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Sexual Violence against Women in Armed Conflicts: Standard Responses and New Ideas

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This article aims to assess ways in which different justice schemes may operate together for an improved legal and political response to victims of sexual crimes in the aftermath of armed conflicts. The article will briefly present the problem of sexual violence against women in armed conflict. It will then consider the evolution of criminal justice in regard to this crime, the results of recent attempts to implement truth and reconciliation processes, as well as briefly assess reparation schemes. Finally it will suggest a series of measures for coordinating the various schemes of justice in a way that guarantees women's rights in the aftermath of a conflict.

Introduction

The issue of sexual violence in armed conflicts began to attract the attention of the domestic and international communities in the last decade. The systematic and widespread campaigns of rape and forced impregnations in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda in the 1990s have greatly contributed to this new trend. This attention can be attributed to two factors: first to the pressure instigated by international media and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) when the rape camps in Bosnia–Herzegovina were reported day after day in 1994 (Meron, 1993: 424–425); second, to the fact that the only female judge participating in the *Akayesu case* in the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) showed an interest in this aspect of the conflict after hearing one of the witness statements (Breton-Le Goff, 2002: 5). However sexual violence has been an omnipresent feature of armed conflicts, yet few victims have been able to seek redress for the attacks they suffered, or support in order to survive and reconstruct their lives in the aftermath of conflict.

Three of the schemes available today in post-conflict situations, which have the potential to be of assistance to victims, will be assessed here. This article investigates, on the one hand, the extent to which these schemes succeed in acknowledging the suffering of the victims and, on the other, whether they constitute efficient means of redress. In addition, the article will advance some ideas as to how the existing procedures can be improved and made more compatible with the specific needs of the victims of sexual violence.

Sexual violence in armed conflicts

Although a virtually unacknowledged fact until recently, sexual violence has been a recurring outcome in many women's lives through conflicts.[1] The nature of sexual violence

differs within and between armed conflicts and entails different consequences for the victims. It can encompass crimes such as rape, sexual assault, sexual slavery, sexual mutilation, forced impregnation, and forced prostitution. These crimes are all an attack on a woman's physical and emotional as well as economic autonomy, and the conditions in which they are perpetrated are often life threatening. Some of the sexual crimes during conflicts can be categorised as follows: first, *sexual violence as spoils and booty*: sexual violence has traditionally been treated as a 'regrettable but unavoidable' part of a conflict. General Patton famously wrote in his memoirs concerning the Second World War that 'there would unquestionably be some raping' (Brownmiller, 1975: 73). Sexual violence has therefore sometimes been referred to as the 'spoils of war'. It has also tended to be accepted among the fighting factions as a part of the booty that any war can offer and has indeed often served as an enticement for soldiers (Naimark, 1995: 71). Second, *sexual violence as a means to dominate*: as such it is an effective tool to control and evict a population which could have put up resistance against the attacker. It demonstrates the strength of the attacker against the weakness of the opponent who was not able to defend the victim. It establishes the superior masculinity (Zarkov, 2001: 77–81) of the assailant, and destroys not only the victim but also the rest of the community who are often forced to watch or even to participate in the attack. Third, *sexual violence as a method of torture*: sexual violence is also an effective and widespread method of torture. Pope (1999: 353) argues that assaults directed at the genitals and forcible nudity during interrogations are frequently used as a method of torture. It is not only used to inflict physical pain, but also has the objective of humiliating the victim. Fourth, *sexual violence as an integral part of ethnic cleansing and genocidal strategies*: sexual violence has turned out to be an integral element of the campaign of ethnic cleansing and genocide perpetrated in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Other recent conflicts have upheld this atrocious trend, among them Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan. Jarvis (1998) explains that 'sexual violence can also be part of a genocidal strategy. It can inflict life-threatening bodily and mental harm, and form part of the conditions imposed to bring about the ultimate destruction of an entire group of people' (p. 2). These occurrences have thus generated a new interest and an unprecedented attempt by the international community to tackle efficiently this ancient injustice. The decision to actually prosecute these crimes for the first time as war crimes and crimes against humanity by the *ad hoc* tribunals in the last decade has been welcomed unanimously.[2]

