is that the problems won't get solved.

This book reveals, in my assessment, that we haven't done enough to explain the variation across issue-areas. For Hale, Held, and Young, gridlock is a uniform problem that seems to afflict all issue-areas. But other scholars aren't so dark—for example, Dan Drezner's new book (*The System Worked: How the World Stopped Another Great Depression*, 2014) argues that within the realm of international financial coordination after the global financial crisis, the "system worked." Future studies would benefit from stronger theory, applied more rigorously across diverse cases, and then an active effort to explain the variation across issue areas.

For scholars and policy makers, some important questions remain. If gridlock sets in, as it seems to be, then does cooperation remain in place or will it come unraveled? The bicycle theory of trade cooperation suggests that pedaling is important. If so, the absence of pedaling—gridlock—could make the whole system tip over. Hale, Held, and Young never really take this question head on, but they do seem to suggest that the stickiness of institutions will make them drift away from what countries are willing to sustain.

In my view, one of the most important questions lies with China. Will China be an institution builder (or at least not destroyer)? That question, in many respects, applies to all of Asia—the region whose economic prosperity is rooted in the fruits of successful international cooperation and yet is a conspicuous laggard when it comes to actually building international institutions. Here, too, it is never exactly clear where Held and Young stand, but their analysis suggests that gridlock will persist. In my view, it is hard to see how a country that is motivated by its own "wealth and power"—to adopt the phrase that Orville Schell and John Delury use to explain two centuries of China's national policy strategies—will necessarily invest much in international institutions that are more democratic and inclusive in their inspiration and benefits.

These are vital questions for policy and theory, and we should all be grateful to Hale, Held, and Young for helping to frame them and for delivering a significant down payment on some answers.

Sustaining Human Rights in the Twenty-First Century: Strategies from Latin America. Edited by Katherine Hite and Mark Ungar. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013. 424p. $60.00.
doi:10.1017/S153759271400067X

— Ann Marie Clark, *Purdue University*

As a region, Latin America has been a proving ground for the scholarly understanding of human rights change at various levels of analysis, including the transnational level. Contributors to this edited volume address the domestic, regional, and global politics of how democratized states reckon with a recent historical legacy of human rights violations, as well as new problems. The subtitle of *Sustaining Human Rights in the Twenty-First Century:*

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Strategies from Latin America is something of a misnomer. It is not a collection of strategies at all, but a compilation of original essays from a set of scholars engaging with the human rights issues that Latin American countries have grappled with for decades. As such, it makes an important contribution to the literature on human rights and Latin American politics that will be useful for anyone who follows political and theoretical developments in this area. It could also serve as an introduction to these topics for advanced students of Latin American politics. And, it poses important questions for further research as the political landscape of human rights changes in this region.

The volume illuminates complexities of human rights recognition in new democracies as well as Latin America's place in a global political context. Commissioned following a 2009 conference at the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars in Washington DC, the book is divided into three sections. The first, "The Human Rights Idea," is something of a refresher course on the development of human rights in tandem with the Latin American political context. Here the editors, Mark Unger and Katherine Hite, helpfully outline the historical, political, and conceptual "Arc of Human Rights" in the region since periods of military rule in the 1960s. The second section, "Institutional and Legal Frameworks and the Question of Accountability," attempts to address impunity as well as threats to human rights that persist in democratic states. In some cases, current problems are fueled by shortcomings in how state and local institutions are responding to ordinary crime, as Ungar's singly authored essay suggests. The third section, "Citizens' Movements and Conceptions of Citizenship," features chapters detailing how civil society has shaped and will continue to shape responses to human rights violations in Latin America. It is worth mentioning that, although the conference was held in 2009, the chapters themselves incorporate later developments.

Ungar and Hite's introductory chapter starts by summarizing the region's recent human rights history as well as the importance of antiauthoritarian political movements within Latin American countries in the mid-to-late twentieth century. Now countries like Chile, Argentina, Peru, and others face the accountability question as human rights principles have been translated into legal protections. Newer rights conceptions and capacity challenges are mentioned, too. For example, incorporation of new rights is detailed in Henry Carey's chapter on how NGOs seek to address issues on the frontier of the provision of economic, social and cultural rights. Not surprisingly, the political and legal changes that *have* occurred dictate that despite the content of law, the substantive provision of rights is still problematic. The need for further progress on the next steps – in essence, applying the law and legal norms related to human rights – is the launching point for many of the essays that follow in this volume.

The very best pieces are those that most pointedly elaborate either explicitly or implicitly on Ungar and Hite's juxtaposition of law with substantive outcomes, by offering empirical perspectives on developments related to the consolidation of rights and the development of rights-protective civil societies in Latin America. For the sake of space, I briefly highlight three chapters in particular: those by Jo-Marie Burt on human rights prosecutions; by Priscilla Hayner on truth commissions; and by Katherine Hite on political memory in Chile.

Jo-Marie Burt reviews the course of human rights prosecutions through a four-case comparison of events in Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and Peru. She argues that although a globalizing justice dynamic may be suggested by the increasing number of human rights prosecutions (as suggested elsewhere by Ellen Lutz and Kathryn Sikkink's term "justice cascade"), the cross-national variation in accountability processes calls for a more fine-grained understanding of how human rights violators are treated after countries return to democracy. Burt notes that trials are often selective and do not target all known violators, leaving society (particularly the persons directly affected by the violations in question) with the justifiable perception that the level of accountability has been incomplete. In support of her argument, she contrasts the legitimacy of Argentina's prompt trials with Uruguay's drawn out process, and contestation in Peru by loyalists of the Fujimori regime.

