

In any event, Tatham deserves whatever audience his book does get for this very thoughtful and impressively researched piece of work. We all have to look for ways to improve on our past performance as social scientists, no matter our career stage, and—after all—*With, Without, or Against the State?* is Tatham's first book. He has plenty of time and space. It is hard to resist the final judgment that Tatham has not quite delivered on his promise here. But there are more times to come and a lot still to which we can look forward.

**Soldiers, Politicians, and Civilians: Reforming Civil–Military Relations in Democratic Latin America.** By David Pion-Berlin and Rafael Martínez. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017. 414p. \$99.99 cloth, \$32.99 paper. doi:10.1017/S1537592718003699

— Florina Cristiana (CRIS) Matei, *U.S. Naval Postgraduate School*

Written by two internationally recognized civil–military relations and democratic consolidation scholars—David Pion-Berlin and Rafael Martínez—this outstanding book covers the relationship among civilian elites, society, and the armed forces in Latin America's consolidating democracies. The authors' main argument, which immediately makes *Soldiers, Politicians, and Civilians* an excellent addition to the literature, is that civil–military relations, in particular democratic civilian control, is an essential component of democratic consolidation. In this context, Pion-Berlin and Martínez treat civil–military relations reforms as one of several “partial regimes” of democratization, a term associated in the literature with Philippe Schmitter (pp. 13–14). They stress the relevance of the sequencing of civil–military relations reforms in line with democratization phases—transitions, consolidation, and deepening of democracy—which they illustrate in Figure 1.3 (p. 39).

The authors use four former military dictatorships from Latin America—Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay—to provide empirical evidence in support of their argument, as well as of their proposed framework for understanding both civil–military relations and democratic consolidation. They justify the selection of these case studies on the basis of their variance, ranging from former military regimes to those with no perceived traditional threats, and (consequently) minimal interest in defense and military issues on the part of their citizens and politicians.

In their search for a suitable framework of analysis for this topic, the authors build on the relevant works of thinkers and scholars who have previously studied the relationship among the armed forces, civilian elites, and society, including Carl von Clausewitz, the aforementioned Philippe Schmitter, Thomas Bruneau, Narcís Serra, and Michael Desch, to name a few. They also consulted academics, professional defense and security

experts, and decision makers from the countries selected for analysis. The innovation of Pion-Berlin and Martínez's work is precisely the proposed theoretical framework for understanding these relationships, one aimed at satisfying both the military and the civilian worlds in a democratizing country. The authors conceptualize this framework as a combination of six critical dimensions: reducing military power, devising a new legal framework, building defense institutions, generating knowledge, achieving convergence, and achieving effectiveness (pp. 28–38, and Chapters 3–8). This is a very useful approach, attaching equal weight to laws—for example, on the organization and functioning of transparency, accountability, and military justice—as well as of institutions, for example, Ministries of Defense, Joint Military Staffs, National Security Council–like organizations, and legislative branches (pp. 125–211).

The book's novelty is the inclusion of the concept of “effectiveness” in this framework, which complements other scholars' efforts to include this dimension within the heavily “control”-centric field of civil–military relations, including Suzanne Nielsen, Thomas Bruneau, and Harold Trinkunas. Pion-Berlin and Martínez stress that the goal in democratic consolidation and civil–military relations is to reform the armed forces into an administrative arm of the state, as compared to simply running the state. For this reason, they note that an analysis of civil–military relations in democratic consolidation cannot focus solely on control. They argue that achieving effectiveness equates to fulfilling key requirements: strategy development and assessment, transparency, and accountability; size of expenditure; reduction and optimization of military size; and movement from conscripted to volunteer military (pp. 299–309). They summarize these dimensions in Table 8.1 (pp. 305–6).

Another highlight of the book is the authors' detailed historical background on the transitions to democracy from military regimes in all of the cases under consideration, and subsequent civil–military developments in those countries, coupled with an in-depth comparative analysis of how effective the four selected nations have been in achieving progress in each dimension of their proposed framework (Chapters 3–8). In their final Chapter, 9, Pion-Berlin and Martínez provide a ranking of each country on each dimension, as well as overall. In this connection, they conclude that Argentina is in the lead in every dimension, followed by Chile (p. 345). They argue that Uruguay and Brazil come in third and fourth place, respectively (p. 345). In this chapter, the authors also provide explanations for variance among the case studies (pp. 351–76). They posit that the motivation and opportunity on the part of civilian elites (early on, during the nondemocratic regime and democratic transition phases, and later during the democratic consolidation process) to undertake military reforms explain the observed