For the victims of sexual violence in armed conflict, survival in the aftermath is extremely difficult. The women, who actually survive the assault(s), have to handle tremendous physical and emotional traumas (Joachim, 2004: 57–94). They might also be left with injuries and scars, which frequently will mark them for life. It may also impair their ability to bear children. On top of that they may have to deal with illnesses such as HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases. Any forced pregnancies add the emotional weight of having to bear an unwanted child, who will be a constant reminder of the traumatic experience. In addition, victims of sexual violence might be confronted with economic hardship, resulting, for instance, from the loss of relatives, destruction of the home, high unemployment, the difficult conditions in a refugee camp and also more generally from the insecurity connected with the post-conflict conditions. There are further problems that victims might be faced with, especially in relation to their family and communities. The fact that victims are often rejected by their communities, advances even more the goals of the aggressors. Women are likely to be ostracised, because of

the stigma that sexual violence carries in most cultures, rather than helped to heal their wounds and be reintegrated into the society that was unable to protect them in the first place. But sexual violence is rarely (despite the obvious negative consequences for its victims) considered and recognised as a crime, of the same seriousness as, say, torture or killings during armed conflicts (Skjelsbaek, 2001: 71).

Transitional justice

The three schemes that will be briefly assessed in this article are usually considered as being part of the transitional justice paradigm. Transitional justice is concerned, as Simonovic (2004) explains, with 'ending the conflict and preventing its recurrence, by achieving social stability and reconciliation' (p. 701). The main forms transitional justice takes nowadays are: criminal justice, amnesties, truth and reconciliation commissions, lustration processes and reparation schemes. For present purposes, the focus will be placed on criminal justice, truth and reconciliation commissions and on reparation schemes because of what they can achieve for the victims of sexual violence. Amnesties are generally for the benefit of the parties having directly taken part in the conflict and are chiefly applied in the interest of the peace negotiations. (Turshen, 2001: 93). Lustration processes are about removing war criminals from public life (Olson, 2004: 182).

Criminal justice

After a conflict, the successor state has a duty to reconstruct a justice system that is able to demonstrate a clear break with the past, by publicly condemning war criminality and the abuses perpetrated by the different factions of that conflict. In addition, the successor regime endeavours for the reestablishment of the rule of law and gaining legitimacy *vis-à-vis* the civil society. As Teitel (2000) explains 'trials offer a way to express both public condemnation of past violence and the legitimation of the rule of law' (p. 30) and therefore international criminal law has become 'the dominant language of successor states' (p. 38).

Three main concepts have to be addressed for criminal justice to fulfil its main purposes. First, accountability: this is achieved by ensuring that the perpetrators of past atrocities answer for their crimes, by publicly acknowledging their criminal responsibility for the violations of human rights and humanitarian law they committed (Ratner and Abrams, 2001: 151). Second, impunity: this requires that appropriate action be taken so that perpetrators are prosecuted for their acts during the conflict. For sexual violence this is of even greater importance because impunity has plagued the safety and livelihood of women for centuries. Third, deterrence: the anticipation is that the criminal prosecution of war criminals would deter others from committing similar crimes in the future (Olson, 2004: 174), but, as Campbell (2000) explains, 'the prevention of future crimes is necessarily a long-term process of social and political transformation' (p. 630).

Customary international law[3] has up to the twentieth century essentially prohibited sexual crimes during armed conflicts, imposing punishments as severe as castration or even death (Whiteclay Chambers II, 1999: 591). Rape was specifically prohibited in the English army as early as 1385. But, in the Middle Ages, rape was not considered a 'serious crime'[4] and the protection and support for the victims was almost non-existent.

