

nominations were won by candidates clearly associated with factions. Some factional candidates, such as Ronald Reagan and Bill Clinton, did well in general elections; others (George McGovern, Barry Goldwater, William Jennings Bryan) did not. Factions also play an important gatekeeping role in nomination contests, vetoing candidates who are ideologically unacceptable or too closely aligned with opposing factions. DiSalvo notes the value placed by some factions on nominating candidates whom they can trust. He quotes an operative saying, “the one thing the AFL-CIO can’t forgive McGovern for is the one thing he can’t do anything about: if he’s nominated, he won’t owe labor anything” (p. 82). Indeed, the worry that a successful candidate might betray the factions that supported him was not misplaced, as evidenced, for example, by Rutherford Hayes. The Stalwart Republicans had accepted Hayes as a compromise candidate, not aligned with any of the party’s three factions, only to see his administration enact the civil service reforms they had most vehemently opposed.

Disappointed factions sometimes split from their parties, either to run third-party candidates (as the Progressive Republicans did in 1912 and the Southern Democrats in 1948 and 1968) or to vote for the candidate of the opposite party (as did the New York Mugwumps in 1884). From a party-centered point of view, running a third-party candidate can seem irrational. But, as DiSalvo shows, from a faction-centered point of view, it can make sense. Yes, by running Theodore Roosevelt as a third-party candidate, the Progressive Republicans contributed massively to the victory of Democrat Wilson. But, as noted, Wilson enacted key aspects of the Progressive agenda in a way that William Howard Taft almost certainly would not have. Other factional defections (Mugwumps in 1884, Southern Democrats in 1968) could also be seen as strategic voting from the point of view of policy preferences. Even Strom Thurmond’s 1948 third-party candidacy can be seen as strategic: If Harry Truman had lost (certainly a plausible outcome *ex ante*), one suspects that the southern faction would have emerged with more leverage against the rest of the Democratic Party.

In the course of pursuing their ideological goals, factions have shaped the internal organization of Congress, seeking strategic advantage via greater centralization or decentralization of power as circumstances dictated. Factions have structured the challenges and opportunities that presidents face in the pursuit of policy agendas. Factional conflict has propelled the major policy initiatives that have defined the development of the American state: Reconstruction, civil service, the major waves of economic regulation in the early twentieth century, and the new social regulation of the post-Vietnam years.

Current theories of political parties view them as forces that stabilize the potentially chaotic process of coalition formation. Scholars may disagree about the nature of party coalitions, but there is general agreement about the stabil-

ity they promote. DiSalvo’s study of factions shows, however, that far greater coalitional stability occurs at the factional level. From a social choice perspective, then, factions are more stable than parties. Members of a faction support each other more consistently than they support copartisans outside the faction. This statement verges on tautology: What could we mean by “faction” if not that? What the author shows us, however, is how important factions are. Jockeying and shuffling among factions is how competition among ideas and interests in the broader society reaches the institutions of government.

From a temporal perspective, however, factions are less stable than parties. Factions have shorter lifespans: DiSalvo estimates the durations of those he studies as ranging from 18 (Liberal-Labor Democrats) to 42 (Southern Democrats) years. The Democratic and Republican parties, in contrast, have endured for the century and a half spanned by his study. The lifespan of his factions is, however, comparable to the lifespan of parties in many countries that use proportional electoral systems. One might easily conjecture that a coalition of interests that remains a faction in the United States would be its own party in other countries. But parties (even small ones) in proportional systems are often themselves factionalized (e.g., the small German Green Party was divided into “Realo” and “Fundis” factions in the 1980s and 1990s.)

The ways in which party factions vary across countries and institutions is, of course, beyond the scope of *Engines of Change*, but it exemplifies an important feature. The book is a conversation starter. The focus on a single country and a limited (though far from short) time period allows a level of detail that would not be possible with a broader scope. The detail and nuance in these accounts of factional impact draws our attention to broader questions. When do parties nominate factional candidates? When do counterfactions organize? When does an ideological movement beget a faction? Are policy proposals more likely to succeed if they are promoted by a faction? To answer these questions, future studies may augment DiSalvo’s systematically compiled lists of factions and factional candidates with complementary events and observations: unified parties, nonfactional candidates, ideologies that had impact in the absence of an associated party faction. The book gives these future projects a basis to build on and a reason to incorporate factions into our understanding of party politics in a systematic fashion.

