


ARTICLE

How Does International Intervention Work to Secure Peace Settlements After Civil Conflicts?

Aila M. Matanock¹ and Adam Lichtenheld^{2*} 

¹University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, USA and ²Mercy Corps, Washington, D.C., USA

*Corresponding author. Email: alichtenheld@mercy corps.org

(Received 15 April 2020; revised 7 February 2021; accepted 3 August 2021; first published online 7 March 2022)

Abstract

There is an emerging consensus that international intervention can secure peace by helping combatants resolve commitment problems following civil wars. But how do interveners accomplish this? Some suggest that intervention primarily works through military coercion, while others propose non-military instruments. We build on the existing literature to theorize that interveners commonly condition political, economic, and legal incentives on compliance with peace processes. Despite a rich literature on intervention, scholars have only started to test the underlying instruments. This article takes a critical step toward this end, examining peacekeeping missions led by the United Nations from 1989 to 2012. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we show military coercion is neither commonly used nor necessary to ensure peace. Missions that employ conditional incentives—on which we collect original data—are consistently correlated with a reduced risk of conflict recurrence, even when controlling for observed selection effects, and regardless of whether they are also authorized to use military coercion.

Keywords: Civil conflict; international intervention; peacekeeping; negotiated settlements; peace agreements; United Nations

The ability of international actors to help stabilize conflict-affected states is critically important for protecting civilians and maintaining global security. Civil wars cause many more casualties than interstate conflicts, but ending them, especially through settlements, is difficult (Walter 2002). On issues such as human rights, electoral integrity, and international trade, external actors can help enforce agreements between domestic actors (Donno 2013; Hafner-Burton 2013; Keohane 1984; Matanock 2020; Simmons 2009; Simmons 2010). Scholars and policy-makers see a similar role for the international community in securing settlements to civil conflicts.

While the international community engages in various forms of intervention, peacekeeping after civil conflict is one of the most invasive, and operations led by the United Nations (UN), in particular, have increased in frequency and intensity (Fortna and Howard 2008). There is an emerging consensus that this type of intervention “works” in improving prospects for post-conflict peace (Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Fortna 2008; Gilligan and Sergenti 2008; Gizelis and Benson 2019; Walter 2002). Existing work shows that third-party involvement can help combatants overcome the challenge of credibly committing to a negotiated settlement (Walter 2002).

Despite a rich literature on peacekeeping, *how* interveners mitigate these commitment problems and change incentives remains unclear—and is crucial to understand (Walter, Howard, and Fortna 2019). Some studies suggest that peacekeeping missions primarily work by threatening military force (for example Hultman, Nygård, and Hegre 2014; Hultman, Nygård, and Hegre 2016; Walter 1997), while other research points to alternative instruments (for example, Fortna

2008; Howard 2019).¹ Overall, however, reviews of the peacekeeping literature explicitly note that it is “inconclusive” about the role military force plays in these operations (Fortna and Howard 2008, 292, 295). Recent work that seeks to test the use of different peacekeeping instruments is qualitative in nature and relies on select case studies (Howard 2019).

This article specifies a theory of incentive change and quantitatively tests potentially critical but different peacekeeping instruments using new cross-national data. Building on the existing literature, we take credible commitment problems to be a major barrier to securing post-conflict peace, and one that peacekeeping missions—which rely on multilateral coordination between the UN and its partners, including member states and other international actors—seek to directly address. We identify two main instruments that the UN and its partners use to change the incentives of domestic actors to credibly commit to comply with a settlement: “conditional incentives” (CI) and “military coercion.” We specify the former “soft” peacekeeping instrument—where interveners condition incentives such as foreign aid on combatants’ settlement compliance—and contrast it with the latter “hard” peacekeeping instrument—where interveners enforce compliance through the threat or use of military force. With few exceptions, peacekeeping missions tend to use information to identify compliance, but they use different instruments or tools to change incentives to comply. We assess whether these instruments are effective at preventing conflict recurrence using data we collected on UN peacekeeping missions’ instruments in post-conflict peace periods from 1989 to 2012. We use a matching analysis to assess their relationship with the durability of post-conflict peace, following and extending the influential work of Gilligan and Sergenti (2008). We show that, contrary to conventional wisdom, military coercion is neither commonly used nor necessary for peace. Peacekeeping missions often rely on conditioning economic, legal, and political incentives on settlement compliance. Our study is not meant to be a conclusive analysis of all peacekeeping instruments, or the conditions under which they are effective—objectives for future studies—but an important step in theorizing and testing how peacekeeping missions broadly work.

As international involvement in intrastate conflict continues to expand, this research has important implications for scholars and practitioners. Global efforts to prevent the recurrence of civil wars have remained “strikingly deficient,” according to UN officials (*New York Times* 2014). Better understanding peacekeeping instruments is still essential for improving prospects for stable peace. Moreover, our finding that CI can reduce the risk of repeat conflict suggests that under certain conditions, peacekeeping may be able to succeed without incurring the casualties or other costs associated with military coercion. Indeed, most post-conflict countries receive considerable foreign assistance that could be leveraged to enforce compliance with peace processes. While deploying peacekeeping missions composed of large numbers of armed troops may, at times, be crucial to protect civilians or prevent the spread of violence in the midst of active conflict (Beardsley and Gleditsch 2015; Carnegie and Mikulaschek 2020; Fjelde, Hultman, and Nilsson 2019; Hultman, Nygård, and Hegre 2019), our results suggest that threatening force is not necessary to secure peace between combatants in post-conflict contexts. This article contributes to a wider understanding of how international intervention works, while opening new policy avenues for its use.

Instruments to Keep Peace Following Civil Conflict

Scholars criticize international peacekeeping at times, including for being counterproductive (Diehl, Reifschneider, and Hensel 1999; Toft 2009), failing to reach its potential (Autesserre 2014), or struggling to improve governance (Lake and Fariss 2014). Generally, however, many studies have established that these interventions can improve prospects for post-conflict peace, as civil war recurrence is less likely when peacekeeping missions are present (for a comprehensive

¹Some studies examine instruments that do not focus on commitment problems, though that work often also acknowledges that overcoming these problems is a necessary first step (see footnotes 5 and 6).

review of this literature, see Walter, Howard, and Fortna 2019). Yet, exactly *how* peacekeeping works remains under debate (Fortna and Howard 2008, 292; Walter, Howard, and Fortna 2019).² We build on existing work but fully specify two different peacekeeping instruments and test them. The first is *military coercion*, which depends on the threat or use of force. Initial evidence from existing studies, however, questions the extent to which peacekeeping missions actually employ this instrument. The second is conditional incentives (CI), which depend on economic, legal, and political benefits that can be withdrawn from former combatants. We describe these instruments after reviewing commitment problems and the roles of peacekeeping missions outlined in the existing literature.

In post-conflict settings, most studies focus on the role of international actors in ameliorating commitment problems faced by combatants following civil wars (Walter 2002), though there are multiple pathways to peace. Since conflict is often costly, combatants can typically identify mutually beneficial deals. However, commitment problems occur when one side becomes even temporarily weaker during a peace process, thereby incentivizing their opponent to take advantage to gain benefits. Concerns about these implementation problems—even suspecting a violation or misperceiving unintentional acts as voluntary noncompliance—can derail an agreement (see, for example, Fearon and Laitin 2007; Toft 2009; Walter 2002). Commitment problems can cause combatants to return to conflict by encouraging surprise attacks to avoid early warnings, preemptive attacks due to concerns over noncompliance, or retributive attacks when an opponent alters aspects of the deal (Fortna 2008, 82–5).

The commitment problem is therefore an informational problem and also, especially, an incentive problem. To solve it, all sides must know noncompliance will be identified and sanctioned, so that complying becomes more beneficial than defecting.³ In terms of information, peacekeepers can reduce distrust by clarifying all parties' obligations, investigating perceived noncompliance, and notifying all parties of their findings. In other words, the presence of peacekeeping missions can reveal credible information about each side's resources, intentions, and behavior, potentially reducing conflict recurrence by overcoming information asymmetries but also by identifying noncompliance that can otherwise contribute to commitment problems (see, for example, Fortna 2008; Hultman, Nygård, and Hegre 2016; Lindley 2007; Mattes and Savun 2010; Ruggeri, Dorussen, and Gizelis 2017).

Yet, if we take commitment problems seriously—both as a major reason for conflict recurrence in post-conflict settings, and as a challenge many peacekeeping missions try to address—then securing peace requires identifying *and* changing combatants' incentives for noncompliance. Peacekeeping missions must make it costlier to defect than to comply with a settlement through credible conditionality. This is particularly important since commitment is most problematic when relative capabilities shift post-conflict, at least temporarily, as each side's fighting capabilities are translated into power in state institutions (Walter 2009, 258–9). Peacekeeping missions therefore require a form of conditionality⁴ to change these incentives and overcome these commitment problems (Fortna 2008).

This question of how peacekeeping missions can effectively provide conditionality is receiving more attention but remains debated. Recent studies that examine the impact of peacekeeping at the subnational level often examine a combination of different instruments or underlying mechanisms without differentiating the effect of each on conflict avoidance or reduction. For instance, Ruggeri, Dorussen, and Gizelis (2017) attribute the conflict-reducing effects of

²This may be partly due to the conflation of conflict and post-conflict settings (see Diehl 2016). Gilligan and Sergenti (2008) find positive effects only for post-conflict UN missions (see also Hultman, Nygård, and Hegre 2016; Hultman, Nygård, and Hegre 2019).

