Chinese thought also comprise a great literary creation. Arising in China's formative period of cultural development, Daoist anarchism might under different circumstances have become the dominant influence in the Chinese polity. This possibility was lost forever with the establishment of the Qin empire in late third century BCE. We accept as axiomatic that Daoism provided relief from the stress of duties for Confucian-Legalist officeholders over the centuries. Why did some Daoist anarchists backslide or turn nihilist, then and in modern times? Their beautiful ideals about the possibilities of human life got flooded out in the sea of statist pressures. Confucius's humanism also succumbed to the Legalist origins of the Chinese state—a curse that still plagues efforts to develop a creative statist culture in China, if that is even possible.

In his concluding comments, Rapp notes the irony that in China now there have been revivals of both Mao and Confucius. He suggests that in this situation there might be a new opportunity for Daoist anarchism to emerge once more and have meaningful influence. This study is most impressive in conception, in the scholarly work it exhibits, and in the intellectual stimulus it offers. John Rapp has made a great contribution to our understanding of this fascinating, vital feature of Chinese history and culture.

Continuum Publishers invites manuscripts for this worthy series; this too is recognition of anarchism's ongoing relevance.

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PLATONIC RESONANCES

Seth Benardete: *The Archaeology of the Soul: Platonic Readings of Ancient Poetry and Philosophy*. Edited by Ronna Burger and Michael Davis. (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine, 2012. Pp. xiii, 383.)

doi:10.1017/S0034670513000697

This is a posthumous collection of essays and reviews by the philosopher-classicist Seth Benardete. Unlike the previous collection edited by Burger and Davis (*The Argument of the Action* [University of Chicago Press, 2000]), *The Archaeology of the Soul* could not have Benardete's stamp of approval, but the range and depth of (occasionally oracular) interpretation are unmistakably his. The volume, in a sense, completes Benardete's body of work and confirms him as one of the most philosophically penetrating thinkers of recent generations. Its highlights include his recovery of the self-reflective wisdom of Heraclitus and Parmenides (arguably exceeding the insights of the avid proponent of the pre-Socratics, Heidegger); his intensive interpretations of ancient tragedy on the city and the gods (perhaps surpassing the interpretations by Hegel and Heidegger [cf. 238n6]); his unfolding of the meaning of

Roman poetry (in its unique placement between classical philosophy, the Roman Empire and law, and the coming of Christianity [309]); his uncovering of the philosophical nature of the ancient historians; and the discussion of the psychological core of Plato's and Aristotle's "metaphysics" (e.g., 354, 242, and 244); not to mention his reflections on Cicero, Nietzsche, and Derrida.

In the brief but very helpful preface, the editors offer the following as the key to the unity of the book and thus the plausibility of its subtitle and of Benardete's "platonizing" approach to the non-Platonic works that take up about half of the book: "Only because Plato seemed to [Benardete] to come so close to the truth of things could he hope to learn so much by unearthing Platonic resonances in other thinkers—whether earlier or later, poetic or philosophic" (x; cf. Leo Strauss's *Studies in Platonic Political Philosophy,* most of which is not on Plato).

To be sure, there is something anachronistic in calling these resonances "Platonic" since "Benardete came to see that the discovery of philosophy through the 'Socratic turn' was really the rediscovery of an understanding already present in some form in the Greek poets" (xii; and ibid.: "Heraclitus or Parmenides is a genuine philosophic thinker precisely to the extent that a Socratic turn can be found in some form within his own thought"). Now, one could justify calling Parmenides Socratic or Platonic insofar as Plato has made the philosophic experience more conspicuous or even rendered it more intelligible. But while in his essay on Parmenides's poem Benardete refers to Plato's *Parmenides* for clarification, those references are not central to his interpretation. And in his reading of Heraclitus—in addition to relying, as he does in all his readings, on a meticulous reflection on the text itself—he begins with Lucretius and introduces Plato in the footnotes in apparently the same manner in which he brings up Herodotus or Sophocles. In fact, Benardete's heightened appreciation of certain pre-Socratics is the greatest change from his earlier understanding (see 328 and 375). In the case of ancient poetry, another non-Socratic alternative, Benardete does not claim that "philosophic reflection" is poetry's core element. Rather, "the relation between the local and the universal, between law and the transcendence of the law, which is at the heart of ancient poetry, recurs in the element of philosophic reflection in Plato" (6). In his essay on Parmenides's poem, Benardete compares Parmenides to Hesiod and suggests that Parmenides succeeds in integrating love and justice with rationality whereas Hesiod's *Theogony* culminates in the triumph of mind over love and teaches that the Sun (i.e., mind) and Justice come from different families (224); nevertheless, Hesiod and Parmenides agree that "the beautiful and the just are at the heart of the human" (ibid.). While perhaps not going beyond what is suggested in the essay on Parmenides's poem, the essay "Socrates and Plato: The Dialectics of Eros" articulates most directly the relation of eros to mind (but also law, justice, and the gods): "Plato has two themes, justice and love, both in their relation to one another and in their relation to mind. … The soul of man is the problem" (259; see also 239).