**Collaborative Governance: Private Roles for Public Goals in Turbulent Times.** By John D. Donahue and Richard J. Zeckhauser. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011. 320p. \$27.95 cloth, \$18.95 paper.  
doi:10.1017/S1537592713000467

— Jos C. N. Raadschelders, *The Ohio State University*

Governing has been a challenge ever since people became sedentary and started to live together in ever larger

concentrations. As time unfolded, governing intensified as it became more complex. In the Western world, we now live in imagined communities where the bulk of the population lives in urban areas. It is in the context of densely populated urban environments that governments will and cannot but seek the aid of nonprofit and private actors if they desire to meet citizen demand. The concept of *governance* captures the extent to which public organizations in the current situation must collaborate with nonprofit and private actors for the delivery of collective services. While public organizations still, and will continue to, deal with multitudes of ordinary problems, it is the “wicked problems” that more than ever require multi-agency, intergovernmental, nonprofit, and private-sector collaboration. Civil servants, and especially the *policy bureaucrats* (cf. Edward C. Page and Bill Jenkins, *Policy Bureaucracy: Governing with a Cast of Thousands*, 2005), cannot but engage in multiple interactions with a wide range of actors if they wish to address the many “wicked” challenges that cannot adequately be addressed by a singular organization.

Does government lack the will, the skill, and the wallet to meet its missions, as John Donahue and Richard Zeckhauser write in the opening sentence of the inside jacket text (also p. 3) of their book? Not really. Indeed, the authors have been evenhanded, showing that any actor in a collaborative governance (CG) arrangement can succeed or fail depending on the institutional arrangements that secure and assure public service delivery. Central to their evocative description of CG is that it is an iterative process, a *cycle of collaboration*, in which the various partners analyze, assign, design, and assess (p. 224).

The operative concepts are *shared discretion* and *monitoring* or *oversight* to assure that discretion is not abused. Too often are private and nonprofit actors guided by self-interest (e.g., pp. 141, 153, 233, 272). Referring to the 2008 collapse of the financial markets in the United States, the authors point to the dangers of unwatched outside monitors, noting that the “major bond-rating services—handsomely paid for keeping close tabs on risk—fell somewhere on the spectrum from comatose to corrupt” (p. 216). They liken the role of government to that of a ringmaster in a circus who oversees all performers and all animals and who has a sophisticated understanding of all that happens under “the big top” (pp. 236–38). While intriguing, the ringmaster analogy does not really work. After all, a situation of true CG cannot but have many ringmasters (cf. shared discretion; see also Robert Agranoff, *Collaborating to Manage: A Primer for the Public Sector*, 2012). Implicitly, the authors acknowledge such when they write that “government serves multiple masters with complex objectives” (p. 232) and that the “collaborative model combines humility about government’s operational capacity with an insistence that government cannot abdicate its primordial role in designating legitimate collective mis-

sions” (p. 257). CG or not, government is still the only actor that can make authoritative decisions on behalf of the entire citizenry!

Case studies are sprinkled throughout the text and the authors convincingly make their case for CG. It is a pleasurable read, not bogged down by scholarly jargon and showing—in between the lines—that CG is not “yet” another fashion in the arsenal of public policy instruments but a necessity that requires careful attention. Footnotes clearly show how they have mined scholarly literature, but there are omissions. Why mention the work of Mancur Olson, Oliver Williamson, Robert Axelrod, and Ronald Coase on collective action (p. 5, n. 2) but not Elinor Ostrom’s work on collaborative arrangements at the local level; the coproduction literature of the 1980s; the 1987 Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations report, “The Organization of Local Public Economies,” that distinguished between provision, production, and governance; the public–private partnership (PPP) literature of the 1980s and 1990s; and the network literature of the past 20 years? (In all fairness, PPP is mentioned briefly on p. 256.) However, it is easy to fault the authors for what they did not promise to do. There are a few comments, though, that came across as awkward.

The first and most important comment concerns government’s skill, will, and wallet, as mentioned earlier. The alliteration is great, but too easily plays upon stereotypical ideas about government performance. With regard to skill, let us make sure that we know what is at issue here. The skill is there, in government. There are very few and perhaps even no (Western) governments that lack the skills and knowledge to consider, in-house, what needs to be done; governments have hired whatever expertise they thought was needed. Thus, governments hire for many skills, and they know how to find these skills too. As for “will,” I can only say that governments have the ability to adapt. Like the new guardians Hegel wrote about in the early nineteenth century, civil servants are usually able to deal with whatever problem is handed to them by elected (and, in the United States, politically appointed) officeholders. Bureaucracy’s scenarios (in anticipation of election outcomes) have been productive and career civil servants have been able to cut into their own flesh (Patrick Dunleavy, *Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice: Economic Explanations in Political Science*, 1991). As for the wallet, governments are limited by what taxpayers are willing to share. People may not like high marginal tax rates, but the reality is that government cannot do its work without ample revenue. Let us keep in mind that it is skill and will that make government actually perform quite well, despite lack of adequate revenue. Remember, it is only the failures that are newsworthy and reported; we will never read how “once again, government actors have been successful in 98% of their actions.”

