

Re-reading the Tea Leaves: New Hampshire as a Barometer of Presidential Primary Success

While critics of New Hampshire's first-in-the-nation presidential primary have had no success in dislodging the Granite State from its place at the front of the line, they have had something to smile about in recent years. For decades, New Hampshire boasted of its ability to choose presidents; no candidate had been elected president without first weathering a New England winter and emerging victorious in New Hampshire. The first blemish on that clean slate appeared in 1992, when Bill Clinton finished second to former Massachusetts Senator Paul Tsongas in the Democratic primary, yet went on to win his party's nomination and ultimately the presidency. Advocates of the primary (and there are many) chalked this up to Tsongas's supposed status as a "favorite son" candidate. A second blemish

by
Dante J. Scala,
Saint Anselm College

on New Hampshire's record appeared in 2000, however, when George W. Bush suffered an 18-point loss to John McCain, yet recovered to win his party's nomination

and the presidency. Disparagers of New Hampshire's quadrennial status (and there are many) doubtless took these "failures" in prediction as more ammunition for their argument that New Hampshire is too small and demographically unrepresentative a state to have so much influence in winnowing out candidates in the presidential nomination process.

Looking ahead to the 2004 Democratic primaries (and making the apparently safe assumption, at this writing, that no serious candidate will emerge to challenge President Bush for the GOP nomination), New Hampshire again is front and center in the so-called invisible primary, the period of time between the last presidential election and the first contests for the nomination in the next election cycle. Prospective candidates for the Democratic nomination already have made several visits to the Granite State (and to Iowa, where caucuses will be held a week before the New Hampshire primary), contributed money to state Democratic candidates, and put staffers on the ground to work for state candidates in 2002, in order to learn the political terrain for 2004.

All of these presidential hopefuls, of course, enter New Hampshire with the assumption that a good showing there in the winter of 2004 will translate into "momentum," rocketing a campaign to victories in later primaries and eventually to the nomination. Gauging

how much of a bump a candidate gets from New Hampshire, however, often seems more of an art than an exact science. In 1972, George McGovern won just 37% of the vote and lost the New Hampshire presidential primary by nine points to Edmund Muskie, yet Muskie faltered and McGovern surged in later contests. In 1992, Clinton managed just 24% of the vote in New Hampshire, yet pronounced himself the "Comeback Kid" and trounced Tsongas in later primaries. In 2000, Bill Bradley lost in New Hampshire by just four points to a sitting vice president—and had absolutely nothing to show for his efforts in terms of "momentum" in later primaries, which Gore won handily.

It is doubtlessly true that the varying amounts of momentum each of the above candidates received had something to do with the "expectations" of success for each candidate, markers laid down by the national political media. Bradley's 45% showing, for example, did not seem so impressive after polls released five months earlier had him dead-even with Gore. Clinton's second-place finish, however, looked mighty indeed after revelations of sexual scandal and draft-dodging had apparently put his campaign on life support. From the "expectations" perspective, the only thing important about New Hampshire's voting returns is that they are the first actual results received, after months of media speculation about the prospects of various candidates. From this perspective, the only interesting question about the actual New Hampshire vote is how the results fit the media's "over/under," that is, whether the candidate has exceeded media expectations, met expectations, or failed to meet expectations.

This article, rather than focusing on media expectations as the key to momentum, instead concentrates on the "fundamentals" of the New Hampshire Democratic primary vote in 1988, 1992, and 2000 as key predictors of success in subsequent presidential primaries. (This is something akin to picking stocks based on old-fashioned measures of value such as price-earnings ratios, as opposed to buying whichever stocks have the best buzz from various brokers on CNBC.) By focusing on how well candidates did with particular segments of the New Hampshire Democratic primary vote, such as the working-class and the liberal elite, we can see which candidates showed "sound fundamentals"—that is, evidence of a broad-based coalition composed of both the liberal elite and the working-class

base—and which candidates showed “weak fundamentals,” or support from just one faction of the party, with little evidence of the ability to build a coalition among the Democratic Party electorate. During the last three Democratic Party cycles, it has been the “coalition candidate,” not the candidate of a particular faction, who has proceeded to win the nomination.

