

The Retreat of the West

Peter Trubowitz and Brian Burgoon

The West is turning inward. Donald Trump's presidency, Britain's decision to leave the European Union, and the spread of populist parties in Europe are the most visible signs of this retreat. The shift is not as recent as these examples suggest, however. Drawing on an array of cross-national data for twenty-four industrialized democracies and hundreds of political parties in those democracies, we show that domestic support for liberal internationalism has been receding for twenty-five years across the West. We show that since the end of the Cold War a large and widening gap has opened up between Western democracies' international ambitions and their domestic political capacity to support them. As Western governments came to rely increasingly on economic globalization, institutionalized cooperation, and multilateral governance, mainstream parties that backed these efforts lost electoral ground to parties on the radical-left and increasingly, the anti-globalist radical-right that have been the vehicles of the current backlash. We discuss the implications of these trends for the Western liberal international order and the strategies now on offer to repair it.


Is the West in retreat? Is the era of Western liberal dominance led by a preeminent America over? While it may be premature to declare the era of Western ascendancy over, domestic support for liberal internationalism is weakening across the West. On issues ranging from immigration, to international trade, to global governance, political parties on the ultra-left and ultra-right are rejecting core principles of liberal internationalism that have long united Western democracies. Radical-left and radical-right parties are offering alternative, divisive foreign policies and party platforms. Established mainstream political parties—Social Democratic, Christian Democratic, and Conservative and Liberal—long the


backbone of the West's defense against illiberalism from abroad, are now on the political defensive at home. Older parties are groping for answers to challenges to the liberal international order that are home-grown, and that show little sign of easing anytime soon.

Much of the debate over the crisis of the Western liberal international order has focused on recent changes: Donald Trump's "America First" presidency, Britain's decision to leave the European Union, and the surge of nationalist sentiment in France, Germany and other Western democracies (e.g., Haass 2017; Luce 2017). We show that the decline in domestic support for liberal internationalism is not as recent as these examples suggest. An array of cross-

A list of permanent links to Supplemental Materials provided by the authors precedes the References section.

**Data replication sets are available in Harvard Dataverse at: <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVNI/X0LYXD>*

Peter Trubowitz  is Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science, where he is also Director of the United States Centre at the LSE (p.trubowitz@lse.ac.uk). His research focuses on international security, domestic politics and foreign policy, and party politics. He is the author of *Politics and Strategy: Partisan Ambition and American Statecraft* (Princeton University Press, 2011) and *Defining the National Interest: Conflict and Change in U.S. Foreign Policy* (University of Chicago Press, 1998).

Brian Burgoon  is Professor of International and Comparative Political Economy at the University of Amsterdam, where he is also Academic Director of the Amsterdam Institute for Social Science Research (b.m.burgoon@uva.nl). His research focuses on the politics of economic globalization, welfare and labor-markets, and comparative immigration policy. His many articles have been published in journals such as *International Organization*, *World Politics*, *Politics and Society*, *Comparative Political Studies*, and *Review of International Political Economy*.

For helpful comments they are indebted to Michael Bernhard, Catherine Boone, Peter Katzenstein, Kyle Lascurettes, Alexander Trubowitz, the anonymous reviewers at Perspectives on Politics, and to seminar participants at the LSE, Hertie School of Governance, and University of Amsterdam.

national data from 1970 through 2017 for twenty-four OECD countries and some 400 political parties shows clearly that party and voter support for liberal internationalism has been receding in Western democracies for a quarter century. We analyze changes in the level and nature of Western government and party support for liberal internationalism from its Cold War apex in the 1970s through the present era and show that government policy and party politics are now visibly out of alignment. A large and widening gap has opened up between the West's international ambitions and its domestic political capacity to support them.

We show that during the Cold War mainstream parties were the bedrock of the Western liberal international order. Across the West, political leaders could advance liberal internationalist policies safe in the knowledge that a broad cross-section of political parties representing the vast majority of the electorate would support these policies. This began to change in the 1990s, as Western governments came to rely increasingly on liberalized trade, institutionalized cooperation, and multilateral governance. Mainstream parties that backed and promoted these efforts began to lose electoral ground to anti-globalist parties on the radical-left and increasingly, on the radical-right. The populist backlash against Western governments that we see today represents an intensification of a process that has been visible across the OECD for over two decades.¹

In making this argument about the erosion of liberal internationalism's domestic foundations, we model government policy and political parties' commitments to liberal internationalism along two separate but related foreign policy dimensions, which we call "power" and "partnership." By power, we mean a commitment to invest domestic resources in national militaries and national defense capabilities and maintaining military preparedness. By partnership, we mean a commitment to economic openness, institutionalized cooperation, and multilateral governance. This two-dimensional model yields four combinations of what can be conceptualized as varying levels of investment in power and partnership, each of which corresponds to four recognizable strategies or approaches to international statecraft: globalism; liberal internationalism; "restraint"; and nationalism.

Using this two-dimensional framework, we show that the defining feature of liberal internationalism during the Cold War was Western democracies' commitment to *both* power and partnership. It is this double commitment that has unraveled since the Cold War ended. As Western governments came to rely increasingly on international partnership, Western voters turned gradually away from mainstream parties promoting liberal internationalism in favor of anti-globalist parties advocating foreign policy strategies of restraint and nationalism. It was only a matter of time until political entrepreneurs like Donald Trump,

Boris Johnson, and others found a way to exploit voters' disillusionment with liberal internationalism for electoral gain. Today, Western democracies are reaping the bitter harvest of years of neglecting voters' resentment and anger about the rising costs of their governments' foreign policies in terms of economic security and national sovereignty.

A variety of cross-national data characterizing the foreign policy orientations of Western democracies support these arguments about the growing disconnect between Western governments and their electorates. These include indicators measuring national spending on guns and butter, as well as various indices measuring the degree to which countries' foreign policies promote international economic openness, membership in international organizations, and the signing of multilateral treaties, among others. We rely on party manifesto and electoral data to measure party and voter support for liberalized trade, military spending and preparedness, and international institutions and multilateral governance. Taken together, these measures allow us to test our arguments about liberal internationalism's trajectory since the height of the Cold War and the growing gap between the West's international commitments and its domestic political capacity to support them since the East-West struggle ended.

Our analysis supports three important claims. First, we show that Western governments' approach to international order-building has changed in important ways in the past quarter-century. During the Cold War era, the United States, Europe, and most of the rest of the OECD shared a vision of liberal international order that rested on a robust commitment by their governments to both military power and international partnership. By contrast, since the end of the Cold War Western governments have invested fewer resources in power (military spending as a percent of GDP declined rapidly in most OECD nations) while investing heavily in partnership through liberalized trade agreements and multilateral treaties and governing arrangements. Western governments shifted from a strategy of liberal internationalism that relied on both partnership and power, to what we call a strategy of globalism that put greater emphasis on partnership. The West's reliance on international partnership accelerated in the 1990s and continued through the 2008 global financial crisis to the current era.

Second, we show that while Western government investment in economic liberalization and institutionalized cooperation has increased since the end of the Cold War, party support for these foreign policies has not kept pace. We show that the mainstream parties that promoted and sustained liberal internationalism during the long struggle between East and West have been steadily losing electoral and legislative ground to radical-left and, increasingly, radical-right parties pushing anti-globalist platforms and agendas. Our data show that this process began at the pinnacle of American (and Western) triumphalism

following the end of the Cold War (Fukuyama 1989; Krauthammer 1990). Indeed, we show that radical-right parties have directly benefited from running on party platforms that oppose international partnership. Today, the mainstream party foundation of the West's liberal international order is a pale shadow of what it was during the height of the Cold War.

Third, we show that what is true of Western democracies in general is also true of the West's preeminent power: America. Its commitment to international partnership also increased, albeit less conspicuously and less fully than European democracies did. The United States has always been less willing to pool sovereignty and sacrifice power for partnership than have many of its allies. Nevertheless, since the end of the Cold War, the United States has also invested more heavily on the partnership side of the power-partnership ledger, its wars in Afghanistan and Iraq notwithstanding. Americans may be from Mars and Europeans may be from Venus, to paraphrase Robert Kagan's (2002) famous formulation, but in the thirty years since the collapse of the Soviet empire, what stands out is not how different America's and Europe's approaches to liberal international order-building are, but rather their similarities.

This paper is organized into five sections. The first section sketches out our two-dimensional framework for analyzing Western democracies' foreign policy preferences and the domestic trade-offs that investing in partnership and power involve. In section two, we describe our approach to measuring changes in Western governments' foreign policies and document their growing reliance on foreign policies of international partnership since the 1990s to strengthen and expand the liberal international order. We show that there has been a clear shift in the balance between Western foreign policies favoring partnership, and policies favoring power. Section three examines Western party support for foreign policy by party type or family. We show that party support for both international partnership and military power tends to be higher among mainstream parties than among parties on the radical-left and radical-right. In section four, we show how relative vote shares for mainstream and radical parties affect their governments' investment in liberal internationalist policies. We also document the decline in Western voter support for parties favoring international partnership and show how radical-right populist parties are capitalizing on it electorally. We conclude by considering the implications of our findings for the future of the Western liberal international order and strategies now on offer to repair it.