variance (pp. 350–51). They find that the combination of motivation and opportunity in Argentina has been more auspicious for reform in civil–military relations than in the rest of the countries, which has led to better outcomes in Argentina in the long run (pp. 360–66). In Chile, the authors contend, while motivation has existed, opportunity has been hindered by the strong reserve domains retained by the armed forces post-transition. In Uruguay and Brazil, on the other hand, both motivation and opportunity have been limited (pp. 360–66). Other variables which, in the authors’ view, explain the variances among the four case studies with regard to their framework of analysis, involve the democratic transition mode and the conditions under which the transition negotiation happened, as well as the role played by the legislative branches in defense and security (pp. 350–51).

Pion-Berlin and Martínez have produced an impressive assessment of the civil–military relations obtaining in Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and Brazil. Of course, no book is beyond criticism. On this score, one might question the authors’ claim that all four countries share a similar lack of perceived enemy or threat. My discussions and experience with officials and Ministry of Defense staffers in Chile have revealed that civilians in Chile do perceive potential enemies in Bolivia, and in Peru. Another minor critique relates to the authors’ ranking of Argentina

in their framework of analysis. While both Argentina and Chile are rightly viewed as the “Higher Achievers” (versus Uruguay and Brazil, which are the “Lower Achievers” [pp. 366–72]), crowning Argentina the “Highest Achiever” leaves some room for debate. The most recent scholarly literature that analyzes Argentina and Chile—for example, Zoltan Barany’s *The Soldier and the Changing State: Building Democratic Armies in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Americas* (2012)—finds civil–military relations in Chile in better shape than in Argentina. Nevertheless, *Soldiers, Politicians, and Civilians* is a sine qua non in any library and curriculum that teaches civil–military relations, as well as on the bookshelves of policy and decision makers who deal with military reforms in developing democracies.

Like other luminaries of civil–military relations who have revolutionized the field, Pion-Berlin and Martínez, with this work, make their own substantial contribution to the enrichment of this body of scholarship. It provides novel and insightful analyses, a list of lessons learned, and a set of best/worst practices in military reforms and civil–military relations and democratization drawn from former Latin American military dictatorships. These lessons are useful not only to the rest of Latin America’s developing democracies but also to countries from other parts of the world that have undergone transitions from military regimes to democracies.

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## INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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**Renegotiating the World Order: Institutional Change in International Relations.** By Phillip Y. Lipsky. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018. 341p. \$99.99 cloth, \$34.99 paper. doi:10.1017/S1537592718003523

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Old institutional designs do not always sit easily with contemporary politics. Demands for change arise, creating tensions among actors; however, institutional change is not ubiquitous. Some institutions are stickier than others. This puzzle nourishes Phillip Y. Lipsky’s insightful and thought-provoking account of why rising or reemerging powers are sometimes successful in their revisionist policies within international institutions, and other times not. His look to international institutions as “facilitators of cooperation [and] moderators of shifts in the international balance of power” (p. 267) is a welcome addition to the international organization (IO) literature.

On the basis of theoretical foundations that rest on rational choice and historical institutionalist insights, Lipsky emphasizes the role that policy area characteristics and institutional rules play in explaining the variation in renegotiating distributive institutional change. Some policy areas (e.g., international finance), he argues, limit

the creation of multilateral or bilateral alternatives and leave little leverage for states to renegotiate the institutional *status quo*. Consequently, international institutions in these policy areas can maintain rigid distributive rules—often reflecting bargaining deals that favor the United States as the most powerful state to date. Other policy areas (e.g., development aid, trade) encourage a competitive institutional environment that can be used by rising or reemerging powers to renegotiate distributive deals within multilateral institutional setups. If these initial international institutions do not already have flexible rules that govern decision-making, they have to create them or face the possibility of becoming irrelevant. The United States, in these instances, is often forced to make concessions beyond its preferred outcomes. This argument is buttressed by a formal model and diverse empirical chapters on institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the European Union, the United Nations Security Council, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, and Intelsat based on quasi-experiments, statistical analyses and archival data, while keeping sight of alternative explanations and addressing idiosyncrasies where information is available.

*Renegotiating the World Order* addresses a big gap in the IO literature: comparative institutional theorizing across policy areas. While international institutions exist in most, if not all, policy areas today, their proliferation across these