³Power sharing can ameliorate some of these concerns (e.g. Hartzell and Hoddie 2007; Toft 2009), but changing institutions to match the existing power distribution is difficult (Fearon and Laitin 2007; Walter 2002).

⁴We define conditionality as a punishment or reward based on the behavior of targeted actors (here, compliance with the terms of a negotiated peace settlement). This use of this term is becoming common (see, e.g., Donno 2013; Girod 2012).

peacekeeping deployments to a blend of coercive and non-coercive instruments that potentially help combatants overcome commitment problems. Another set of studies explore the effect of peacekeeping missions on civilian casualties, finding some mixed effects and attributing the results to different instruments (for example, Fjelde, Hultman, and Nilsson 2019; Hultman, Nygård, and Hegre 2013; Hultman, Nygård, and Hegre 2019; Hunnicutt and Nomikos 2019). Some cross-national research similarly takes a broad perspective that considers but does not fully distinguish between peacekeeping mechanisms (for example, Hultman, Nygård, and Hegre 2016; Mattes and Savun 2009). These studies join theoretical work that suggests a variety of possible pathways through which peacekeeping missions can secure peace (for example, Fortna 2008). Recent work by Howard (2019) uses several in-depth case studies of peacekeeping to propose persuasion, inducements, and coercion as possible instruments.⁵ This article builds on that work and explores how aspects of the last two instruments address commitment problems.⁶

Drawing on this research, we specify two main instruments through which peacekeeping missions are likely to change incentives for compliance with peace processes: military coercion and CI. Both require information to identify compliance—but they use different tools to change incentives for compliance based on that information.

For both instruments, multilateral coordination is a central component. To implement peacekeeping missions, the UN relies on its partners—member states and other bilateral and multilateral organizations—for personnel and resources that can be conditioned on compliance; these actors together comprise the “peacekeeping missions” that we examine. The UN coordinates the recruitment and deployment of troops, police, and other personnel from member states, but some impose restrictions on what their personnel can do. Japanese peacekeepers, for example, have not been permitted to engage in combat operations, and other countries restrict their personnel to safer operating areas or keep them beholden to the commands of their home governments (see, for example, Bove and Ruggeri 2016, 685–7; Ishizuka 2013, 408–9; Polman 2003, 40, 52; Ruggeri, Dorussen, and Gizelis 2018, 7). The UN also coordinates the provision of resources to states that receive peacekeeping missions, both by distributing foreign assistance through its agencies directly and by working with “Groups of Friends” of the Secretary-General—which are especially interested donor governments and international organizations (for example, the European Union)—to shape a country’s receipt of aid and other benefits, such as membership in certain organizations (see, for example, Whitfield 2007). Most peacekeeping missions do eventually receive personnel, though partners do not send as many individuals as quickly as the UN prefers (see, for example, Lundgren, Oksamytna, and Coleman 2020; Passmore, Shannon, and Hart 2018). Likewise, most of the contexts to which missions are sent garner substantial foreign assistance, as countries recovering from conflict tend to receive more aid than similar, non-conflict-affected countries (Collier and Hoeffler 2004, 1136).

While multilateral coordination is not the central focus of this article, we argue that UN peacekeeping missions rely on this coordination to mobilize personnel *and* resources, making it a critical feature of these missions regardless of what instruments they use to incentivize compliance. Others have examined the challenges of coordination in peacekeeping, including specifically in mobilizing troops (for example, Lundgren, Oksamytna, and Coleman 2020; Passmore, Shannon, and Hart 2018). However, generally, the UN plays a pivotal role not only in monitoring the behavior of combatants, but also in leveraging its ties to member states and other

⁵Peacekeeping missions can also address a series of problems through information sharing that may extend into persuasion or reassurance (see, e.g., Fortna 2008, 102; Howard 2019; Lindley 2007; Ruggeri, Dorussen, and Gizelis 2017). Mattes and Savun (2010) show that provisions to increase information help sustain peace by overcoming asymmetries in expectations; they may also help deal with unintentional or unauthorized violations. We cannot test all of these mechanisms, but we do provide some qualitative evidence regarding the role of information in helping overcome commitment problems.

⁶Peacekeeping missions can also address commitment problems by acting as state builders (Doyle and Sambanis 2006) or temporary trustees (Lake and Fariss 2014), particularly when governments suffer from low capacity. Studies highlighting these other mechanisms indicate they must also change incentives to ensure peace (see Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Lindley 2007). Still, in our analysis, we remove state building cases as a robustness check, and the results hold.

organizations to develop, deploy, and ensure support for peacekeeping missions. In contrast to domestic civil society—which is often weak and polarized at the end of civil wars, limiting its ability to monitor and incentivize compliance (Wantchekon 2004, 17, 27)—or other foreign actors—which do not require the same buy-in from multiple stakeholders (Dobbins et al. 2005, 243–5; Kreps and Wallace 2009; Osborn 2013, 48–50)—the UN is more capable of exercising oversight and shaping a response that is less partisan to the particular conflict. This is one reason why the UN deploys the most peacekeeping missions globally (Mullenbach 2013). We now turn to the two primary instruments these missions use to incentivize compliance with peace processes.

Military Coercion

Some studies—including Walter (1997, 340–1) and Hultman, Nygård, and Hegre (2016)—suggest peacekeeping missions work by threatening military force. In this conception, peacekeeping missions recruit troops that can use military coercion to provide security guarantees to each side, which raises the cost of aggression, so that a secure settlement can then offer combatants a path to survival and an opportunity to achieve their political goals. Rebels are usually required to disarm more extensively than the government, so they may especially require guarantees from peacekeeping missions that have the capability to protect and the resolve to sanction government non-compliance (Hultman, Nygård, and Hegre 2019). The threat of force by peacekeepers, rather than its use, may shape combatants' behavior (Ruggeri, Dorussen, and Gizelis 2013, 389; Fjelde, Hultman, and Nilsson 2019), but if deterrence fails, force must be employed to make enforcement credible (Fortna 2008, 87–9, 102; Schelling 1966; Walter 2002).

While the existing literature often emphasizes this *military coercion* instrument, many empirical studies indicate that peacekeeping missions tend not to have access to it. The high costs of troops can render the sustained application of military methods untenable, diminishing mission credibility (Fortna 2008; Gilligan and Sergenti 2008). Even when troops are deployed, they may be hesitant to risk casualties or provoke combatants. Many missions are allowed to employ force only to protect themselves or civilians, not to pursue combatants, supply “compellence-based” security guarantees, or seek the military defeat of spoilers or other noncompliers (Howard 2019, 21, 186; United Nations 2008, 34–5). Military coercion may also be disproportionate to the violation; in general, UN actions are supposed to be “calibrated in a precise, proportional and appropriate manner” (United Nations 2008, 35). Thus, the troops that are deployed after fighting has stopped are generally not enforcement missions—instead, they typically serve primarily as “referees,” supplying information and coordinating among different actors (Kjeksrud and Ravndal 2011, 9–11; United Nations 2008, 19, 31–5). In post-conflict contexts, deploying troops who seek to credibly threaten force is especially uncommon (Fortna 2008, 88; United Nations 2008, 34–5). While the UN could use a mission without a mandate for force as a “trip wire” for the use of force should violations be detected (Fortna and Martin 2009), the evidence does not support it: “the international community has not responded to the tripping of a peacekeeping wire with forceful intervention” (Fortna 2008, 80, 88).

The pervasiveness of *military coercion* is therefore questionable—and existing work has struggled to assess its use. Walter (2002), Doyle and Sambanis (2006), and Fortna (2008) find that “traditional” peacekeeping—observation and verification missions authorized under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, which requires receiving host-state consent—is equally effective in reducing conflict recurrence compared to Chapter VII peace enforcement missions. However, distinguishing only between Chapter VI and VII overlooks extensive variation in the tools available to, and employed by, different operations.⁷ Other work attempts to gauge the impact of

⁷Doyle and Sambanis (2006) find that missions combining aspects of both Chapter VI and Chapter VII missions tend to enjoy the highest rates of success.

different types of peacekeeping by focusing on the constitution of a mission, finding that increases in personnel, particularly troops, are associated with greater cooperation, fewer civilian casualties, and less conflict recurrence (Hultman, Nygård, and Hegre 2016; Maekawa, Ari, and Gizelis 2019; Ruggeri, Dorussen, and Gizelis 2013).⁸ However, this may just be driven by the overall size of the mission.⁹ For instance, Hultman, Nygård, and Hegre (2016) find that mission size and troop presence are highly correlated, so it is not clear that military coercion specifically is driving their results.¹⁰ In many cases, troops carry weapons but do not employ or even threaten force. Indeed, while peacekeeping has become more militarized over time, it often reflects group-preserving decision making among permanent members of the UN Security Council, not increasing reliance on military coercion (Howard and Dayal 2018). Analysts of UN missions have long noted that “the use of military contingents in a peacekeeping mission is wrongly associated with the use of force” (IPS 1997, 72).