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The first real attempt at establishing a normative framework, although this was essentially meant for the two parties in this particular conflict, was in the nineteenth century when sexual violence and rape were referred to specifically for the first time at the outset of the American Civil War (1863) in the Lieber Code.[5] However the twentieth century has been the turning point for real changes in the legal framework on a national and international level. The 1929 Hague Convention (relative to the prisoners of war) noted for instance in its Article 3 that women prisoners of war should not be raped (Viseur Sellers, 1999: 319). Although there was almost no mention, and certainly very few indictments put forward specifically for these types of crimes in the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals, rape being only seen as an 'inhumane act' and thus not mentioned in any of the judges' findings in either tribunal (Viseur Sellers, 1996: 606), the first real development in the legal framework came after the horrors of the Second World War with the Geneva Conventions and later their Protocols.[6] The conflicts in Yugoslavia and Rwanda triggered some further developments in international criminal law and international humanitarian law, allowing for the first time a more efficient prosecution and indictments of the perpetrators of the genocides. Some of the sexual violence may now be dealt with specifically as a war crime, crime of genocide or a crime against humanity in the *ad hoc* tribunals established by the United Nation Security Council after these two conflicts (Askin, 1999: 122). Despite those improvements, which resulted in the prosecution of some of the sexual crimes and the concomitant appearance of a certain culture of accountability, the sentences appear to remain quite scarce and lenient. In addition, they still do not take into account the full range of consequences that such crimes imply for the women's livelihood after the conflict (Askin, 1999: 123). That said, they have managed to set precedents and jurisprudence that already has been useful for cases dealt within the hybrid courts in Sierra Leone or East Timor as well as for the drafting of the statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). These developments notwithstanding, prosecutions and especially convictions are still rare for sexual violence and, as Breton-Le Goff (2002) reports, they are as a matter of fact becoming even rarer in the international tribunals (for instance the ICTR).

More general problems have now also appeared: first, the fact that the international tribunals deal only with a very small minority of offenders (Zolo, 2004: 730). Second, it is difficult and may be dangerous for the victims (particularly of sexual violence) to come forward and to give witness statements, as, in doing so, they risk being re-victimised and re-traumatised (Bedont, 1999: 17). Although for instance the ICTR and International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) have set up specific witness protection units to help and follow the potential witnesses through the experience of a trial (generally only for the time of the said trial), domestic courts rarely provide for such facilities. Third, there is little trust in these institutions by the indigenous populations, because they are physically remote from the place where the crimes were committed and therefore are perceived as being out of context. At times the international tribunals are also considered as 'imperialistic', because they are, in the population's eyes, imposed by foreign powers. Furthermore, the high cost of running international courts has often put their existence into question, especially because the cost of domestic courts may be lesser. Domestic courts also are frequently considered as more legitimate by the population and in a position to have a more direct impact on the society with their decisions. Additional problems have surfaced, such as the discrepancies between the domestic and international retributive instruments, for instance the differences in treatment of the prisoners or the disparity in

the sentences given out to them; a good example for this is the unresolved issue of the death penalty.

However, a reason for locating international tribunals far from the set of the conflicts is to safeguard the impartiality and objectivity of the procedure and to avoid pressures from the different protagonists of the conflicts. One of the obstacles with local courts is that they often are not in a position to operate properly and independently directly after the conflict, as the resources, the personnel and the infrastructures are failing (Dickinson, 2003: 296–300). The hybrid courts that were created in Sierra Leone and East Timor, for instance, appear to have been able to deal with some of the problems addressed above, but, as Dickinson (2003) explains, they have been undermined by both international and domestic justice supporters, despite the fact that 'such courts hold a good deal of promise and may offer an approach to accountability that addresses some of the concerns raised in both camps' (p. 296).

Truth and reconciliation commissions

There has been a renewed interest in the 1970s and 1980s in implementing truth and reconciliation processes, which started in Latin America. South Africa is a recent example that has brought the topic into focus, especially because its process of truth and reconciliation has been fairly positive (Erasmus and Fourie, 1997: 713). It is now frequently used to justify and promote politics of transition within other states, which are going through a political transformation after conflict (Turshen, 2001: 93). The commissions are established with the intention of examining a conflict that has ended, as Hayner (1994) explains, in order to 'paint an overall picture of certain human rights abuses or violations of international law, over a period of time' (pp. 600–604). A truth commission should expose the truth about the past in order for the whole society to understand what happened, seek to acknowledge the traumas of the past and attempt to deal with them.

The second aim is the process of reconciliation, which is the long-term objective. Sideris (2001) argues that 'individual and social healing, which requires reconciliation in the sense of mending social divisions and coming to terms with the past, can take several generations' (p. 59). This is due to the fact that this process can only happen after the commission has compiled a catalogue of all wrongs perpetrated by the different parties of the conflict, thus producing a clear image of the involvement of each one and acknowledging the pain and torment suffered by the victims.

