

believes that things cannot be set right if we continue to accept misguided contemporary accounts of ancient *thumos*: "If we cannot see how expansive *thumos* becomes with Aristotle, and how our classical heritage, despite the fame of its rationalism, houses a significant role for emotion, we will continue to be blind to the emotional dimensions of political life and their need to be normatively theorized" (p. 177).

Where We Live, Work, and Play: The Environmental Justice Movement and the Struggle for a New Environmentalism.

By Patrick Novotny. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000. 115p. \$55.00.

William Chaloupka, *University of Montana*

Case studies of four groups working in the much discussed arena of "environmental justice" form the core of *Where We Live, Work and Play*. The Gulf Coast Tenants Organization (active in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama), the South-West Organizing Project (New Mexico), the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers (OCAW) Local 4-620 (Louisiana), and the Labor/Community Strategy Center (Los Angeles) are examined, mainly on the basis of how each has framed environmental questions in relationship to the groups' other work. Novotny primarily studies the groups' self-descriptions and organizing materials, and he traces the ways in which each moved to incorporate environmental issues into its original focus on class or civil rights concerns. In each case, this move "took place in the context of organizations that had already been working [in their] communities for years" (p. 73).

The Gulf Coast Tenants Organization expanded on work with public housing project residents, adding environmental concerns to the more familiar issues of racial equality and discrimination that it had emphasized for a decade. The SouthWest Organizing Project was founded twenty years ago to address a wide array of social and racial justice issues. OCAW Local 4-620 came to environmental concerns as an outgrowth of its long lockout battle at a BASF chemical plant. The Labor/Community Strategy Center, which works with low-wage workers and on community concerns, moved into explicitly environmental organizing after a 1992 explosion at a local chemical plant. In each case, the book documents the ways the group frames environmental concerns and traces the transition that brought it into what now can be described as the environmental justice movement. Novotny mostly avoids speculating on why these groups now find the environment an attractive issue, other than to suggest that such framing expresses community concerns.

The book emphasizes the framing conducted by these groups, which in part is of interest as "a part of the repertoire of mobilization strategies that are available to a movement" (p. 7). Novotny also suggests that this framing implies a position in the ongoing debate about the interconnection between language and nature; "the language used to refer to the environment is rich with cultural connotations, laden with the history of social relations and struggles" (p. 85). Going farther, the last two chapters acknowledge that the analysis raises intriguing questions about environmental justice and the environmental movement in general. All the groups began to emphasize the environment after working with their communities for years. Some of the groups initially expressed suspicion of the environmental movement, which they sometimes criticized for having a "narrow" or "single-issue" focus (p. 77). "That these groups repeatedly used the term environment in quotation marks reflected [their work] to create a

new definition of environment as distinct from that of the . . . environmental movement" (p. 77).

This is a short book (94 pages including notes), but it raises important questions. Environmental justice arises at a time when the nation's largest environmental groups have experienced a decade of challenges, including community opposition to the logging of public lands, for example, at the behest of antienvironmentalist groups in the "Wise Use" movement. Although Novotny does not directly address the NIMBY (not in my backyard) argument that has long been a part of the discussion of environmental politics, his focus on the phrase that provides the book's title suggests that race and class concerns may alter the way NIMBY is understood in discussions of environmental politics.

Similarly, although the book does not directly suggest it, the implication arises that mainstream environmental groups may enhance their legitimacy by explicitly altering their scope to embrace "issues of racism, poverty, and the legacy of injustice" (p. 81). Mainstream environmentalism "has been beset by an assumption of the environment as a concern for more well-to-do groups," whereas environmental justice offers a corrective, "showing that groups from many different backgrounds have a stake in [protecting] the environment" (p. 93).

Novotny's work joins a growing genre of environmental justice books. It expands on case treatment in other volumes, including *The Struggle for Ecological Democracy* (1998), edited by Daniel Faber, and David Schlosberg's *Environmental Justice and the New Pluralism* (1999). Other recent studies, such as Sylvia Noble Tesh's *Uncertain Hazards: Environmental Activists and Scientific Proof* (2000), Christopher H. Foreman's *The Promise and Peril of Environmental Justice* (1998), and Schlosberg's book take as their project the critical or theoretical consideration of the movement or its context. Novotny adds to that by gathering historical information that should assist in the ongoing investigation of a number of issues, including several mentioned or implied in this book.