To further explore this instrument, we examine the mandates of the UN missions dispatched to post-civil war contexts from 1946 to 2012.¹¹ We find that only 51 per cent (18 of 35) were actually authorized to employ force under their UN mandates.¹² The evidence also suggests that even when peacekeeping missions are authorized, they often elect not to employ force. One UN study of eight peacekeeping operations—mostly robust peace enforcement missions—found that peacekeepers intervened in only 20 per cent of reported combatant attacks on civilians (101 of 507), despite being authorized to do so (UN General Assembly 2014). When peacekeepers did respond, “a show of force to deter the progress of actual or intending attackers” was rare (UN General Assembly 2014, 8, 21).

This casts doubt on the notion that peacekeeping missions in post-conflict settings primarily provide credible conditionality through military coercion. We therefore specify another peacekeeping instrument that can act as a complement to, or a substitute for, *military coercion* in changing incentives.

Conditional Incentives (CI)

We specify a *CI* instrument for altering incentives by conditioning economic, political, and legal incentives on compliance during peace processes. To overcome commitment problems, combatants—particularly leaders who negotiate and sign settlements—must anticipate conditionality on their compliance. Yet, leveraging military coercion is often so costly that combatants may not expect outside actors to use or sustain it. Withdrawing aid or enacting similar punishments is often more proportionate to many violations of peace settlements that tend to be political in nature, and, for many missions, these actions are not as costly as military coercion, so they

⁸Studies of active conflict contexts show more troops are associated with reduced fighting and civilian casualties (e.g. Hultman, Nygård, and Hegre 2013; Hultman, Nygård and Hegre 2014; Hultman, Nygård, and Hegre 2019; Wood and Kathman 2016; Ruggeri, Dorussen, and Gizelis 2017). Hultman, Nygård, and Hegre (2019), in particular, show that weaker mandate types, smaller budgets, and fewer troops correlate with conflict escalation—however, like much of this literature, they focus on peacekeeping in active conflicts, not in post-conflict contexts.

⁹In addition, selection effects may condition the size and scope of a mission (see Ruggeri, Dorussen, and Gizelis 2017). Other work shows that peacekeeping missions are deployed to more “difficult” conflicts (Fortna 2008; Ruggeri, Dorussen, and Gizelis 2018), but missions with large forces may deploy disproportionately where peace is easier to secure.

¹⁰Moreover, when the authors include a variable for whether peacekeeping missions have a mandate to use “any means necessary,” the relationship between peace duration and more troops remains large and statistically significant, suggesting there may be some effect of a robust mission, but *also* an independent effect of a large deployment, perhaps operating through another instrument than the threat of force (Hultman, Nygård, and Hegre 2016, 244–5).

¹¹For this analysis only, we code post-conflict missions conservatively as those deployed after fighting ceased and combatants signed a peace agreement, with missions drawn from the UN operations list (see: <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/repertoire/peacekeeping-missions> and <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/list-of-past-peacekeeping-operations>).

¹²Most UN missions immediately after the Cold War lacked authorization to employ force, but the 2001 Brahimi Report strengthened peacekeeping based on supply-side concerns (Howard and Dayal 2018).

can significantly raise combatants' expectations of international enforcement. We describe how CI are supplied and the effects they have in specific cases before empirically testing this instrument alongside military coercion.

In peacekeeping missions, verification on the ground can be combined with external assistance to reward compliance and punish noncompliance. Post-conflict contexts often feature UN "Groups of Friends" (initially, "Friends of the Secretary-General"), as described earlier, which are informal collections of interested states that complement international troop deployments by supplying technical expertise and humanitarian, development, and peacebuilding resources (Whitfield 2007, 3–4). Since the end of the Cold War, donor governments and international organizations have often offered this assistance, so conditioning it on domestic actors' behavior tends not to raise costs for the UN and its partners. The employment of UN Groups of Friends during peacekeeping missions increased sevenfold over the 1990s (Whitfield 2007, 4), when donor-funded economic development and democracy and governance assistance also expanded—which was typically conditioned on compliance with constitutional rules and procedures by recipients (Bjornlund 2004, 24; Carothers 1999, 6, 85).¹³ While early research suggested that donors might be unwilling to cut off aid—the so-called "Samaritan's Dilemma" (for example, Buchanan 1975)—systematic reviews show conditionality is often enacted (Wright and Winters 2010). In post-conflict settings, foreign aid tends to be "the main repository of 'sticks' and 'carrots' to keep a peace process on track" for all parties (Arnault 2006, 12; see also Cil and Huth 2019). Yet, most conflict-related research focuses on the "sticks," such as economic sanctions, and pays less attention to the "carrots" (Regan and Aydin 2006). However, aid for all parties—including incentives formally provided in exchange for disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, reconstruction, and party building—can make compliance more beneficial and violations less so (Cil and Huth 2019; Flores and Nooruddin 2011; Matanock 2017a; Matanock 2020). The tools that these peacekeeping missions use in post-conflict contexts, then, may be economic (foreign aid and sanctions), political (electoral incentives and diplomatic threats), or legal (accession processes).

While the existing literature focuses less on this CI instrument compared to military coercion, case studies illustrate how some peacekeeping missions have used it to change the incentives of governments and rebels. Some of the "early" UN peacekeeping missions, for instance, intentionally avoided force but used CI (Miller 2013). During El Salvador's 1990s peace process, the government failed to register voters, mainly among rebel supporters, tipping the balance of power; in response, UN peacekeepers verified the complaints and the US froze disbursement of US\$70 million in aid—pressure that ultimately forced the government to comply (Fortna 2008, 90; Howard 2008, 94, 115–16; LeoGrande 1998, 108). Aid provided by the UN and its partners has also been useful for changing rebels' incentives: rebels in Mozambique considered renegeing on the 1992 Rome Accords after losing post-conflict elections, but they decided to remain peacefully engaged because the international community established a substantial trust fund for political party development conditioned on compliance (Turner, Nelson, and Mahling-Clark 1998, 72, 161–4). CI are not unique to smaller peacekeeping missions, and they may help explain the success of larger operations, even those mandated to use force. The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), for example, was largely effective in preventing further conflict, but its authority "never derived from UNTAC's ability to coerce [with force]," despite its large number of troops, and was based instead on its ability to provide information and "deliver on certain [non-military] promises" (Howard 2008, 177–8).

While many missions rely on economic tools, political tools, such as electoral incentives, are also common. Returning to El Salvador, after an explosion at an illegal arms cache was attributed to the rebels, the government suggested that their party be banned from registering to participate

¹³A total of 89 per cent of post-conflict peacekeeping missions deployed from 1989 to 2012 were sent to countries that had "Groups of Friends"—including 85 per cent of missions that used CI and 94 per cent that employed military coercion.

in elections until it disarmed as agreed, and the UN Secretary-General criticized the rebels and, notably, did not contradict the threat, while the US State Department also discussed this possibility—being kept from participating in elections pushed the rebels to immediately reveal and destroy other weapons caches, and even to deem some of their candidates as “too damaged to run” in the elections (UN Doc S/26005, June 29, 1993, and interviews cited in Call 2002, 560; Howard 2008, 117–18; “FMLN Legalization—Contingent on Demobilization,” 1992, 1–2; Stanley and Holiday 1997, 27, 32). This approach of using electoral incentives has been widespread when both government and rebel parties participate in elections (Matanock 2017b). In Guatemala, for example, the UN established a trust fund and coordinated direct support from organizations, such as the Organization of American States (OAS) and its Group of Friends. Some support, especially from leftist Spanish foundations, provided specific assistance for the political process and for each of the parties, and the broader mission made clear that these benefits were conditional on compliance with the peace accords (Azpuru et al. 2004, 24–30; Heard 1999, 25; Stanley and Holiday 2002, 32; Versteegen 2000, 62).

Finally, to illustrate the use of legal tools, in Croatia, the United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES)—a highly complex and heavily militarized operation—convinced its partners to stake International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans and membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) on adherence to the peace process. Then, using peacekeepers to monitor implementation, UNTAES was able to “achieve compliance ... in the sense that Croatia subsequently refrained from taking unilateral military action, as it had done previously despite the presence of [prior peacekeeping missions]” (Remmert 2017, 22).

These examples show how the prospects of being denied aid, the ability to run candidates in elections, or membership in beneficial organizations can be sufficient to overcome incentives for noncompliance with peace settlements. Losing resources or access to political power may not be as costly as facing violence, but these cases demonstrate that they were, at least in some instances, costly enough to encourage former rebels or governments that began violating a settlement to change course. Indeed, due in part to the appropriate proportionality and ease of implementing CI, international officials overseeing peacekeeping missions have emphasized the importance of employing them (for example, Soto and Castillo 1994). This instrument also builds on existing work showing that the international community often uses conditionality when providing foreign aid in post-conflict contexts, especially around elections, to influence the behavior of domestic actors (Cil and Huth 2019; Fortna 2008, 89–93, 102; Girod 2012; Matanock 2017a; Matanock 2020).¹⁴

Empirical Implications

Hypothesis 1: If military coercion is effective in prolonging peace, then *post-conflict environments that receive peacekeeping missions mandated to employ military coercion should experience less conflict recurrence than other cases.*

Hypothesis 2: If CI reduce conflict recurrence, then *post-conflict environments that receive peacekeeping missions that employ CI should experience less conflict recurrence.*

We evaluate the efficacy of each peacekeeping instrument independently, as they potentially complement each other. We therefore mainly focus on the efficacy of each instrument in prolonging peace compared to similar post-conflict contexts without peacekeeping missions, though we

¹⁴Economic tools (namely, aid) may be more widely used than political or legal tools, but tallying and comparing the use of each type is largely outside the scope of this article. This theory also evokes previous research on incentivizing compliance with commitments in other contexts (see Simmons 2010), especially through the use of aid attached to observation (see Matanock 2020).

also compare the instruments. We use cross-national data on post-conflict peace periods, assessing UN missions—the most prevalent type of peace operation—with different mandates to test these hypotheses.

