state grew, so did the range of foreign practices that came under its purview. Growing rapidly from the 1960s, criminal behavior by foreign nationals brought the assertion of new authority by the United States, which continued to deny them full constitutional protections. All three forms of extraterritoriality, Raustiala concludes, "demonstrate an often overlooked face of postwar American hegemony: a marked willingness to project power and law, sometimes unilaterally, within the territorial borders of other sovereign states in an effort to better control and deter transboundary threats" (p. 180).

All this sets the stage for Raustiala's penultimate chapter examining the war on terror. After 9/11, the United States dramatically extended its extraterritorial reach once again, and employed new tactics such as extraordinary rendition and new "black sites" to detain and interrogate suspected terrorists. Guantanamo Bay, in turn, was selected as the principal prison site for terrorists, regardless of nationality, because it is the only American military base on the sovereign territory of another state—Cuba—without a SOFA. Relying on earlier conceptions of strict territoriality, as well as established precedent, the Bush administration considered Guantanamo to be beyond the reach of American law, thus providing the executive branch with considerable flexibility in dealing with detainees. Yet, in *Boumediene* v. *Bush,* decided in 2008, the Supreme Court reacted to this end run around the Constitution and found that "detainees [at Guantanamo] had a constitutionally protected right to challenge their detention before a federal court" (p. 215). Although this right would likely not apply to facilities outside of direct U.S. control, for the first time, as Raustiala shows, the Supreme Court discovered that a "constitutional right applied to an alien held outside the United States" (p. 218).

Written for lawyers and a general audience, *Does the Constitution Follow the Flag?* will be of interest to at least three groups of political scientists. Constitutional law scholars will find Raustiala's focus on territoriality helpful in organizing debates over the extent of American law and in revealing shifts in legal doctrine. Scholars concerned with the meaning of citizenship will also benefit from the author's fresh insights into what it means to be an American. In a country bound together only by respect for the Constitution, to understand that the protections of that venerated document vary not only by *who* a person is but by *where* he or she is renders more problematic that already fraught concept. Finally, Raustiala contributes to the growing revisionist literature on sovereignty and, thus, his book is important to scholars of international relations. The notion of territoriality is central to the principle of Westphalian sovereignty, which takes as its foundation that a nation's laws and borders coincide. Others have shown that international practice is often inconsistent with the principle of sovereignty. Breaking new ground, Raustiala demonstrates here that even basic laws do not conform with Westphalia sovereignty.

This wonderful book is not, however, without its limitations. Even as an analysis of legal doctrine, it lacks a theory of judicial decision making. Raustiala insightfully places judicial decisions in the context of the evolving international position of the United States, the rise of the regulatory state at home, and larger Supreme Court debates. But the key decisions that determine the zone of law seem to come from "nowhere." At most, judicial decision making is portrayed as responsive to political pressures, pragmatic and flexible, and generally directed toward the enhancement of "American power and interests on the world stage" (p. 224). But how and why individual cases are decided as they are remains unexplained. His analysis of intra- and extraterritoriality also cries out for comparative analysis. Some tentative comparisons are posed in the conclusion, but possible American "exceptionalism" needs more detailed examination.

Finally, it would have been useful for the book to look to the future and the relationship between extraterritoriality and international law. If extraterritoriality is an attempt to harmonize American and foreign laws, as Raustiala argues, how will this play out as the United States declines, China rises, and globalization continues? Will national legal systems clash as they are projected onto the world, or will fears of conflict provoke new efforts to unify law at the international level? Again, the author makes reference to these questions, and is explicit throughout in showing how international law shaped the meaning of intra- and extraterritoriality, but by limiting his analysis to the United States he cannot really engage these issues.

No one can do everything in one book, and Raustiala wisely does not overreach. These limitations, like the subject matter itself, open the door through which I hope that others will walk to a broader and more international research agenda on territoriality in the modern world.

Degrees of Democracy: Politics, Public Opinion, and Policy. By Stuart N. Soroka and Christopher Wlezien. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009. 254p. $87.00 cloth, $26.99 paper.
doi:10.1017/S1537592711000685

— Paul M. Kellstedt, *Texas A&M University*

The metaphor of the public behaving as if it were a thermostat—that is, responding to increasingly liberal policies by becoming more conservative, and vice versa—was first proposed by Christopher Wlezien in his important 1995 article in the *American Journal of Political Science.* That model, which turns the more traditional notion of representation (opinion causes policy) on its head, reaches its fullest explication in this excellent new book by Stuart N. Soroka and Wlezien.