The Demographics of New Hampshire’s Democratic Primary Electorate

New Hampshire’s place at the beginning of the presidential primary calendar has long been dismissed as an unfortunate eccentricity of the nomination process. “New Hampshire is said to be too small, too remote, too atypical to be seriously regarded as a national political barometer,” wrote Jules Witcover in his book on the 1976 presidential election (Witcover 1977, 222). The reporter went on, however, to question that conventional wisdom on the Granite State:

Except for an uncommonly small percentage of blacks, however, New Hampshire is not all that unlike many other states. Contrary to the impression given by picture postcards of snowy covered bridges and white church steeples, the state is heavily industrial, and growing more so each year as plants and blue-collar workers push northward from Boston and the eastern Massachusetts complex. From Manchester and Nashua south and over to the seacoast, where most of the state’s population works and lives, New Hampshire hums with the rhythms of machine and manual labor, and with considerable white-collar energy as well. (Witcover 1977, 222)

Another piece of conventional wisdom on New Hampshire was its conservatism, an ideological factor that crossed party lines. Manchester, the largest city in the state and host of long-closed textile mills, was acknowledged to be the center of working-class conservatism. Its newspaper, the *Union Leader*, was notorious for the blistering editorials of its publisher, William Loeb; in 1972, negative stories on the wife of Edmund Muskie during the primary season drove the senator to a fiery (some say teary) defense of his spouse in front of the newspaper’s offices. As late as 1984, Democratic candidates were sizing up the state’s electorate as moderate-to-conservative (Buell 2000).

Recent exit-poll surveys of New Hampshire Democrats, however, give cause for significant correction of their conservative image. According to a comprehensive review of primary exit polling by Emmett Buell (2000, 111–118), only 17% of New Hampshire voters in the 1984 Democratic primary described themselves as conservatives—a smaller percentage than was found in Massachusetts, Illinois, Maryland, Ohio, and New Jersey, for instance. Self-described moderates were a majority of the primary vote that year. In 1992, only 14% of all voters casting ballots in the Democratic primary described themselves as conservatives; that figure dropped to 7% among strong party identifiers. In contrast, six of ten strong party identifiers described themselves as liberal, and that label was adopted by 43% of all Democratic primary voters. Moderates were also quite prominent, representing 32% of strong party identifiers, 50% of independents, and 42% of all primary voters.

Exit-polling from the most recent primary reinforced the profile of New Hampshire as a liberal-to-moderate state for Democrats. An outright majority of Democratic primary voters identified themselves as liberals, 38% as moderates, and just 8% as conservative. Independents remained a significant factor, representing three of ten primary voters. The primary electorate is also noteworthy for its large number of upscale voters, both well-educated and well-off financially.

Table 1
CNN exit poll of 2000 New Hampshire Democratic Presidential Primary

| | |
|-----------------------------|-----|
| Gender | |
| Male | 38% |
| Female | 62% |
| Age | |
| 18–64 | 84% |
| Over 65 | 16% |
| Income | |
| Under \$15k | 6% |
| \$15k–\$30k | 13% |
| \$30k–\$50k | 23% |
| \$50k–\$75k | 26% |
| \$75k–\$100k | 17% |
| Over \$100k | 16% |
| Education | |
| No H.S. Degree | 4% |
| High School Grad. | 15% |
| Some College | 26% |
| College Grad. | 25% |
| Post-Graduate | 30% |
| Religion | |
| Protestant | 25% |
| Catholic | 41% |
| Jewish | 5% |
| Other | 16% |
| None | 13% |
| Party Identification | |
| Democrat | 56% |
| Republican | 3% |
| Independent | 40% |
| Other | 1% |
| Ideology | |
| Very liberal | 17% |
| Somewhat liberal | 37% |
| Moderate | 38% |
| Somewhat conservative | 7% |
| Very conservative | 1% |
| Party Registration | |
| Independent | 30% |
| Democrat | 65% |
| Unregistered | 5% |
| Union Household | |
| Yes | 23% |
| No | 77% |

Where’s the Vote Going? Turnout Trends in New Hampshire Cities and Collar Communities

What storms lie ahead in the 2004 New Hampshire Democratic presidential primary? Long-range forecasts are notoriously inaccurate, especially with the roster of potential contestants so unsettled. One factor that may be forecast with some accuracy is the balance of power between the two main blocs of Democratic primary voters in New Hampshire: wealthy, highly educated elites, and traditional working-class constituencies. In order to offer a glimpse of the demographic trends that will shape the

2004 Democratic presidential primary, I examined the Democratic primary turnout from 1976 to 2000 (in eight-year increments) in four major New Hampshire cities—Manchester, Nashua, Concord, and Portsmouth—and compared it to the turnout in the “collar” suburban communities surrounding these cities.