A common methodological problem in quantitatively studying peacekeeping is that missions are not randomly assigned. Previous research has shown that peacekeeping missions are sent to areas most likely to experience recurrence (Fortna 2008; Ruggeri, Dorussen, and Gizelis 2018), but mission coerciveness or conditionality may not similarly select the “hardest” cases. While there exists no perfect remedy, we adopt several methods to deal with these concerns as rigorously as possible by assessing selection models of the deployment of particular types of peacekeeping and by employing matching (following Gilligan and Sergenti [2008] and Ruggeri, Dorussen, and Gizelis [2017]).

Data and Measures

Dependent Variable

We use an existing dataset of post-conflict peace periods that we expand temporally. Gilligan and Sergenti (2008) specify a country-level unit of analysis with the dependent variable as the number of months until conflict recurs after an intrastate conflict that ended between 1989 and 2003.¹⁵ We extend the data from 2003 to 2012. This increases the peace periods from 87 to 118 and those that received peacekeeping from 19 to 30.

We also code whether combatants reached a settlement as the peace period began, based on the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Peace Agreement Dataset (Högbladh 2011).¹⁶ Of the 118 peace periods in our data, 43 featured settlements (36 per cent): 23 were among the 30 cases that received peacekeeping missions (77 per cent), and 20 were among the 88 cases that did not (23 per cent). Previous studies suggest peace periods resulting from settlements are more fragile than those following military victories because commitment problems are more intense (for example, Toft 2009). Therefore, given that more peacekeeping cases in our data end through peace agreements—which are more likely to fail—examining all peace periods should bias *against* the effect of peacekeeping.¹⁷ We also examine the content of these settlements—whether they include power sharing, security sector reform (SSR), and disarmament and demobilization (DDR) provisions—and other controls to assess balance across mission types (see Online Appendix 1.6).

Independent Variables

To explain variation in the duration of peace periods, we follow Gilligan and Sergenti (2008) in focusing on UN peacekeeping, as opposed to other types of intervention, for several reasons. First, UN peacekeeping missions have been the most widely deployed (Mullenbach 2013), and since they are more often empowered to use military coercion than regional intergovernmental organizations,¹⁸ successful reliance on CI would be particularly surprising and have broader policy implications. Second, as discussed earlier, the UN is uniquely equipped to both provide credible information and elicit conditional responses—using its own tools and shaping the response of its partners—so its missions are therefore a suitable first test of the CI instrument. We do, however, control for the presence of non-UN peacekeeping missions (described later).

¹⁵Like Gilligan and Sergenti (2008), we identify peace periods based on whether the Uppsala Conflict Data Program reports a conflict ending at some point, even if it later restarts.

¹⁶We coded settlements from one year before and up to five years after peace periods because ongoing negotiations during ceasefires can produce late settlements, as in Bangladesh (1993–2005), Moldova (1992–2012), and Papua New Guinea (1997–2012).

¹⁷Still, as a robustness check, we analyze only those cases with a settlement (see Online Appendix 2.2).

¹⁸UN Security Council resolutions provide this power in some cases to the UN, but regional organizations often deploy only consent-based missions.

CI

For our first independent variable of interest, we coded UN peacekeeping missions' use of CI. Our coding was based on evidence of any economic, legal, or political "threatened or imposed" punishments or "promised or granted" rewards tied to combatants' compliance with the terms of a peace settlement. This builds on the coding of conditionality developed by Donno (2013, 203–4) regarding adherence to electoral rules.¹⁹ If there were elections held during a peace period with peacekeeping missions, we referred to Donno's coding of conditionality. However, since some cases of post-conflict peacekeeping—approximately a third of peace periods in our sample—did not experience elections, we drew on qualitative evidence from individual cases to provide a broader coding of conditionality.²⁰ Using evidence from UN reports, UN Security Council resolutions, case studies of individual missions, and news databases, we coded each case "1" if the reports indicated evidence of conditionality on incentives from the UN or its donor partners, and "0" otherwise.

Conditionality can take different forms, as we illustrated earlier, but the measures we encountered while coding primarily included economic instruments, such as UN trust funds and reconstruction aid from Groups of Friends and other foreign donors working alongside the UN. For example, the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) used the threat of aid withdrawals and the enticements of trust funds to help peacekeepers "steer demobilization [of combatants] to completion" (Howard 2008, 198). In Bosnia, donors linked the agreed-on return and protection of displaced civilians and cooperation with war crimes tribunals to economic assistance—and relied on peacekeepers to verify compliance (Vayrynen 1997, 158). In Cote D'Ivoire, the UN Security Council threatened to impose sanctions against individuals "obstructing the work of ONUCI [the UN mission]" (BBC 2006).

Coding data on conditionality for peacekeeping is a primary contribution of this article.²¹ We required that CI be enacted in response to UN monitoring and verification, which could, if anything, underestimate the effectiveness of CI because donors may instead employ conditionality in response to their own information, for instance. Similarly, in some cases, conditionality may be implicit rather than explicit. Our measure may therefore undercount the use of these incentives, which would likely bias against our findings: in many other instances, implicit conditionality may have deterred noncompliance. CI do not appear to be driven by a case's propensity for peace—something we examine more systematically later. Reward and punishment were promised for compliance and noncompliance, and our coding suggests that conditionality was invoked based on ex-combatant behavior. There does not seem to be a selection effect whereby conditionality occurs only in instances without expected violations (see Online Appendix 2.3b). Moreover, a settlement did not automatically mean CI: it was employed in 60 per cent of peace periods where combatants reached settlements.²² Nonetheless, this correlation between peace agreements and CI should underestimate CI's effectiveness because settlements are less stable than military victories.

Military Coercion

For our second independent variable, we coded *military coercion* by assessing whether a peacekeeping mission was authorized to use or threaten military force, based on: (1) the mandate's language (drawing on Franke and Warnecke 2009); (2) whether it was a Chapter VI or Chapter VII

¹⁹Donno (2013) codes conditional enforcement (the tools described earlier) and non-conditional enforcement (mediation, diplomacy, and shaming).

²⁰CI may work, in part, through post-conflict elections (see Matanock 2017a; Matanock 2017b), as we explore in our analysis.

²¹For one case, United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), evidence of CI is ambiguous. We use an alternative coding of this case as a robustness check (see Online Appendix 2.0).

²²There are two cases of CI without a settlement, both in Georgia, where it was employed based on the 1994 settlement and subsequent negotiations.

Table 1. Mandates for military coercion and CI in post-conflict peacekeeping missions, 1989–2012

	CI	No CI	Total
Military coercion mandate	6 (38%)	10 (71%)	16 (53%)
No military coercion mandate	10 (62%)	4 (29%)	14 (47%)
Total	16 (100%)	14 (100%)	30 (100%)

Note: P-value (Fisher's exact): 0.08.

mission (from Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Fortna 2008); and (3) the primary purpose of the mission (drawing on Mullenbach 2013). If any of these criteria were met, we coded the mission as authorized for military coercion. This coding is more precise than previous attempts to distinguish between mission types, particularly because it goes beyond the “Chapter VI” versus “Chapter VII” distinction. We coded all Chapter VII missions as authorized for military coercion but also eleven Chapter VI missions because either the mandate language or mission purpose suggested its possible use.

Despite our skepticism that force is used even under Chapter VII missions, if there is any possibility for a UN mission to employ it, we code it as having a mandate for military coercion. This means that we code as military coercion many successful cases of peacekeeping that may really operate through CI to ensure any bias works against our argument. This approach is a generous estimate of military coercion because at least some missions may only be allowed to use force to protect UN personnel or civilians. As a robustness check, we also coded as military coercion only missions with Chapter VII authorization.²³ Since peacekeeping is authorized by the UN Security Council, changes to missions' mandates typically require authorization of a “new” operation, so coding by mission captures temporal variation in military coercion.

Analysis

We evaluate the empirical implications of each instrument by examining whether peacekeeping missions employing one or both instruments are associated with reductions in conflict recurrence. We primarily compare post-conflict peace periods that experienced different missions—those that did and did not employ CI, and those with and without mandates for military coercion—to peace periods that received no peacekeeping. We also compare outcomes in periods that received different missions, but the number of cases is small, so the results must be interpreted cautiously.²⁴ We employ several techniques to try to account for selection effects.

Descriptive Statistics

In our sample, 53 per cent of UN missions (16 of 30) employ CI, which is the same as the percentage of missions with mandates for military coercion (see Table 1). However, CI is nearly twice as common in noncoercive compared to coercive missions, suggesting CI and military coercion often act as substitutable tools.²⁵ This is notable given our generous coding of military coercion. Many missions coded as employing CI but not military coercion are so-called “observer” missions comprised of unarmed peacekeepers.

Cross-tabulations of conflict recurrence rates, using a binary indicator of peace failure at any point in the peace period, suggest cases with CI and without military mandates both have statistically significantly lower rates of recurrence than those without peacekeeping missions (see

²³See Online Appendices 1.4–1.5.

²⁴See Online Appendix 2.1.