The peace *versus* justice debate is a familiar conundrum for societies in transition after periods of repression, but Hayner brings fresh scholarly precision as well as a regional comparison to the discussion in her chapter. She compares the pursuit of justice in Africa (where debate is currently intense about the role of the International Criminal Court), with Latin America (where countries for the most part have applied national measures). Hayner focuses on Latin American cases where the pursuit of justice has occurred in the aftermath of some sort of negotiated peace accords: El Salvador, Guatemala, and Colombia. By comparison, the International Criminal Court and global actors have been much more involved in Sudan, Uganda, Sierra Leone and Liberia. She notes that whereas civil society actors were key participants in Burt's cases, the formal peace agreements in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Colombia (thus far) seem to have made it more difficult to pursue criminal justice routes for accountability, particularly given those countries' weakened civil societies and domestic institutions. The peace agreements also came with at least partial amnesty provisions. Despite the difficulty of comparing Latin America and Africa on the human-rights-justice axis, she offers four causal factors that impact levels of accountability: the strength of the regional human rights framework, strength of civil society, presence or absence of ongoing conflict, and arrests of leaders after agreements. This is an ambitious chapter, and thorough lessons from the cases are precluded

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by its brevity, but she tantalizingly suggests, “to find out if Latin America represent[s] the future . . . watch Africa” (p. 161). Indeed, a global thread is present throughout the volume, including Gordon Hanson’s chapter on migration and Monique Segarra’s on development, human rights, and the environment.

Hite’s singly-authored chapter explores another issue of importance as Latin America’s most repressive periods recede: memory and memorialization of the victims. Here she surveys the ways that these periods have been represented in museums and memorials. She highlights, as do many of the other chapters, the importance of human rights organizations and activists in not only remembering, but “educating.”

The volume was compiled to honor Prof. Margaret Crahan, now a senior research scholar at Columbia University. A sense of humor and scholarly staying power shines through in her brief but substantive epilogue, where she jokes about having worked on human rights “since the Middle Ages (i.e., the 1950s).” The scholars here have done her proud. Conference compendia can be either very specialized or not well integrated, or both. But this volume presents a high-quality, fascinating snapshot of the wide range of Latin American rights-related governance issues from global, regional, and national perspectives.

European Security in NATO’s Shadow: Party Ideologies and Institution Building. By Stephanie C. Hofmann. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013. 275p. $99.00.

The European Union and Military Force: Governance and Strategy. By Per M. Norheim-Martinsen. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013. 242p. $95.00.
doi:10.1017/S1537592714000681

— Brian C. Rathbun, *University of Southern California*

While the crisis of the euro currency has been the most visible issue facing the European Union in recent years, the EU has moved quietly ahead on cooperation in the area of security and defense over the last decade and a half. Indeed, more could argue that this has been the most successful endeavor of Union members in that period, particularly in light of the financial bailouts of numerous debtor Eurozone members. Two recent books, *European Security in NATO’s Shadow* by Stephanie Hofmann and *The European Union and Military Force* by Per Norheim-Martinsen, try to make sense of this process, both past and future.

Hofmann’s purpose is to explain how the European Union, after decades of failed efforts, finally managed to create an autonomous European capacity in security and defense. After hesitating in negotiations at Maastricht and Amsterdam, the EU surged ahead in 1999, creating institutions to manage small-scale crisis-management operations, such as peacekeeping, without the direct participation of the United States, as well as some collective capacity to do so in the form of national forces earmarked to a European Rapid Reaction Force. The Europeans have put these capacities to good use, undertaking a number of small military operations in the last decade.

As Hofmann points out, this is something of a puzzle for international relations theory. Given that most of the EU members are also NATO members, why would they duplicate the functions of the most successful military alliance of all time, one that had engaged in an extensive process of reform to be able to undertake the very same type of operations? This was hardly a shrewd utilitarian choice. Nor did it go nearly far enough to indicate any kind of soft balancing strategy vis-à-vis the United States.

The author argues that major progress in the area of an autonomous European capacity for military operations was made possible by the alignment of similarly minded political parties in the major European capitals—Berlin, Paris, and London. Once governments had compatible ideologies, they found it much easier to move forward. Headway in European security cooperation, she argues, is facilitated by the commitment to similar values, in this case those of Europe as a political community, multilateralism as an end in itself or at least a means to an end (i.e, *not* unilateralism), and intergovernmentalism or supranationalism (as opposed to a vehement defense of sovereignty).

Theoretically, Hofmann claims that her contribution is to integrate political parties and their ideologies as causal factors into the study of foreign policy, as well as to point out the importance of ideological congruence for foreign policy. This is too much to claim. The “notable exceptions” included in the book broke this ground in a virtually identical fashion long before, and they explain how the unique ideologies that parties bring into the decision-making process help define the national interest in a way that differentiates them from others, even in the same structural circumstances (p. 14, n. 1). Core values give rise naturally to particular preferences in regard to international institutions, including the European Union.

Hofmann distinguishes herself by taking a more inductive approach to uncovering those values, arguing that such a step is necessary lest one miss the multidimensionality of ideology in regard to European integration. However, in an effort to differentiate herself from previous work, she falls into a trap. If one does not deduce foreign policy preferences from broader ideologies evident in preferences on other issues, such as domestic issues, one can only measure foreign policy ideology by reference to support for the very policies she is trying to explain. How do we know, for instance, that the Socialist Party has a preference for Europe as a political community, leading to support for European defense? If the answer is, as in Hofmann’s book, by reference to previous statements of support for European integration and European defense,

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