Of course *nostra* alone does not solve all the difficulties here, even with the minimal alteration of *optandus* to *optandam* to produce, for example,

> quis me uno vivit felicior? aut magi' nostra
> optandam vita dicere quis poterit?

This is similar to Ribbeck's proposal *aut magis hace / optandam vita*, which D'Angour (note 12) calls 'worth considering' despite the difficulty (though not impossibility) of supplying *vitam* out of *vita*. Alternatively, one could follow D'Angour and adopt the further alteration of *vita* to *vitam* found in many editions.

Yet objections remain: (i) the sense is weak, whether we understand 'Who will be able to say that a life is more desirable than mine?' or 'Who will be able to call a life more desirable than mine?'; (ii) the corruption *optandus* has not been accounted for (Lachmann's *hac res / optandas vita* is one of the few conjectures to try to explain it)—one can hardly imagine *optandus vita* arising out of the predictable, perfectly straightforward *optandam vitam* or *vita*, and *optandas vitas* seems no more liable to corruption. I propose therefore a further correction: Catullus expressed the supremacy of his happiness in two distinct ways, by saying that he was the happiest man alive, and that his was the most desirable life on earth, and originally wrote

> quis me uno vivit felicior? aut magi' nostra
> vitam esse optandam dicere quis poterit?

This satisfies palaeographical considerations by being able to account for the ending of *optandus* (the process of corruption is far from self-evident, but perhaps we should imagine an original metathesis of noun and gerundive leading to *optandam esse vitam*, which was then further corrupted through some intermediate stage such as *optandesse vitam*). It also yields a satisfactory sense, with *esse* emphatic not simply by its position but indeed by its very presence: 'Who will be able to say that a life more desirable than mine *exists*?'

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THREE SUGGESTIONS IN LATIN POETRY

CATULLUS 10.26

> 'quaeso', inquit 'mihi, mi Catulle, paulum
> istos commoda: nam volo ad Serapim
> deferri.'

Such is the reading of the Oxford Text. Emendations have been numerous and unconvincing—for example, *nam volo commode* (Statius); *commodo* (Scaliger); *commodum enim* (Hand, Haupt); *commoda* (fem. sing.) (Schulze); *da modo. nam* (Monro). On the other hand the text of V has had its defenders; thus Thomson[1] writes 'it is hard to find a satisfactory alternative to the licence of the shortened final *a* in *commoda*', and

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[1] D. F. S. Thomson, *Catullus Edited with a Textual and Interpretative Commentary* (Toronto, 1997), ad loc.

Lindsay[2] regards it as an instance of 'conversational diction', yet the undoubtedly colloquial conversation would be all the more effective if confined within the strict limits of classical metre.

In fact it is clear that imperative *commoda* simply does not scan;[3] parenthetical *puta*, whose final syllable is always short, is a special case, and supposed Plautine examples[4] are irrelevant. Granted that *commoda* makes sense but is not what Catullus wrote, we must suppose that it entered the text as a gloss telling the reader what verb to supply in an ellipse,[5] and that it displaced whatever Catullus did write. The received text therefore points to *istos –⏑⏑ nam volo ad Serapim*, so that the *ductus litterarum* can be ignored. It is clear that the girl's demand for the loan of litter-bearers is immediate, otherwise Catullus would keep up the pretence and hope to find some excuse later. But this urgency needs to be conveyed both to Catullus and to the reader. The girl should also explain why the loan will only be for a short time (*paulum*). There is only one dactylic word that can perform these functions; therefore that is the word Catullus used. Write:

> 'quaeso', inquit 'mihi, mi Catulle, paulum
> istos, crastina nam volo ad Serapim
> deferri.'

Catullus must hand over his non-existent litter-bearers now, so that the young lady may make her devotions to Serapis early[6] tomorrow morning. This adverbial use of *crastinus* can be paralleled with *matutinus* (*OLD* s.v. 1b), *vespertinus* (*OLD* s.v. 1c), *nocturnus* (*OLD* s.v. 4), and *hodiernus* (Tib. 1.7.53 *sic venias hodierne*): cf. K-S 1.235–6. As it happens, *crastinus* itself is not used in verse again in this way until Sidonius Apollinaris, *Carm.* 24.22, *flavum crastinus aspicis Triobrem*, and Dracontius *Rom.* 10.447, *crastina cum Glauce veniet nuptura marito*, but Sidonius and Dracontius were both so steeped in classical models that an idiom employed by both of them is likely to be classicizing rather than innovatory; note also Apuleius, *Met.* 2.31, *sollemnis dies . . . crastinus advenit*.