The main difference between this scheme and criminal justice is that the whole population needs to take part in one form or another, meaning there has to be a national willingness to undergo such a process. It cannot be achieved without a government or a majority sponsored initiative. Thus, what is investigated depends a lot on the will and the means put at the disposal of the inquiry team. The lack of funds and of personnel left to realise the process in good conditions, added to the precariousness of the attitudes of the people in power, are definitely deadly impediments for the good development of such an enterprise. The challengers of such commissions argue also that this process can generate more animosity as it forces people to 'reopen old wounds' (Olson, 2004: 176). The population of Mozambique, for instance, collectively refused to undergo such a process, following this logic (Hayner, 1994: 609–610).

Women's fate in conflict has rarely been considered specifically. There are several explanations for this apparent disinterest. First, the most common crimes committed

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against women, such as domestic but also sexual violence, are still frequently considered as part of the private realm and therefore allegedly not requiring due diligence from the public authorities. They are rarely perpetrated publicly and are often held to be, as Sideris (2001) explains, 'more complicated to address. Society defines the domestic context as personal and treats it as peripheral to a broader political process, even though it is essential to social reproduction' (p. 153). Second, many women themselves do not wish to relate to these abuses for, on the one hand, this would require the exposure of their intimate suffering and trauma to the greater public; on the other, by telling their story, they would have to relive their indescribable ordeal under the scrutiny of their communities.

In the truth and reconciliation commission in South Africa, a gendered perspective was only added following the continuous lobbying of NGOs and women's groups (Sideris, 2001: 157). Eventually a report was submitted with gender as the exclusive focus and consequently three hearings were organised specifically for the crimes committed against women (Meintjes and Goldblatt, 1996). Many observers and participants were then surprised that women related less to the sexual violence and their own personal suffering under the apartheid regime, than to the suffering of their families and men folk (Sideris, 2001: 157). However this should not come as a surprise in the light of the previous discussion, namely the lack of protection for witnesses and victims and the exposure such an experience entails. Some commentators have thus argued that 'truth commissions have inherent limitations for psychosocial healing' (Pillay, 2001: 59).

Reparation schemes

Reparation schemes are either included within the truth reconciliation commissions' results or can emerge out of a court decision, after a criminal trial. Reparation policies have a long history but the twentieth century has been the turning point in the evolution of reparatory practises, especially with the attempts made after the Second World War (Teitel, 2000: 120–124). Yet the recent standards for reparations were set by the *Velasquez–Rodriguez* case (Teitel, 2000: 124–125) in Honduras, which established a new trend of reparatory policies throughout Latin America and also in the rest of the world. Teitel (2000) explains that 'because of their versatility, reparatory practices have become the leading response in the contemporary wave of political transformation' (p. 127). For many victims, the reparation schemes mean that their suffering is being publicly acknowledged and that the community wants to somehow redeem itself for the harm it has caused them or has failed to prevent. Their situation is often disastrous after an armed conflict and victims would welcome financial help, the restitution of their land or the educational or health benefits that such reparation policies may encompass (United Nations Security Council, 2004: 18). Reparation schemes have only recently been developed into a more widespread policy and are starting to benefit from clearer guidelines that make the implementation of such schemes possible. For instance, the ICC incorporated in its statutes a specific article (Article 75) for the reparations due to victims (Bell, 2000: 270). Nonetheless, a great number of the injuries and traumas victims suffer from are very difficult to measure, and the choice of who should receive compensation is often an arbitrary one. Furthermore, victims would often favour a public apology or proper social support as they feel that the proposed monetary contribution will never replace or bring back lost ones or repair the damage caused to them (Teitel, 2000: 126–127).

In Argentina the money offered by the state when reparation laws were passed in 1994 was considered as 'blood money' by the relatives of the 'disappeared' and therefore consistently turned down (Olson, 2004: 184). Besides, even if reparations are given out, they usually consist of small amounts of money, which in most cases are inappropriate and unhelpful considering the situation of the victims. Yet governments rarely even possess sufficient funds to finance such a policy (Olson, 2004: 184). Nevertheless new trends have emerged recently regarding reparatory practices, which tend to be more proactive. For instance the Inter-American Human Rights Court has sentenced states to repair their past wrongs by financing initiatives for the collective interest, for example schools, community centres or monuments (Wilson and Perlin, 2002: 81).