Power, Partnership, and International Order


Nearly twenty years ago, Robert Kagan challenged the widely held notion that the West shared a common view of international order-building (Kagan 2002). Americans,

Kagan argued, were more apt to rely on power and coercion to promote international order and stability. By contrast, Europeans preferred diplomacy, negotiation, and partnership to manage international conflict and strengthen the international order. Ever since, international relations scholars and foreign policy analysts have debated the extent of Western differences over foreign policy, how best to characterize them (as a clash of ideas or interests, or as Kagan suggested, of values), and the sources of these differing strategic cultures or perspectives (Anderson, Ikenberry, and Risse 2008; Dorman and Kaufman 2011; Lake 2018; Lindberg 2005). Most of these efforts, including Kagan's own formulation, assume, implicitly or explicitly, that Western approaches to international order can best be represented along a single continuum: power versus diplomacy, unilateralism versus multilateralism, modernity versus post-modernity, among others.

One-dimensional models like Kagan's are suggestive, but they presuppose high levels of global engagement. In Kagan's model, what distinguishes Western democracies from one another is not the *level* of support for international engagement, but the *type* of engagement and leadership they favor. Americans, Kagan argues, are more likely to invest in military power to manage international problems. Europeans prefer diplomacy and negotiation to power politics. Yet as suggested by Donald Trump's "America First" credo, Britain's Brexit vote, and the surge in support for populist parties in Europe, many Western politicians and their followers do not favor international engagement across the board. These politicians see no intrinsic value in policies and institutions that actively promote freer trade, open immigration, common defense, and other features of the liberal international order. The existing models leave little room for leaders, parties, or movements like these that oppose deep international engagement and favor other forms of international order. The nationalist and populist surge today thus exposes the limits of models of Western democracies' foreign policy strategies like Kagan's, which focus only on different understandings of and approaches to internationalism, but not support for or opposition to it.

We argue that to model the political dynamics driving the current debate over the future of the West, internationalism itself should be conceptualized along two separate dimensions. We call these power and partnership, as in figure 1. Here, the horizontal dimension measures the extent to which Western democracies invest domestic resources in building up national militaries and national defense capabilities and in maintaining military preparedness.² Because states' resources are limited, political leaders must decide how much military power is enough and whether to rely on strategies that make fewer demands on the government's resources (Brodie 1965; Oatley 2015; Trubowitz 2011). Political economists often describe this

Figure 1
Structure of Western debate over international order



trade-off as a choice between guns and butter. States must decide how much to spend on national defense (guns) versus social welfare (butter). Where leaders, parties, and voters stand on this continuum tells us something about the relative weight they attach to international and domestic priorities.

The vertical dimension in figure 1 refers to international partnership. It measures the extent to which Western democracies actively promote international economic openness, institutionalized cooperation, and multilateral governance arrangements. Here, too, political leaders face choices and trade-offs. They must decide how much discretion over national policies to surrender in order to comply with standards set by international institutions, treaties, and agreements (Hafner-Burton, Mansfield, and Pevehouse 2015). There is an extensive literature on when and why states elect to voluntarily pay what Moravcsik (2000) aptly calls the “sovereignty costs” of international cooperation (e.g., Ikenberry 2001; Lake 2009; Ruggie 1982). Motivations can vary from gaining access to larger markets and capital, to bolstering physical security through alliances, to reassuring foreign investors about

states’ commitment to private property rights, and so on. The vertical dimension tells us something about how willing states are to pool authority internationally to achieve such valued national goals.

This two-dimensional model yields four permutations of “power and partnership”: “partnership over power” (quadrant 1), “power plus partnership” (quadrant 2), “little power or partnership” (quadrant 3), and “power over partnership” (quadrant 4). These combinations are consistent with four identifiable strategies or foreign policy approaches: globalism (quadrant 1); liberal internationalism (quadrant 2); the strategy known as “selective engagement” in the 1990s and that today is often referred to as “restraint” (quadrant 3);³ and nationalism (quadrant 4). We briefly describe each of these general approaches to international order, starting with “globalism” in quadrant 1.

Globalism favors partnership over power. Globalists view power politics, militarism, and nationalism as root causes of international instability and war, and see international openness, institutionalized cooperation, and multilateral governing arrangements that pool sovereignty

as means to curb nationalist passions, make borders more porous, and check hegemonic ambitions. Investing in partnership fosters peaceful relations, promotes commerce, and spreads liberal values, or so globalists argue (Angell 1912; Held 1995). Robert Cooper characterizes contemporary Western democracies that subscribe to these liberal principles and Kantian ideals as “postmodern”—postmodern because they rely on “moral consciousness,” the rule of law, and institutionalized cooperation instead of traditional *raison d'état*, military strength, and balance of power to manage the risks and uncertainties associated with international anarchy (Cooper 2000). States that firmly locate themselves in this quadrant invest fewer resources in military power and are reluctant to use it for purposes other than mutual self-defense and the protection of human rights. Woodrow Wilson’s failed plan for building an open international order of law and institutions was an early attempt at this approach to international order-building. Today’s supranational European Union, which pools sovereignty and guarantees the free movement of goods, capital, services, and people across borders, stands as its greatest achievement (Birchfield, Krige, and Young 2017).

If globalists favor partnership over power, liberal internationalists (quadrant 2) seek to fuse the two into one. Liberal internationalists also see international commerce, institutionalized cooperation, and multilateral diplomacy as means to tame national ambition, encourage political moderation, and foster international community. Yet they also think power has its place, and they are not reluctant to use it to defend national borders, balance against foreign threats, or promote democratic values (Kupchan and Trubowitz 2007). In a world of sovereign states, liberal internationalists do not think the Hobbesian challenges of preserving security can be solved, but they think those challenges can be managed if partnership is supported by power. As John Ikenberry has persuasively argued, this very intuition lies at the core of the liberal international order that the West built after World War II, and in the thinking of its chief architect, Franklin Delano Roosevelt (Ikenberry 2009). Scholars and policy-makers who associate liberal internationalism with globalism are thus not wrong. Liberal internationalism does entail a commitment to institutionalized cooperation and multilateral governance, along with international openness (Hoffman 1995). But for much of the post-World War II era, liberal internationalism also involved a commitment to invest in national military power as a complement to international partnership. Indeed, this dual commitment to power and partnership is liberal internationalism’s distinguishing feature (Brooks and Wohlforth 2016; Kupchan and Trubowitz 2007; Hoffmann 1995).

In contrast to liberal internationalism, the strategy of restraint (quadrant 3) attaches comparatively little weight to international institutions and multilateral governance.


At best, proponents of restraint see international institutions as irrelevant; at worst, they consider them a threat to national sovereignty. Advocates of restraint take a dim view of large, expensive armies and the unnecessary risks they pose, whether this be the risk of centralization of power, of stoking imperial ambitions, or of strategic over-expansion. In principle, proponents of restraint oppose or are deeply skeptical of both power and partnership (Gholz and Press 2001; Posen 2014; Sapolsky et al. 2009).⁴ However, in the real world, this “ideal point” is nearly impossible to achieve. As a practical matter, restraint’s advocates often find themselves playing defense, arguing for ways to manage international involvement with the least possible risk and cost. In the American context, restraint is most closely identified with Thomas Jefferson and his vision of a national “empire of liberty,” free of standing armies and entangling alliances that were commonplace in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Europe (Tucker and Hendrickson 1990). Today, libertarians are its principal champions.

Nationalists (quadrant 4) share restrainers’ aversion to international institutions and multilateral governance. They think first and foremost about national sovereignty. However, unlike restrainers, who worry as much about the dangers of militarism as the risks of pooling sovereignty, nationalists strongly support building and maintaining large armies. They are also not hesitant to use firepower to protect vital *national* interests: territorial boundaries; spheres-of-influence; core economic interests (e.g., export markets, trade routes, raw materials). As John Mearsheimer points out, in this crucial respect, nationalists are close cousins of realists (Mearsheimer, 2018). Populists like France’s Marine Le Pen belong in this nationalist quadrant. In her run for the French presidency, she vowed to invest more of France’s GDP in defense while liberating it from the “tyrannies” of globalization and the European Union (Henley 2017). Donald Trump, whose foreign policy evokes comparisons to the country’s first populist president, Andrew Jackson, belongs here, too (Mead 2017). Like Jackson, Trump sees military power the way he sees economic power: as a means to promote narrowly defined national interests.