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² W. M. Lindsay, *Early Latin Verse* (Oxford, 1922), 40; his supporting examples are 'Catullus' *nescio* (85.2), Horace's *Pollio*, *mentio*, *dixero* and the *nescioquis* of classical Latin'; but none of these are first-conjugation imperatives, nor do they end in *a*. Imperative *commoda* is also strongly upheld by O. Skutsch, 'Notes on Catullus', *BICS* 23 (1976), 18–22; but if it was acceptable for Catullus, we would expect to find it or other dactylic first-conjugation imperatives (e.g. *compara*, *iudica*, *occupa*, *postula*: dactylic *postea* and *antea* would also be welcome to versifiers) in at least the hexameters of Horace and Juvenal. V's *mane me* is universally rejected; *minime* (Pontanus) is as easy as anything, but prosodic hiatus of *mane* before the vowel of *inquii* would be acceptable; cf. 97.1, *non ita me di ament*, and possibly 58b.10, where *te, mi amice* runs more smoothly than *te mihi, amice*; cf. also the shortening of the last syllable of *vale* before *inquit* at Verg. *Ecl.* 3.79 and Ov. *Met.* 3.501.

³ Cf. E. Fraenkel, review of Fordyce's Catullus, *Gnomon* 34 (1962), 253–63, 'Dactylisch gemessenes *commoda*, bei Plautus denkbar, ist hier schlechthin unmöglich.' R. G. M. Nisbet, 'Notes on the text of Catullus', *PCPhS* 204 (1978), 92–115, also rejects imperative *commoda*, and suggests *quaero . . . istaec commoda*, with *commoda* being a neuter plural meaning 'perquisites'; one difficulty with this is the replacement of idiomatic *quaeso*, which cannot take a direct object, with *quaero*, which does not seem to be employed in requests for favours.

⁴ Cf. C. J. Fordyce, *Catullus: A Commentary* (Oxford, 1961), ad loc.

⁵ Elliptical expressions are natural in the conversational style; cf. e.g. Ter. *Andr.* 204, *bona verba, quaeso*, and Cic. *Att.* 13.51.2, *Tigellium totum mihi, et quidem quam primum*; cf. K-S 2.549ff. However, the text of Cat. 38.7–8 is too dubious to provide support.

⁶ The proper time; cf. Ov. *Am.* 3.7.53–4: *a tenera quisquam sic surgit mane puella, / protinus ut sanctos possit adire deos?*

LUCILIUS 186–7 (MARX)

Housman[7] restores 185–8 as follows:

> hoc 'nolueris' et 'debueris' te
> si minus delectat, quod atechnon et Isocration
> ληρῶδεςque simul totum ac sit μειρακιῶδες,
> non operam perdo.

He explains the ὀχληρῶδες (ὀχ- was deleted by Scaliger) of the MSS by suggesting that ὀχ - is a relic of -on written in to correct -um at the end of the previous word. It would be a remarkable coincidence if such an accident produced something resembling a more appropriate Greek word; it is more economical to suppose that Lucilius wrote ὀχληρόν and that its ending was assimilated to that of the next epithet. It should be noted that ὀχληρός ('irksome') is at home in literary criticism; cf. DH *Th.* 30; whereas ληρώδης ('nonsensical') would refer to content rather than stye and is thus out of place. Finally it does not seem plausible that Lucilius transliterated two adjectives and left the other two in Greek; therefore we should write:

> quod ἄτεχνον et Ἰσοκράτειον
> ὀχληρόνque simul totum ac sit μειρακιῶδες.

OVID, *AMORES* 2.10.9

> errant ut ventis discordibus acta phaselos,
> dividuumque tenent alter et alter amor.

Ovid is claiming to be in love with two girls at once. The MSS text, printed above, has not given general satisfaction, because the two loves do not 'wander'; on the contrary they remain attached to their prey. Camps[8] suggested *erro velut*, but the shortening of the final syllable is unacceptable. Führer[9] suggested *erramus*, but the plural is harsh with *dividuum* following, and the absence of the particle of comparison is difficult despite Booth.[10] Bentley realized that *errant* is a scribal filler designed to produce a hexameter after Ovid's own word had been lost; he therefore suggested *auferor*, comparing *Am.* 2.4.8, *auferor ut rapida concita puppis aqua*. However, this fails to give due weight to the evidence of *discordibus* and *dividuum*; Ovid is not telling us that he is being driven off course, but that he is being pulled apart by forces that are acting on him in different directions.[11] There is only one dactyl available to Ovid to express this; we should write:

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[7] A. E. Housman, 'Luciliana', *CQ* 1 (1907), 148–59.