For victims of sexual violence reparatory schemes are an opportunity to rebuild their lives, for women, as indicated earlier, have often not only been the victims of sexual violence with little support thereafter, but also of the stigma attached to this type of crime. These different direct or indirect effects might leave them in hopeless situations, making it very difficult to survive after the conflict (Human Rights Watch, 2004: 10–13). But the problems concerning the quantification and the distribution method of reparation schemes remains. In addition to that, there emerges the problem regarding the procedures, often complicated, to actually ask for the compensation. Some lobby groups for women's rights have tried to point out this problem and to put pressure on the decision makers in order to facilitate the process enabling those women to ask for and receive some specific and meaningful financial and material support; for instance, health care for rape victims (Human Rights Watch, 2004: 56).

Some ideas for a gender-sensitive coordinated approach

In recent years the issues facing specifically women during and after a conflict have started to be acknowledged and dealt with. The three schemes have managed to set some precedents that will undoubtedly help victims of sexual crimes in the future. What this assessment brings to light is the need to increase the efficiency of the different schemes by combining their efforts systematically in the future,[7] through a holistic approach. In fact for a post-conflict society to be able to end its injustices, allow reconciliation and start a healing process in order to bring back stability and peace, and also build a fair and equal society, all the components of transitional justice should be integrated into a common effort.

Kaldor (1999) argues in *New and Old Wars* that 'an effective response to the new wars has to be based on an alliance between international organisations and local advocates of cosmopolitanism in order to reconstruct legitimacy' (p. 123). The following suggestions attempt to relate to the schemes previously examined by focussing on hybrid courts and hybrid forms of truth and reconciliation commissions. In addition, the setting up of a coordinating unit shall be proposed, which would act at the same time as a 'watch-dog' and also as 'driving force' for the post-conflict processes. Finally a number of ideas for gender mainstreaming will be advanced.

- Hybrid courts should be developed and improved further, because, owing to their character as a compromise between international and domestic courts, they can resolve some of the problems encountered by the two levels of jurisdictions (Simonovic,

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2004: 704). For victims of sexual violence during armed conflicts, hybrid courts are of particular interest. These courts are for instance situated within the boundaries of the country where the conflict took place, enabling the jurisdiction to be considered as more legitimate and influential by the population. This type of court enables the setting of precedents for the domestic courts and can contribute decisively to the reestablishment of the rule of law. At the same time they allow a certain awareness to develop because of the impact they can have directly on the population and, as a result, encourage the acknowledgement of the suffering of the victims within the society. To that extent, the existence of such a jurisdiction could help implement some 'indispensable' cultural changes. The international component of hybrid courts adds a safeguard that all the war crimes will be dealt with, and that all the issues (i.e. sexual crimes) will be addressed within the framework of international norms. The international component can, in virtue of its expertise, set focuses on such important issues as, the guarantee that victims and potential witnesses will receive adequate protection and support before and during the trials, or that a proper gender mainstreaming policy will be implemented and seen through.

- Hybrid forms of Truth and Reconciliation Commissions – these need to embody a systematic collaboration between the national promoters of such a policy and those international organisations that have a certain experience and 'know-how' for ensuring safeguards for such a policy to be successfully realised and to avoid the usual pitfalls encountered when such a procedure is first started. In addition, this would yet again ensure that all types of crimes are being investigated (i.e. sexual crimes). In addition, it would guarantee that victims/potential witnesses are being protected, supported and respected, meaning that they are not put under any pressure to testify and that, if they accept, they are allowed for instance to do it anonymously.
- The proposed scheme would be a complementary system that includes these different hybrid forums, allowing the various courts, commissions, and processes to work closely together. On the level of a theoretical account, it might be possible with this system to eliminate the apparent contradictions between these schemes by adopting a wider perspective that shows them to pursue the same ideal of justice rather than some mutually exclusive values. The objective of this system would be to guarantee that, when peace dealings are initiated, a truth and reconciliation commission is constituted which would then work in direct connection with the courts. For that purpose, a unit (composed of international and local representatives) should be set up systematically as a bridge between the different forums in order to monitor constantly their respective advancements as well as problems and to allow the synchronisation of their tasks. This unit, in agreement with the different forums, would be able to decide about issues such as reparations and the best ways to induce a reconciliation process, ensuring that a coordinated and harmonised approach is in place. The national component is primordial, because without it the processes could not start and serious legitimacy problems would arise. Conversely, the international component would ensure the initiation of such a process in good conditions, would provide the financial and institutional support and bring a certain expertise that is needed to avoid the problems generally encountered when such a process is started (Charlesworth and Wood, 2001).
- This unit, which would be placed in between the different processes, would also ensure that medical and psychosocial initiatives and structures are put into place, along with the witness protection units. This would be to ensure that victims are not

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only used as witnesses (and protected only then), but are also from the start helped and encouraged in their efforts to heal, through proper medical and psychological support, and given assistance with respect to rebuilding their lives socially and economically in the aftermath.