Benardete uncovers a Socrates who, similarly to Parmenides, is "immune from illusions, hopes, and ideals, and is *eros* itself united with mind" (259).

The title for the collection the editors have chosen seems to be a version of Benardete's statement in the extraordinary essay on Greek and Roman poetry, "The Poet-Merchant and the Stranger from the Sea," the first chapter of the volume: "The archaeology of the human spirit is one of the characteristics of ancient poetry" (1). The volume, however, points beyond such an archaeology to what the editors call "a lifetime of philosophic reflection on the human soul" (xiii). "Archaeology" is also used in the last chapter of the volume, "Memorial Speech for Leo Strauss": "'Archaeology' was the only path still open to any possible 'physiology'" (375; cf. 355). In this way, "archaeology" frames this volume. The greatest density of "archaeology" occurs, however, in Benardete's comments on the Thucydides chapter of Strauss's *City and Man* (370–72). The main theme of Thucydides's archaeology is the origin of Greekness in barbarism. One wonders, then, about the place of the historian Thucydides (and Herodotus) in a volume of "Platonic readings of ancient poetry and philosophy." In a sense, Thucydides's history is a "chastened" version of Homer's fabulous patterns. But this formulation is "much too fragile, too poetic to capture the whole of Thucydides's thought," in which "elusive patterns" are mere means to thought. Thucydides's "archaeology" is ultimately not history, but a heuristic device (370); Thucydides completes the transition from poetry and history to philosophy. As for Herodotus, Benardete remarks that in reaching Herodotus's understanding of law, one is led to "an appreciation of Aeschylus' *Persians*, in which no word for justice … ever appears" (335). The poets and the historians expose the amoral roots of the city and display an "indifference to the issue of right in itself" (263). Plato, however, perhaps Parmenides or Heraclitus as well, radicalizes or completes poetic-historical thought and shows that, although "the good city lives in the element of justice while it violates justice from the start," "this veil of false opinion is on the whole good as well" (264; cf. 41).

The reference to Strauss as an "archaeologist" raises the question of the relation between Strauss and Benardete (whose remarkable correspondence is yet to be published). "Political philosophy"—Strauss's crucial catchphrase—is not used much by Benardete except in reference to Strauss (375, 359; but see 245). And one might receive the impression that Benardete addresses the uncanny, the sacred, the tragic (e.g., he wrote on Homer and Sophocles while Strauss wrote in a sustained way only on Aristophanes among the ancient poets, 375), the soul, *eidos*, *phantasia*, and many intricate literary puzzles while Strauss operates in the "rich middle" of political philosophy. But this would be misleading: for one, in going to the pre- and transpolitical, Benardete always clarifies the political (and conspicuously, the essay "Freedom: Grace and Necessity" offers a sharp indication of the essence of modernity—in its scientific and political dispositions and hopes). Strauss and Benardete also share a focus on "the problem of the gods"

(e.g., 330; see also 61, 260, 283, 308, 346, 356–57 [Plato's *Republic* in relation to the Bible and Christianity], as well as 358: "writing poses the issue of divine revelation of the law"). Another way to see Benardete's affinity to Strauss is to say that the ontological psychology that Benardete outlines (242, 199) is in agreement with Strauss's "anti-historicist historical psychology" (376). For both, at any rate, political philosophy is linked to "first philosophy." If anything, one might be tempted to say that Benardete turns all his authors into Strauss's Plato. But this facile claim is easily belied by the originality and sheer power, as well as filigree subtlety, of Benardete's readings. Benardete's demanding work is less likely to reach as broad an audience as that of Strauss. Still, while this collection is unlikely to change that situation radically, in "pointing the way to understanding," it extends a "lifeline to the rest of us" (358).

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BY NATURE AND BY DESIGN

Roslyn Weiss: *Philosophers in the* Republic*: Plato's Two Paradigms*. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012. Pp. xi, 236.)

doi:10.1017/S0034670513000703

Against the scholarly norm that interprets the philosopher-kings of the *Republic* as paragons of Platonic philosophy, Roslyn Weiss's *Philosophers in the Republic* argues that there is more than one paradigm of philosophy in the dialogue and that the dialogue treats the philosopher-kings as "not only second but second-rate" (3). Calling philosopher-kings "philosophers by design" (chaps. 2–3) and demoting them below what she calls "philosophers by nature" (chap. 1), Weiss also advocates for the superiority over both of a third paradigm of philosopher, exemplified by Socrates (chap. 4). Offering an original appreciation of the dialogue's consideration of justice (chap. 5), one that tracks the different paradigms of the philosopher (145–49), Weiss develops her bold and refreshing alternative to standard interpretations of the *Republic* by way of close readings of the dialogue that attend with nuance to its language and arguments and also to its dramatic structure. Weiss's exceptionally rich footnotes supplement the careful arguments of her text, while also offering, over the course of the book, a sustained set of insightful gestures to undernoted proximities between Plato and Aristotle.

Weiss's negative assessment of the philosophers by design (whom she also calls "Book 7's philosophers" and whose description she takes to begin at 6.502c and run through Book 7) rests on the contrast she sets up between