

this book would give an even more useful and rewarding discussion of an obviously worthwhile theoretical approach.

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PERCEPTION

T. SCHIRREN: *Aisthesis vor Platon. Eine semantisch-systematische Untersuchung zum Problem der Wahrnehmung*. Pp. xxvi + 286. Stuttgart and Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1998. Cased. ISBN: 3-519-107666-7.

One of the challenges of studying Presocratic philosophy is the avoidance of terminological and conceptual anachronism. S.'s study tries to show that the distinction between *αἴσθησις* as mere sensory awareness, on the one hand, and thought or knowledge, on the other, is generally not represented in preplatonic writing. His argument is in two parts. The first is a word study of *αἰσθάνεσθαι* and cognates. How were verbs of perception used in relation to works of thinking and knowing (e.g. *μανθάνειν*, *πυνθάνεσθαι*, *γινώσκειν*) before the Platonic division between the physical and the intelligible world? The approach here is roughly structuralist: meanings of *αἰσθάνεσθαι* are identified by surveying patterns of contrast with other cognitive verbs. Thucydides provides the main evidence, though the orators, Herodotus, and the Hippocratic writings are also separately analysed. The general conclusion for Thucydides (p. 61) is that *αἰσθάνεσθαι* indicates an alert awareness and cognition of what is real. Furthermore, there is an emphasis on the suddenness of the events 'perceived'. The conclusion is generally supported by an analysis of the orators. In the Hippocratic corpus *αἴσθησις* occurs as a technical term for 'physical affection', and as thinking itself is seen as a function of physical affections, we again see the absence of the Platonic contrast between perception and thought. Though S. allots one section to the relationships between *ὄραν*, *ἀκούειν*, and *αἰσθάνεσθαι* in Thucydides, one aspect that deserves more prominence is the relationship between *αἰσθάνεσθαι* and verbs of specific sense modalities. One occasion when this consideration would be relevant is when S. argues (p. 48) that the fact that *αἰσθάνεσθαι* is never used in the imperative indicates that it refers to a passive receptiveness which perhaps cannot be controlled. But the imperative may be missing not because *αἰσθάνεσθαι* indicates a passive receptive disposition but because it is too general a term to be appropriately used in the imperative. If you want somebody to perceive, you tell him to look, hear, or smell. The scope of S.'s word study is perhaps too limited here to be reliable as a guide to general views about perception.

In the second part S. brings his thesis to bear on the Presocratic philosophers, Xenophanes, Heraclitus, Alcmaeon, Parmenides, Empedocles, and finally the Sophists. In view of the scarcity of occurrences of *αἰσθάνεσθαι* in the fragments, S. sensibly abandons the lexical approach. Instead, he analyses the material in relation to the overarching notion of 'sensibility' (*Sinnlichkeit*), which includes not just sense-perception proper but also (erotic) sensuality. Through this notion the Presocratics are placed in relation to the 'world experience' (*Weltgefühl*) characteristic of lyric poetry, according to which the self is in the grip of the powers of sensuality. For example, S. argues that Parmenides criticizes the lyric world experience by showing its implication in what is not. Weaknesses show up, however, when S. seeks to avoid the view that the Parmenidean critique of the senses anticipates the Platonic. In what is surely an exaggeration, S. says (p. 202) that it has been generally accepted since K. Reinhardt

(1977) that the Way of Doxa should be taken seriously as cosmology. His argument that the principles of Day and Night are both manifestations of being and identical in their complementary difference (and thus consistent with the Way of Truth) seems at odds with the description of being as *μονογενές* (fr. 8.4) and *πάν ὁμοίον* (fr. 8.22). In the end, S. seems to underestimate the radical nature of Parmenides' rationalism.

Among the many virtues of S.'s work are the thoroughness of his textual analyses and his sensitivity to intertextuality. S.'s general thesis, however, stands in need of further clarification and argument. It is not clear exactly which Platonic view of the senses is being opposed to the Presocratic writers. For Plato to say that perception does not give knowledge in a strong sense is compatible with the idea that common-or-garden knowledge is based on sense perception (cf. e.g. D. Scott's interpretation of the theory of recollection in *Recollection and Experience* [Cambridge, 1995]). Certainly, it is hard to find preplatonic precedents for the way Plato draws the perception/knowledge distinction in some dialogues, but that may be more because of the strength of the concept of knowledge developed there than because perception is seen as inadequate to everyday cognitive tasks. Plato might well have written of a general, as did Thucydides (4.116.1), that he 'perceived (*ἤσθητο*) that his people abandoned the fortifications and saw (*ὄρων*) what was happening'. Indeed, in the *Republic* he did write that we perceive (*αἰσθανόμεθα*) that an artisan has no time for being ill (406c6) and that a man trained in *μουσική* 'is quick to perceive (*αἰσθάνοιτο*) any defect or ugliness in art or in nature' (401e2–3).

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MIND–BODY

J. P. WRIGHT, P. POTTER (edd.): *Psyche and Soma. Physicians and Metaphysicians on the Mind–Body Problem from Antiquity to Enlightenment*. Pp. xii + 298. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000. Cased, £45. ISBN: 0-19-823840-1.

Few concepts have been so constant through time, and yet so difficult to define, as the soul, and its relationship to the body. The present collection of articles traces the debate on the soul among European physicians and metaphysicians from the fifth century B.C. to the nineteenth century. B. Gundert opens with a discussion of the relationship between bodily and psychic functions in the Hippocratic Corpus, and concludes that Hippocratic medicine did not have a perception of the soul as an entity independent from the body, but rather a unitary perception of nature that encompassed mental and bodily functions. T. M. Robinson attempts to follow the development of Platonic theories and perceptions of the soul. He understands the contradictions and changes of direction in Plato's theories as the result of a life-time 'wrestling with the problem', and 'a splendid memorial to his (sc. Plato's) intellectual honesty'. P. J. van der Eijk explores the connection between bodily and psychic functions in Aristotle. He argues that although Aristotle mostly had in mind a set of functions, 'a form of pattern', when he spoke about the soul, at times he seems to imply that the *psyche* was a separate entity residing somewhere in the body. H. von Staden explores the perceptions of the soul in Hellenistic medicine in an excellent article that allows the reader to understand very clearly the evolution of the theories