

researches led him further and further back into childhood for explanations of the psychology and psychopathology of the adult, Jung's interest moved in the other direction, that is, to the latter half of life, with its full maturity and eventual involution. It seems significant that Jung was so much impressed by 'opposites'. Other issues where he took up a position 'opposite' to Freud's were: prospective versus retrospective, purpose versus cause, spiritual and mythical versus sexual, typology versus universality—and no doubt many others. Dr. Fordham, however, is different, and has always seemed one of the more Freudian Jungians, even if he feels more affinity with the standpoint of Melanie Klein than with that of Freud. It is interesting that his new title is 'Children as Individuals', for he certainly treats them as such.

The introductory chapters deal with clinical material related especially to play, dreams, and pictures. Much of this is straightforward and will be familiar to most of those who do clinical work with children; but in addition there are interesting Jungian insights regarding such concepts as opposites, mandalas, archetypes etc. The following chapters are more theoretical and serve to expound the author's concepts of ego, archetype, and self, of the process of maturation, and of identity formation. Dr. Fordham very properly follows up this account of individual development with a chapter discussing the mutual interactions of child and family.

Chapter 9 deals with analytical psychotherapy and makes it clear that this involves a preliminary 'family diagnosis' and attention to parental neurosis, though not necessarily treatment for it. The actual technique with the child is well illustrated by two patients whose treatment is described in some detail. A further case is described in the concluding chapter to illustrate the theme of symbol formation.

There is a bibliography of 9 pages; the majority of authors cited are psychoanalysts, a fact which confirms the impression that Dr. Fordham's sympathies are by no means exclusively Jungian.

W. H. GILLESPIE.

FAR FROM THE CLINICAL BATTLE FRONT

Psychiatry and Philosophy. By ERWIN W. STRAUS, MAURICE NATANSON and HENRI EY. Edited by MAURICE NATANSON. Berlin, Heidelberg, New York: Springer-Verlag. 1969. Pp. 161. Price DM 32.

Although the three essays which make up this book were written in 1963, they touch upon questions which increasingly occupy the minds of thoughtful psychiatrists, namely 'what is mental illness?'

Titled and discussed in more formal language than, for example Thomas Szasz's *The Myth of Mental Illness*, philosophy and psychiatry, or the philosophy of psychiatry, reflects the fundamental questioning of psychiatric concepts and the 'whatness' of mental illness. This represents a counter-current to the bland assumption that human unhappiness or social abnormality means some kind of mental illness, and should be susceptible to treatment like other illnesses.

Erwin Straus's essay is titled *Psychiatry and Philosophy*. Maurice Natanson follows immediately with *Philosophy and Psychiatry*. The philosophic roots here are those of phenomenology and existentialism, and consequently have the merits and defects of these branches of philosophy. The existentialism stems largely from the ponderous and uphill philosophy of Heidegger. It is interesting as philosophy, but it all seems far away from the clinical battle front.

Perhaps the most interesting essay for clinicians is the last one by Henri Ey—*Outline of an Organodynamic Conception of the Structure, Nosography and Pathogenesis of Mental Diseases*. This develops a description of mental illness from, among others, the work of Hughlings Jackson in neurology.

As the Preface to the book, by Straus and Natanson observes, 'the role of philosophy in the advancement of science is to make trouble; to challenge fundamental assumptions, to insist on rigour, and to demand some order of synoptic responsibility.' This sort of thing is good for unphilosophical psychiatrists and biological scientists generally, but unfortunately they are unlikely to read this book.

H. M. FLANAGAN.

ARE THESE ANTHOLOGIES WORTHWHILE?

Social Psychiatry; Volume I. Edited by ARI KIEV. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd., for Science House, New York, Inc. 1970. Price 80s.

The contributors to this collection of reprinted papers are (in order of appearance): J. Ruesch, N. W. Bell and J. Spiegel, M. Shepherd and B. Cooper, M. L. Kohn, A. Hock, R. Moses and L. Terrespolsky, P. Paumelle and S. Lebovici, Warren Dunham, T. Plaut, D. M. Englehart and N. Freedman, Kathleen Jones, D. Michael, J. Z. Hes, M. Fried, C. Rule, Eliot Slater (on Lorenz), and H. F. Harlow. The contributions are arranged in five sections, Social Psychiatry: Definitions and Parameters; Epidemiology; Community Psychiatry; Social Problems; and Animal Studies. The editor provides an introduction to the book and a short introductory note to each section.

Are these anthologies of reprints worthwhile? As reference books they are too personal (it can hardly