The Erosion of Liberal Internationalism

We use this conceptual framework to map out Western democracies’ foreign policy preferences and consider whether they have changed over time, and if so, along which two underlying dimensions. In this section, we focus on Western governments’ policies.⁵ We constructed government policy output indicators for power and partnership for twenty-four OECD countries.⁶ For *power*, we rely on total national defense expenditure (share of GDP) published by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI 2018). Military spending as a share of GDP is a widely used indicator by international relations

Figure 2
Western support for international partnership and military power, 1970–2016



scholars, diplomatic historians, and foreign policy analysts to assess states’ willingness to invest in military power (e.g., Gaddis 2005; Oatley 2015; Mearsheimer 2001).⁷ This metric is deeply woven into the fabric of public discourse in Western democracies and figures prominently in national election campaigns and public debates like the current one over “burden sharing” within NATO (e.g., Cordesman 2018).⁸ While it does not directly measure Western democracies’ propensity to use military force, previous research shows that public support for military spending is highly correlated with public support for the actual use of force (Eichenberg and Stoll 2017).⁹

For *partnership*, we rely on KOF Swiss Economic Institute indices measuring government *policies* to promote and regulate economic and political globalization (Dreher 2006; Gygli et al. 2019).¹⁰ KOF’s economic globalization policy index monitors variations in tariff rates, trade regulations and taxes, capital account openness, and international trade and investment agreements —policy tools that governments use to stimulate or restrict cross-border flows of goods, capital, services. KOF’s political globalization policy index measures country membership in international organizations, signed international treaties, and how multilateral its treaties are.¹¹ Together, they capture the extent to which a country’s government invests in institutionalized cooperation and multilateral governance. Our partnership measure is a composite index of these two KOF indices from 1970 through 2016.¹²

Figure 2 summarizes the results of our aggregated and longitudinal analysis of Western democracies’ support for

power and partnership. The horizontal axis represents the level of Western government investment in military strength and preparedness (military power). The vertical axis represents the level of Western government policy support for economic and political globalization (international partnership). To provide reference points, we set the axes in figure 2 using the full-sample country-year medians with respect to the spatial distribution of countries (110 countries total in the sample) and time period (1970–2016). These yield rough approximations of the four quadrants discussed in figure 1. For ease of visual interpretation, we label the four combinations of power and partnership in the corners of their respective quadrants in figure 2. While the KOF data does not cover the entire post-World War II era, it does span enough of that era to enable us to compare and contrast Western democracies’ support for liberal internationalist policies during and after the Cold War.¹³

Figure 2 broadly conforms to expectations. During the 1970s and 1980s, the West as a whole clearly favored an approach to international order-building that relied *equally* on military power and international partnership. It is located in the top right quadrant. Forged in the shadow of the Cold War, the West’s liberal internationalist strategy was organized around two regional axes, with the United States at the center of each. One was an Atlantic axis binding North America and Western Europe; the other, a Pacific axis tying Japan and other non-communist Asian nations to the United States. Similar economic, political, and military means were used to develop and expand both halves of the system, albeit in different

combinations and at different rates. Often described as *Pax Americana*, the Western system was dominated by the United States. However, it was not a distinctively American system, or unilaterally imposed by Washington. European and Japanese leaders saw geopolitical benefits in a system that combined power with partnership (Forsberg 2000; Lunderstad 1986).

Of course, geopolitical imperatives were not the only reason Western democracies favored liberal internationalism. As John Ruggie (1982) and others have argued, Western support for liberal internationalism also rested on a crucial domestic bargain—the so-called compromise of “embedded liberalism.” In the 1930s, Western democracies’ commitment to full employment, social insurance, and the welfare state expanded. At Bretton Woods, Western policy-makers looking to rebuild the postwar world economy agreed to preserve those domestic commitments, and the peace between capital and labor they bought. Western policymakers struck a balance between international openness and national autonomy that kept globalization within manageable bounds during the Cold War (Rodrik 2011). Despite considerable variation in institutional make-up, Western democracies each found ways to harmonize economic openness with social protection at a time of East-West rivalry.

Liberal internationalism allowed the West to achieve a level of integration and coherence that set it apart from the rest. Yet even before the Soviet empire collapsed in the early 1990s, the West’s commitment to liberal internationalism’s distinctive combination of power and partnership had weakened. While Western governments continued to invest in military power, the economic slowdown of the 1970s led them to do so at a lower and declining rate.¹⁴ Meanwhile, Western governments in the 1980s began moving increasingly away from the managed globalization of the postwar era toward a more market-based “neoliberal” approach. In the trade realm, for example, Western leaders launched the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations that led to lower global tariffs and the strengthening of international authorities’ hands to settle trade disputes through the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Western governments also deepened their commitment to regional integration. In Europe, the European Community was expanded. The 1986 “Single European Act” created a single market in goods and services and transformed the European Commission into a powerful agent for market liberalization. In North America, the 1983 Caribbean Basin Initiative was followed in 1988 by the U.S.-Canadian free trade agreement. In Asia, an Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum was created to promote freer trade in the region.


In the 1990s, the West’s reliance on international partnership accelerated. As figure 2 indicates, over the course of the 1980s the center of gravity in the West shifted from a strategy relying on both international

partnership and military power to one privileging partnership at the expense of power. Between 1990 and 2016, the average level of defense spending as a percentage of GDP in Western democracies continued to drop, falling from 2.5% to 1.4%. Less power on average did not mean less partnership, however. During this period, Western capitals’ willingness to pool authority internationally increased across a wide range of issues (Blyth 2002; Gygli et al. 2019, 562; Pevehouse, Nordstrom, and Warnke 2004).¹⁵ The West’s security architecture was also reshaped and updated. In Europe, this involved the unification of Germany and the integration of the former Warsaw Pact states and Soviet Baltic republics into NATO (and the European Union). In Asia, Washington and Tokyo reaffirmed their alliance commitments. Meanwhile, regional integration in Europe, North America, and Asia-Pacific continued apace on a wide range of economic and political issues.¹⁶

Western investment in international partnership reached its apex in the early 2000s before leveling-off and even modestly dropping. As figure 2 indicates, Western government support for international openness and international cooperation was not shaken by the Iraq War or by the 2008 global financial crisis. As we show later, the war did not drive the West apart. Nor did the Great Recession lead to “deglobalization.” After the initial shock, global trade, investment, and output rebounded. One important reason is that the existing international institutional architecture proved to be far more robust than expected (Drezner 2014). In the area of international trade, the WTO was able to prevent or at least limit many forms of trade policy backsliding. Whatever tariff and non-tariff barriers Western governments adopted in the short term were offset by increased participation in multilateral institutions and treaties and growing enthusiasm for regional and bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs).¹⁷ As figure 2 indicates, ten years after the 2008 crash, Western government policies promoting trade, institutionalized cooperation, and multilateral governance continued to dwarf levels reached in the 1970s and 1980s.

What is true of the West as a whole is also true of its two most influential actors: the European Union and the United States. Figure 3 reports the results for the EU and the United States. We also include Japan for comparative purposes, given that the Japanese Constitution inhibits military investment comparable to most Western powers.¹⁸ We see in figure 3 that over the entire time period, there is very little distance between the EU-15 and the United States over international partnership (vertical dimension) and that as EU support for international openness and cooperation increases, so does U.S. support.¹⁹ On the horizontal dimension (military power), the distance between the EU-15 and the United States narrows over time.²⁰ Overall, though, the EU and United States follow the general pattern we see in figure 2.

Figure 3
Western support for international partnership and military power by major power, 1970–2016



In the 1980s, Western governments move away from a strategy that relies heavily on both power and partnership (liberal internationalism) to one that relies increasingly on partnership (globalism), and this process accelerates in the 1990s and early 2000s. While Washington never fully embraces globalism, it does follow a path that is strikingly similar to the EU's.

Japan's trajectory is clearly different than America's and Europe's. Not surprisingly, Japanese investment in power is extremely low by Western standards. Japanese defense spending averaged less than one percent (0.96%) during the 1990s through 2000s. This is not significantly different than Japan's defense burden during the 1970s and 1980s, when it averaged 0.89% of GDP. Yet like the EU-15 and the United States, Japan's investment in international partnership increases over time, and substantially so during the 1990s and especially, the 2000s. This was a very active period of Japanese diplomacy. In the 2000s, Japan signed free trade agreements with Singapore (2002) and Mexico (2005). Similar trade negotiations were launched with the Philippines, Thailand, and Malaysia, among other countries in the region (Urata 2009). Tokyo also expanded its level of participation in multilateral peacekeeping and non-lethal international security missions (Liff 2015). In short, as Japan invested more heavily in international partnership, its foreign policy priorities more closely aligned with America's and Europe's.