²⁵See Online Appendices 1.4 and 1.5 for robustness checks using Chapter VII mission designations as an alternative military coercion measure.

Table 2. Conflict recurrence rates in all post-conflict peace periods, 1989–2012

	No PKO	PKO: CI	PKO: no CI	PKO: military coercion	PKO: no military coercion
Conflict recurs	59 (67%)	4 (25%)	10 (71%)	9 (56%)	5 (37%)
No recurrence	29 (33%)	12 (75%)	4 (29%)	7 (44%)	9 (63%)
Total	88 (100%)	16 (100%)	14 (100%)	16 (100%)	14 (100%)
<i>P-value (versus no PKO)</i>		0.00	1.00	1.00	0.04

Table 3. Conflict recurrence rates in all post-conflict peace periods, 1989–2012

	No PKO	PKO: CI and military coercion	PKO: CI and no military coercion	PKO: no CI and military coercion	PKO: no CI and no military coercion
Conflict recurs	59 (67%)	1 (17%)	3 (27%)	8 (70%)	2 (50%)
No recurrence	29 (33%)	5 (83%)	8 (73%)	2 (30%)	3 (50%)
Total	88 (100%)	6 (100%)	11 (100%)	10 (100%)	5 (100%)
<i>P-value (versus no PKO)</i>		0.02	0.02	0.50	0.34

Notes: The total number of peacekeeping cases in this table adds up to 32 instead of 30 because two cases (peace periods) are double counted—Croatia and Sierra Leone—since each one experienced two separate UN missions (including a coercive mission *and* a non-coercive one) in the same peace period. PKO = peacekeeping operation.

Table 2). The same is true in comparing cases that received peacekeeping missions with CI and missions without CI (not shown; Fisher's exact = 0.03). The recurrence rate for post-conflict contexts receiving missions without CI is statistically the same as those receiving no missions (71 versus 67 per cent).

Since military coercion and CI may act as complementary tools in some cases, we also examine categories of each combination of peacekeeping type: CI missions with mandates for military force (for example, the United Nations Mission in Bosnia Herzegovina [UNMIBH]); CI missions without mandates for military coercion (for example, the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador [ONUSAL]); non-CI missions with military coercion (for example, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti [MINUSTAH]); and non-CI, noncoercive missions (for example, the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara [MINURSO]).²⁶ While the sample sizes are small, cross-tabulations show peace periods receiving peacekeeping missions with CI—regardless of whether they were also mandated to use military coercion—tended to experience less recurrence than periods that did not experience peacekeeping (see **Table 3**). The results are statistically significant. Again, the recurrence rates for missions without CI were not significantly different than non-peacekeeping cases.

Selection Models

It is possible, however, that peacekeeping missions employing particular instruments are not distributed randomly. If CI missions are sent to post-conflict contexts where peace is easier to secure, then the associated reductions in conflict recurrence may not be driven by the use of that tool. While not the focus of this article, we identified possible correlates of peacekeeping deployments and ran selection models to assess whether they predict the deployment of particular types of peacekeeping compared to no peacekeeping. We also checked for correlate balance across mission types, including CI versus no CI, and military coercion versus no coercion.²⁷

²⁶Four missions employed neither instrument: Burundi (BINUB), Croatia (UNCRO), Liberia (UNOMIL), and Morocco/Western Sahara (MINURSO). Conflict recurred in two of those cases (BINUB and UNOMIL). BINUB, UNOMIL, and MINURSO were all small, civilian-led peacebuilding operations, while UNCRO was a short-lived interim mission that served as a bridge between other UN missions.

²⁷This includes a comparison of CI-only missions and military coercion-only missions.

Our correlates included those identified by Gilligan and Sergenti (2008) as potentially affecting conflict recurrence: *battle deaths* from the previous war (a measure of conflict intensity); the *war's duration*; a country's *degree of ethnic fractionalization*, *population size*, *mountainous terrain*, *number of military personnel*, *level of democracy*, *gross domestic product (GDP) per capita* before the war, and *regional* indicators. Previous studies have shown that these variables can influence peace durability and peacekeeping deployments, but we also incorporated a series of additional correlates to control for other confounding factors (Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Fortna 2008; Toft 2009).²⁸ These included: the *outcome* of the previous conflict (examining *peace agreements* and *outright military victories* by one side); whether *elections* occurred during the peace period; whether the previous war was *territorial*, *Marxist*, or *ethnic*; combatants' *relative capabilities*; the *number of rebel groups* involved; whether peacekeeping missions were also sent *during* the conflict; and whether a *non-UN mission*—for example, led by the African Union—deployed during the peace period.²⁹ We also examined whether a peace agreement included provisions such as *power sharing* and *autonomy*. We looked at: how much *military and economic aid* a country received; its *alliances*; *Groups of Friends*; and *colonial history*. Finally, we included a *time period* indicator for whether a peace period started before 1995, during 1995–2001, or after 2001.³⁰

The selection models and balance tests, discussed in Online Appendix 1.6, suggest missions either with CI or mandates for military coercion are more likely following conflicts that are harder to settle, similar to findings for peacekeeping generally (Fortna 2008; Ruggeri, Dorussen, and Gizelis 2018). Missions with military coercion are associated with a higher number of rebel groups; CI missions are associated with fewer government troops and peace settlements without SSR provisions; and both instruments are less likely to be deployed following outright military victories. Other studies have linked each of these dynamics to less stable peace (Hartzell and Hoddie 2007; Toft 2009).³¹ Both instruments also tend to be accompanied by post-conflict elections—a vehicle through which CI can be enacted (Matanock 2017a; Matanock 2017b)³²—along with Groups of Friends that can help coordinate either instrument.³³ Finally, CI missions were more common in countries with higher levels of GDP, indicating that they are not unique to aid recipients. CI missions and missions with mandates for military coercion are otherwise less associated with other variables, both in comparison to the deployment of the other type of mission and to peace periods without peacekeeping. Some of these results suggest that a reduction in conflict recurrence associated with peacekeeping may be an underestimate given the possibility that missions employing each instrument are sent to contexts where peace is *more difficult* to secure—similar to the argument made by Fortna (2008)—including on some dimensions that distinguish missions with CI from those mandated for military coercion.

Matching

We also take a second step to address selection concerns. Following Gilligan and Sergenti (2008) and Ruggeri, Dorussen, and Gizelis (2017), we turn to matching to control for the observable factors identified in our selection models as potentially confounding the effects of peacekeeping. We use genetic matching (Sekhon 2011), which employs a genetic algorithm to maximize covariate

²⁸For more discussion of these variables, see Online Appendices 1.6 and 2.3a.

²⁹We also used a separate indicator for whether a non-UN mission employed military coercion (Mullenbach 2013).

³⁰This variable helps control for factors that change over time, especially on the supply side, including permanent UN Security Council members' relations (Howard and Dayal 2018), lessons learned from previous operations (Howard 2008), and prevailing international norms (Paris 2003).

³¹Other potentially important peace agreement provisions—such as power sharing or DDR—were not significant predictors of either instrument.

³²Electoral participation provisions are positively associated with both missions, not one more than the other.

³³Groups of Friends are common but difficult to predict since they are driven by complex supply-side factors that can influence other dimensions of UN peacekeeping (see Howard and Dayal 2018; Whitfield 2007).

balance between observations to create a “control” group of cases (post-conflict peace periods that did not receive peacekeeping missions) that are as similar as possible to “treated” cases (periods that received missions using each instrument). We matched peace periods one-to-one with replacement for four different treatments: UN missions with mandates for military coercion; missions without military coercion; missions that employ CI; and missions that do not employ CI. Given that the peacekeeping instruments could be complementary, we also broke missions into four categories (CI with a mandate for military force, and so on) and rerun the results. These treatments are dichotomous variables equal to “1” if a particular mission was present at any point during the peace period and “0” otherwise. For each treatment, we restricted the match to cases that receive no peacekeeping mission at all (the control category).³⁴

Matching offers a method to address some selection bias and endogeneity concerns. Yet, it is unable to fully resolve these issues. Matching is only able to approximate an as-if random research design for observed confounders (Dunning 2010), so, like most work on peacekeeping, we still cannot completely exclude the possibility that unobserved variables bias our results. However, we include a broad array of potential confounders in our analysis and conduct a battery of robustness checks. Given that the UN is unlikely to randomize its instruments—and in the absence of a plausible instrumental variable—this is the best technique we can employ.

Since the samples are relatively small, we conducted two separate matches on covariates identified in our selection models. The first matched cases on Gilligan and Sergenti’s (2008) covariates described earlier, plus the number of rebel groups in the conflict ending in the peace period; the second replaced the regional indicators with indicators for *war type* (ethnic, territorial, or Marxist).³⁵ We include these covariates because they seemed to influence peacekeeping deployments in some of our selection models, and unlike some of the other variables—such as Groups of Friends³⁶—they are pre-treatment (a requirement for matching). Both matches generate pairs of observations—one treated; one control—that differ as little as possible on these covariates (for a list, see Online Appendix 1.8). Balance statistics for all matched covariates show we achieved excellent balance according to standard indicators (see Online Appendix 1.6). Our sample size was close to the original: Gilligan and Sergenti (2008) had 19 treated observations and 68 possible controls; ours contains 14–17 treated and 101–5 possible controls, depending on the treatment. As a robustness check, we also included only peace periods that followed settlements and rematched (see Online Appendix 2.2).³⁷

To evaluate the four treatments—missions with and without CI, and with and without military coercion—we used *peace duration*, in months, as our outcome variable and ran Cox proportional hazards models. Table 4 presents the results, with values less than 1 indicating a decreased risk of renewed conflict and values greater than 1 indicating an increased risk. For all four treatments, the control category is peace periods that received no UN mission. Yet, our results are similar when we analyze a restricted sample of matched pairs containing only those peace periods that received CI missions assessed against non-CI missions. We included controls for the covariates on which we matched to adjust for any remaining imbalance,³⁸ along with an indicator for

³⁴In other words, for the CI mission treatment, we removed any observations that received a mission without CI, and we did the same for military coercion. This is the same as restricting the match to these variables and ensures that we do not conflate comparisons since we are interested in the effect compared to no mission. However, in additional tests shown later, we match missions of one type to the others.

