

folk psychology aside, developmental differences had brought into being two separate peoples. Decades of diverse cultural practices transformed both the diaspora and homeland Ukrainians into “others.” Their differences often spelled reciprocal misunderstandings.

The omission of a formal bibliography—bibliographic details are included in the notes—and a slightly incomplete index, detract somewhat from the functionality of the volume’s documentation. Nevertheless, the author is to be commended for producing such a noteworthy and engagingly recounted narrative of life in twentieth-century Ukraine, and its diaspora “otherlands.”

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Between Justice and Stability: The Politics of War Crimes Prosecutions in Post-Milošević Serbia. By Mladen Ostojić. Farnham: Ashgate, 2014. xiv, 250 pp. Appendix. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Tables. \$119.95, hard bound.

As responses to recent controversial judgements in the cases of Radovan Karadžić and Vojislav Šešelj have demonstrated recently, the legacy of war crimes in post-Milošević Serbia (and across the western Balkans region) remains highly contentious. In particular, there is considerable dissonance between the record of “justice” meted out by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague, and the way in which that record, and indeed the highly contested notion of “justice,” is perceived among its “constituents” in the western Balkans region. It is in this context that Mladen Ostojić’s book makes an important contribution to our understanding of the politics of war crimes prosecutions in Serbia, specifically, and more broadly the difficulties of seeking “justice” in the aftermath of war, in cases where ideas of what constitutes “justice” vary widely and, crucially, are mediated by political and cultural discourse and values.

The book provides a detailed account of the different phases of the politics of what Ostojić terms “international justice and transitional democracy” from the fall of Milošević, in October 2000 and his subsequent transfer to the ICTY in June 2001, to the arrest and transfer of the last two remaining fugitives, Ratko Mladić and Goran Hadžić, in 2011. The book explores how externalised or international criminal justice operates, not in relation to peace and reconciliation, but in relation to domestic transition to democracy, and sheds light on the messy, complicated and sometimes paradoxical domestic politics of international justice (see: Jelena Subotic, 2009). On the one hand, in Serbia’s case, the politics of war crimes prosecution was compounded by the “Scylla” of widespread denial of Serb involvement in any atrocities. Ostojić notes that in 2009, polling data showed that a majority believed that Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić were innocent, and in 2011, when Mladić was arrested, only 34% of the population supported his transfer to the ICTY (2). On the other hand is the “Charybdis” of the policy of “Hague conditionality,” in which cooperation with the ICTY was set as a key condition for both EU integration talks and financial assistance packages. The result of this policy was a success for the ICTY in so far as it ensured that the remaining fugitives were brought to trial, but cooperation on the part of the Serbian government was grudging and sporadic, and did not, for the most part, entail an honest reckoning of Serbia’s role and discussion of accountability.

Ostojić explores this apparent contradiction, giving a detailed account based on close analysis of official thinking and policy-making among Serbia’s political elites. He shows how the politics of war crimes prosecution was not one of simple obstruction driven by nationalist politics, but underwent different waves of cooperation,

compliance and non-compliance which can only be understood in the context of detailed understanding of Serbia's contemporary history, its protracted transition and, in particular, the ambivalence with which the ICTY was regarded (12). This is where Ostojić's book is most interesting, in demonstrating that opposition to the ICTY was shared among Serbia's political elite, not just among nationalist politicians, but also among those who were not opposed to pursuing some form of transitional justice or accountability, but were nevertheless opposed to the ICTY because of its perceived threat to Serbia's fragile stability. This trend is made clear in his account of the immediate post-Milosevic era, including the arrest and transfer of Milošević in June 2001 and the murder of Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjić two years later (57–85).

In his discussion of "truth-telling," Ostojić exposes the difficulty with the purported didactic potential of the ICTY, where the "record" created by the Tribunal's judgements was supposed to provide an authoritative account. Ostojić shows how this was undermined by the perceived conflation of individual and collective responsibility in the conduct and coverage of the Milosevic trial and in the Genocide case at the International Court of Justice (126–146). Even the eventual, and hard-won, recognition of the fact that genocide had indeed occurred in Srebrenica by the Serbian parliament in 2010 "hardly reflected or facilitated reckoning with war crimes in Serbia" (160). The failure of the Tribunal to generate public engagement with issues of accountability for war crimes resulted from the attitudes and policies of Serbian elites, which ranged from outright denial, to cynical cooperation and finally, grudging partial acknowledgement (219). This leads to the somewhat depressing conclusion that the disconnect, or dissonance, between the ICTY and the way in which it was perceived in Serbia has engendered what Ostojić rightly terms an "ambivalent legacy" (217).

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Postsowjetischer Separatismus. Die pro-russländischen Bewegungen im moldauischen Dnjestr-Tal und auf der Krim 1989–1995. By Jan Zofka. Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2015. 437 pp. Notes. Bibliography. EUR 39.90, hard bound.

This carefully written book (I noticed only one minor error, the misspelling of the English word "sovereignty" on page 63) can be recommended for its thorough treatment of the overall context of pro-Russian movements in the former Soviet Union in the early 1990s and their specific local driving forces. The question of the relation between these movements and the present-day policies of President Vladimir Putin will inevitably be in the reader's mind. The author responds, however, that the Russian seizure of the Crimea in 2014 was "not the work of the pro-Russian movement of the 1990s," because twenty years later this movement "was in practice no longer in existence" (396). This is in fact slightly contradictory to his earlier assertion that "the activities of the pro-Russian nationalists in the Crimea since 1991 were a necessary prerequisite for its military appropriation" (10). One would have liked to see some attempt to reconcile those two statements.

Dr. Zofka adopts Carsten Wieland's position that "ethnic conflicts do not exist" (12) as the starting-point of his study, and he repeats the phrase at the end (408). The appearance of ethnicity, he says, emerges because narratives of conflict "serve the interests of political and economic elites" (13). The claim that "villagers spontaneously attack their neighbors out of hatred" is, he says, part of the "West's mythology about the Balkans, the Caucasus and Africa" (28). His study, in contrast, is located very