In all four cases, the ratio of city turnout to collar-community turnout has decreased since 1976. The most striking shifts in turnout appeared in the cases of the Manchester and Nashua metropolitan areas, where turnout in the collar communities exploded while turnout in the cities remained stagnant or experienced smaller growth. Smaller shifts from city to collar town occurred in Concord and Portsmouth and their environs. All in all, it may fairly be claimed that as New Hampshire has become more prosperous and more sub-

urban over the past quarter-century, so have Democratic presidential primary voters.

Predictors for Success: Coalition Candidates vs. Factional Candidates

What, then, can New Hampshire primary voting patterns tell us about a presidential candidate’s potential for success in subsequent nomination contests? Political analyst Rhodes Cook has claimed that results in the Granite State offer a first, often definitive, look at how candidates will do among three constituencies: suburban voters; college towns; and the mill towns where the remnants of New Hampshire’s blue-collar population live.

In the following section, I build on Cook’s analysis by using Census Bureau data to target towns and city wards where these three constituencies are most prominent. (For the purpose of this analysis, I have collapsed college-town areas and well-to-do suburbs into “elite communities,” as opposed to “working-class communities.”) In order to target these specific areas, I examined each town and city ward in New Hampshire for the following indicators of socioeconomic status: percentage of adults with at least a college education; percentage of adults in blue-collar and white-collar occupations; and median family income.¹ Once lists of “elite communities” and “working-class communities” were set,² the Democratic primary vote results were compiled for both sets of communities.

The results offer a comprehensive view of how candidates for the Democratic presidential nomination in 1988, 1992, and 2000 did among two important party constituencies in New Hampshire. Candidates are listed by their statewide vote, from highest to lowest, followed by their vote totals and percentages in elite communities and working-class communities.

After the vote totals were listed, a candidate’s percentage of the vote in elite communities was divided by a candidate’s percentage of the vote in working-class communities. The result is the candidate’s “elite factor.” The higher the candidate’s elite factor was above 1.00, the better he did among elite communities, compared to his support in working-class communities. The lower the candidate’s elite factor below

Table 2
Manchester, Nashua, Concord, and Portsmouth, and their collar towns, 1976–2000

| | 2000 | 1992 | 1984 | 1976 |
|----------------------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| Manchester | 15,190 | 18,311 | 14,235 | 15,409 |
| Hooksett | 1,220 | 1,328 | 595 | 784 |
| Candia | 489 | 512 | 197 | 184 |
| Auburn | 570 | 594 | 291 | 279 |
| Londonderry | 2,430 | 2,765 | 1,202 | 753 |
| Litchfield | 800 | 800 | 407 | 217 |
| Merrimack | 3,021 | 3,254 | 1,298 | 1,299 |
| Bedford | 2,170 | 1,963 | 989 | 809 |
| Goffstown | 2,062 | 1,764 | 1,411 | 1,355 |
| Total, collar towns | 12,762 | 12,980 | 6,390 | 5,680 |
| RATIO | | | | |
| <i>city: collar votes</i> | <i>1.19</i> | <i>1.41</i> | <i>2.23</i> | <i>2.71</i> |
| Nashua | 11,175 | 13,870 | 8,780 | 7,816 |
| Hollis | 980 | 866 | 480 | 360 |
| Amherst | 1,526 | 1,258 | 682 | 525 |
| Merrimack | 3,021 | 3,254 | 1,298 | 1,299 |
| Litchfield | 800 | 800 | 407 | 217 |
| Hudson | 2,588 | 2,940 | 1,579 | 653 |
| Total, collar towns | 8,915 | 9,118 | 4,446 | 3,054 |
| RATIO | | | | |
| <i>city: collar votes</i> | <i>1.25</i> | <i>1.52</i> | <i>1.97</i> | <i>2.56</i> |
| Concord | 6,430 | 6,235 | 3,468 | 2,686 |
| Bow | 404 | 439 | 249 | 179 |
| Pembroke | 849 | 1,132 | 532 | 548 |
| Chichester | 302 | 279 | 110 | 73 |
| Loudon | 452 | 504 | 191 | 157 |
| Canterbury | 390 | 380 | 185 | 105 |
| Boscawen | 404 | 439 | 249 | 179 |
| Webster | 206 | 192 | 113 | 69 |
| Hopkinton | 978 | 832 | 430 | 265 |
| Total, collar towns | 3,985 | 4,197 | 2,059 | 1,575 |
| RATIO | | | | |
| <i>city: collar votes</i> | <i>1.61</i> | <i>1.49</i> | <i>1.68</i> | <i>1.71</i> |
| Portsmouth | 4,317 | 4,265 | 3,072 | 2,447 |
| New Castle | 211 | 178 | 137 | 147 |
| Rye | 889 | 925 | 567 | 383 |
| Greenland | 468 | 477 | 264 | 229 |
| Newington | 101 | 106 | 71 | 84 |
| Total, collar towns | 1,669 | 1,686 | 1,039 | 843 |
| RATIO | | | | |
| <i>city: collar towns</i> | <i>2.59</i> | <i>2.53</i> | <i>2.96</i> | <i>2.90</i> |

Source: New Hampshire Manual for the General Court.