Taken together, the patterns in figures 2 and 3 tell us two important things. First, with few exceptions Western democracies have followed a similar foreign policy path

from Cold War to the present. Once deeply committed to liberal internationalism, Western governments turned increasingly toward a strategy of globalism and foreign policies that relied more on partnership than on power. In the aftermath of the Cold War, this realignment gathered speed in the 1990s and then slowed and leveled off in the 2000s where it has continued to the present. Second, contra early post-Cold War predictions that the West would quickly divide and splinter over economic and security issues in the absence of geopolitical imperatives, the West became more integrated (and larger geographically).²¹ The September 11 attacks, the Iraq War, and the Great Recession did not fundamentally alter the path Western governments followed for the next quarter century. Yet as we will show, Western governments' commitment to ever-greater internationalization was not matched by a corresponding increase in domestic political support. As Western democracies' international ambitions expanded, they became increasingly detached from what their parties and voters were willing to support.

The West's "Vital Center"

In 1949, the historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. published *The Vital Center*, a best-selling call to arms (Schlesinger 1949). Often remembered as an appeal for bipartisanship, the term "vital center" actually referred to a middle point on the political spectrum, lying between radical-left politics and radical right-wing parties. Schlesinger saw mainstream parties of the late 1940s as Cold War liberalism's

best defense against the spread of Soviet-style communism or a possible resurgence of the *laissez-faire* capitalism that resulted in depression and war. Though writing principally for an American audience, Schlesinger's view that mainstream parties offered the best hope for guaranteeing security and prosperity echoed public sentiment in Britain, France, Germany, and other Western democracies. As we show in this section, mainstream parties—Christian Democratic and Social Democratic, Conservative and Liberal—have in fact been liberal internationalism's staunchest advocates, opposing the pacifism and “one-worldism” of the extreme left and the narrow nationalism and xenophobia of the extreme right.

Our analysis here draws on the Manifesto Project database. This is a widely-used database of political manifestos (party platforms) for individual political parties, by country and by election year (c.f. Benoit, Mikhaylov, and Laver 2009; Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 2006).²² The Manifesto Project database includes all OECD countries and over 455 political parties from our sample years 1970 to 2017. The coding unit in the Manifesto Project database is the number of sentences or sentence fragments (quasi-sentences) in party platforms that give attention to or take a position on a particular issue (e.g., trade, military preparedness, European Union). Here we focus on the variables that include a pro- and an anti-position taken on issues relevant to military power or international partnership (Burgoon 2009; Colantone and Stanig 2018). This allows us to measure the broad salience of a given issue in a party's platform, as well as to gauge the level of support for or opposition to a given position (e.g., for or against more open trade) by individual party and more importantly for our purposes, by party family.

Our Manifesto measure of “military power” refers to the percentage of total sentences or quasi-sentences in favor of military spending, preparedness, security, and defense generally *minus* the percentage of statements expressing doubt and criticism of defense spending, military conscription, and the use of military power to solve conflict.²³ Our “international partnership” support measure is equally broad and inclusive. It refers to the percentage of total sentences or quasi-sentences (single statements) expressing support for general internationalism, free trade (low trade protectionism) and the European Union *minus* the percentage of (quasi-) sentences expressing opposition to each.²⁴ This net measure includes every reference to open markets, international cooperation, and global governance in the Manifesto database.


We use these measures to determine whether mainstream political parties are significantly more supportive of liberal internationalism than political parties located on the far-left or far-right of the political spectrum.²⁵ Following many others, we define mainstream parties as those that are considered center-left to center-right ideologically (Huber and Inglehart 1995; Mair 1997). These

include Social Democratic, Liberal, Christian Democratic, and Conservative parties. We classify parties whose ideological positions fall to the extreme left or extreme right as non-mainstream parties or “radical-left” and “radical-right,” respectively (Mudde 2009; Rooduijn et al. 2017). On the left, these include political parties usually associated with communist or post-communist ideologies (e.g., Spain's Podemos; Germany's The Left; Italy's Five Star Movement). On the right, it includes parties associated with nationalist or populist appeals to nativism, traditionalism, and statism (e.g., France's National Front; Austria's Freedom Party; Denmark's People's Party).

Figure 4 summarizes the policy preferences of these party families for partnership (left-side) and power (right-side). Summary box plots capture the distribution in support for partnership and power by party type and over time. The sample median for each party type is denoted by white horizontal lines. The dark-shaded boxes represent the bottom twenty-fifth and top seventy-fifth percentile of the interquartile distribution. The “whiskers” in the box plots reflect the smallest and greatest adjacent values, respectively.²⁶ The first row of box plots in figure 4 shows the pattern for our core sample of Western countries over the entire period under examination (1970 to 2017). To determine whether the cross-sectional pattern shifted over the decades, figure 4 also breaks the party-type distributions down by sub-period: 1970–1990 (second row of box plots); 1991–2017 (third row of box plots). The patterns revealed in figure 4 are borne out in a fuller regression analysis of all parties (refer to online appendix table A1).

With respect to international partnership (left-side panels), we see a clear and consistent curvilinear, inverted-U pattern, where radical-left and radical-right parties tend to be less supportive of partnership than are mainstream parties. This is especially true of radical-right parties, which consistently oppose partnership: the sample median party-year is below 0 in all three box plots in figure 4. Radical-right manifestos contain proportionately more anti-trade, anti-EU, anti-internationalism and anti-multilateralism statements than statements in support. By contrast, mainstream parties are more supportive of partnership. As figure 4 indicates, their party platforms are proportionately more positive than negative about free trade, international institutions, and multilateral governance. Moreover, despite many differences over economic and social policy, the mainstream parties disagree only modestly among themselves over whether to invest in international partnership. The key pattern in figure 4 is the inverted-U shape. Significantly, this pattern is stable over time—that is, across the three box plots (from top to bottom). While radical-left parties become more supportive of international partnership after the Cold War, and radical-right parties become

Figure 4
Party platform support for international partnership and military power by party family, 1970–2017



more hostile, mainstream parties (Social Democrats, Christian Democrats, Liberals and Conservatives) barely shift.²⁷

The story of party support for military power (support for military spending, modernization, or preparedness, minus opposition to each) is simpler. We see a more

“monotonic” (rather than curvilinear) distribution as we move from the radical-left, through the mainstream parties, to the radical-right. Radical-left parties’ platforms reveal that they are significantly less inclined to support investing in military power than are mainstream parties. By contrast, radical-right parties are more likely to support

investing in military power than most mainstream parties. The only exception are mainstream Conservative parties, which are as bullish on military spending as radical-right parties. As figure 4 indicates, this pattern has not changed much over time. While there is some increase in support for military power expressed in the full-sample averages of each party family, radical-right parties are consistently the most supportive of investing in military power. Conversely, radical-left parties are the parties most strongly opposed to military spending and preparedness.²⁸

Our analysis of Western party support for liberal internationalism indicates that the Western consensus in favor of liberal internationalism during the Cold War existed at the level of party politics as well as at the level of government policy. Mainstream parties that made up the West's "vital center" strongly favored investing in both power and partnership. This pattern has continued during the post-Cold War era. Mainstream parties remain liberal internationalism's staunchest supporters; radical-left and radical-right parties, dedicated foes. This pattern suggests that Western foreign policies that we associate with liberal internationalism have long rested on the electoral fortunes of mainstream parties. During the Cold War, Western governments and liberal internationalism did, in fact, benefit greatly from this electoral connection. As we show in the next section, this is no longer the case. Liberal internationalism's vital center is waning.

The Hollowing Out of the Center

During the Cold War, mainstream parties dominated the electoral landscape (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Budge and Laver 1992). Even in Europe, where communist parties were competitive, mainstream parties captured, on average, 70% to 75% of the vote during the 1970s and 1980s. The leaders of mainstream parties were well placed in the highest reaches of national government to frame public debate, influence foreign policymaking, and keep nationalist and populist pressures in check (Martill 2019). Their dominance all but guaranteed broad and consistent domestic support for Western governments' foreign policies. At the same time, Western governments' commitment to liberal internationalism was a source of consensus within Western democracies. Western leaders could advance liberal internationalist policies confident that they would garner the support of a broad cross-section of political parties representing the vast majority of voters. This type of cross-party consensus no longer holds.

In this section, we show that domestic support for liberal internationalism has weakened considerably since the Cold War. Mainstream parties are losing electoral market share to parties on the far-right and far-left that are opposed to liberal internationalism. While many factors have contributed to the decline of mainstream parties, the following analysis indicates that their strong and consistent support of liberal internationalism has become

costly to them. In particular, we show that as Western governments' investment in international partnership deepened, mainstream parties' hold on voters weakened. The resulting gap between Western governments and mainstream parties' international commitments and voters' willingness to support those commitments created opportunities for anti-globalist parties to exploit. This is especially true of parties on the radical-right that have used anti-globalist nationalist rhetoric and platforms to penetrate Western electorates and significantly boost their share of the vote.