³⁵We had to limit the number of covariates in each match given the small sample size.

³⁶We did control for these factors in added modeling, which correlate with missions but not necessarily conflict recurrence (see Match 2).

³⁷We could not add settlements to our matching covariates because the small sample size meant our models would not converge. Rerunning the match on the sample among settlements helps ensure that the peacekeeping instruments are driving the results.

³⁸Coefficients for the matching variables are not substantively meaningful and thus not shown.

Table 4. Effect of UN peacekeeping on conflict recurrence, by mandate type

Mission type	Unmatched	Match 1: Cox model	ATT	Match 2: Cox model	ATT
<i>CI</i> (<i>N</i> = 32)	0.23** (−2.68)	0.01*** (−2.77)	1.57*** (3.05)	0.03*** (−3.09)	2.02*** (4.64)
<i>No CI</i> (<i>N</i> = 28)	1.52 (0.91)	1.07 (0.07)	0.44 (0.53)	0.21* (−1.06)	0.83* (1.67)
<i>Mandate for military coercion</i> (<i>N</i> = 32)	0.72 (−0.71)	1.08 (0.13)	0.79 (1.62)	0.72 (−0.59)	0.76 (1.40)
<i>No mandate for military coercion</i> (<i>N</i> = 32)	0.67 (−0.74)	0.52 (−0.44)	1.29*** (2.68)	0.18 (−1.41)	1.09** (2.33)

Note: Control category = no peacekeeping. Statistically significant estimates denoted by * $p = 0.10$; ** $p = 0.05$; *** $p = 0.01$; **** $p = 0.001$. *T*-statistics in parentheses. ATT = average treatment effect for each treatment.

the alternative instrument than the one being analyzed (so we control for mandates for military coercion when assessing CI missions).

The results show that only CI missions—which reduced the hazard rate by 99 per cent—are associated with statistically significant reductions in conflict recurrence across specifications.³⁹ Missions with mandates for military coercion, and those without CI, were associated with an increased risk of renewed conflict in the first analysis, but neither association is statistically significant. The associations with missions without coercive mandates—which reduced the hazard rate by estimates of 48 and 82 per cent, respectively—are also not statistically significant.

Since hazard models can be unreliable (see, for example, Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn 2001), we used GenMatch to estimate the average treatment effect for each treatment (ATT) compared to not receiving peacekeeping. Unlike the Cox models, these are not hazard rates, so positive coefficients indicate a longer peace period. Here, again, only CI missions and those without mandates for military coercion have statistically significant associations with peace.

We also estimated Cox models for the unmatched data using the same controls included in the models in Table 4. The results are similar, but the matched data show much larger associations compared to the unmatched data (see Online Appendix 1.7). This is consistent with Gilligan and Sergenti's (2008) findings, indicating that a failure to correct for the nonrandom assignment of peacekeeping underestimates its importance.

We also rematched cases using each possible combination of mission type: CI with and without military coercion; and military coercion with and without CI. For both matches, we added *time period* to the covariates because it correlates with mandates for military coercion (but not CI) (see Online Appendix 1.2; see also Howard and Dayal 2018). Balance statistics show each match achieved good balance; however, given the small sample size, we ran the same analyses but without controls (see Table 5).⁴⁰ While the results should be interpreted especially cautiously given the small sample size, they are consistent with our other findings. Compared to no peacekeeping, missions with CI, both with and without military coercion, reduced the risk of conflict recurrence by between 74 and 91 per cent, and the results were statistically significant in all but one model. Missions without CI had a much weaker association with the risk of recurrence (and were not statistically significant). As with the other analysis, we ran Cox models on the unmatched data, which also yielded similar results.

As noted earlier, our findings are similar when we confined the analysis to only those peace periods that received a peacekeeping mission (see Online Appendix 2.1). Peace periods that were treated with CI peacekeeping experienced a large (80 per cent) and statistically significant

³⁹We also ran the analysis for *any* UN mission compared to no peacekeeping, and the result—an 80 per cent reduction in the hazard rate of renewed conflict—was similar to Gilligan and Sergenti's (2008) finding of 85 per cent based on data from 1989 to 2003 (see Online Appendix 1.9).

⁴⁰Given the size, we also ran logit models on the matched data using a binary indicator of *peace failure* as the dependent variable (see Online Appendix 1.9).

Table 5. Effect of UN peacekeeping combinations on conflict recurrence

Mission type (<i>N</i> = unmatched, matched)	Unmatched	Match 1: Cox model	ATT	Match 2: Cox model	ATT
CI, military coercion (<i>N</i> = 94, 12)	0.16* (-1.82)	0.19 (-1.49)	1.28** (2.08)	0.09** (-2.15)	1.99*** (2.93)
CI, no military coercion (<i>N</i> = 99, 22)	0.24* (-2.38)	0.26* (-1.94)	1.39** (2.49)	0.25* (-1.95)	1.72** (2.84)
No CI, military coercion (<i>N</i> = 98, 20)	1.37 (0.82)	0.97 (-0.05)	0.17 (0.42)	0.51 (-1.37)	0.68 (1.08)
No CI, no military coercion (<i>N</i> = 93, 10)	0.42 (-1.20)	1.26 (0.23)	-0.57 (-0.80)	0.52 (-0.71)	0.30 (0.72)

Notes: Two peace periods with peacekeeping—Croatia and Sierra Leone—are double-counted since they experienced two separate UN missions (a coercive mission and a non-coercive mission). Control category = peace periods receiving no peacekeeping. Statistically significant estimates denoted by * $p = 0.10$; ** $p = 0.05$; *** $p = 0.01$; **** $p = 0.001$. *T*-statistics in parentheses.

decrease in the risk of renewed conflict compared to the control group (peace periods that received peacekeeping without CI). However, peace periods treated with missions mandated to use military coercion experienced no statistically significant decrease. Finally, we evaluated the effect of CI-only missions ($N = 11$), compared to coercion-only missions ($N = 10$). While the small sample size precluded the use of matching or the inclusion of controls—meaning that, again, the results should be met with caution—we found that CI-only missions reduced conflict recurrence risk by 88 per cent (see Online Appendix 1.7).

Robustness Checks

As noted throughout our analysis, we ran myriad robustness checks, considering different comparisons (CI to no CI missions and so on), different measures, and different covariates. In addition, we reran the analysis in Table 4 controlling for seven additional correlates found in our selection models to be positively associated with all missions: whether missions were deployed during the preceding conflict; whether any non-UN mission was deployed post-conflict; whether a non-UN mission mandated for military coercion was deployed; whether there was prior peacekeeping in the country; whether a Group of Friends formed; whether a peace period had a settlement providing for participatory elections; and whether post-conflict elections were held during the peace period.⁴¹ We did not match on these variables since they predict missions but not necessarily conflict recurrence, and most are post-treatment, so they cannot be used in matching. The results are substantively the same (see Online Appendix 2.0a).

We also repeated the analysis after incorporating governance-related factors that previous research has shown to be correlated with post-conflict peace, such as political and legal institutions that can constrain elites (Walter 2015). We therefore matched on three covariates that measure legal accountability, political accountability, and transparency in the country in the first year of the peace period (Freedom House 2019; World Bank 2019). The results hold (see Online Appendix 2.0b).

We then conducted a series of additional checks, where we changed the genetic algorithm for population size for all matches,⁴² included and excluded cases where we disagree with Gilligan and Sergenti's (2008) coding, used alternative coding for ambiguous cases of conditionality, removed potential "key" cases (for example, the former Yugoslavia), and included controls for how the previous conflict ended, past UN missions, and the presence of other peace operations (see Online Appendix 2.0c). We also reran the match exclusively on peace periods with peace agreements (see Online Appendix 2.2). Only CI missions consistently yield statistically significant

⁴¹We substituted them for the matching covariates rather than adding them because of the small sample size.

⁴²The standard population size in GenMatch is 1,000, but increasing the size usually improves overall balance (Sekhon 2011), so we reran using 5,000 and 10,000.

results, where it is associated with a reduced risk of renewed conflict compared both to no peacekeeping and to other types of missions.

Conclusion

How does international intervention work? This article focuses on a prominent form of international involvement in civil wars—UN peacekeeping missions—and disaggregates the instruments used to influence prospects for post-conflict peace. In doing so, we contribute to an important and growing literature seeking to understand *how* intervention works. We challenge the notion that peacekeeping missions often rely on military coercion to help combatants overcome commitment problems in post-war settings, and we build on previous research to theoretically and empirically specify a different instrument—CI—which relies on rewards, pressure, and punishments that do not entail force.