Table 3
1988, 1992, 2000 New Hampshire Democratic Presidential Primary Results

| Candidate | Total vote | Total % | Elite vote | Elite % | Working-class vote | Working-class % | Elite factor |
|----------------|---------------|-------------|---------------|-------------|--------------------|-----------------|--------------|
| 1988 | | | | | | | |
| Dukakis | 44,112 | 35.9 | 12,346 | 35.5 | 9,629 | 34.1 | 1.04 |
| Gephardt | 24,513 | 19.9 | 5,810 | 16.7 | 6,811 | 24.1 | 0.69 |
| Simon | 21,094 | 18.7 | 6,758 | 19.4 | 3,837 | 13.6 | 1.43 |
| Jackson | 9,615 | 7.8 | 3,034 | 8.7 | 1,628 | 5.8 | 1.50 |
| Gore | 8,400 | 6.8 | 2,400 | 6.9 | 1,997 | 7.1 | 0.97 |
| Babbitt | 5,644 | 4.6 | 2,091 | 6.0 | 840 | 3.0 | 2.00 |
| Hart | 4,888 | 4.3 | 934 | 2.7 | 1,669 | 5.9 | 0.46 |
| 1992 | | | | | | | |
| Tsongas | 55,663 | 33.2 | 19,859 | 39.9 | 8,221 | 22.2 | 1.80 |
| Clinton | 41,540 | 24.8 | 11,062 | 22.2 | 10,472 | 28.3 | 0.78 |
| Kerrey | 18,584 | 11.1 | 4,532 | 9.1 | 4,827 | 13.0 | 0.70 |
| Harkin | 17,063 | 10.2 | 4,169 | 8.4 | 4,596 | 12.4 | 0.68 |
| Brown | 13,659 | 8.2 | 3,789 | 7.6 | 2,469 | 6.7 | 1.13 |
| 2000 | | | | | | | |
| Gore | 76,897 | 49.8 | 21,307 | 44.1 | 16,541 | 56.7 | 0.78 |
| Bradley | 70,502 | 45.7 | 25,028 | 51.8 | 10,150 | 34.8 | 1.49 |

N. B. "Elite factor" = percentage of the vote in elite communities, divided by the percentage of the vote in working-class communities.

Boldface = eventual presidential nominee of the Democratic Party.

1.00, the better the candidate fared among working-class communities, compared to his support in elite communities.

The closer a candidate's elite factor was to 1.00, the more even the candidate's performance in elite communities and in working-class communities—and thus, a candidate was better able to forge a coalition among different factions of the Democratic Party, than a candidate with an elite-factor score high above or significantly below 1.00.

Findings

Candidates for the presidential nomination of their party (as well as the media that cover them) often approach New Hampshire as the dispenser of that magical elixir known as "momentum." In the frantic process of "winnowing" that begins with the Iowa caucuses and ends with New Hampshire and its immediate aftermath, pundits often draw a cause-and-effect relationship between a candidate's ability to exceed the expectations of conventional media wisdom, and his potential to convert performance in these first two contests into success in subsequent primaries. Excessive focus on the media-expectations game leads to a narrow reading of the vote totals, with a lack of serious thought about what those votes represent in terms of core party constituencies.

Shifting the focus to the "core fundamentals" of a candidate's performance in the New Hampshire primary—that is, how the candidate performed among "elite communities" and "working-class communities"—offers a perspective that tempers "irrational exuberance" regarding the significance of a strong candidate performance in New Hampshire. Concentrating on the core fundamentals of a candidate's support also puts perspective on the effects of "media spin" on a candidate's performance.

Put simply: Candidates who are competitive in New Hampshire, and display "coalition" or "crossover" potential there (appealing both to elite voters and working-class voters), are much more likely to win the Democratic Party's nomination than candidates who only appeal to one faction.