- All these different forums would have to be gender-focused: indeed such an approach could not be complete without first making sure that women and gender issues are included in all the proceedings for reasons of legitimacy and equality. As noted earlier women are easily left out because sexual violence is traditionally considered as part of the private realm. These attitudes need to be changed through educational initiatives and lobbying among the population and the people in power. As such, the unique opportunity arising at the end of a conflict, when institutional, constitutional and legislative changes are being initiated, has to be used to transform old-fashioned and unjust customs and laws.[8] As far as the criminal justice system is concerned it is imperative that women be involved at each step of the investigations, the witness protection units and the trials. They also have to take part in: the peace negotiations; the decisions on amnesties and lustration; the build up and running of a truth and reconciliation commission, and the decisions about compensation schemes. All of these processes must have clear gender perspectives and all participants, from the judge to the prison officer, from the witness protection unit personnel to the peace negotiators, must receive gender-specific training (United Nations Security Council, 2004: 21).

Conclusion

I have argued that the various instruments that victims of sexual violence in armed conflict have nowadays at their disposal will not develop their full potential until they are integrated into a coherent and holistic system. However nothing will be truly effective as long as sexual violence carries such a stigma and as long as the subordination of women is not tackled seriously and effectively in their societies. The problem does rest on these cultural issues and relief will not be brought to victims of these particularly egregious crimes as long as the perception of sexual violence is not altered in most societies on earth.

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Notes

1 The conflicts considered in this article fit in Mary Kaldor's classification of most of the recent conflicts, which she calls 'new wars'. For more details see Kaldor (1999).

2 See for instance cases such as *The Prosecutor* v. *Kunarac, Kovac and Vukovic* (ICTY) or *The Prosecutor* v. *Akayesu*(ICTR) where rape and sexual violence have been recognised for the first time as crimes against humanity. Nevertheless this has had also negative consequences, indeed the less 'spectacular' rapes, which happen 'inevitably' in conflict, have been overshadowed by the 'genocidal

rape'. They rendered invisible or at least less worthy of attention the so-called 'normal rapes' to the international community. For this debate see for example Copelon (1998: 64).

3 International lawyers usually distinguish between two types of legal sources: on the one hand, treaties which derive from the explicit agreement of two or more states that is usually incorporated in a written document. On the other hand, custom which arises from a consistent practice between at least two states (so-called *longa usus*) and is accompanied by the belief that it is binding (so-called *opinio juris*or *necessitatis*).

4 This was nevertheless dependent on the social position of the victim. See Perrot (1998: 369–375).

5 Provision 44 states 'even after taking a place by main force, all rape, wounding, maiming, or killing of such inhabitants, are prohibited under the penalty of death'. See Roberts and Guelff (2000: 12).

6 Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions prohibits 'violence to life and person, in particular . . . mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment'. Sexual crimes have generally been seen since then as a violation of this article. Furthermore Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention requires that: 'Women shall be especially protected against attack on their honour, in particular against rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent assault.' In 1977 the article 76/1 in the Protocol I Additional, was changed to assert that, 'Women shall be the object of special respect and shall be protected in particular against rape, forced prostitution and any other form of indecent assault.'

7 See Drumbl (2000: 288) for a similar conclusion, although he also includes restorative initiatives in his proposed heterogeneous and holistic approach to post-conflict dealings in Rwanda. See also Chapter 6 by Kaldor (1999: 112–137) who argues in favour of a 'cosmopolitan approach' and makes suggestions for its implementation. Zolo (2004) states in the same frame of mind that: 'any mediating intervention in a situation of post-war transition should be multi-dimensioned and very articulated' (p. 733).

8 Rwanda and South Africa have become striking examples of what can be achieved by women and for women. See Mutume (2004) for Rwanda and Cock (1997) for South Africa.

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