We find cross-national evidence that UN peacekeeping missions that condition economic, legal, and political incentives on compliance with post-war settlements are associated with more enduring peace. We collect original data on peace operations that employ these CI, and, to analyze the effect of different types of peacekeeping, we extend data on post-conflict peace periods. We then follow other studies of UN peacekeeping (Fortna 2008; Gilligan and Sergenti 2008; Ruggeri, Dorussen, and Gizelis 2017) and employ both selection models and matching to help address potential selection problems. Our analysis suggests that CI help prolong peace, both examined alone and when paired with mandates for military coercion, whereas military coercion alone does not. This casts doubt on the notion that effectively keeping peace between ex-combatants requires the threat of force. Our approach has limits—a small sample size and an inability to completely rule out unobserved sources of bias—so, like most work on peacekeeping missions, we cannot definitively claim causality. Yet, combined with the qualitative examples we presented earlier in the article, this is compelling evidence that CI are an effective peacekeeping tool. Our results thereby challenge studies suggesting more militarized interventions are needed to secure post-conflict peace (Hultman, Nygård, and Hegre 2016) but are consistent with recent work showing softer missions can prevent the outbreak of conflict (Beardsley 2011; Howard 2019).

More research is needed to confirm or invalidate more implications of our analysis, and to further assess the relative effectiveness of peacekeeping instruments under different conditions, including at the subnational level (Gizelis and Benson 2019). However, this article takes a crucial step toward carefully theorizing and quantitatively testing a potentially important non-military instrument by which intervention helps secure settlements following civil conflicts. Our results suggest that, at least under certain conditions, peacekeeping can increase the durability of peace even if it does not possess a mandate to use force. Future research should therefore explore when different CI are used, by what types of actors, when they are effective, and when they fail, building on our analysis of conflict types and severity. Such studies should also explore alternative development and democratization outcomes.

Understanding the processes by which intervention works, especially these tools that we examine, is critical for refining theories of peacekeeping and identifying the ingredients of a successful operation for policymakers. Amid growing debate over the proper role of peacekeeping, UN officials—such as Jean Arnault (2006), former head of several peace missions—recognize that non-military measures are critical tools for an effective intervention. Yet, it has seemingly become conventional wisdom that, in the words of one report, “robust peacekeeping involves the use of force” (Sartre 2011, 20). While such tactics may be necessary in some cases—particularly in the midst of active conflict, but perhaps also to protect civilians and mission personnel in post-conflict contexts—our research questions the assumption that more active and armed troops are always needed to help implement a peace agreement. Given that a primary goal of peacekeeping missions is often to prevent conflict recurrence between combatants, policymakers may be able to

consider less costly options of intervention. This could enhance the viability of third-party intervention, since countries may be more likely to supply peacekeepers if they are not required to employ military coercion. The UN can focus on effectively employing alternative instruments to force—such as donor assistance or elections—to promote peace.

Acknowledgements. We are most grateful to Naazneen Barma, Kyle Beardsley, Andrew Bertoli, Jennifer Bussell, John Ciorciari, Bridget Coggins, Alex Cooley, Paul Diehl, Michael Doyle, Pierre Englebert, Jim Fearon, Page Fortna, Desha Girod, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, Lise Morjé Howard, Susan Hyde, Bob Keohane, Steve Krasner, Andy Kydd, Dan Lee, Melissa Lee, Katerina Linos, Michaela Mattes, Alison Post, Bob Powell, Emily Ritter, Burcu Savun, Ken Schultz, Megan Shannon, Hannah Smidt, Art Stein, and Sarah von Billerbeck, the journal editors and anonymous reviewers, as well as others at the Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association, the International Studies Association, the UC Conference on International Cooperation, the Online Peace Science Colloquium, and workshops at Brown, Denver, Essex, Maryland, MIT, Notre Dame, Princeton, Stanford, Wisconsin, and Yale for valuable comments that have improved our work. Of course, however, any omissions or other errors are our own.

Supplementary Material. Online Appendices are available at: <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123421000491>

Data Availability Statement. Replication Data for this article can be found in Harvard Dataverse at: <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/ENAZAA>

Financial Support. Our early research on this project was supported by funding from the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation at the University of California, San Diego.

Competing Interests. None.

References

- Arnault J** (2006) *Good Agreement? Bad Agreement? An Implementation Perspective*. Princeton, NJ: Centre of International Studies, Princeton University.
- Autesserre S** (2014) *Peaceland: Conflict Resolution and the Everyday Politics of International Intervention*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Azpuru D et al.** (2004) Democracy Assistance to Post-Conflict Guatemala: Finding a Balance between Details and Determinants. CRU Working Paper 30 at The Hague: Clingendael Institute.
- BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation)** (2006) UN threatens sanctions against those obstructing Ivorian peace process. 20 January.
- Beardsley K** (2011) Peacekeeping and the contagion of armed conflict. *The Journal of Politics* 73, 1051–1064.
- Beardsley K and Gleditsch KS.** (2015) Peacekeeping as Conflict Containment *International Studies Review* 17(1), 67–89.
- Bjornlund EC** (2004) *Beyond Free and Fair: Monitoring Elections and Building Democracy*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Bove V and Ruggeri A** (2016) Kinds of blue: Diversity in UN peacekeeping missions and civilian protection. *British Journal of Political Science* 46(3), 681–700.
- Box-Steffensmeier J and Zorn C** (2001) Duration models and proportional hazards in political science. *American Journal of Political Science* 45(4), 972–988.
- Buchanan JM** (1975) The Samaritan's Dilemma. In ES Phelps (ed), *Altruism, Morality and Economic Theory*. New York: Russell Sage, pp. 71–85.
- Call C** (2002) Assessing El Salvador's Transition from Civil War to Peace In Stedman SJ, Rothchild D, and Cousens E (eds), *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements* Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers pp. 383–420.
- Carnegie A and Mikulaschek C** (2020) The promise of peacekeeping: protecting civilians in civil wars. *International Organization* 74(4), 810–832.
- Carothers T** (1999) *Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve*. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Cil D and Huth P** (2019) Carrot or stick? Development aid and the implementation of peace agreements by recipient governments. Minerva Research Institute's Owl in the Olive Tree, 10 October. Available online: https://minerva.defense.gov/Owl-In-the-Olive-Tree/Owl_View/Article/1985998/carrot-or-stick-development-aid-and-the-implementation-of-peace-agreements-by-r/
- Collier P and Hoeffler A** (2004) Aid, policy and growth in post-conflict societies. *European Economic Review* 48, 1125–1145.
- De Soto A and Del Castillo G** (1994) Obstacles to peacebuilding. *Foreign Policy* 94, 69–83.
- Diehl P** (2016) Breaking the conflict trap: the impact on peacekeeping on violence and democratization in the post-conflict context. In Mason D and Mitchell S (eds), *What Do We Know about Civil Wars?* Lanham, MD: Roman and Littlefield. pp. 139–156.

- Diehl P, Reifschneider J and Hensel PR** (1999) United Nations intervention and recurring conflict. *International Organization* 50(4), 683–700.
- Dobbins J et al.** (2005) *The UN's Role in Nation-Building from the Congo to Iraq*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.
- Donno D** (2013) *Defending Democratic Norms: International Actors and the Politics of Electoral Misconduct*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Doyle MW and Sambanis N** (2006) *Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Dunning T** (2010) Design-based inference: beyond the pitfalls of regression analysis? In Collier D and Brady H (eds), *Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 273–311.
- Fearon JD and Laitin DD** (2007) Civil War Termination. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, August 30–September 2.
- Fjelde H, Hultman L and Nilsson D** (2019) Protection through presence: UN peacekeeping and the costs of targeting civilians. *International Organization* 73(1), 103–131.
- Flores TE and Nooruddin I** (2011) Credible commitment in post-conflict recovery. In Coyne C and Mathers R (eds), *Handbook on the Political Economy of War*, London: Edward Elgar, pp. 474–497.
- FMLN Legalization – Contingent on Demobilization** (1992) October 29, Case ID F-2008–05748, Document No. C17582252, El Salvador Declassification Project, U.S. Department of State Freedom of Information Act, U.S. Department of State.
- Fortna VP** (2008) *Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents' Choices after Civil War*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Fortna VP and Howard LM** (2008) Pitfalls and prospects in the peacekeeping literature. *Annual Review of Political Science* 11, 283–301.
- Fortna VP and Martin L** (2009) Peacekeepers as signals: the demand for international peacekeeping in civil wars. In Milner HV and Moravcsik A (eds), *Power, Interdependence and Non-state Actors in World Politics: Research Frontiers*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 87–107.
- Franke VC and Warnecke A** (2009) Building peace: an inventory of U.N. peace missions since the end of the Cold War. *International Peacekeeping* 16(3), 407–436.
- Freedom House** (2019) Freedom of the Press. Available from <https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-press> (accessed March 2019).
- Gilligan MJ and Sergenti EJ** (2008) Do U.N. interventions cause peace? Using matching to improve causal inference. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 3(2), 89–122.
- Girod D** (2012) Effective foreign aid following civil war: the nonstrategic-desperation hypothesis. *American Journal of Political Science* 56(1), 188–201.
- Gizelis TI and Benson M** (2019) Advancing the frontier of peacekeeping research. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 63(7), 1595–1600.
- Hafner-Burton EM** (2013) *Making Human Rights a Reality*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Hartzell CA and Hoddie M** (2007) *Crafting Peace: Power-Sharing Institutions and the Negotiated Settlement of Civil Wars*. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Heard J** (1999) Guatemala Demobilization and Incorporation Program: An Evaluation Prepared for the Office of Transition Initiatives, Bureau for Humanitarian Response, US Agency for International Development. January.
- Höglbladh S** (2011) Peace agreements 1975–2011—updating the UCDP peace agreement dataset. In Pettersson T and Themnér L (eds), *States in Armed Conflict 2011*. Uppsala, Sweden: Uppsala University, Department of Peace and Conflict Research Report, p. 99.
- Howard LM** (2008) *UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Howard LM** (2019) *Power in Peacekeeping*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Howard LM and Dayal AK** (2018) The use of force in UN peacekeeping. *International Organization* 72(1), 71–103.
- Hultman L, Nygård HM and Hegre H** (2013) United Nations peacekeeping and civilian protection in civil war. *American Journal of Political Science* 57(4), 875–891.
- Hultman L, Nygård HM and Hegre H** (2014) Beyond keeping peace: United Nations effectiveness in the midst of fighting. *American Political Science Review* 108(4), 737–753.
- Hultman L, Nygård HM and Hegre H** (2016) United Nations peacekeeping dynamics and the duration of post-civil conflict peace. *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 33(3), 231–249.
- Hultman L, Nygård HM and Hegre H** (2019) Evaluating the conflict-reducing effect of UN peacekeeping operations. *The Journal of Politics* 81(1), 215–232.
- Hunnicut P and Nomikos W** (2019) UN Peacekeeping at the Local-Level: Using Geocoded Data to Assess Diversity, Gender Balance, and Effectiveness. February 16. Available from <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3335560>
- Institute of Policy Studies (IPS)** (1997) *Humanitarian Action and Peacekeeping Operations: Debriefing and Lessons; Report and Recommendations of the International Conference Singapore, February 1997*. London, UK: Kluwer Law International.
- Ishizuka, K** (2013) Japan In Bellamy AJ and Williams PD (eds), *Providing Peacekeepers: The Politics, Challenges, and Future of United Nations Peacekeeping Contributions*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, pp. 396–414.