To be sure, the metaphor, and the entire conception of the connection between the mass public and elected officials, is inextricably tied to time; there are no representational dyads to be found in these pages. Soroka and Wlezien

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examine the connections between the over-time movement of public opinion and public policy across several policy domains in three countries (the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom). After an introductory chapter, they lay out their theory of the relationship between public opinion and public policy in Chapter 2. There, they clarify that the theory is not exceedingly demanding of what decades of research has shown to be a public with limited appetites and abilities to process political information. In Chapter 3, they add important comparative wrinkles to their theory, specifying two dimensions that should moderate the opinion–policy connection. The first is issue salience; the authors expect both more representation and more public responsiveness to policy on issues that are of high salience, and less of both on issues that are of low salience. (Importantly, salience can vary over time.) The second moderator is the nature of institutional arrangements in a political system. They argue that both representation and responsiveness are diminished in systems with federal (as opposed to unitary) organization and also in parliamentary (as opposed to presidential) systems.

Soroka and Wlezien lay out the specifics of their conceptualizations of both public opinion and public policy in Chapter 4. Public opinion, in their examination, is a rather blunt instrument, characterized by a Goldilocks-like sense of preferring either too much, too little, or about the right amount in varying policy areas, such as health, defense, and education; the domains vary by country. Although the time series in each country covary substantially, the authors resist the urge to go to the macro-level extreme and aggregate across all issues into a single "mood" reminiscent of James Stimson's influential book *Public Opinion in America* (1991). There is, they argue, enough unique variation within each policy domain to warrant separate analysis. Having measured public preferences for spending, the authors likewise conceptualize and measure public policy in a similarly broad manner, examining over-time levels of spending on various policy domains. In Chapters 5 and 6, the thermostatic model is tested and largely confirmed. The public, in all three countries, on almost all policy domains, reacts thermostatically to government spending. When the government spends more, the public comes to prefer less; when the government spends less, the public comes to prefer more. The predicted moderators, federalism and issue salience, turn out to have powerful effects.

In Chapter 7, Soroka and Wlezien document the more familiar representational connections, showing that when the public prefers more liberal policy, it gets it, and when it prefers less, it gets that, too. Strikingly, this is true across both issue and country contexts. At least for students of macro politics, however, this portion of the book will be familiar turf. The controversial question beneath the fully aggregated analysis is explored a bit in Chapter 8, where the authors examine whose opinions are represented. Consistent with other recent over-time analyses (but not with some cross-sectional works, like: Martin Gilens, "Inequality and Democratic Responsiveness," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 65: 778–96; and Larry Bartels, *Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Guilded Age,* 2008), Soroka and Wlezien find that across many salient subdivisions of the public (like education), opinions move in parallel over time. So who is represented? In these formulations, seemingly to the authors' surprise the answer is more or less "everyone."

The book's primary (and quite substantial) theoretical value lies in a unification of the literatures on representation and public responsiveness. The scholarly literature on the connections between public preferences and public policy has seen the causal arrow go in both directions. And yet these works, though cognizant of one another, have not been linked theoretically until this book—and this represents its most significant and novel theoretical achievement. Indeed, in the current volume, Soroka and Wlezien make it clear that the opinion–policy representational connection only makes theoretical sense if the policy–opinion feedback connection also exists. They write that "without such [public] responsiveness [to policy], policymakers would have little incentive to represent what the public wants in policy—without public responsiveness, expressed public preferences would contain little meaningful information. There not only would be a limited basis for holding politicians accountable; registered preferences would be of little use even to those politicians motivated to represent the public for other reasons" (p. 22).

This is an important synthesis. It serves as a reminder that scholars of representation must necessarily assume that feedback will take place. And it serves as a reminder to scholars of public opinion that they must expect and look for the effects of policy feedback. Both of these postures will require adjustments from scholars in the field.

The empirical scope of the book is impressive. Soroka and Wlezien commandeer all of the aforementioned data on opinion and spending dynamics, showing both their similarities and their contextual uniqueness in the best comparative tradition. The lack of data from other regions of the world produces intriguing possibilities for future scholars: Chapter 2 (the main theoretical chapter) contains interesting theoretical insights—about majoritarian systems, for example—that remain untested in the current book. As more data on democratic systems becomes available, there will be opportunities to subject the thermostatic model to increasing amounts of scrutiny. As the time series in the Latinobarometer and other sources grow, for example, scholars should focus on the challenges of collecting policy data of similar quality in the hopes of testing the mechanics of democracy further.