[8] W. A. Camps, 'Critical notes on some passages in Ovid', *CR* 4 (1954), 203–7. He refers to *Am.* 3.2.26, *collige—vel digitis en ego tollo meis*. Such scansions (also to be found at Prop. 3.9.35, *findo*, and Ov. *Pont.* 1.7.56, *credo*) are extremely rare, confined to verse-endings, and (except for irrelevant instances of *brevis brevians* like *puto*) occur with the present indicative of the third conjugation which, unlike that of the first, is in most persons characterized by a short vowel.

[9] R. Führer, 'Ov. *Am.* II 10, 9', *Hermes* 100 (1972), 408–12.

[10] J. Booth, *Ovid Amores II* (Warminster, 1991), ad loc.

[11] J. C. McKeown, *Ovid Amores: Text, Commentary and Notes* (Liverpool, 1987–), 3, ad loc., adduces Aristaen. 2.11, ἔοικα γοῦν κυβερνήτηι ὑπὸ δυοῖν πνευμάτων ἀπειλημμένωι . . . ἐπ᾽ ἀμφότερα δὲ τὴν μίαν ναῦν ἐλαυνόντων, where the supposed writer is also in love with two women at once.

> distrahor ut ventis discordibus acta phaselos,
> dividuumque tenent alter et alter amor.

This is a standard use of the word; cf. *OLD* s.v. *distraho* 8. It might be added that the loss of *distrahor* is easier to explain; a scribe might jump from one *dis-* to the next and then fail to restore all that he thus passed over.

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THE INVENTION OF THE YOUNG CICERO[1]

This article is a re-evaluation of a passage of Cicero's *De Inuentione* which seems to have been unfairly overlooked by the critics and which offers a glimpse of a typical Ciceronian attitude familiar in his later works. The passage is in the section where Cicero, in concluding the discussion on one of the traditional parts of an oration, namely *partitio*,[2] points out:

Ac sunt alia quoque praecepta partitionum quae ad hunc usum oratorium non tanto opere pertineant, quae uersantur in philosophia, ex quibus haec ipsa transtulimus quae conuenire uiderentur quorum nihil in ceteris artibus inueniebamus.   (1.33)[3]

Here Cicero claims that he has introduced philosophical precepts which are relevant to rhetoric, and that this introduction is an original device, not found in the other handbooks of rhetoric. In what follows my intention is to show (i) that Cicero does effectively present some philosophical concepts in his treatment of *partitio*; and (ii) that the only existing text that is contemporary and thematically similar to *De Inuentione*, namely *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, reinforces the originality Cicero claims. In so doing, I hope to modify the idea that Cicero at the time of *De Inuentione* was an immature student who, in Hubbell's words, simply recorded the dictation of his teacher.[4]

I

Cicero clarifies that *partitio* is the part of an oration where speakers, first, guide the audience to a clear understanding of the controversy involved in a case and, second, introduce briefly the matters they will discuss in the argumentation:

Recte habita in causa partitio inlustrem et perspicuam totam efficit orationem. Partes eius sunt duae . . . Vna pars est quae quid cum aduersariis conueniat et quid in controuersia relinquatur ostendit; ex qua certum quiddam destinatur auditori in quo animum debeat habere occupatum. Altera est in qua rerum earum de quibus erimus dicturi breuiter expositio ponitur distributa; ex qua conficitur ut certas animo res teneat auditor, quibus dictis intellegat fore peroratum. (1.31)

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[2] See F. Solmsen, 'The Aristotelian tradition in ancient rhetoric', *AJP* 62 (1941), 35–50 and 169–90. Reprinted in R. L. Enos and L. P. Agnew (edd.), *Landmark Essays on Aristotelian Rhetoric* (Mahwah, 1998), 215–43; G. Kennedy, *The Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World* (Princeton, 1972), 103–48.
[3] Text after G. Achard (ed.), '*Cicéron, De l'Invention* (Paris, 1994).
[4] See H. M. Hubbell (trans.), '*Cicero's De inuentione, De Optimo Genere Oratorum, Topica* (Harvard, 1976), xi.