- Kathman JD and Wood RM** (2016) Stopping the killing during the “peace”: peacekeeping and the severity of postconflict civilian victimization. *Foreign Policy Analysis* 12(2), 149–169.
- Keohane, RO** (1984) *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Kjeksrud S and Ravndal JA** (2011) Emerging lessons from the United Nations mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo: military contributions to the protection of civilians. *African Security Review* 20(2), 3–16.
- Kreps SE and Wallace G** (2009) Just How Humanitarian Are Interventions? Peacekeeping and the Prevention of Civilian Killings during and after Civil Wars. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Toronto, Canada, September 3–6.
- Lake DA and Fariss CJ** (2014) Why international trusteeship fails: the politics of external authority in areas of limited statehood. *Governance* 27(4), 569–587.
- LeoGrande WM** (1998) Foreign aid to Central America: is the era of aid over? In Grant R and Nijman J (eds), *Global Crisis in Foreign Aid*. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, pp. 103–112.
- Lindley D** (2007) *Promoting Peace with Information: Transparency as a Tool of Security Regimes*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Lundgren M, Oksamytna K and Coleman KP** (2021) Only as fast as its troop contributors: Incentives, capabilities, and constraints in the UN’s peacekeeping response. *Journal of Peace Research*, 58(4), 671–686.
- Maekawa W, Ari B and Gizelis T-I** (2019) UN involvement and civil war peace agreement implementation. *Public Choice* 178(3–4), 397–416.
- Matanock AM and Lichtenheld A** (2021) “Replication Data for: How Does International Intervention Work to Secure Peace Settlements After Civil Conflicts?”, <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/ENAZAA>, Harvard Dataverse, V1, UNF:6:cUUtT1TUdJeST4zleAG3Eg== [fileUNF].
- Matanock AM** (2017a) *Electing Peace: From Civil Conflict to Political Participation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Matanock AM** (2017b) Bullets for Ballots: Electoral Participation Provisions in Peace Agreements and Conflict Recurrence. *International Security* 41, 93–132.
- Matanock AM** (2020) How International Actors Help Enforce Domestic Deals *Annual Review of Political Science* 23, 357–83.
- Mattes M and Savun B** (2009) Fostering peace after civil war: commitment problems and agreement design. *International Studies Quarterly* 53, 737–759.
- Mattes M and Savun B** (2010) Information, agreement design, and the durability of civil war settlements. *American Journal of Political Science* 54(2), 511–524.
- Miller PD** (2013) *Confronting State Failure, 1898–2012*. Cornell Studies in Security Affairs. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Mullenbach MJ** (2013) Third-party peacekeeping in intra-state disputes, 1946–2012: a new data set. *The Midsouth Political Science Review* 14, 103–133.
- New York Times** (2014) U.N. Set to Cut Force in Darfur as Fighting Rises. 25 December. Available from www.nytimes.com (accessed 27 January 2015).
- Osborn BJ** (2013) Peacekeeping and Peace Kept: Third Party Interventions and Recurrences of Civil War. Unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Kentucky, USA.
- Paris R** (2003) Peacekeeping and the constraints of global culture. *European Journal of International Relations* 9(3), 441–473.
- Passmore TJ, Shannon M and Hart AF** (2018) Rallying the troops: collective action and self-interest in UN peacekeeping contributions. *Journal of Peace Research* 55(3), 366–379.
- Polman L** (2003) *We Did Nothing: Why the Truth Doesn't Always Come out When the Un Goes In*. New York, NY: Viking.
- Regan PM and Aydin A** (2006) Diplomacy and other forms of intervention in civil wars. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50(5), 736–756.
- Remmert D** (2017) The Effects of International Peace Missions on Corruption. Unpublished PhD dissertation, Freie Universität Berlin, Germany.
- Ruggeri A, Dorussen H and Gizelis T-I** (2013) Managing mistrust: an analysis of cooperation with U.N. peacekeeping in Africa. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 57(3), 387–409.
- Ruggeri A, Dorussen H and Gizelis T-I** (2017) Winning the peace locally: UN peacekeeping and local conflict. *International Organization* 71(1), 163–185.
- Ruggeri A, Dorussen H and Gizelis T-I** (2018) On the frontline every day? Subnational deployment of United Nations peacekeepers. *British Journal of Political Science* 48(4), 1005–1025.
- Sartre P** (2011) *Making UN Peacekeeping More Robust: Protecting the Mission, Persuading the Actors*. New York, NY: International Peace Institute.
- Schelling TC** (1966) *Arms and influence*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Sekhon JS** (2011) Multivariate and Propensity Score Matching Software with Automated Balance Optimization: The Matching package for R. *Journal of Statistical Software* 42, i07.
- Simmons BA** (2009) *Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Simmons B** (2010) Treaty compliance and violation. *Annual Review of Political Science* 13, 273–296.

- Stanley W and Holiday D** (1997) Peace Mission Strategy and Domestic Actors: UN Mediation, Verification and Institution-Building in El Salvador. *International Peacekeeping* **4**, 22–49.
- Stanley W and Holiday D** (2002) *Broad Participation, Diffuse Responsibility: Peace Implementation in Guatemala*. In Rothchild D, Stedman SJ, and Cousens EM (eds), *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements* Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publications, pp. 1–54 (in pre-publication PDF provided).
- Toft MD** (2009) *Securing Peace: The Durable Settlement of Civil Wars*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Turner JM, Nelson S and Mahling-Clark K** (1998) Mozambique's vote for democratic governance. In K Kumar (ed.), *Postconflict Elections, Democratization, and International Assistance*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 153–175.
- United Nations** (2008) Principles of Peacekeeping. Available at: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/principles-of-peacekeeping>
- UN (United Nations) General Assembly** (2014) Evaluation of the implementation and results of protection of civilians mandates in United Nations peacekeeping operations. Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services, A/68787, March 7.
- Vayrynen R** (1997) Economic incentives and the Bosnian peace process. In Cortright D (ed.), *The Price of Peace: Incentives and International Conflict Prevention*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 150–180.
- Verstegen S** (2000) The Netherlands and Guatemala: Dutch Policies and Intervention in the Guatemalan Conflict and Peace. Clingendael Institute, Conflict Policy Research Unit, The Hague, the Netherlands, December 1.
- Walter BF** (1997) The critical barrier to civil war settlement. *International Organization* **51**, 335–364.
- Walter BF** (2002) *Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Walter BF** (2009) Bargaining failures and civil war. *Annual Review of Political Science* **12**, 243–261.
- Walter BF** (2015) Why bad governance leads to repeat civil war. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* **59**(7), 1242–127.
- Walter BF, Howard LM and Fortna VP** (2021) The extraordinary relationship between peacekeeping and peace. *British Journal of Political Science*, **51**(4), 1705–1722.
- Wantchekon L** (2004) The paradox of “warlord” democracy: A theoretical investigation. *American Political Science Review* **98** (1), 17–33.
- Whitfield T** (2007) *Friends indeed?: the United Nations, Groups of Friends, and the resolution of conflict*. Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press.
- World Bank** (2019) World governance indicators. Available from <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/> (accessed March 2019).
- Wright J and Winters M** (2010) The politics of effective foreign aid. *Annual Review of Political Science* **13**, 61–80.