We develop these arguments about the decline of the West's vital center in two steps. The first step focuses on descriptive and aggregated over-time averages for our full sample of Western countries between 1970 and 2017 in terms of our government policy measures of partnership and power, measures of electoral vote shares for mainstream parties relative to radical parties, and measures of voter support for party platforms for and against partnership and power. The second step takes a more inferential approach, focusing on the effects of parties' electoral strength and voters' support of partnership and power on Western governments' foreign policies. We show that at the level of country-years and party-years, changes in the relative electoral strength of mainstream and radical parties affect the level of government support for power and especially partnership. The analysis also indicates that voters are abandoning parties that are most supportive of international partnership and flocking to those parties that are most opposed.

Aggregated Descriptive Trends

The descriptive results for the West as a whole are summarized in figures 5 and 6.²⁹ We plot three indicators in the figures. A first indicator (darkest of the lines) measures the level of government support (*government policy support*) for international partnership (figure 5) and military power (in figure 6), the same measures displayed in figure 2. A second indicator (the broken lines) measures the national electoral vote share for mainstream parties *minus* the national electoral vote share for radical-left and for radical-right parties (we call this *net mainstream vote share*).³⁰ And a third indicator (in the grey lines) measures party manifesto scores for international partnership and military power weighted by parties' actual electoral vote share (what we call here *weighted manifesto score*). We treat this as a country-level proxy for the voting public's support for liberal internationalism.³¹ In most Western democracies, the larger mainstream parties' *relative* vote share, the more legislative backing or capacity we can expect political leaders to have for liberal internationalist policies and positions. Reciprocally, higher levels of voter support for parties advancing liberal internationalist policies should result in stronger government support for those policies.³²

Figure 5
Western support for international partnership by government and voter, 1970–2017





Figure 6
Western support for military power by government and voter, 1970–2017



The aggregated descriptive patterns for international partnership in figure 5 conform to our expectations. We see that during the Cold War *net mainstream-vote share* and especially, *weighted manifesto score* for partnership were leading indicators of Western *government policy support* for international partnership. That pattern continued until the end of the Cold War. Western

governments' support for partnership continued to rise through the 1990s and into the 2000s. However, during the same period mainstream political parties began to lose electoral market share to radical-right and radical-left parties. This process accelerated in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, as mainstream parties' share of the electoral vote declined rapidly from one election to the next.

Notably, this has not led Western democracies to retreat wholesale from policies promoting greater economic interdependence and institutionalized cooperation, though government support for international partnership has cooled since its peak in the early 2000s. This pattern contrasts sharply with the Cold War era, when Western government support for international partnership increased during most years.

Most striking is the hefty price political parties promoting international partnership have paid with voters. As figure 5 shows, since the early 1990s those parties advocating international partnership (indicated by their *weighted manifesto score*) have lost significant electoral ground to radical-left and radical-right parties. Indeed, the decline in voter support for international partnership outpaces the dramatic downward trend in electoral support for mainstream parties (relative to radical parties). It also helps us understand the sizeable and growing gap in support for international partnership between Western governments and their voting publics. Government support for policies of globalization, international institutions, and multilateral governance has continued, as has mainstream party support for those policies (refer to figure 4 and also to figure A2 in the online appendix, which tracks party platform support for partnership and power by party family). Yet public support for parties advocating those policies has fallen off sharply since the 1990s, and especially since the 2008 global economic crisis.

The story is quite different when it comes to the West's commitment to military power, at least since the early 1990s. As figure 6 makes clear, during the Cold War, Western political leaders who invested GDP in military power could do so knowing that they had the support of mainstream parties (though not always their voting publics). This lasted until the collapse of the Soviet empire. Since then, Western investment in military power as a share of GDP has fallen. The decline in Western government support for military spending has been so steady that since 2000, public support for military spending (*weighted manifesto score*) has eclipsed actual government spending on defense in Western democracies as a share of GDP.³³ In contrast to international partnership, where Western governments have overreached (exceeded what their voting publics support), the reverse is true when it comes to investing in military power.

Detailed and Inferential Patterns

To assess how systematic these relationships between policy, parties, and voters are we also ran a series of regression analyses.³⁴ The key findings are summarized in figure 7, with full results of the regression analyses detailed in the online appendix (table A2). The left-side panels in the figure display the results for Western government policy support for international partnership; the


figure's right-side panels summarize the results for Western government support for military power. The upper panels describe the main results for mainstream parties (*net mainstream party vote*), while the lower panels describe the results for voters (*weighted manifesto score*). Each panel displays the counterfactual predicted levels of government policy support for partnership and for power.³⁵

We see that the correlation between mainstream parties' electoral strength and our two policy measures for partnership and power is positive and statistically significant. The stronger mainstream parties are electorally, the more likely Western governments are to invest in *both* partnership and power—that is, in liberal internationalism.³⁶ The bottom half of figure 7 displays the effects of voter support for party manifestos advocating liberal internationalism on Western government policy. Here too we see that Western governments' support of international partnership has been generally responsive to public support.³⁷ By contrast, voter support for increasing military power has no discernible effect at the level of government policy.³⁸

The inferential analysis summarized in figure 7 makes clear that the West's commitment to liberal internationalism rested on broad cross-partisan political foundations—foundations that have long since fractured. Mainstream political parties have weakened considerably, as has Western voter support for mainstream parties' liberal internationalist platforms and agendas.³⁹ This is especially evident in the case of voter support for international partnership. Figure 5 shows that it is here, in the government policies and mainstream-party platform positions aimed at promoting greater international openness, institutionalized cooperation, and multilateral governance, that the gap between Western leaders and their citizens is most acute. It would also appear to be where Western political leaders have so consistently and profoundly misjudged the depth of voters' alarm and anger over the economic and sovereignty costs of liberal internationalism.

To get analytic leverage on this question, we used a more fine-grained level of analysis, relying on party-year as opposed to country-year (as in figure 7). We wanted to see whether a given party's platform position on international partnership and military power before a national election improves or hurts its performance (vote share) in the election. On the basis of the aggregated descriptive trends in figure 5, we expected that all things being equal, political parties that were more supportive of international partnership would be punished at the ballot box, while parties more opposed to partnership would be rewarded. This is, in fact, what we find in simple models pooling all parties, countries, and years in the available Manifesto data (1970–2017).⁴⁰ While a given party's support for military spending and preparedness tends to correlate insignificantly with that party's share of the national vote in the subsequent election, a party's support for freer trade,

Figure 7
Effect of mainstream party strength and voter foreign policy preferences on Western government policy, 1970–2017




international cooperation, and multilateralism correlates significantly and negatively with its subsequent electoral performance. In general, parties supporting international partnership lose votes; by contrast, opposing partnership increases vote share. This pattern also applies for the entire 1950–2017 time period, and the electoral rewards for parties opposing partnership have only increased since the end of the Cold War.

Figure 8 breaks down the results of the same estimates for how platforms correlate with subsequent vote shares by party family (interacting party platforms by party-family dummies).⁴¹ The black dots in the figure represent the coefficients for the predicted effect of net party support for partnership and power on party vote share. In the case of international partnership (left-side panel), we see that the predicted effect is negative for all five party families. However, with exception of radical-right parties, the negative effect is not statistically significant at the 95% confidence level.⁴² Simply put, Western voters are not

rewarding political parties that favor international partnership, but they are rewarding parties that oppose it. By contrast, we do not see the same pattern between mainstream and radical-right parties in the case of military power (right-side panel). While we see variation across party families, the correlations between party platforms and vote share in the left-side panel are not statistically significant.

The results in figure 8 and the underlying estimates are suggestive. Mainstream parties appear to be losing market share because they favor international partnership; radical-right parties appear to be gaining votes by running on anti-globalist platforms. The basic statistical patterns we see in the Manifesto data do not allow for strong causal claims, however. Moreover, there is no shortage of alternative explanations for the dramatic rise of radical-right parties in recent years (e.g., Kitschelt and McGann 1997; Mudde 2004; Kriesi et al. 2008; Bolleyer 2013). What the patterns revealed in figure 8 do suggest is that international

Figure 8
Effect of party support for international partnership and military power on vote share by party family, 1970–2017



partnership no longer affords mainstream parties the electoral advantages it once did, and that for their part, radical-right parties have found a powerful weapon in anti-globalism to attack Western democracies' vital center.

Conclusion

The West has overreached. A large and widening gap has opened between the West's international ambitions and its domestic political capacity to support them. Contra much current public discourse, this process did not begin in 2016 with Donald Trump's election and the British vote to leave the EU. It took shape a quarter-century ago in the aftermath of the Cold War and at the height of Western triumphalism. In the ensuing years, as Western leaders invested in ever-greater internationalization, domestic support for international openness, institutionalized cooperation, and multilateral governance steadily weakened in Western party systems and electorates. Mainstream parties lost ground to globalization's opponents on the political left and right. The gap between the West's foreign policy agenda and domestic support widened. Political entrepreneurs like Trump, Boris Johnson, and others found a way to exploit this gap for electoral gain.