Twenty years ago, Nelson Polsby, in his pioneering work on the primary-centered nomination process, made the case that candidates for a presidential nomination must try to mobilize factions, rather than build coalitions, in order to win. "The task of a presidential hopeful, threading a path through the minefield of successive primary elections, is not to win a majority but rather to survive," he argued (Polsby 1983). In order to survive, a candidate must achieve as high a ranking as possible among his competitors. To accomplish this, one must win an early primary, in order to gain exposure and media attention as a "contender," and to raise more money to compete in subsequent contests. A win in an early state might depend on defeating a rival by just several thousand votes, as it did for Jimmy Carter in the 1976 New Hampshire primary. Therefore, a candidate should try to distinguish himself from his competitors, build organizations, and get more of his supporters out to vote—all while hoping that his rivals wind up competing for the same share of the vote in a particular wing of the party. Again, such a strategy worked for Carter in 1976; early on, most of his rivals were fighting to be the candidate of the liberal wing of the party, while Carter had the conservative wing mainly to himself in Iowa and New Hampshire.

In 1988, 1992, and 2000, however, the eventual nominee of the Democratic Party was the candidate who did the best job of building coalitions in New Hampshire, not the one who mobilized a particular faction. In 1988, Michael Dukakis was the only candidate to draw equally well from both elite and working-class communities, defeating two "faction" candidates, Richard Gephardt (who did very well among working-class communities, considerably worse among elite communities) and Paul Simon (strong performance among elite communities, weak performance among working-class communities). Al Gore, who aborted his 1988 New Hampshire campaign to pursue a Southern strategy, showed some potential for achieving crossover status, but only received 7% of the overall vote. Dukakis, the coalition candidate in New Hampshire, proved to have much more staying power in the primaries than either of his factional rivals.

The 1992 primary cycle provides the most compelling evidence that the ability to form coalitions in New Hampshire is a good predictor of success in subsequent primaries. In 1992, Bill Clinton succeeded in disproving the maxim that every president must first win the New Hampshire primary; despite finishing second to Paul Tsongas in New Hampshire, Clinton succeeded in winning the Democratic Party's nomination and eventually the presidency. (Jerry Brown also drew equally well from both elite and working-class communities, but like Gore, received under 10% of the statewide vote.) Again, looking at the core fundamentals of Clinton's and Tsongas's respective votes in New Hampshire casts doubt on the conventional analysis of the 1992 primary. One piece of conventional wisdom was that Tsongas won the primary because of his "favorite son" status as a Massachusetts senator who hailed from Lowell, right next to the border between the two states. Geography played some part in Tsongas's success, but a comparison of his core fundamentals with those of another Massachusetts candidate, Michael Dukakis, indicates that the two had very different bases of support. While Dukakis drew support almost equally well from elite communities and working-class communities, Tsongas's base came mainly from elite communities.

Another piece of conventional wisdom on that New Hampshire primary is that Clinton stole the night (and the all-important momentum) from Tsongas, by getting on the airwaves first with his declaration that New Hampshire had made him the "Comeback Kid." Again, a look at the fundamentals of Clinton's vote indicates that he actually had good reason to be confident that evening, regardless of when he got on the air: he had drawn well from both elite and working-class communities, an early indication that his vote-getting potential in subsequent primaries would be much greater than Tsongas's.

The last New Hampshire primary studied here, the 2000 contest between Gore and Bradley, provides one last piece of evidence for the potential of candidates who prove their ability to form coalitions in New Hampshire. One of the great "what ifs" in New Hampshire primary history concerns the future potential of the Bradley campaign, if only it had managed to turn a few thousand more votes its way in the Granite State. Again, this "what if" scenario is based on the expectations game: Bradley had been running even with Gore in New Hampshire polls as early as Labor Day 1999, therefore nothing less than a win in New Hampshire would meet or exceed media expectations. In a variation on this, Bradley's strong second place in New Hampshire was overshadowed by John McCain's stunning first-place finish; in effect, McCain became

In 1992, Bill Clinton succeeded in disproving the maxim that every president must first win the New Hampshire primary;

the insurgent of the 2000 primary cycle, sucking all the media oxygen out of Bradley's campaign.

No doubt a Bradley victory in New Hampshire would likely have given his campaign a much-needed second wind. A look at the fundamentals of Bradley's vote, however, compared to the broad base of Gore's support, indicates that the insurgent's campaign was based on the support of the elite faction of the party, not a coalition. As a result, even a narrow Bradley victory in New Hampshire would not have overcome his relatively poor fundamentals, compared to those of his rival.