Power versus Liberty: Madison, Hamilton, Wilson, and Jefferson. By James H. Read. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 2000. 201p. \$47.50 cloth, \$16.50 paper.

Michael T. Gibbons, *University of South Florida, Tampa*

The political thinking of four leading figures of the American founding can, James Read argues, best be understood in terms of "a four-way comparison structured by a set of interlocking themes and problems, all of which branch off from the basic question of how to reconcile the power of government with the liberty of citizens in a republican political order" (p. 4). Such an approach has several virtues, Read argues. First, it avoids reducing the debate among Madison et al. to what Read describes as ideological divisions (e.g., the republican-liberalism debate). Second, it emphasizes the extent to which the participants in the debate shared a common conception of liberty that provided a common reference point for the disagreements that did exist among them. Third, it emphasizes the extent to which Madison, Hamilton, and Wilson, at least, broke with the traditional Whig view that portrayed power and liberty as inherently at odds with each other (pp. 6, 8–10). Fourth, it has the practical value of reminding us that the issue of how much power ought to be vested in the national government is more complex than is sometimes commonly understood. This is not to say that Madison and his contemporaries can resolve our differences about power and liberty. But they do remind us that there is no single, simple answer to the question of

whether the relationship between power and liberty is a zero-sum game (pp. 157–74).

Read presents the respective views of Madison, Hamilton, Wilson, and Jefferson on power and liberty and relates these to their political thinking per se and to policy positions that each took during the decade or so immediately following the Constitutional Convention of 1787. Although the text is framed as a four-way conversation, the comparisons between Madison and Hamilton, on the one hand, and Wilson and Jefferson, on the other, are thrown into relief. Read critically addresses a number of conventional interpretations of each thinker and provides a corrective to those he believes either oversimplify or misconstrue the thinker in question as inconsistent.

For example, Read argues that Madison's opposition to the increase in national power in 1791 in the form of Hamilton's plan to establish a national bank was not inconsistent with his earlier support for an increase in national power in the Convention of 1787, in which Madison himself favored such authority. The difference can be explained by the fact that although Madison had favored the policy earlier, that authority was explicitly rejected by the convention as a whole. More important for Madison, the Constitution was ratified with the understanding that the power to charter a bank was not among the powers being granted to the new federal authority. In effect, Madison changed his position about the bank because it was not what was agreed to by citizens participating in the ratification process (pp. 35–51). Therefore, to establish a bank would be a paradigm case of a violation of the liberty of citizens, whatever one's personal preferences. Madison's change of position actually reflects, Read argues, a principled position regarding liberty.

Similarly, interpretations of Hamilton that portray him as a proponent of aristocracy and power and an unreconstructed enemy of liberty and republicanism fail to take into account his commitment to his own particular brand of republicanism and liberty. Hamilton, Read argues, tried to strike a balance between power and liberty "that sometimes entailed correction in the direction of power, sometimes in the direction of liberty. Fear of the power of the states was the primary driving force behind Hamilton's efforts to strengthen national government. He insisted that the liberty of the citizen is not a function of the relative power of the state of which he is a member (p. 85). For Hamilton, as for Madison, the increase in the authority of the national government might itself be an extension of the liberty of the people as a whole.

Hamilton did not accept the idea that political initiative could spring from what he considered the myth of the sovereign people. Rather, the augmentation of power could only be ratified or rejected once the new form of power took shape and form (as in the case of the bank). From this perspective, when an increase in national power represented the embodiment of greater liberty, and if the power of the states hindered that (as was likely to be the case, according to Hamilton), then it follows that greater power of the states would also be a hindrance or constraint on public liberty and not, as some Jeffersonians would have it, a defense of liberty.

Read concludes in the case of Madison and Hamilton that the problem posed by the relation between power and liberty is more complicated than simply seeing them as opposites. For Madison, "because threats to liberty are so numerous and proceed from so many different sources, preserving liberty sometimes will require more governmental power, sometimes less" (p. 51). Just as important, for Madison the question was not simply one of quantity but of boundaries and the genius or "sense of the community" (p. 51). Similarly,

Read shows that Hamilton did not prefer power over liberty but that ultimately his "nationalism was consistent with his commitment to public and private liberty" (p. 85).