In retracing the Western liberal international order's trajectory from the height of the Cold War in the 1970s through the 2008 global economic crash to the current crisis, we have shown several things. The first is that for decades mainstream political parties were the bedrock of the Western liberal international order. As the vital center, they were not only a bulwark against political extremism from the political left and political right during the Cold War. Mainstream parties were also the building blocks upon which the West's shared commitment to liberal

internationalism rested. Western leaders could advance liberal internationalist policies knowing that those policies enjoyed the backing of a broad cross-section of political parties representing the majority of voters. As we have shown here, Western political leaders can no longer assume such levels of domestic support. The center has not held.

We have also shown that the populist backlash against liberal internationalism we see across the West today has deep roots. Anti-globalist domestic pressures have been steadily rising in Western democracies since the 1990s. While many factors have contributed to anti-globalism, Western governments bear their fair share of responsibility. As Western governments invested in ever greater international openness and pooled more and more authority in multilateral institutions and governance arrangements, increasing numbers of Western voters grew resentful of the costs in economic security and national sovereignty. The chickens have now come home to roost. This has proved costly, and not only for Western mainstream parties. China and Russia have been quick to seize on the erosion of domestic support for Western international leadership to promote alternative illiberal visions of politics and society and to expand their spheres of influence (Snyder 2018).

In tracing the roots of the backlash against liberal internationalism, we have also shown that today's anti-globalist pressures in the West owes more to the breakdown of embedded liberalism than the headlong pursuit of "liberal hegemony," as some have argued (Mearsheimer 2018; Walt 2018). While the West's pursuit of expansive liberal goals like democracy promotion have undoubtedly contributed to voter disillusionment with liberal

internationalism, we have shown that domestic disenchantment set in well before Western efforts to expand the liberal international order to the Middle East, former republics of the Soviet Union, and elsewhere. As the steady rise in domestic opposition to trade liberalization, institutionalized cooperation, and multilateral governance since the 1990s indicates, the overreliance on these foreign policy tools has been the principal source of the widening gap between Western governments and their publics over foreign policy.

These developments did not occur in a geopolitical vacuum, however. Our analysis underscores the critical role that the Cold War, the Soviet collapse, and geopolitics more generally, has played in shaping party politics across the West. The disappearance of a common geopolitical threat after the Cold War opened up the domestic political space for political parties on the political left and right that were marginalized during the Cold War, and that refused to subordinate local grievances and claims to wider post-Cold War international geopolitical logics. Mainstream parties, for their part, became less responsive to mass publics. There is substantial literature documenting the toll that economic globalization in particular has taken on Western party systems and especially, mainstream parties (e.g., Hooghe and Marks 2018; Kriesi et al. 2008; Rommel and Walter 2018). Comparable systematic empirical research on how geopolitical imperatives or their absence contributed to party dynamics in Western democracies is clearly needed. Our analysis offers support for explanations of anti-globalism and populism that stress the breakdown of the compromise of embedded liberalism that kept economic security and sovereignty costs in check (Burgoon 2009; Rodrik 2011). But the timing of the West's turn from liberal internationalism to globalism also suggests that during the Cold War, bipolar superpower rivalry did have a disciplining effect on party politics in the West (Kupchan and Trubowitz 2007).

The West now faces a conundrum. The liberal world order hinges on the ability of the United States, Germany, France, and other advanced democracies to lead and support it. However, the more these democracies invest in liberal-order building, the more divided and polarized they risk becoming. Two strategies for resolving this tension are likely to dominate the coming foreign policy debate in Western capitals. One option is for Western democracies to adopt more limited expectations about what can be achieved internationally and to rely on more efficient and less costly means (e.g., Allison 2020; Lind and Wohlforth 2019; Posen 2014). An alternative strategy is for Western democracies to return to the principles of embedded liberalism by making international markets and multilateral institutions more responsive to the desires of national electorates and more supportive of policies aimed

at national cohesion (e.g., Colgan and Keohane 2017; Ikenberry 2018; Snyder 2019).

Given the intensity of the domestic pressures now confronting Western democracies, the problem must be attacked from both sides simultaneously. Internationally, Western leaders need to find ways to reduce sovereignty costs by making multilateral governance structures more democratic and flexible (DeVries and McNamara 2018). However, a strategy that relies solely on restructuring international commitments will not be sufficient to restore domestic consensus and legitimacy. It will also be necessary for Western governments to renew and update their commitment to inclusive growth and economic security for their citizens. This will require innovation in domestic growth regimes centering on strategic localization of productive activities, investment in human capital, quality-of-life supports, and environmental sustainability. Some of these processes are already underway in some progressive internationalist policy initiatives within the OECD. Yet given the depth of the anti-globalist backlash, far more is needed if Western democracies hope to close the gap between their international ambitions and what their citizens will support.

Supplementary Materials

To view supplementary material for this article, please visit <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592720001218>.

Notes

- 1 Examining populism's many causes lies beyond the scope of this article. Our focus here is narrower and concerns the changing relationship between Western governments' foreign policies and party and electoral support for those policies. For a review of the sources of populism in the West, see Przeworski 2019.
- 2 States' commitment to power could also be measured by the *use* of military power. Since we are principally interested in how much weight governments attach to the international and domestic sides of the national ledger, measuring power projection is less useful for our purposes. However, as we discuss in notes 7 and 9, national commitment to defense spending is correlated with other military-related indicators, including the use of force.
- 3 The term "isolationism" might be used to describe this quadrant. However, since World War II the term has been misconstrued and abused, so we avoid it here.
- 4 A strategy of restraint does not necessarily preclude open and free trade. However, advocates of restraint do not think surrendering sovereignty to international institutions is necessary to gain access to international markets or to protect them from disruption. See, for example, Gholz and Press 2001.
- 5 In the analysis of over-time trends that follows, the "West" refers to the following countries: Australia,

- Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States. These aggregated over-time trends exclude the Central and Eastern European countries (e.g., Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland), as they joined the West only after the Cold War. The regression results reported later, which are disaggregated by country-year and by party-country-year, include the broader sample, but hold up to the more limited sub-sample.
- 6 We also constructed indicators for power and partnership for parties and voters using party platform and election data. These are discussed later.
 - 7 This measure correlates with other measures of military power. For example, military expenditures have Pearson correlation coefficients of .42 with personnel, .48 with heavy weapons arsenals, .30 with defensive alliance obligations, .54 with arms exports, .25 with offensive missions, .23 with security apparatus, and .20 with conflict intensity. Results are available upon request.
 - 8 We also consider alternative specifications, particularly military spending per capita, that yield patterns corroborating our baseline focus on defense spending as share of GDP.
 - 9 Eichenberg and Stoll focus on public opinion data between 2004 and 2013 from the Transatlantic Trends dataset assembled by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations. The dataset includes eight Western countries (France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden, Spain, United Kingdom, and United States). Using their data, we found that the relationship is positive and statistically significant beyond the $p < .05$ level and usually beyond the $p < .01$ level in each of these Western countries. When the data is pooled, the correlation is strongly positive and highly significant ($p < .001$). The estimations control for left-right ideological orientation, age, occupation, survey year, and whether respondents viewed China as a threat. Results available on request.
 - 10 KOF's widely used and cited database includes a range of policy and flow measures of globalization for more than 200 countries and territories over the period 1970 to 2016. Here we use only those measures representing national government policies that promote or limit economic and political globalization—measures that the current dataset refers to as “*de jure*,” as opposed to “*de facto*” measures representing actual cross-border flows of trade, foreign direct investment, and migration. Our indices also exclude the dataset's measures of socio-cultural globalization.
 - 11 Treaty party diversity measures how multilateral a country's investment treaties are.
 - 12 There are many ways of aggregating, normalizing, and weighting the various components. Our baseline simply adds these two KOF indices, providing an intuitive composite measure of global engagement and international cooperation and the pooling (sacrificing) of national sovereignty.
 - 13 The measures of partnership and power we use here correlate negatively with one another (Pearson's correlation coefficient of -0.16) with a bivariate R-square of 0.02 for the full country-year sample.
 - 14 During the 1970s and 1980s, average defense spending in the West was 2.8% of GDP. This compares to an average of 3.9% of GDP in the 1950s and 1960s.
 - 15 Between the mid-1980s and late-2000s, the number of international governmental organizations more than doubled, from 3,546 in 1985 to 7,459 in 2008. Western governments accounted for the lion's share of the increase (Bloodgood 2016).
 - 16 In Europe, the Maastricht Treaty signed in 1992 formally established the European Union. In North America, the U.S.-Canadian free trade agreement was expanded to include Mexico, resulting in the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). In Asia, APEC expanded its goals, calling for free and open trade in the Asia-Pacific by 2010 for the region's more advanced economies and 2020 for its developing economies.
 - 17 Historically, FTAs were considered closed-door measures. However, in the 1990s they came to be seen as complements to WTO efforts to promote trade liberalization.
 - 18 Our expectation is that Japan's positioning in the Euclidian space will differ on this dimension from the EU and the United States.
 - 19 The EU-15 includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, (West) Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
 - 20 These patterns hold with respect to the broader national-level sample's quantitative measures, such as Euclidean distance between the points in the figure 2 matrix or coefficients of variation. Between 1970 and 2016, for instance, we see an increase (36%) in the coefficient of variation in military spending among the sample countries, while over the same period there is a large drop (67%) in the coefficient of variation in international partnership.
 - 21 On post-Cold War predictions about the future of the West and world politics more generally, see Mastanduno 1999.
 - 22 The strengths and limits of this particular measurement instrument have been widely debated. To help gauge specific party-political sentiments, we take advantage of the Manifesto Project coding methodology, which includes positive and negative

