

on. Since the author is testing his hypotheses with case studies, he uses process-tracing techniques focused on the public and private statements of leaders, as well as their actual behaviors.

Haas offers an interesting selection of historical cases spanning two hundred years: the three wars of the French Revolution, the Concert of Europe, the 1930s and the origins of World War II, the rise and fall of the Sino-Soviet alliance, and the 1980s and the end of the Cold War. While all of the cases are noteworthy, I believe that the Sino-Soviet split case study provides the strongest evidence in support of the ideological distance hypothesis. The People's Republic of China (PRC) and the USSR were ideological allies and "should" have remained so, especially in light of their shared enmity of the United States. However, Haas deftly illustrates how Mao's increasing ideological radicalization alienated the Soviet Union, even though realist arguments would predict that the two states should have allied to balance the power of the United States.

A marked strength of this book is that it does not attempt to oversell the importance of the central tenet of ideological distance. Haas does not ignore significant realist arguments, and his theoretical exposition outlines the conditions under which power variables versus ideological distance considerations would be expected to operate. The case studies bear this out as well. For example, in the chapter on the origins of World War II, he states that realist explanations based on power maximization help explain much of Soviet behavior toward Germany. Of course, he later qualifies these realist arguments and clarifies how ideological variables may have been the motivating factor behind Soviet foreign policies.

Although the book has few weaknesses, a few are worth discussing. In my view, Haas's theory of a "communications mechanism" is problematic. It posits that ideological distance will lead to miscommunication and misperception. Yet, throughout the book, he explains in great detail how leaders began to see each other as threats because of the things they said and did in terms of ideology. He admits the indeterminacy of this factor when he states that "there is not an inevitable connection between an inability to communicate effectively and increasing perceptions of international threats" (p. 14).

Second, in several places, Haas refers to the fact that power variables were constant or identical, inferring that leaders' decisions had to be based on other factors, that is, ideological variables. However, it seems plausible that different actors within and between states will have different perceptions of relative power. In such cases, power variables may play a more influential role in foreign policy decisions than otherwise accounted for by his ideological-distance thesis.

Third, I found myself repeatedly thinking of possible counterfactuals to Haas's primary thesis. For example, how

do we reconcile the United States (and other Western powers) allying with the Soviet Union during World War II against Hitler's Germany when the United States had been at "ideological war" with communism long before Hitler's fascism/Nazism? Why did the PRC move toward rapprochement with the United States in the early 1970s when, ideologically speaking, Chinese leaders had much more in common with Soviet leaders, notwithstanding their disagreements? I suspect that Haas would answer that in these cases, power considerations became paramount.

Despite these weaknesses, *The Ideological Origins of Great Power Politics, 1789–1989*, is a definite must read. Haas is an effective writer; each of the case studies is meticulously researched, and the evidence marshaled in support of the hypotheses is impressive. The theoretical argument also lends itself nicely to what I hope will be a quantitative approach in future work. Overall, he makes a strong case for the inclusion of ideological factors, specifically distance, in examining and predicting the behavior of leaders of nation-states toward each other.

Keepers of the Flame: Understanding Amnesty International. By Stephen Hopgood. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006. 249p. \$49.95 cloth, \$19.95 paper.
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— James Ron, *Carleton University*

As human rights promotion gradually comes to rival development and democratization in the Western policy pantheon, more human rights-related books appear each year. Only a minority of these are empirically and methodologically rigorous, however, and even fewer are theoretically adventurous. Stephen Hopgood's unique study of Amnesty International is thus a welcome contribution from a political scientist with anthropological instincts, and it is likely to become a classic in the field. Hopgood immersed himself for over a year in Amnesty's culture, rituals, and politics, and then interpreted this data with insights from Emile Durkheim and Pierre Bourdieu. He writes clearly and well, and his interpretations should appeal to students of transnational organizing, human rights, and international affairs, broadly conceived.

The book's underlying thesis is that the Western human rights movement is a secular religion whose spiritual and organizational core is Amnesty International. Hopgood treats the group as a tribe worthy of ethnographic analysis, studying Amnesty's London-based "International Secretariat" much as one might perceive global Catholicism through the prism of Vatican politics. His interpretations are provocative and important, and the book is likely to be read, and reread, for years to come.

For students of international organizations, one of the book's most intriguing elements is the author's representation of the Amnesty employee experience. Although the organization is devoted to promoting empathy, its

workplace dynamics are anything but compassionate. Staffers told Hopgood that they often felt miserable and exhausted, and that higher-status employees often bullied their juniors. These findings are shocking, but he does a good job of explaining how Amnesty's "shadow side" is reproduced through an organizational culture of overwork, dedication, and monklike self-flagellation.