A second comment that struck me is that “officials and bureaucrats can wall themselves off from public accountability and *feather their own nests*” (p. 23; emphasis added). Perhaps elected officeholders have that opportunity, but how many civil servants really do? I know plenty of career civil servants—in the United States and elsewhere—who are not in the business of feathering their own nests.

A third comment puzzled me: The authors call the delegation of tax collection to private revenue agents in ancient Rome and the British East Indian Companies (BEIC) examples of CG. Let us be clear. There is no CG conceivable before the early nineteenth century. Tax farming was widespread until the 1850s and cause for much unrest among the disenfranchised. Most rebellions started as tax revolts. And the BEIC exemplifies how the social, economic, and political elites of the day (one small, happy family) managed to wall off the exploitation of far lands from domestic politics. In fact, those in politics also held positions in corporations such as the BEIC.

When all is said and done, Donahue and Zeckhauser have written an appealing book that, once again, conceives of collaboration as possible. *Collaborative Governance* targets the world of both practitioners and policy bureaucrats. It is pragmatic, as Associate Justice Stephen Breyer observes in his foreword. The scholarship upon which the book is based cannot be doubted, but the authors first and foremost desired to reach out to the real world by displaying successful and failing efforts at CG. So they believe in its potential, but do not come across as acolytes or salesmen peddling a product. Justice Breyer’s final remark is on the mark; the authors are nonideological, while at the same time being idealistic in their message: It is time to recognize that “government is not ‘us vs. them’; rather, government is ‘us *and* them,’ working together” (p. xiii; emphasis original). The public, nonprofit, and private sectors will need one another to meet on the basis of respect for the strengths of the other. This book’s optimism is a delightful step in that direction.

### **American Politicians Confront the Court: Opposition Politics and Changing Responses to Judicial Power.**

By Stephen M. Engel. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011. 408p. \$99.00 cloth, \$32.99 paper. doi:10.1017/S1537592713000479

— David F. Ericson, *George Mason University*

This is a highly ambitious book. It integrates the scholarship on American political culture, party development, judicial politics, and legal history. It also utilizes several of the key conceptual tools of the American political development literature, such as “courts and parties,” “situated rationality,” “institutional thickening,” and “policy entrepreneurship.” Given Stephen Engel’s high ambitions, it is not surprising that the payoff falls somewhat short of the promise. Nonetheless, the book has significant payoffs.

The author’s central argument is that changing evaluations of the legitimacy of party competition explains the changing nature of antijudicial politics in the United States. More precisely, the argument is that the shift from the dominant party viewing the opposition party as illegitimate to recognizing the legitimacy of political opposition explains the shift from undermining to harnessing strategies directed toward the federal judiciary. At that point, the intention of party leaders is not to undermine judicial authority but, rather, to harness it to some partisan policy objective, such as by encouraging the Supreme Court to make decisions more supportive of New Deal programs (Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s court-packing scheme), or to gain some partisan electoral advantage, such as by attacking an “activist” Court, because such attacks play well with the party faithful (the threatened impeachment of William O. Douglas). The corollary is also important. What does *not* explain the shift in the nature of antijudicial politics is the emergence of a norm of judicial supremacy because then we would expect to see a decline in antijudicial politics rather than merely a shift in its nature.

This is a novel argument. It revises the emergence of “judicial supremacy” literature (by Robert Clinton, Justin Crowe, and Barry Friedman). It also contests the revisionist scholarship (of Robert Dahl, Mark Graber, and Keith Whittington) that claims the judiciary’s “counter-majoritarian difficulty” is not really a difficulty, at least not for long, because the judiciary is integrated into a policy regime that encourages supportive rather than antagonistic relations among the three branches of government. Engel’s book is at its best when it recounts how the antagonism remains, as in Congress’s reactive court-curbing attempts in school-integration cases and in its preemptive jurisdiction-stripping attempts in “enemy combatant” cases.

Engel also provides a convincing explanation of the changing evaluations of party competition. His explanation works on a cultural level, as he tracks a gradual shift from civic republicanism to liberal pluralism. Civic republicans hold a unitary view of the public good so that if multiple views of the public good exist, one or more of those views must be wrong. In contrast, liberal pluralists admit, and even embrace, the legitimacy of multiple views of the public good. The novelty of Engel’s account is how he applies this distinction to constitutional interpretation, as an expansion of legitimate interpretive methodologies, from “originalist” to “living constitution.” The author also allows for the possibility of reversal, highlighting the recent revival of originalist methodologies.

Engel’s broader argument is, however, problematic on two counts. First, the shift from undermining to harnessing strategies could well be an indication of the emergence of the norm of judicial supremacy. The author repeatedly claims that if such a norm exists, then we would not see repeated attacks on the Supreme Court. But he never addresses the counterargument that harnessing strategies