- sentiments that can be off set from one another (c.f. Burgoon 2009; Lowe et al. 2011; Milner and Judkins 2004).
- 23 Following Lowe et al. 2011, we use the natural logarithm of positive mentions of military spending and preparedness (per104) minus negative mentions of such military spending and preparedness (per105), adding 0.5 to both to avoid zeroes. Such logarithms transform the measure into a normal distribution.
 - 24 The partnership manifesto score is based on the logged Manifesto Project codes for positive mentions of international cooperation, the European Union, and free trade and open markets (per107 + per108 + per407+.5) minus the log of negative mentions of each (per109 + per110 + per406 + .5).
 - 25 Online appendix figure A1 highlights the evolution of average party-system support for “partnership” and “power” using our Manifesto Project measures for the United States, EU-15, and Japan. We take the average party positions for all parties in a country’s party-system in a given election year. This sheds considerable light on party-system dynamics, but our interest here is mainly in differences *across* party families within the West.
 - 26 Adjacent values are outside the upper and lower quartiles of the interquartile range (IQR), referring to observations outside the lower and upper whiskers, where: Lower whisker=Q1 - 1.5 IQR; and Upper whisker=Q4 + 1.5 IQR.
 - 27 Fuller analysis of the 1970–2017 period is reported in online appendix figure A2. It bears out the over-time pattern reported here. Throughout the 1970–2017 period, mainstream parties are more supportive of partnership than the radical parties. Radical-right parties are more opposed to partnership over time; radical-left parties are slightly more supportive.
 - 28 More detailed, year-by-year analysis reported in online appendix figure A2 supports this conclusion.
 - 29 We rely here on these aggregate, average indicators for the West, though the combined country analysis finds support in more fine-grained individual country breakdowns (refer to online appendix figure A3) and in fuller regression analysis (refer to online appendix table A2).
 - 30 The *net mainstream vote share* is based on linear interpolation between a given party’s and country-year’s raw data for a given election-year.
 - 31 Ideally, we would use direct measures of voter sentiment on issues similar to our policy and manifesto measures for partnership and power. However, public opinion data on such issues is spotty over time and cross-nationally, leaving too many gaps for the countries-years we are studying. We note, however, that voter-weighted manifesto measures like the ones used here tend to correlate significantly with direct opinion measures. For instance, Burgoon et al. 2019 finds that manifesto positions on the EU and trade tend to correlate with direct questions on these issues in European Social Survey data. As with *net mainstream vote share*, the voter-weighted manifesto measures are based on linear interpolation between a given party’s raw data for a given election year.
 - 32 Because it takes time for these electoral dynamics to make themselves felt at the level of national government policy, we incorporate time lags into the inferential analysis.
 - 33 Of course, in absolute terms military spending has increased in most Western democracies, even adjusting for inflation.
 - 34 Specifically, we regressed *government policy support* for both military power and international partnership on *net mainstream vote share* and *weighted manifesto score*. To reduce endogeneity and address delays in outcomes, we lagged (t-1) the explanatory variables (*net mainstream vote share* and *weighted manifesto score*). In addition to controlling for past globalization flows, the model estimates include country fixed effects to control for country features and party-system types that might influence policy. We also include decade-period effects to control for system-wide economic or geopolitical events and trends on policy. Results are similar with year-dummies.
 - 35 These predicted levels are estimated using the full sample variation for *net mainstream vote share* and *weighted manifesto score*, holding all other parameters and controls in the models at their sample medians or means.
 - 36 In the case of government policy support for partnership (the upper-left panel in figure 7), the first through the ninety-ninth percentile sample distribution in *net mainstream party vote* predicts an increase in *government policy support* for partnership from roughly 5.01 to 5.12, amounting to nearly 25% of the sample distribution of *government policy support* (from the twenty-ninth to the fifty-third percentiles). The results for Western *government policy support* for military power (the upper-right panel in figure 7) are more modest still, but also statistically significant. The full distribution of *net mainstream vote share* predicts increases in actual military spending ranging from the thirty-ninth to the fifty-fifth percentile in *government policy support* for military power (here in logged percentages of GDP).
 - 37 Increased voter support for party manifestos (*weighted manifesto score*) advocating greater international openness and institutionalized cooperation results in a significant increase in *government policy support* for international partnership. The full range of our *weighted manifesto score* (across all decades and countries) predicts increases of nearly 50% of the sample

distribution of *government policy support* for partnership, ranging from the twenty-sixth to the seventy-fifth percentile.

- 38 The impact of the *weighted manifesto score* on government support for greater military power is statistically insignificant.
- 39 The patterns in figure 7 hold up to a range of approaches to estimating Western government support for liberal internationalism. For instance, simultaneously including *net mainstream-vote share* and *weighted manifesto score* produces similar effects on *government policy support* (despite substantial resulting collinearity). Standardizing and combining our policy measures of power and partnership into one composite indicator correlates significantly and positively with lagged *net mainstream party vote*.
- 40 Our baseline models control for party-families, year, and country fixed effects and address auto-regression and time- and unit-wise heteroskedasticity. Refer to table A3 in the online appendix.
- 41 Models 13–16 in online appendix table A3 shows the full results.
- 42 For radical-right parties, the upper confidence interval is below the 0-threshold, and the substantive size of the effect of party platform position on vote share is more than twice that of the average for all parties. See the predicted conditional coefficient for net partnership among radical-right parties relative to the -.067-effect (s.e. 0.020), averaged across all parties in M13 of online appendix table A3.

References

- Allison, Graham. 2020. "The New Spheres of Influence: Sharing the Globe with Other Great Powers." *Foreign Affairs* 99(2): 30–40.
- Anderson, Jeffrey, G. John Ikenberry, and Thomas Risse. 2008. *The End of the West? Crisis and Change in the Atlantic Order*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Angell, Norman. 1912. *The Great Illusion: A Study of the Relation of Military Power to National Advantage*. London: W. Heinemann.
- Benoit, Kenneth, Slava Mikhaylov, and Michael Laver. 2009. "Treating Words as Data with Error: Uncertainty in Text Statements of Policy Positions." *American Journal of Political Science* 53(2): 495–513.
- Birchfield, Vicki L., John Krige, and Alasdair R. Young. 2017. "European Integration as a Peace Project." *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 19(1): 3–12.
- Bloodgood, Elizabeth. 2016. "The Yearbook of International Organizations and Quantitative Non-State Actor Research." In *The Ashgate Research Companion to Non-State Actors*, ed. Bob Reinalda, 31–46. London: Routledge.
- Blyth, Mark. 2002. *Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and Institutional Change in the Twentieth Century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bolleyer, Nicole. 2013. *New Parties in Old Party Systems: Persistence and Decline in 17 Democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Brodie, Bernard. 1965. *Strategy in the Missile Age*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Brooks, Stephen G., and William C. Wohlforth. 2016. *America Abroad: The United States' Global Role in the 21st Century*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Budge, Ian., Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Andrea Volkens, Judith Bara, and Eric Tannenbaum. 2001. *Mapping Policy Preferences: Estimates for Parties, Electors and Governments, 1945–98*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Budge, Ian, and Michael Laver. 1992. *Party Policy and Government Coalitions*. London: St. Martin's Press.
- Burgoon, Brian. 2009. "Globalization and Backlash: Polanyi's Revenge?" *Review of International Political Economy* 16(2): 145–77.
- Burgoon, Brian, Sam van Noort, Matthijs Rooduijn, and Geoffrey Underhill. 2019. "Positional Deprivation and Support for Radical Right and Radical Left Parties." *Economic Policy* 34(97): 49–93.
- Colantone, Italo, and Piero Stanig. 2018. "The Trade Origins of Economic Nationalism: Import Competition and Voting Behavior in Western Europe." *American Journal of Political Science* 62(4): 936–53.
- Cordesman, Anthony H. 2018. "NATO 'Burden Sharing': The Need for Strategy and Force Plans, Not Meaningless Percentage Goals." Center for Strategic International Studies. (<https://www.csis.org/analysis/nato-burden-sharing-need-strategy-and-force-plans-not-meaningless-percentage-goals>).
- Colgan, Jeff D., and Robert O. Keohane. 2017. "The Liberal Order Is Rigged: Fix It Now or Watch It Wither." *Foreign Affairs* 96(3): 36–44.
- Cooper, Robert. 2000. *The Post-Modern State and the World Order*. London: Demos.
- De Vries, Catherine and Kathleen R. McNamara. 2018. "The EU Needs Less Technocracy and More Democracy." *Foreign Affairs*. (<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2018-05-14/how-choice-can-save-europe>).
- Dorman, Andrew M., and Joyce P. Kaufman, eds. 2011. *The Future of Transatlantic Relations: Perceptions, Policy, and Practice*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Dreher, Axel. 2006. "Does Globalization Affect Growth? Evidence from a new Index of Globalization." *Applied Economics* 38(10): 1091–110.
- Drezner, Daniel W. 2014. *The System Worked: How the World Stopped Another Great Depression*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Eichenberg, Richard C., and Richard J. Stoll. 2017. "The Acceptability of War and Support for Defense