All metaphors, of course, break down at some point. The most useful metaphors only succumb after extensive probing; the less useful ones crumble after only the most

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trivial questioning. Each reader will come to his or her own conclusion about the usefulness of the metaphor of the thermostat. For an actual thermostat, it is easy to see why, during the winter, the thermostat demands more heat: It is cold outside. Then, yes, the furnace kicks on, provides some heat, and is followed by a reduced demand for more heat. But when the heat goes off, it will again get cold because the heat dissipates, and the cycle starts all over again. That is not exactly what happens in Soroka and Wlezien's metaphor. What, after all, is their parallel for the winter cold (or, equivalently, summer heat)?

Overall, this is an important scholarly work that will be essential reading for scholars of representation, of public opinion, and of empirical democratic theory. It is well written, methodologically quite accessible (the technical material is relegated to an appendix), and appropriate for a broad variety of graduate-level courses in the subjects just mentioned, and for specialized undergraduate courses in comparative politics.

POLITICAL THEORY

Marx at the Margins: On Nationalism, Ethnicity, and Non-Western Societies. By Kevin B. Anderson. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010. 336p. $66.00 cloth, $22.50 paper.
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— D. Paul Thomas, *University of California at Berkeley*

It is a commonplace of this post-historical age that Karl Marx's materialist conception of history is a simplistic grand narrative, positing a unilinear and reductive account of historical change and expressing a Eurocentric view of the world. In *Marx at the Margins,* Kevin Anderson challenges this view. Paying careful attention to what Marx actually wrote about politics at the peripheries—the margins—of Europe, especially in his more marginal journalistic writings, Anderson demonstrates the richness of Marx's understanding and the extent to which his mature thinking incorporated a nuanced appreciation of the importance of events and processes beyond the heart of Europe.

Anderson is to be commended for having come up with a terrific idea for a book, and for having written a genuinely innovative book, which may well be his best to date. The reasons for this commendation are not hard to see. Marx was, in *Capital* and elsewhere, at pains to insist that his life's work, the "Critique of Political Economy," was centered on Western Europe and had application elsewhere only intermittently and/or by extension. Marx's admonition to a Russian reviewer of *Capital* is well known:

> He [N. K. Mikhailovsky] feels he absolutely must metamorphose my historical sketch of the genesis of capitalism in Western Europe into an historico-philosophical theory of the general path every people is fated to tread, whatever the historical circumstances in which it finds itself, in order that it might ultimately arrive at the form of economy which ensures, together with the greatest expansion of the productive powers of social labor, the most complete development of man. But I beg his pardon. (He is both honoring and shaming me too much). . . . By studying each separate form of evolution separately and then comparing them one can easily find the clue to this phenomenon, but one will never arrive there by using as one's master-key a general historico-philosohical theory, the supreme virtue of which consists in being super-historical. (Marx, *Selected Writings,* ed. David McLellan [1977], 572)

This seems unambiguous enough, and certainly offends against the notion of Marx as a believer in determinism and historical inevitability. Anderson calls attention on page 57 of *Marx at the Margins* to Marx's characterization of Poland as the "external thermometer" of revolution in Europe. Marx would not have done this if he had believed, *tout simplement,* that only working-class movements were worthy of the revolutionist's attention. But quite to the contrary, "Marx's support for the Polish cause was one of the great political passions of his life" (p. 56); Polish freedom was for Marx (though not for Proudhon or the residual Proudhonists in the International) the focal point of honor for all the democrats of Europe. Marx drew similar conclusions in his writings about India, China, Ireland, and the US Civil War, all of which Anderson anatomizes diligently and with care. But Marx's response to Mikhailovsky may in fact remain ambiguous in at least one crucial respect. It (and *Capital* at large) could still readily enough be taken to be suggesting that the royal road to social revolution runs through Western Europe, and—by extension—that to lose one's focus on this basic fact is to waste one's time.

But why should this be so? And did Marx even really believe it? As Karl Löwith observed many moons ago, "in Paris, Brussels and London, [Marx] lived on scanty honorariums, newspaper work, subsidies and credit," (*From Hegel to Nietzsche,* 1964, 69), and of these four sources, newspaper work was, as a rule, the most regular and lucrative (or least penurious). It is at this point that Anderson's *Marx at the Margins* really kicks in. As Anderson points out, "Marx's journalism for the [*New York Daily*] *Tribune* and other newspapers has too often been dismissed as hackwork," even though "it contained significant theoretical analyses of non-Western societies, ethnicity . . . race and nationalism" (p. 5). (These phenomena, contrary to received wisdom, were not exclusively twentieth-century discoveries or contributions, and Marx in particular, as Anderson shows quite convincingly, had interesting observations to advance about all four categories.) What the

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