Several possible explanations exist for why coalition candidates, not factional candidates, have been more successful of late. One is the front-loading of numerous primaries increasingly early in the schedule, close to Iowa and New Hampshire. As a result, candidates do not have the luxury of beginning the primary cycle with the support of just one faction of the party, with the hope of adding other factions later in the process. Coupled with front-loading is the need to raise large amounts of money (at least 20 million dollars, conventional wisdom dictates) before the primaries even begin; in a front-loaded process, an insurgent candidate can no

longer "live off the land," counting on upset victories to bring more funds into campaign coffers, in order to fight and win another day. Perhaps the need to raise large amounts of money early forces a candidate to appeal to diverse interests in the party. The recent success of coalition candidates in New Hampshire may be supporting evidence for the hypothesis that party leaders have recovered their ability to control presidential nominations, despite the vagaries of the primary process; one would expect party leaders to coordinate their efforts on behalf of a candidate who appeals to various factions of the party (Cohen et al. 2001).

Whatever the case, while a victory in New Hampshire can no longer be declared essential to ascending to the presidency, a strong case can still be made that a candidate must perform well in the Granite State to be a serious contender. An examination of recent New Hampshire primary results, however, indicates that one must be careful how strength of performance is measured. In 2004, New Hampshire again could be a hothouse for candidates who appeal to the party's elite, such as Bradley and Tsongas; but campaigns which grow well in Granite State soil often wither when exposed to the harsher voting environment of subsequent primary states, where the socioeconomic status of the average primary voter is most likely significantly lower (Brownstein 1999). In contrast, candidates that do not necessarily finish first in New Hampshire, but build a broad base of support, could do much better than expected in subsequent primaries.

Notes

1. To ascertain which towns and wards qualified as "working-class communities" or "elite communities," the author used the latest information available from the Census Bureau. As of this writing in August 2002, the Census Bureau had not yet released New Hampshire's 2000 "long-form" data, which includes measures of socioeconomic status such as educational attainment, median family income, and occupational status. Therefore, 1990 data was used. Towns and city wards with educational attainment and occupational status levels significantly below the national average were classified as "working-class" communities, and conversely, towns and city wards with levels significantly above national averages were classified as "elite" communities. Median family income also was considered as a factor, albeit not as significant as the first two variables.

Determining the socioeconomic status of New Hampshire's city wards proved especially difficult, because Census data is not provided for these units, as they are for towns. Therefore, the following procedure was followed: 1) Census block groups belonging to a particular ward were identified, using the 2000 Census maps available online at http://www2.census.gov/plmap/pl_blk/st33_NewHampshire; 2) Demographic data on these block groups were obtained from 1990 Census records, and 3) Block-group data were compiled and aggregated to provide an approximate demographic profile of the city ward.

This procedure was not without its difficulties, which the author will identify here. First, while the 1990 Census data are reasonably close in time to the 1988 and 1992 New Hampshire primaries, they are far away

in time from the 2000 primary. Data from 1990 was the best available, however, while waiting for the release of 2000 data. Second, the 2000 Census maps take into account the redrawing of city wards in the early 1990s. Thus, for purposes of analyzing the 1988 and 1992 New Hampshire returns, the author made the assumption that only minor changes in city ward lines were made in the early 1990s—in other words, that no ward was changed so drastically that it would lose its status as an elite or working-class ward. An exception to that case was made for the city of

Concord, which shifted from eight wards to ten in the early 1990s; in this case, information was obtained on wards from the city's Community Development Department.

2. For a list of the specific towns and wards classified as elite and working-class, contact the author at dscala@anselm.edu, or consult the appendices to his forthcoming book, *Stormy Weather: The New Hampshire Primary and Presidential Politics* (Palgrave MacMillan, December 2003).

References

Brownstein, Roland. 1999. "To Challenge Gore, Bradley Needs to Look Beyond Volvo Democrats." *The Los Angeles Times*, May 17.

Buell, Emmett. 2000. "The Changing Face of the New Hampshire Primary." In *In Pursuit of the White House 2000*, ed. William G. Mayer. New York: Chatham House.

Cohen, Marty, David Karol, Hans Noel, John Zaller. 2001. "Beating Reform: The Resurgence of Parties in Presidential Nominations, 1980

to 2000." Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco.

Cook, Rhodes. "New Hampshire Introductory Essay." http://www.rhodescook.com/analysis/presidential_primaries/nh/intro.html.

Witcover, Jules. 1977. *Marathon: The Pursuit of the Presidency 1972–1976*. New York: Viking Press.