- Spending: Evidence from Fourteen Democracies, 2004–2013.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 61(4): 788–813.
- Forsberg, Aaron. 2000. *America and the Japanese Miracle: The Cold War Context of Japan's Postwar Economic Revival, 1950–1960*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Fukuyama, Francis. 1989. “The End of History?” *National Interest* 16: 3–18.
- Gaddis, John Lewis. 2005. *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War*. 2d ed. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Gholz, Eugene, and Daryl G. Press. 2001. “The Effects of Wars on Neutral Countries: Why It Doesn't Pay to Preserve the Peace.” *Security Studies* 10(4): 1–57.
- Gygli, Savina, Florian Haelg, Niklas Potrafke, and Jan-Egbert Sturm. 2019. “The KOF Index Revisited.” *Review of International Organizations* 14(3): 1–32.
- Haass, Richard N. 2017. *A World in Disarray: American Foreign Policy and the Crisis of the Old Order*. New York: Penguin.
- Hafner-Burton, Emilie M., Edward D. Mansfield, and Jon C. W. Pevehouse. 2015. “Human Rights Institutions, Sovereignty Costs, and Democratization.” *British Journal of Political Science* 45(1): 1–27.
- Held, David. 1995. *Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Henley, Jon. 2017. “Marine Le Pen Promises Liberation from the EU with France-First Policies.” *The Guardian* (<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/05/marine-le-pen-promises-liberation-from-the-eu-with-france-first-policies>).
- Hoffmann, Stanley. 1995. “The Crisis of Liberal Internationalism.” *Foreign Policy* 98: 159–77.
- Hooghe, Liesbet, and Gary Marks. 2018. “Cleavage Theory Meets Europe's Crises: Lipset, Rokkan, and the Transnational Cleavage.” *Journal of European Public Policy* 25(1): 109–35.
- Huber, John, and Ronald Inglehart. 1995. “Expert Interpretations of Party Space and Party Locations in 42 Societies.” *Party Politics* 1(1): 73–111.
- Ikenberry, G. John. 2001. *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- . 2009. “Liberal Internationalism 3.0: America and the Dilemmas of Liberal World Order.” *Perspectives on Politics* 7(1): 71–87.
- . 2018. “The End of Liberal International Order?” *International Affairs* 94(1): 7–23.
- Kagan, Robert. 2002. “Power and Weakness.” *Policy Review* 113(1): 3–28.
- Kitschelt, Herbert, and Anthony J. McGann. 1997. *The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Klingemann, Hans, Andrea Volkens, Judith Bara, Ian Budge, and Michael McDonald. 2006. *Mapping Policy Preferences II: Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments in Eastern Europe, European Union and OECD 1990–2003*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- KOF Swiss Economic Institute. 2019. *KOF Globalization Index*. (<http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch>).
- Krauthammer, Charles. 1990. “The Unipolar Moment.” *Foreign Affairs* 70(1): 23–33.
- Kriesi, Hans-Peter, Edgar Grande, Romain Lachat, Martin Dolezal, Simon Bornschier and Timotheos Frey, eds. 2008. *West European Politics in the Age of Globalization*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kupchan, Charles A., and Peter L. Trubowitz. 2007. “Dead Center: The Demise of Liberal Internationalism in the United States.” *International Security* 32(2): 7–44.
- Lake, David A. 2009. *Hierarchy in International Relations*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- . 2018. “International Legitimacy Lost? Rule and Resistance When America Is First.” *Perspectives on Politics* 16(1): 6–21.
- Liff, Adam P. 2015. “Japan's Defense Policy: Abe the Evolutionary.” *Washington Quarterly* 38(2): 79–99.
- Lind, Jennifer, and William C. Wohlforth. 2019. “The Future of the Liberal World Order Is Conservative: A Strategy to Save the System.” *Foreign Affairs* 98(2): 70–80.
- Lindberg, Tod, ed. 2005. *Beyond Paradise and Power: Europe, America, and the Future of a Troubled Partnership*. New York: Routledge.
- Lipset, Seymour Martin, and Stein Rokkan. 1967. *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives*. New York: Free Press.
- Lowe, Will, Ken Benoit, Slava Mikhaylov, and Michael Laver. 2011. “Scaling Policy Preferences from Coded Political Texts.” *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 36(1): 123–55.
- Luce, Edward. 2017. *The Retreat of Western Liberalism*. London: Little, Brown.
- Lunderstad, Geir. 1986. “Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945–52.” *Journal of Peace Research* 23(3): 263–77.
- Mair, Peter. 1997. *Party System Change: Approaches and Interpretations*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Martill, Benjamin. 2019. “Center of Gravity: Domestic Institutions and the Victory of Liberal Strategy in Cold War Europe.” *Security Studies* 28(1): 116–58.
- Mastanduno, Michael. 1999. “A Realist View: Three Images of the Coming International Order.” In *International Order and the Future of World Politics*, ed. T.V. Paul and John A. Hall, 19–40. London: Cambridge University Press.

- Mead, Walter Russell. 2017. "The Jacksonian Revolt." *Foreign Affairs* 96(2): 2–7.
- Mearsheimer, John. 2001. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. New York: Norton.
- . 2018. *The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Milner, Helen, and Benjamin Judkins. 2004. "Partisanship, Trade Policy, and Globalization: Is There a Left-Right Divide on Trade Policy?" *International Studies Quarterly* 48(1): 95–119.
- Moravcsik, Andrew. 2000. "The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe." *International Organization* 54(2): 217–52.
- Mudde, Cas. 2004. "The Populist Zeitgeist." *Government and Opposition* 39(4): 541–63.
- . 2009. *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Oatley, Thomas. 2015. *A Political Economy of American Hegemony: Buildups, Booms, and Busts*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Pevehouse, Jon C., Timothy Nordstrom, and Kevin Warnke. 2004. "The Correlates of War 2 International Governmental Organizations Dataset Version 2.0." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 21(2): 101–19.
- Posen, Barry R. 2014. *Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Przeworski, Adam. 2019. *Crises of Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Rodrik, Dani. 2011. *The Globalization Paradox: Why Global Markets, States, and Democracy Can't Coexist*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Rommel, Tobias, and Stefanie Walter. 2018. "The Electoral Consequences of Offshoring: How the Globalization of Production Shapes Party Preferences in Multi-Party Systems." *Comparative Political Studies* 51(5): 621–58.
- Rooduijn, Matthijs, Brian Burgoon, and Erika J. van Elsas. 2017. "Radical Distinction: Radical Left and Radical Right Parties in Europe." *European Union Politics* 18(4): 536–59.
- Ruggie, John G. 1982. "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order." *International Organization* 36(2): 379–415.
- Sapolsky, Harvey M., Benjamin H. Friedman, Eugene Gholz, and Daryl G. Press. 2009. "Restraining Order: For Strategic Modesty." *World Affairs* 172(2): 84–94.
- Schlesinger, Arthur, Jr. 1949. *The Vital Center: The Politics of Freedom*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- Snyder, Jack. 2019. "The Broken Bargain: How Nationalism Came Back." *Foreign Affairs* 98(2): 54–60.
- Snyder, Timothy. 2018. *The Road to Unfreedom: Russia, Europe, America*. New York: Penguin.
- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). 2018. *Military Expenditures Database*. (<https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex>).
- Trubowitz, Peter. 2011. *Politics and Strategy: Partisan Ambition and American Statecraft*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Tucker, Robert W., and David C. Hendrickson. 1990. *Empire of Liberty: The Statecraft of Thomas Jefferson*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Urata, Shujiro. 2009. "Japan's Free Trade Agreement Strategy." *Japanese Economy* 36(2): 46–77.
- Walt, Stephen M. 2018. *The Hell of Good Intentions: America's Foreign Policy Elite and the Decline of U.S. Primacy*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.