Amnesty was formed in the early 1960s, and as Hopgood suggests, its early adherents were seeking alternatives to both organized religion and socialism. In its first decades, supporters conducted letter writing campaigns in support of carefully selected "prisoners of conscience," appealing to middle-class sympathizers familiar with Christian narratives of individual sacrifice and heroism. Although the early Amnesty cadre tended toward the political Left, their activist inclinations were liberal, privileging research and polite letters over militant, radical solidarity. Amnesty's staffers were dedicated, self-sacrificing, and entirely committed to key liberal principles, such as due process and fair play.

During its first decades, the group worked hard to project an image of sober respectability. It distributed its attentions equally across the First, Second, and Third Worlds, barred members from working on abuses within their own countries, and carefully screened prospective prisoners of conscience for nonviolence. This strategy paid off in 1977 with a Nobel Peace Prize, dramatically boosting the group's reputation. By the end of the 1980s, Amnesty International was, for many, synonymous with the term "human rights." This is especially true in political science, where virtually every major quantitative human rights study uses a five-point "Political Terror Scale" based on Amnesty's annual reports. Other institutions take careful note of Amnesty's annual country commentaries. As Steven Poe and colleagues have shown, for example, the U.S. State Department's annual human rights reports have converged over time with those of the London-based nongovernmental organization. Although Human Rights Watch, Freedom House, and others produce excellent material, Amnesty's analyses are still regarded by many as the final word.

The human rights idiom spread like wildfire after the Cold War, displacing discredited leftist narratives and, in some cases, joining forces with feminism, environmentalism, and development. Some Western governments also voiced their support, funding a slew of policy initiatives that transformed nongovernmental groups across the Global South into "human rights"—promoting entities. New members flooded Amnesty's ranks in the Western world, and the group's operating budget grew apace. The 1990s witnessed what Michael Ignatieff aptly dubs a "rights revolution," and Amnesty was beautifully positioned to ride the wave.

Abundance of members and resources proved to be a Trojan horse of sorts, however, creating bitter conflicts between the group's old guard, dubbed by Hopgood

"Keepers of the Flame," and a new generation of activists with very different ideas. The new guard was impatient with the Keepers' caution and impartiality, believing that the organization's moral authority was being needlessly squandered. Keepers were wasting too much time in careful research, and were missing important opportunities for generating positive change through media-savvy politicking. The reformers also argued that the old guard was too white, male, and Western, and that Amnesty's focus on a few core civil and political rights was far too narrow.

The new guard initiated many important changes, bringing in new and culturally diverse managers; building up the organization's campaign, media, and fund-raising capacities; and reconfiguring Amnesty's research so that it fed directly into advocacy. The organization has moved away from its focus on prisoners of conscience and political and civil rights. It now works on a range of diverse economic, social, and gender rights, and is far closer to a solidarity model of activism. These changes have been bitterly resisted by the Keepers, however, many of whom fear that the reformers are destroying Amnesty's impartial reputation. Hopgood does a fine job of walking us through the struggle for Amnesty's soul, explaining how these battles raged even while the group's budget, membership, and reputation soared.

Here, the implications go much further than Amnesty. On the one hand, human rights organizations are the world's moral stenographers, impartially recording acts of brutality, oppression, and discrimination. To maintain their credibility, they must speak in calm and measured tones, adopting the mannerisms of international lawyers and diplomats. Yet human rights abuses are also raw and emotional things, and genuine struggles for freedom require impassioned, politically engaged campaigns. Amnesty is not alone in vacillating between these two different roles, of course; many advocacy groups are similarly torn. Some, such as Human Rights Watch, may be situated closer to the impartial side of the continuum, but this is often a deeply frustrating position to occupy. When observing slow-motion genocides such as the one occurring in Darfur, advocacy groups are tempted each day to yell more loudly and stridently, relying more and more on politicized methods of persuasion.

Hopgood also thoughtfully analyzes the sources of North–South cleavages within the global human rights community. The tactics, images, and narratives that made Amnesty a household world in the Global North do not translate well in the Global South, and time and again, southern Amnesty chapters have disappeared without a trace. Although Amnesty claims to be a global, transnational movement for justice, it has sunk very few roots in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. Hopgood offers various explanations for these failures, the most convincing of which is that Amnesty's ethos and organizational style

draw too heavily on Western Christianity, liberalism, and bureaucratic rationality.

