

prosperity, the new fleet was simply the existing navy which had been loaned to privateers, and Lutatius' offensive was due to hopes of booty more than to patriotism (pp. 205–14).

Other scepticisms are equally risky. B. rejects that Roman forces in Sicily were halved following peace with Hiero in 263 (Pol. 1.17.1), because both consuls of 262 went there—and because Dio-Zonaras has no reduction (pp. 96–7). That Duilius in 260 had the land forces and his colleague Scipio the fleet is denied in favour of Dio's opposite report (pp. 113–17), even though it was Scipio who was then captured at sea. Nor does B. like Regulus and Manlius sending to Rome for further orders from the Senate after reaching Africa. Consuls, he holds, did not seek such orders (pp. 163–4).

B. does have grounds for accepting Roman annalistic evidence in places, for Polybius tends to focus on certain major campaigns and pass lightly over others. Annalistic evidence, if just as selective, at times gives extra details, as for various events in 248–243. Polybius can make mistakes, too: most egregiously, perhaps, in claiming that Iunius Pullus, Pulcher's equally disastrous colleague in 249, was consul in 248 (1.52.5). Overall, B.'s emphasis on the potential value of Roman tradition, even in comparison with the sober Polybius, is important. Re-evaluation, however, needs to be pursued cautiously. Simply as a question of method, it is controversial how much preference should be accorded to late sources over one who wrote a century after the events using contemporary or near-contemporary accounts. That Dio managed to reflect mostly the early, 'good' annalists while Orosius and others fell, too often, for the later, Antias-type ones is more a wishful assumption than a probability, despite B.'s lengthy arguments (pp. 36–50).

There are some surprising omissions. The Fabii, with consuls in 265 and 247–245, earn little notice. There are no broad assessments of groups, interests, and families, for instance in 264 and around 242—patricians and plebeians, the place of *novi homines*, balances and tensions between different sectional interests—which would have been valuable. Again, B.'s forte is German-language scholarship, with less use made of recent non-German scholarship than could be expected.

B.'s essential thesis would still be defensible with less *Korrektur* from late authors. It would also be easier to follow in a less dense writing style; sixty- and seventy-word sentences, and a full panoply of portmanteau phrases, make for slow comprehension. The interest of his theme, all the same, more than makes up for these difficulties.

University of Sydney

DEXTER HOYOS

## REPUBLICAN CAVALRY

J. B. MCCALL: *The Cavalry of the Roman Republic. Cavalry Combat and Elite Reputations in the Middle and Late Republic*. Pp. viii + 200. London and New York: Routledge, 2002. Cased. ISBN: 0-415-25713-1.

Since 1990 there have been several book length studies of Roman cavalry. K. R. Dixon and P. Southern, *The Roman Cavalry* (London, 1992), provided an overview of the mounted troops of the principate, S. MacDowall, *Late Roman Cavalryman* (Oxford, 1995), a well-illustrated, popular introduction to its subject, and A. Hyland, *Equus* (London, 1990), an eccentric and often inaccurate general survey. Yet M. is the first serious treatment of Republican cavalry since

The Classical Review vol. 54 no. 2 © The Classical Association 2004; all rights reserved

Lieutenant-Colonel G. Denison's *A History of Cavalry* of 1877. The focus of M.'s book is narrower than the title suggests. It concentrates on citizen, and by extension allied, cavalry from c. 300 to 100 B.C. It can now be read in tandem with sections of G. Daly, *Cannae* (London, and New York, 2002).

The central argument of the book is easily stated. The traditional view that Roman citizen cavalry were ineffective, and that this underlies their disappearance, is wrong. For M., they were very effective, and thus we have to look to wider social, economic, and political factors to explain their end. As such, the book offers an alternative way into thinking about the big changes in Roman society in the last three centuries B.C.

The first chapter sets out the links between cavalry service and élite status, including discussions of the equestrian census, for M. introduced by the early third century at the latest, the élite bonding and networking which mounted service fostered, and the privileges which accrued to the cavalry class.

The next chapter argues for the effectiveness of the cavalry. Here, the criterion for effectiveness, the ability to disrupt heavy infantry, seems more specific than many, either in the ancient world or now, would hold. Much good use is made of recent studies of ancient Greek cavalry, and the John Keegan line (e.g. *The Face of Battle* [Harmondsworth and New York, 1976]) is taken that the main effect of charging cavalry is psychological. Given the latter, it smacks of the doctoral thesis, on which M.'s book is based, that there is a discussion (pp. 22–3) of M. M. Markle's argument that *sarissa* armed Macedonian companion cavalry could physically break heavy infantry; an argument both implausible and here irrelevant.