The views of Wilson and Jefferson are interpreted as seeing the relationship between power and liberty in much more simple terms. Read argues that Wilson believed there was a single, national citizenry that was capable of exercising its sovereign authority. The Constitution and the national government it authorized were expressions of that sovereignty. The exercise of that sovereignty is at the same time the embodiment of the liberty of citizens. Hence, Wilson "seems to have believed that the principle of the sovereignty of the people removed all serious conflict between the power of government and the liberty of citizens. This is merely the obverse of the equally simple and straightforward belief that the power of government and the liberty of citizens are eternally antagonistic; Wilson in effect substituted one simple proposition for another" (p. 115). In effect, Wilson ignored the possibility of a majoritarian threat to liberty.

Jefferson's simplicity is the obverse of what Read points to in Wilson, the clearest expression of which is perhaps found in the Kentucky Resolutions. Jefferson tended "to reduce all political divisions to contests between power and liberty" (p. 121). He identified strong national government with power. He identified state governments with liberty. Power and liberty are inherently antithetical. "By radically simplifying the political alternatives at stake—strong national government equals antimajoritarian government equals unfree government—Jefferson was able to avoid ever having to choose between the state and national versions of popular sovereignty" (p. 123).

One shortcoming of Read's analysis is his treatment of the concept of public liberty, particularly as it relates to Wilson and Jefferson. Early on Read notes that in the eighteenth century the term liberty included both private and public liberty. The latter was defined as the right to participate in the public and political life of one's community. Read points out that although there was a difference between private and public liberty, it did not reflect the modern tendency to construct a dichotomy between the two, as has been done with the notions of negative and positive liberty. Read is, of course, absolutely right in emphasizing the inclusion of public liberty under the rubric of liberty per se. Nonetheless, the importance of public liberty as a distinctive element of republicanism does not seem to have the presence one might expect. This is particularly important for Read's treatment of Wilson and Jefferson. Both thinkers emphasize the centrality of public liberty and the public participation it required. If Read had paid more attention to that element in their arguments, he might not have interpreted their thinking as being as simple as he does.

A related point is that Read's treatment of Madison and Hamilton reflects their complexity and subtlety, whereas Wilson and Jefferson do not fare nearly as well. They are interpreted as offering relatively one-dimensional accounts of the political problems facing the new nation and politics and, not surprisingly, offering one-dimensional answers. This does not do justice to either man. Wilson may very well have been overly optimistic about the possibility of a national, democratic political identity. Nonetheless, missing from Read's account is any discussion of the idea in Wilson that the primary purpose of a political order is the intellectual and moral development of citizens. Moreover, because such development presumes political participation, and participation presumes freedom from want and need, it follows that a rough equality goes hand in hand with democracy and vice versa.

Similarly, although Read makes occasional reference to the different views of political economy between Hamilton and Jefferson, he does not take the opportunity to examine the fact that these differences entail radically different views of the good society. Hamilton seems to believe that a political economy built around what we would today call a national economic policy can provide increasing levels of economic growth. Hence, he seems to pin the idea of the good society on the idea of material well-being. Jefferson's ideal, by contrast, is that of political and community self-determination through active, independent citizenship. By situating the views of Wilson and Jefferson on power and liberty within their larger political vision and by paying more attention to the nuances of public liberty, Read might have avoided portraying them as having overly simple solutions to one of the most important questions of political life.

Read's detailed reconstruction and analysis of the competing accounts of the relationship between power and liberty in these four thinkers is a valuable contribution to the literature on the founding period. He reminds us of the quality of thought on profound questions by those at the very center of political life of the time. Moreover, he brings to our attention the fact that for Madison, Hamilton, Wilson, and Jefferson everyday political life was defined in large part by the answers we provide to the fundamental questions of politics.

Environmental Justice and the New Pluralism. By David Schlosberg. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. 223p. \$45.00.