On this count, the jury is still out. Human rights groups have sprung up all over the world, but most of them are heavily dependent on foreign funds. To be sure, the rights idiom has sunk deep roots in Latin America and Eastern Europe, where long histories of constitutionalism provide receptive environments. Elsewhere, however, the prospects for sustainable, indigenous “human rights” movements seem less promising. People everywhere are keen for justice, equality, and dignity, but it is still unclear whether universal human rights standards can form the basis for a truly global civil society. As Hopgood’s book makes abundantly clear, it is devilishly difficult to build a representative, transnational movement for justice, even with the best of intentions.

Capitalism, Democracy and Welfare. By Torben Iversen. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 226p. \$29.99.

Inequality and Prosperity: Social Europe vs. Liberal America. By Jonas Pontusson. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005. 242p. \$19.95.
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— John Zysman, *University of California Berkeley*

Can policymakers reconcile the dual objectives of economic development and social justice? Are equity and sustained growth in an inherent conflict? How does the welfare system fit in a capitalist market economy? Jonas Pontusson and Torben Iversen provide two perspectives on these basic policy and political debates in interesting, well done, and quite complementary studies of comparative capitalism.

Pontusson’s *Inequality and Prosperity* depicts statistically and explores analytically the balance that the diverse advanced countries have arrived at between the objectives of equity and growth. Pontusson provides an excellent summary of the salient institutional, economic, and organizational differences between countries categorized as liberal market economies (LMEs) and those he categorizes as social market economies (SMEs), to be distinguished here later from coordinated market economies (CMEs). He argues that both SMEs and LMEs have institutional advantages for growth, but that the dynamic, and hence the balance between equality and growth, is different in each category. LMEs are organized through market-based linkages and compete on the basis of their flexibility in labor and capital markets, enabling rapid changes when necessitated by the market. SMEs’ advantages for growth stem from high levels of society-led coordination, allowing negotiated policy compromises to meet the needs of economic actors. The SME social actors include both business and labor, permitting compromises fueling growth in SMEs to support higher levels of social equality. Pontusson’s conclusion considers policies that might provide a better reconciliation of these dual objectives, but is it limited by the

lack of an argument about the processes of productivity growth and value creation.

By contrast, Iversen uses the modeler’s tools to approach the problem in *Capitalism, Democracy and Welfare*. Using a largely rational-choice approach, he sets out to explain as a product of self-interested individual actors the broad cross-national variation in inequality and redistribution that Pontusson depicts. Iversen’s analysis begins with the logic of worker investment in specialized skills. He argues that those who have acquired distinctive value-added skills will seek policies to protect them; conversely, these protections will lead individuals and firms to make the investments to create those capacities. Workers with more general skills demand and win fewer protections, which again creates a self-perpetuating logic: The absence of the protection for investment in skills results in lower levels of skill investment. Using individual preferences as his primary unit of analysis, Iversen creates exciting new ways to link choices about skills to a larger dynamic of welfare and party politics, intended to account for national variation in skills and social protections of skills.

Both books are real contributions. They reject the notion that global processes will drive convergence and explore the foundations of cross-national diversity. The data are interesting and the sophisticated models will display to even the skeptic the utility of formal method. Nonetheless, each book is limited by its analytic approach and interpretation of the global economy rooted in the dynamics of the late 1980s and 1990s. Let us consider these issues in turn.

Both authors position themselves firmly within the varieties of capitalism (VoC) debate about liberal market economies and coordinated market economies, (see Peter Hall and David Soskice, *The Varieties of Capitalism*, 2001). The VoC argument proposes that economies are institutionally organized around two sets of choices. One set is about workers, labor markets, and training; the second is about corporate governance, finance, and interfirm linkages. VoC’s causal logic is that the needs of firms to create stable solutions to these two sets of choices generate nationally distinct institutional arrangements. The argument proposes that institutional arrangements come in packages that cannot be easily unbound, and that arrangements in one domain are tightly linked to and dependent on arrangements in another. As a consequence, there are two ideal types of institutional arrangements—liberal markets and coordinated markets. Liberal market economies, such as the United States, have a decentralized economic society organized around general skills, arms-length market relations of finance, and market-based linkages. Coordinated market economies, such as those in northern continental Europe, use a larger number of nonmarket-based cooperative societal links, such as coordinated wage bargaining and cooperative relationships between firms. These ideal types then define categories for empirical work and debate.