The third chapter, on equipment and tack, concentrates on the reform of the cavalry recorded by Polybius (6.25.3–11). Seeking to date this, M. hunts for a defeat big enough to convince the Romans to adopt Greek style kit, and settles on the Second Punic War. This forces M. into trying to explain away both the fact that Gallic, Spanish, and Numidian cavalry in Carthaginian service did not use Greek equipment, and the Roman defeat by Perseus' cavalry in 171 B.C. It can be noted that Daly, *op. cit.* pp. 74–5, inclines to the early third-century defeats by Pyrrhus. Possibly it is wrong to assume that it must have been a defeat which led to the adoption of alien equipment. Hannibal's Libyan infantry took to using Roman kit after a string of victories (Polybius 3.87.3; Livy 22.46.4).

In the chapter on tactics, M. argues that, in contrast to contemporary Hellenistic cavalry, Roman cavalry sought stationary hand-to-hand combat, for which they often dismounted. Discussing combat motivation, M. briefly looks at the modern concepts of *esprit* and cohesion (pp. 82–3). Here, he wisely avoids getting involved in the S. L. A. Marshall-inspired theory that only one in four combatants actually fought; a theory which ancient historians are taking on at the same time as modern historians are abandoning it (e.g. J. M. McPherson, *For Cause and Comrades* [Oxford and New York, 1997], p. 72). Instead, M. concentrates on the ancient evidence for leadership and *Virtus*, for the latter usefully collecting material on the use of battle scars as claims to respect.

The penultimate chapter seeks to date the disappearance of the citizen cavalry. Laying down *termini* of the 90s and 63 B.C., the urgent need for legionary manpower in the Social War is advanced as the turning point. That citizen cavalry was not reintroduced is ascribed to the Roman élite's reluctance to share a status marker with the élites of the newly enfranchised allies.

The final chapter examines the rise of two other status markers which allow for the abandonment of cavalry service. The second-century establishment of permanent courts and the vast increase in citizen numbers after the Social War caused a growth in

the importance of advocacy. To acquire skills in forensic oratory called for time, money, and contacts, and thus served as a useful mark of status for the élite. The monetization of the economy and the great increase in wealth available to the élite between the fourth and first centuries B.C. led to an increase in conspicuous consumption as a signifier of élite status. These points are well made, but another very relevant factor is not mentioned. During this period, Roman élite hunting, possibly influenced by Hellenistic royal practices, changed from a relatively egalitarian form conducted on foot with hounds that hunted by smell to an extremely expensive activity carried out on horseback with hounds which hunted by sight. An ideological link between hunting and war was widely recognized, and the new form of hunting continued into the principate as an aspect of an élite life style. A social history of hunting in the classical world, which could draw inspiration from R. Carr, *English Fox Hunting* (London, 1976) and supersede J. Aymard, *Essai sur les chasses romaines* (Paris, 1951) and J. K. Anderson, *Hunting in the Ancient World* (Berkeley, 1986), is much to be desired.

This engaging short work will be the first port of call for its subject, and should encourage further research.

*Lincoln College, Oxford*

HARRY SIDEBOTTOM

## REPUBLICAN PERSONALITIES

R. J. EVANS: *Questioning Reputations. Essays on Nine Roman Republican Politicians*. Pp. x + 221, maps. Pretoria: Unisa Press, 2003. Paper, SAR 168/US\$23.60/£15.20/€23.60. ISBN: 1-86888-198-9.

In this engagingly written book, E. reassesses the historical accuracy of the current reputations of nine familiar figures from the late Republic. Each chapter challenges conventional wisdom: Chapter 1 argues that Marius' military capacities have been exaggerated (he was 'less than superlative in military terms', p. 36); the following chapter makes a similar case for Pompey in the seventies, but emphasizes as well his keenness to cooperate with the senatorial establishment during this same period, despite later and modern tendencies to tag him as a *popularis* at that time; Chapter 3 questions the *popularis* credentials of Caesar (on the grounds that his commentaries do not mention tribunes often enough, nor does he convey enough gratitude toward tribunes who fostered his career). Chapters 4–6, devoted to 'lesser figures' (p. 96), each deals with a pair of politicians: Saturninus and Glaucia are compared and contrasted, to the advantage of the latter, who, it is claimed, remains too little appreciated in modern accounts; Drusus and Sulpicius are subjected to a similar synkrisis, the result of which is that Drusus is judged comprehensively deficient, whereas Sulpicius' talent is deemed genuine but unfortunately blighted by the consequences of Sulla's march on Rome; and, finally, Milo and Clodius are set against one another, but found to be 'more equals than opposites' (p. 161).

Reappraisals are useful exercises, helpful both to professional historians and to those who must rely on their judgements. To his credit, E. makes many sound observations. His discussion of Glaucia's significance, to cite the best example in the book, is very much along the right lines (though I am not certain what in this instance can be done about the limitations of our sources). And E. is absolutely correct that 'it

The Classical Review vol. 54 no. 2 © The Classical Association 2004; all rights reserved