Wade Sikorski, *Willard, MT*

According to David Schlosberg, the first thing to do is forget that there is any such thing as environmentalism, a single philosophy shared by everyone who might be described as an environmentalist. Instead of a single theory, which might inform the environmental movement the way that Marxist theory informed the socialist movement, there is an almost unlimited variety of ways environmental advocates identify themselves. Schlosberg lists but a few of them: "Not only romantic preservationists, efficient conservationists, public-health advocates, and environmental illness victims, but also deep ecologists, greens, bioregionalists, animal liberationists, advocates of permaculture and organic agriculture, ecofeminists, religious evangelists, social ecologists, steady-state economists, neo-Malthusians, neo-Luddites, neo-Hobbesians, ecological technology promoters, nature consumers, indigenous rights activists, spiritualists, planners, conservation biologists, environmental health professionals, environmental justice advocates, environmental lawyers, gains, ecosocialists, nature writers, worker-health advocates, eco-anarchist youth, and more" (p. 3).

As anyone who has ever tried to organize a coalition of environmentalists knows, getting anything done is a lot like herding cats. The more you try to point everyone in the same direction, the more everyone heads off in different directions. According to Schlosberg, this diversity of environmental philosophies is not a cause for despair; it may suggest a failure of leadership and lack of theoretical development, but it is an inescapable necessity based on different experiences of an industrialized environment. Following the thinking of Donna Haraway (*Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature*, 1991) Schlosberg argues that knowledge about the environment is necessarily situated, limited by place and time. As a result, no coalition of environmentalists

can come to a single interpretation of the environment and the harm being done to it because their experience is necessarily dispersed over a wide array of occupations, toxic exposures, disease experiences, personal histories, philosophical and religious orientations, identity structures, and power relationships. However much some may aspire to an objective knowledge about the environment, appeals that transcend any single ideology or perspective are doomed to failure as a purely practical political matter because they simply will not reflect the different things people know about their lives.

The task that Schlosberg sets for himself is to find a way for different kinds of people with different experiences and different knowledges to work together without giving up the energy that comes from being different—to make difference an advantage rather than a weakness. Classical pluralism, as put forward by Edward Banfield, Robert Dahl, Charles Lindblom, Nelson Polsby, and David Truman, although it ostensibly deals with difference, is miserably inadequate for this task. This model of pluralism is what the large environmental groups, such as the Natural Resources Defense Council, National Audubon Society, and the Environmental Defense Fund, have followed. These groups built huge organizations, centralized control in the staff, went to Washington, lobbied Congress, and negotiated with their opponents, the major polluting corporations, in an attempt to countervail their influence. For all their efforts and all the attention they have received, the Big Ten environmental groups have accomplished little.

Schlosberg contends that a new kind of critical pluralism is more likely to be effective in protecting the environment and seeking environmental justice. Something like William Connolly's (*The Ethos of Pluralization*, 1995) ethic of agonistic respect for difference will create the respect needed for environmentalists of all stripes to work together in rhizomatic pluralities, networks of mutual aid. Instead of approaching difference in others as an obstacle to be overcome, an agonistic respect for difference cultivates an appreciation for it, recognizing that identities are necessarily formed by the way we distinguish ourselves from others. Because those "others" are necessarily lacking in something we appreciate or endorse, we should encounter difference within an understanding that there can be no identity without others who differ from it, and difference becomes an opportunity to learn about the inevitable cruelties and injustices lodged in one's own identity and presumptions. As people reflect on how their differences from others constitute their identities, even the most worthy ones, they gain an opportunity to understand themselves better, perhaps becoming more just and compassionate. Instead of feeling threatened by differences with their allies, environmentalists would be more likely to work effectively with them toward common ends. That is the hope that Schlosberg pursues.

Although environmental justice organizations such as the Center for Health, Environment, and Justice (CHEJ) may not have read Connolly, or writers in a similar vein, such as Michel Foucault, Giles Deleuze, and Felix Guattari, that is what they have been doing, Schlosberg contends. They have been organizing what these writers might call rhizomatic pluralities, heterogeneous networks sustained by difference and connection, by multiplication and dispersion, not by hierarchy and singularity. Instead of focusing on policy at a national level, going from the top down (as the Big Ten environmental groups have done), environmental justice groups such as CHEJ have focused on what is happening at the local level, on a particular incinerator, hazardous waste dump, nuclear power plant, confined feedlot operation, or